CHAPTER II
THE STAND-UP OF A MAJOR COMMAND

Introduction

(U) This chapter will cover the events which led up to the redesignation of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) from Twenty-Third Air Force (23 AF) on 22 May 1990 and the one year moratorium with the Military Airlift Command (MAC) that followed. During this turbulent period, responsibilities included not only those of establishing an Air Force major command (MAJCOM), which far exceeded the responsibilities of the former numbered air force (NAF), but also those of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM--the largest military operation since the end of the Vietnam Conflict.

Air Force Special Operations Command - An Overview

(U) Following Congressional inquiry into the military handling of Operation EAGLE CLAW, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt in April 1980, the Holloway Commission convened to investigate what went wrong. The commission produced two major recommendations. First, the Department of Defense (DOD) should establish a counterterrorism task force with a permanently assigned staff and forces. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should consider formation of a Special Operations Panel.¹

(U) Meanwhile, in December 1982, after two internal reviews, an Air Force 2000 study and functional management inspection (FMI) of United States Air Force (USAF) special operations capability, General (Gen) Charles A. Gabriel, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), approved the transfer of Air Force special operations from Tactical Air Command (TAC) to MAC. Consequently, on 1 March 1983 MAC activated 23 AF at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois, which assumed
responsibility for both special operations and Air Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) forces.\(^2\)

(U) In May 1986, Senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn co-introduced Senate Bill 5.2453 while the following month Representative Dan Daniel introduced a like measure, H.R. 5109 in the House of Representatives. The key provisions of the legislation formed the basis of the 1987 Defense Authorization Act. The bill, signed into law in October 1986, in part directed the formation of a unified military command responsible for special operations and created the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) within the National Security Council.\(^3\)

Major Command Equivalency

(U) As stated above, Congress clearly stated that "unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces (SOF) of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command" [10 USC 167 (b)]. Shortly after the activation of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at MacDill AFB, Florida, on 16 April 1987, the Army and Navy established their service components as MAJCOMs--Army Special Operations Command (ARSOC) and Navy Special War Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) respectively. However, the Air Force leadership decided to leave its SOF under MAC assigned to 23 AF. Since USSOCOM had expected all three components to be MAJCOM equivalents, this became the first of several major contentious issues between the Commander in Chief (CINC) of USSOCOM and Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC).\(^4\)
Training Consolidation

(U) A second issue which helped the Air Force leadership to recognize the need for a special operations MAJCOM was the issue of training. The United States Special Operations Command took the position that it was their responsibility. Likewise, the Air Force felt training was an Air Force service responsibility because one was initial training and the other was qualification training. According to Colonel (Col) John F. Bridges, 23 AF Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) Plans and Programs (and later AFSOC DCS/Plans and Programs), "The difference here is who's responsible for pilot training and who's responsible for aircraft check out?" An interim solution was reached in which training would remain at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, with mission rehearsal at Hurlburt Field, Florida. However, neither party was totally satisfied and the question still remained; who's responsible for training; was it USSOCOM, 23 AF, MAC, or USAF?\(^5\)

(U) Within a year after 23 AF moved from Scott AFB, Illinois, to Hurlburt Field, Florida, in August 1987, the Florida base had reestablished itself as the center of Air Force special operations activity which included training. Although the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing (CCTW) located at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and assigned to 23 AF, provided the flying training; a major effort was initiated in June 1988 to establish a special air warfare center (SAWC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in order to consolidate training. The center was being fashioned after a similar organization in the early 1960s known as "Jungle Jim."\(^6\)
Funding Difficulties

(U) Beginning in the fall of 1988, the 23 AF staff began putting together its first program objective memorandum (POM)* with USSOCOM for fiscal year 1992 (FY92). The program objective memorandum would recommend to the Secretary of Defense the proposed application of USSOCOM's portion of the DOD appropriations. The preliminaries for the FY92 POM were submitted to USSOCOM in 1989. Twenty-Third Air Force started working with MAC to put together the POM because 23 AF did not have the staff to build one. Colonel Bridges went to Scott AFB, Illinois, to see what was required of MAC's program decision packages (PDP) structure. He soon found the data unworkable. According to Colonel Bridges, "MAC was not watching special operations as special operations--they were watching it as MAC. There is nothing wrong with that. We just couldn't break it out very well." Twenty-Third Air Force needed to know which PDP structure fell under Major Force Program (MFP)-4, airlift/sealift, and which ones fell under MFP-11, special operations. Between FY88 and FY91, the services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) had MFP-11 responsibilities. Twenty-Third Air Force attempted to differentiate MFP-11 dollars from MAC. "We found a lot of MFP-11 dollars being spent for things that were not SOF and some MFP-4 dollars being spent for things that were SOF," said Colonel Bridges. 7

