AF RESCUE & AFSOF:
OVERCOMING PAST RIVALRIES FOR
COMBAT RESCUE PARTNERSHIP
TOMORROW

BY

JOE E. TYNER
Lt Col, USAF
National Defense Fellow
Center for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
United States Navy Postgraduate School
Monterey, Ca

This research report represents the views of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
PREFACE

Combat rescue may seem to most a subject that is a small dot on the big radar scope of Air Force issues. For myself it has been a matter of intense interest since 1987 when I reported to a rescue wing transitioning to special operations. I was selected to be the standardization pilot for the HC-130s at the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing (ARRW). Being asked to be the standards pilot for a weapon system I had never flown seemed quite unusual to me so I questioned why was I selected for the job? Colonel James L. Hobsen Jr., 39th ARRW/CC and now Commander and Chief Air Force Operations Command (CINCAFSOC), it turned out, had requested someone from tactical airlift to help the rescue HC-130 force train for airdrops and tactical airland operations. He also wanted someone to help his wing correct a perceived reluctance to move into the special operations arena.

Many believe that "perceptions become reality." Indeed, in my tour with rescue I found considerable friction among rescue and special operations forces (SOF). The attempt to hang on to the rescue ways was especially obvious among senior NCOs working in my standardization evaluation shop. These men were extremely proud of their rescue traditions. The special operators, for their part, were proud of their mission. There was a clear rift between the rescue forces and the SOF. "How the intense rivalry developed" was of great interest to me.

Another reason I find the subject of combat rescue important is the impact rescue tasking has had on SOF HC-130s ever since DESERT STORM. Recently, I had the privilege of commanding a SOF HC-130 squadron. The squadron's biggest challenge was keeping up with our SOF exercise and training requirements while doing constant deployments for combat rescue in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. SOF men and women were TDY 180 days or more because of these commitments. We in SOF resented that rescue was not doing its job.

I started my research for this paper with this same resentment and some organizational parochialism. I felt my research would
document the following assumptions: a) that the AF dedicated rescue force should be assigned to AFSOC, b) that the combat rescue mission to be accomplished correctly should be similar to AFSOC's special operations missions, c) that AFSOC's expertise will help rescue force train to combat standards, and d) that if rescue forces were assigned to AFSOC they would have deployed sooner to support rescue requirements in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Bosnia.

The research for this paper revealed my predetermined assumptions were based on myths. The study of events since the Southeast Asia conflict shows that the growth of SOF was at the expense of rescue forces. Rescue forces have been busy rebuilding to meet today's continual needs and the results are now relieving SOF of some of their rescue tasking. Keeping rescue squadrons in ACC provides the AF with many advantages not available in the past.

Traditionally the services have put rescue aside during peace to maintain the force structure needed to win the big war. Rescue forces had little combat capability before the Southeast Asia conflict and almost no capability before DESERT STORM. Today, ongoing peacekeeping deployments will keep rescue busy, but these peacekeeping operations require only a limited combat capability. Rescue under Air Combat Command has become good enough to accomplish today's tasking but, as in the interwar years of the past, it is not good enough for a stand alone rescue force in the next major conflict.

The Air Command's focus is on its war fighting equipment such as the F22 fighters and with these high cost fighting machines, little money will remain to pay for costly and sophisticated rescue equipment. With little expectation of ACC buying expensive state of the art equipment, the Air Force must optimize the forces available today for combat rescue. The Air Force teamed SOF and Rescue in the early 1980s to enhance both forces. Today, unless Rescue receives substantial upgrades in its equipment, then according to current doctrine the theater CINC may give SOF the rescue mission.

As military commanders, we will do everything possible to recover our soldiers. Today with CNN we have a public that is also dedicated to saving downed serviceman. Rescue will not win the
next war, but its importance to the American public can not be overstated. Look at how public interest increased in the aftermath of the capture of a warrant officer in Mogadishu. The nation criticized DOD for not having a rescue plan. The headlines of Scott O'Grady rescue from Bosnia show a profound public interest in saving a serviceman. Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are looking for greater jointness in personnel recovery and joint combat search and rescue (JCSAR). The best team we can assemble today would be SOF with the help of dedicated combat rescue forces. SOF did it alone in DESERT STORM, but they would have been better if a dedicated rescue was part of an intra-service team. The DOD budget and the service's focus on combat rescue will determine how much longer SOF will have to be a part of the combat rescue team. Force optimization today and for the foreseeable future requires that SOF and dedicated rescue forces plan to work together as a team. Making the team effective will require understanding each others capabilities. Each must understand the other's own training uniqueness creates a better total capability. SOF and rescue forces (RESF) must also put the myths of the past and disagreements behind them and face the future as a synergistic team.
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INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the Vietnam war found this nation's Air Rescue Service (ARS) unprepared for combat. The organization went from a force of 7600 personnel in 1952 during the Korean War buildup, to a low of 1500 personnel in 1961.¹ An organizational directive published in 1958 stated that ARS would support peacetime air operations and no special units or aircraft "will be provided for the sole purpose of wartime" rescue. ARS's peacetime capabilities would dictate it's wartime operations.² As a consequence, ARS focused only on peacetime operations in the years prior to the Southeast Asia conflict.

*The United States Air Force; Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia* by Earl H. Tilford is an excellent source of information about ARS before and throughout the Vietnam period. His reflections in the last pages of this history of Air Rescue stand true today:

Almost every modern military organization has, at one time or another, been accused of attempting to fight its present war as it fought its last war. If true, it would seem that we should ignore the lessons of history to concentrate on discovering inventive alternatives to previous tactics and policies. But one should study history to learn from rather than repeat, the past.

Those involved in rescue can learn some valuable lessons from the Southeast Asia experience. The most important lesson can be summed up in the concept of readiness. Peacetime rescue forces must be ready to perform combat search and rescue in a variety of situations.³

History did repeat itself and Air Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) saw a steady decline in combat readiness in the years following the Southeast Asia conflict. (ARS was renamed Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service on 8 Jan. 1966.)⁴ The reasons for this decline in readiness were primarily due to external factors. The
military’s draw down in the post Vietnam years once again compelled ARRS to move to peacetime duties.

In the past, the Air Force’s special operation and rescue programs were secondary to the service’s high interest programs. The