(U) Twenty-Third Air Force ran into a lot of problems because of the suddenness in which USSOCOM was directed to submit a POM for FY92 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress. Suddenly, all the programs that once went through MAC would go through USSOCOM starting 1 October 1991. The schedule for putting together USSOCOM's POM was much like the Air Force's since it was an Air Force

* The POM & funding issues will be discussed in Chapter III.
officer who set it up. But all the dates were 60 to 90 days behind the Air Force’s MAJCOM system. Thus, when 23 AF went to Scott AFB, Illinois, to start collecting data from MAC, they were already two to three months behind. The Military Airlift Command was working their POM as well and did not have time for 23 AF and did not want to go back and put together all the data needed for USSOCOM. 

Relationships of USCINCSOC & CINMAC to HQ 23 AF

(U) The issue of establishing AFSOF as a MAJCOM was brought to a head by a series of issues involving the relationship of USCINCSOC and CINMAC to Headquarters (HQ) 23 AF. The first issue involved Air Force headquarters’ (MAJCOM, NAF, and air divisions) manpower reductions in the fall of 1989. Prior to this time Gen Duane H. Cassidy, CINMAC, and United States (U.S.) Army Gen James J. Lindsay, CINC of USSOCOM, had a gentlemen’s agreement that because of special operations 23 AF was for the most part autonomous to MAC in working with USSOCOM as each stood up a relationship. General Lindsay knew he had the support of Major General (Maj Gen) Robert B. Patterson, 23 AF Commander, and had four star coverage through General Cassidy to the Air Force. On 7 September 1989, Maj Gen Thomas E. Eggers assumed command of 23 AF from General Patterson who retired, and likewise on 22 September 1989 General Cassidy relinquished command of MAC to Gen Hansford T. Johnson.

(U) In late November 1989, when USAF directed all MAJCOMs to reduce management headquarters, General Johnson felt strongly 23 AF should take its proportional share of the reduction. Since General Lindsay was still trying to build his Air Force component a major disconnect was encountered. Eventually General Johnson agreed not to cut Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF), but 23 AF had to realign to his way of thinking.
(U) In an effort to have 23 AF focus on special operations General Johnson on 1 February 1990 reassigned responsibility for the 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing (AAW); USAF Medical Center, Scott AFB; and all other responsibilities of Scott AFB, Illinois, from 23 AF to Twenty-Second Air Force (22 AF), Travis AFB, California. This realignment met with General Lindsay's approval as he too wanted to see 23 AF "streamlined or purified." However General Lindsay was not as enthusiastic with General Johnson's next move. In December 1989, during the MFP-11 crosswalking of manpower, the question of funding for pararescuemen (PJs) came to a head. Special operations needed to keep PJs in existence, but MAC wanted to eliminate the career field entirely. General Lindsay agreed to fund the PJ career field with MFP-11 dollars, but they were assigned against mission tasking not aircraft thereby assuring utilization by special operations, not rescue.\(^{11}\)

(U) Unlike the transfer of PJs, crosswalking combat control team (CCT) positions proved more difficult. When the 23 AF staff went to MAC and began the transfer of MFP-11 funds to USSOCOM for FY92 they logically started to crosswalk the positions funded by MFP-11 as well. General Johnson agreed to crosswalk the money but not the people. By law he had to release the money but wanted to keep the authorizations for rescue. General Johnson's bottom line was "You (23 AF) are Air Force first!"

(U) It became apparent to General Lindsay that unlike General Cassidy the new commander of MAC, General Johnson, did not see special operations in the same light. Consequently, General Lindsay began an effort to force the Air Force to recognize the need for the Air Force to comply with the Congressional mandate and provide him with the necessary organization for him to accomplish his mission. As Colonel Bridges stated, "...when General Johnson came...that gentlemen's agreement kind of went away."\(^{12}\)
General James J. Lindsay's Insistence for a Major Command

(U) In January 1990, "the month of 'what's mine, is mine' games between Generals Johnson and Lindsay," the USSOCOM staff first asked the question of how many people 23 AF needed to become a MAJCOM. Anticipating this request, Colonel Bridges had his staff look at the manpower of Air Force Space Command (AFSPACECOM), Electronic Security Command (ESC), and Alaskan Air Command (AAC). General Eggers concluded that 23 AF did not want to be a MAJCOM. However, if forced to become a MAJCOM, AFSOC would have a projected growth similar to that of AFSPACECOM, the Air Force's newest MAJCOM, which had a headquarters staff of 6.77 percent compared to its entire population. General Eggers took that 6.77 figure and lowered it to 6.75 percent and came up with a HQ AFSOC manning number of 552 people. He figured the Air Staff would not argue with that figure, and in the end General Eggers was right.\(^{13}\)

(U) In early February 1990, General Johnson met with General Lindsay at MacDill AFB, Florida. After the meeting General Lindsay was more convinced than ever that 23 AF should be a MAJCOM.\(^{14}\) Shortly thereafter General Eggers, Col Ronald L. Jones, DCS/Operations, Col William L. Whitaker, DCS/Logistics, and Colonel Bridges made a last attempt to try and turn USSOCOM off to the idea of becoming a MAJCOM. It quickly became apparent, "this is a waste of time," remembered Colonel Bridges. The United States Special Operations Command had already made up its mind, "you've got to become a MAJCOM."\(^{15}\)

(U) On 8 March 1990 at the Pentagon, Washington D.C., General Lindsay met with Gen Larry D. Welch, CSAF, and discussed the possibility of whether or not 23 AF should become a MAJCOM.\(^{16}\) On 13 March 1990, General Lindsay tasked his staff to produce a USSOCOM plan of action to make 23 AF a MAJCOM. According to General Eggers, "I didn't sleep a wink that night." Needless to say, General Johnson reacted slowly
on the initiative. On 14 March 1990, Colonel Bridges began working on possible manpower increases within the headquarters and related organizations anticipated becoming a MAJCOM. He came up with two additive manpower figures: 275 personnel if AFSOC was not assigned bases and 388 people if AFSOC had bases. The people of HQ 23 AF reacted to all the confusion of who was their higher headquarters with the only way special operators knew how--light heartedly. However, to those working the issue, it was no joking matter.

(FOUO) On 16 March 1990, General Lindsay officially submitted a proposal to General Welch. On 22 March 1990, General Welch agreed to study the proposal and formed a committee chaired by Maj Gen Eugene H. Fischer, HQ USAF Assistant DCS/Programs and Resources, and began meeting on 26 March 1990, at which time the draft for USSOCOM/USAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 90-1 was ready for review. The committee consisted of two people from USAF, two people from USSOCOM, two people from MAC, and one person from 23 AF, who was Col Bill Douglas. As once 1 SOW Resource Manager, Colonel Douglas best understood the five year plan concerning Hurlburt facility upgrades—a necessity during the discussions on who (AFSOC, MAC, or TAC) should "own" Hurlburt Field, Florida. Early on by the committee, three options were considered: 1) status quo, 2) separate operating agency, or 3) MAJCOM.

(U) On 28 March 1990, MAC and USSOCOM made their presentations. The Military Airlift Command persuaded towards the first option as to why it would be beneficial; USSOCOM persuaded towards the third option as to its legality; and even TAC made a presentation in hopes of regaining host responsibilities of Hurlburt Field, Florida. Representing 23 AF at this final session and feeling caught in the middle—as their boss, General Eggers, still answered to MAC—were Colonel Douglas and Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Howard B. Chambers, 23 AF Assistant DCS/Plans and Programs, who had
brought the first skeleton diagram as to what 23 AF should look like if stood up as an Air Force MAJCOM.²⁴

(U) By early April 1990, it became apparent that if 23 AF upgraded to a MAJCOM, it would need two additional DCS functions, Comptroller and Personnel, and in that order of priority. On 6 April 1990, General Welch received a preliminary briefing by General Fischer from the committee's findings and talked further about the MAJCOM with General Johnson, not with General Lindsay.²⁵

(U) On 11 April 1990, General Eggers went to MacDill AFB, Florida, and briefed USSOCOM to insure they were aware of all the support MAC had been providing and the necessity for more money and personnel if 23 AF picked up all the responsibilities being considered, i.e. owning Hurlburt Field, Florida, and Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.²⁶ According to General Eggers, the meeting "went well," but General Lindsay stood firm that 23 AF would be a MAJCOM.²⁷

(U) Meanwhile back at Hurlburt Field, Florida, other actions were being worked that were necessary to activate a MAJCOM--like selection of an emblem and motto. On 11 April 1990, Maj Ralph L. Thomas, 23 AF Operations Programs (XPPP), began compiling inputs for a new motto.²⁸ (It wasn't until 23 November 1990 when General Eggers' selection of "Air Commandos--Quiet Professionals" was required on all letterhead paper.)²⁹ Likewise, Mr. Donald D. Little, 23 AF Historian, was in charge of getting a new emblem.³⁰

It's Official - 23 AF Will Become AFSOC

(U) On 23 April 1990, General Welch officially responded to General Lindsay's 16 March 1990 proposal, "You proposed the establishment of 23rd Air Force as a major command. I agree and we are prepared to proceed..."³¹ General Lindsay quickly responded on 24 April 1990, writing back "We are extremely
pleased to join with you in standing up the USSOCOM Air Force component as a USAF major command."³²

(U) Likewise, U.S. Representative Earl Hutto, Democrat, was equally quick in making the announcement to his constituents of the first district, Florida, on 25 April 1990. Since less than 100 additional manpower spaces were involved, as released by Congressman Hutto, the economic impact would not be very noticeable.³³ However, on 26 April 1990, the headline in the local newspaper read "AF plan means big boost for Hurlburt."³⁴

(U) Also on 26 April 1990, Mr. Donald Little submitted a memo to Colonel Bridges as to why 23 AF should "redesignate" rather than "inactivate/activate."³⁵ According to Colonel Bridges, "that was one of the first messages that went out," to redesignate 23 AF as AFSOC and preserve its lineage and honors.³⁶ Also on the morning of 26 April 1990, Mr. Little received word from Mr. Jay Godwin of the United States Air Force Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, that General Lindsay wanted a new emblem for AFSOC as soon as possible (ASAP). Jay Godwin then "greased the wheels" with USAFHRC enabling 23 AF to move directly to the Army Institute of Heraldry and coordinate a new emblem. A package of four proposed emblems had already been submitted to General Eggers and on the afternoon of 26 April 1990, he decided on the emblem designed by Major (Maj) Henry S. Murphy, 23 AF Foreign Internal Defense (XPXR).³⁷

(U) The emblem was originated by using the same wings in the 15th Air Force (15 AF) emblem. The circle with the star was used in the 1920s and had been associated with Air Corps since World War I (WWI). The argent was used in a number of Air Force symbols in World War II (WWII) also. The F-5 knife was also selected for the AFSOC emblem. The dagger was designed by the British and issued to commandos in WWII. The Americans tried to copy the design of the knife and their rendition of it was the K-42 knife. The knife used in the
emblem was altered to include the skull crusher. Thus, the
dagger used in the emblem was actually an F-5 knife with a K-
42 skull crusher. Major Murphy used the cut and paste method
to come up with the draft. He then had Mr. Bob Duguid from
Graphics, Detachment 8, 1361st Audiovisual Squadron, Hurlburt
Field, Florida, make a drawing to be used in the creation of
the new emblem. Mr. J. Hammond was the artist at the Army
Institute of Heraldry that drew the final rendition. (The
emblem is pictured on the following page.)

Transition Teams

(U) Meanwhile on 10 April 1990, Col Clifford A. Hodge,
23 AF Chief of Staff, established a transition team under the
leadership of Colonel Bridges. On 26 April 1990, the team
held its first meeting with the following members: Colonel
Bridges, Lt Col Randy Peixotto, HQ 23 AF Programs (XPP), Maj
Mike Hoelzel, 23 AF Standardization and Evaluation (DOV), Maj
Joe Vallimont and Captain (Capt) Jim Godfrey from 23 AF
Programs, Senior Master Sergeant (SMSGt) Billie Abbott, 23 AF
Logistics Plans (LGX), and Ms. Laura Clark, Personnel (DP). The
following day, MAC began the manpower and organization
actions to stand-up AFSOC. On 30 April 1990 General
Johnson formally pledged his full support.

(FOUO) While Colonel Bridges and Major Vallimont went to
HQ USSOCOM on 27 April 1990 to receive guidance on how to
proceed, the remainder of the transition team pressed ahead
at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and began working diligently to
construct a Programming Plan (P-Plan) which outlined how AFSOC
would function. This resulted in HQ USAF PAD 90-03,
Establishment of AFSOC.

(U) In addition to the P-Plan, one of the major areas
the transition team worked was worldwide logistics support for
AFSOC aircraft while deployed. Worldwide logistics support
meant that if an aircraft broke down, AFSOC could take a part
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to a MAC base and they would send it out just like any MAC part. Colonel Bridges said, "If a MAC airplane is down, they will bump cargo to get that part out to that airplane to fix it so they can keep the MAC system running. We interpreted it that they would treat our airplanes the same way."45

(U) Another issue worked by the transition team was the initial 100-person plus up. Lieutenant General Robert L. Rutherford, HQ USAF DCS/Plans and Resources, was in the middle of a force structure drawdown and interpreted the 23 April 1990 letter by General Welch to General Lindsay, which stated "The Air Staff believes that AFSOC can provide the responsiveness you require with the addition of less than 100 manpower spaces," to mean 60 billets. However, General Lindsay interpreted the letter to mean 99 billets. The latter was the eventual base number of manpower spaces.46

(U) The final issue worked by the transition team was the one year moratorium tied against training equipment. According to General Welch, "MAC will provide, to SOCOM standards, initial training support through the 1550 CCTW at Kirtland AFB," New Mexico. The Military Airlift Command had always provided excellent training and General Eggers' position was "if its not broken, don't mess with it." Thus, throughout 1990 and 1991, MAC continued to provide AFSOC its crew training.47

(U) On 1 May 1990, the Air Staff held its first meeting with the organization transition teams. The United States Special Operations Command personnel wanted to go, but was not invited. General Welch saw no need for a theater CINC to be involved in a stand-up of an Air Force MAJCOM. "That, to me, is a very good indication of the relationship between Air Force and USSOCOM," said Colonel Bridges. All members of 23 AF's team attended. According to Colonel Bridges, "it was really quite interesting to watch this staff grow," for example:48
Laura Clark at the time was working civilian personnel. We were trying to figure out how many people were needed to be in each DCS area given the initial limited growth of 99 people. How it was going to be all divided up. So she called MPC (Military Personnel Center), called MAC, and came up with 17 people. She said, 'I think we need one more.' We said, 'what for?'...So she gave us further good rationale for it. We said, 'o.k.' So we made it 18.

(U) Another example was the growth of the Comptroller (AC) staff. Like personnel,49 We didn't have an AC...We called up different MAJCOMs and talked to people and talked to MO up on the Air Staff. We said, 'that's about right--30.' We knew what jobs had to be done, because we looked at all...UMDs (unit manning documents). We saw multiple 702s (administrative specialists) and secretaries. We just said, 'no.' We took the meat and we said, 'that's what we're going to put in...'

(U) There was nothing scientific about dividing up the additional personnel into the MAJCOM. The transition team strictly made educated guesses and assigned one person per job. However, "I think that was probably where we really made a mistake," concluded Colonel Bridges, where particularly within the DCS/Plans and Programs, having no two-deep positions anywhere as AFSOC stood up troubled the likes of Acquisition Management (XPQ) and Requirements (XPMR) who were heavily involved in the AC-130U gunships and MC-130E Combat Talon II programs. But the transition team "couldn't look out to the future" and plan for something. They did not know how much AFSOC was "going to be involved at the MAJCOM level."50

(U) Half way through the week at the Pentagon, Colonel Bridges received a phone call from his counterparts at USSOCOM and was directed to return to MacDill AFB, Florida, and brief them on what had happened thus far. On 3 May 1990, Colonel
Bridges and Major Vallimont went to USSOCOM and left Lieutenant Colonel Peixotto in charge at the Air Staff. Colonel Bridges "took the positive approach in saying, 'guys, three weeks ago I was down here telling you that we don't want to do this and you don't want to make us a MAJCOM...Now I'm down here to tell you that the decision has been made...We are going to do it.'" But, "if you don't let us, 23 AF, stand us up as a MAJCOM, we will never become a strong MAJCOM. You cannot hold our hand now." But USSOCOM wasn't so quick to let go as they wanted to know "what's MAC going to give you (in terms of MFP-11 headquarters positions up at MAC)?" United States Special Operations Command wanted them all. Military Airlift Command wanted to give up few slots. Twenty-Third Air Force wanted most of the positions since they were the ones taking on most of the responsibilities. However, 23 AF realized they would still need MAC's support. When Colonel Bridges, a program staff officer by trade not a special operator, presented the proposal to Maj Gen Hugh L. Cox III, Deputy CINC, USSOCOM, he turned to Maj Vallimont and asked, "Joe, is it going to work?" Major Vallimont said, "Yes sir." From that point on according to Colonel Bridges, "it was greased...because Joe Vallimont had been SOF cured when he was in the Second Air Division (2 AD) under General Cox. The SOF network is very very strong. That was the key thing that happened. It will always stand out in my mind watching the general turn from me and ask the question."^52

(U) By 10 May 1990, all Air Force matters concerning the stand-up of AFSOC had been cleared. A week later on 17 May 1990, by order of the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald B. Rice, HQ 23 AF was to be redesignated HQ AFSOC effective 22 May 1990, and the gaining command for the 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) Air National Guard (ANG) and 919 SOG Air Force Reserves (AFRES) would change from MAC to AFSOC. ^54

(U) In accordance with the CSAF to accomplish this the 834th Combat Support Group (CSG), Hurlburt Field, Florida,
from the 1 SOW, was redesignated the 834th Air Base Wing (ABW) and reassigned to MAC’s Twenty-First Air Force (21 AF), McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Also, the 1550 CCTW and 1606 ABW at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, were reassigned from 23 AF to 22 AF, Travis AFB, California. The Military Airlift Command would continue as host of both Hurlburt Field, Florida, and Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. However, through program element code (PEC) 11, if the 1 SOW deployed, AFSOC picked up positions from the 834 ABW staff. This later proved crucial during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM when MAC contracting, security police, and transportation personnel of the 834 ABW supported AFSOF.

Redesignation Ceremony

(U) In a ceremony on 22 May 1990 at the Hurlburt Field Commando Hangar, General Welch redesignated 23 AF as AFSOC—a testimonial to the dynamic growth of special operations. General Johnson spoke of the seven years 23 AF had been associated with MAC:

These were important and very rich years. They were years of growth, developing doctrinal, tactical and support structure for Air Force special operations around the world...The most important accomplishment of the 23d has been to build a sturdy foundation for the Air Force role as a member of the joint special operations team...We, in the Military Airlift Command, are very proud of the 23d and all you have accomplished. We are honored to be a part of the development of Air Force special operations...On behalf of the men and women in MAC, I welcome the newest major command of the Air Force. We will continue our support to AFSOC.

(U) General Johnson’s words were backed, when on 22 May 1990, MAC granted approval for AFSOC personnel to travel aboard its aircraft. The approval applied to the same extent
that such travel was authorized for 23 AF personnel. This included additional crew member (ACM) status for accomplishing flight evaluations and training requirements and mission essential ground personnel (MEGP) status. The approval remained in force until 22 May 1991.59

(U) In welcoming AFSOC, General Lindsay said the new MAJCOM would be looked upon by USSOCOM and the Air Force to provide a single focus for the combat readiness of "bluesuiters" in special operations:60

This ceremony is symbolic of the recognition of your very important role in special ops...The security threats in the 90s, and the next century, are going to demand us to focus on special operations. Air Force special operations has an especially significant role to play in dealing with terrorists, regional conflict, narcotic trafficking, insurgencies, and although less likely, readiness for general war...Only the special ops airmen could have pulled off an operation as complex as the one in Panama. You are truly the tip of the USSOCOM spear...Under your commander, Major General Thomas E. Eggers, I am confident that you, the world's most capable airmen, will continue to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, and live up to the high standards set by your commando heritage.

(U) General Welch welcomed guests to the ceremony, making it clear that activating a MAJCOM was not a common occurrence in USAF:61

AFSOC is a tribute to the leaders, and men and women in the Military Airlift Command who formed and nurtured much of the current special operations capability...I gladly welcome the commitment by General Johnson, and the men and women in MAC, in continuing support for the new command...The AFSOC's activation comes in a very unique period of Air Force history. Air Force special operations is experiencing a phenomenon of budget growth,
while most of the rest will decrease in size...I congratulate you on your past accomplishments, and I look forward to your future.

(U) Taking command of AFSOC, General Eggers said the people could not be more excited and more challenged about the opportunities that lay ahead of them. "The Air Force has placed special emphasis on special operations in the past. That will continue in the future. We will work closely and jointly with our Army and Navy components of special operations forces." 62

(U) The occasion marked a significant milestone for both USAF and USSOCOM. Elevation of AFSOC to MAJCOM status served to institutionalize the special operations warfare specialty in the Air Force, and provided the opportunity to focus more directly on joint and service responsibilities. As an Air Force MAJCOM, AFSOC reported directly to the CSAF for service matters, while serving as the Air Force component to USSOCOM in carrying out certain unique Title 10 responsibilities for SOF. Streamlining the effectiveness of AFSOF paid considerable dividends towards the readiness of AFSOC to support the needs of all combatant commands. Designation of AFSOC as a MAJCOM established a focal point for Air Force special operations readiness and support. While certain MAJCOM functions for special operations had been supported previously by HQ MAC, AFSOC would serve as coordinator for such matters, and would work in conjunction with USSOCOM, the Air Staff, and other USAF commands to carry out those responsibilities. The relationship would enable AFSOC to continue to focus on the capabilities and readiness of USSOCOM to meet its warfighting requirements. 63

(U) As with the other USSOCOM service components, AFSOC responsibilities to General Lindsay included, but were not limited to: developing AFSOF strategy, doctrine and tactics; training assigned forces; validating AFSOF requirements; ensuring the combat readiness of assigned forces; and
monitoring preparedness to carry out assigned missions of AFSOF assigned to other unified combatant commands. Those responsibilities also included exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for all AFSOF with respect to the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, and acquisition of special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services. With the exception of certain additional responsibilities transferred to AFSOC in conjunction with MAJCOM status, command relationships established by agreement with each of the unified and specified commands and the services would remain unchanged. Subordinate commands designated to provide planning and support were encouraged to continue direct liaison, while keeping appropriate commanders informed. Assignment of MAJCOM status to the air component of USSOCOM served to align functionally those special operations responsibilities mandated by law and directed by the Secretary of Defense. With the level of support demonstrated by each of the services for the special operations community, the opportunity to ensure the interoperability of equipment and forces while meeting joint warfighting requirements had never been greater.  

The One Year Moratorium

(U) One of the first priorities for AFSOC was to build a Key Manpower Rules briefing to pave the way for a systematic personnel growth. Colonel Peixotto’s briefing on 30 May 1990 asked for an additional: five colonels; six rated officers; a senior enlisted force comprised of one percent Chief Master Sergeants (CMSgt), two percent SMSgts, and six percent Master Sergeants (MSgt); and restricted the civilian force in grades GS-13 and above.  

(U) By the time Major Vallimont visited HQ MAC in early June 1990, AFSOC was ahead of schedule in preparing their
annexes for the PAD/P-Plan. The hard work and enthusiasm was indicative of what AFSOC could do as a MAJCOM. In developing command agreements, Major Thomas ensured there were no conflicts with existing USAF and USSOCOM memorandum of agreements (MOAs) that encompassed: management and control of MFP-11 funds; research, development, and acquisition; training, education, and professional development; strategy, doctrine, and tactics; and supervision and control of intelligence activities.66

(FOUO) One month after the activation of AFSOC on 22 June 1990, MAC published P-Plan 90-20, Establishment of AFSOC at Hurlburt Field, Florida.67 Not far behind, AFSOC published P-Plan 90-1, Establishment of AFSOC, on 1 July 1990.68 In preparing the memorandum of understandings (MOUs), Colonel Bridges was appreciative of the "excellent" staff support it received from MAC.69

(U) In July 1990, ESC's efforts to enhance support to special operations progressed rapidly and as ESC formed a unit to support AFSOC. The following month the two commands got together and discussed ESC's overall capabilities and how they would support special operations.70

(U) In August 1990, HQ MAC agreed to be the acting comptroller agent for HQ AFSOC for all SOF helicopter contractor logistic support (CLS) funds for FY91. Headquarters AFSOC would assume full comptroller duties starting in FY92. The MH-53J weapon system trainer (WST), MH-53J part task trainer, and TH-53A operation flight trainer were MFP-11 programs, and the MH-60G WST was a MFP-4 program. Headquarters MAC (XRS & DOT) would also remain the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for all SOF helicopter simulator programs.71

(U) Headquarters AFSOC held its first annual aerobics run on 9 October 1990. Semiannual weight checks took place during the month of October. Also, as part of a new emphasis
on weight management, AFSOC continued with a monthly commando fitness program.⁷²

(U) As part of USAF PAD 90-03, the command designation of all MFP-11 funded aircraft changed to "SOC" or special operations command. Likewise, on 1 October 1990, organizations began reporting MFP-11 flying hour data against AFSOC.⁷³ Five months after the activation of the command, the majority of PAD and P-Plan actions were proceeding smoothly. Those behind schedule were being worked, and completion dates had been revised.⁷⁴

(U) On 5 November 1990, Colonel Bridges made his first trip to HQ MAC for the purpose to work out a MOA between MAC and AFSOC.⁷⁵ The eventual MOA was signed by General Eggers on 18 June 1991.⁷⁶

(U) In 1991, numerous problems were encountered in AFSOC breaking away from MAC. For example, in April 1991, MAC questioned the taskings for 834th Transportation Squadron personnel, a MAC and 21 AF asset. This meant the personnel assigned were tasked for contingency and exercise support by 21 AF and HQ MAC. Instances arose during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM where the 834 ABW was tasked by the 1 SOW to support AFSOC requirements. The taskings did not flow through the functional managers at 21 AF or HQ MAC. During wartime operations, all MAC base transportation assets needed to be controlled by HQ MAC to ensure adequate and timely support for area of responsibility (AOR) and mission support requirements. Headquarters MAC assured AFSOC it would make every effort to support AFSOC requirements when assets were available from the 834 ABW; however, requested in the future that AFSOC pre-coordinate tasking requirements or use Palace Blitz procedures.⁷⁷

(U) In April 1991, another conflict of interest between AFSOC and MAC involved the budget and who paid for FY90 Military Construction Program (MCP) SOF-Expand Sewage Treatment Plant. Headquarters AFSOC felt MAC should pay the
bill because Hurlburt Field, Florida, was a MAC base. The Military Airlift Command felt AFSOC should pay the bill because it was a SOF project. Of the $6.5 million project, AFSOC had agreed to pay $2 million. The Military Airlift Command had only agreed to pay $500,000 in design costs. The two commands could never resolve who should pay for the badly needed sewage treatment plant as the Air Force came up with the remainder $4 million from cancelled MCP projects.78

(U) Two questions answered by 22 May 1991 included whether or not AFSOC would pick up base ownership of Hurlburt Field, Florida, and if the commander would become a three star billet. The Air Force Special Operations Command took the position that neither should they own "a" base nor was it necessary to have a lieutenant general to run AFSOC.79 However, the question unanswered remained whether or not AFSOC should own the 1550 CCTW at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico? As of 31 December 1991, the issue was still unresolved. The United States Special Operations Command had agreed to pay for all SOF training conducted at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, with MFP-11 funds (an exception being the contractor logistics support for the MH-53J Pave Low weapons system simulator,) but MAC appeared reluctant to give up such a large wing.80

(U) Driven by Congress, during the one year moratorium AFSOC continued to be pushed away from USAF and pulled in by USSOCOM. For example, when Congress saw Air Force dollars funding research and development for AFSOC, they cut the money. Sometimes Congress would transfer the dollars to MFP-11, but most of the time it was simply cut which meant the Air Force could no longer do Balance Technologies Initiatives (BTI) for AFSOC. According to Colonel Bridges, the Air Force has "got to fund that for us. We’ve got to get Congress to let them ..." As of 31 December 1991, AFSOC was continuing its fight through Scientific Advisory Boards and the National Research Council.81
(U) Although the primary objectives of many P-Plans, such as 90-1 (AFSOC), or PADs, such as 90-20 (MAC), were closed by August 1991, an equal number of issues remained unresolved.\(^2\) One issue that would have to wait until FY93 involved the transfer of funds for AFSOC personnel who attended Professional Military Education (PME) training (MFP-8A). As of 31 December 1991, PME requirements for AFSOC remained in MAC’s MFP-8A FY92 budget.\(^3\)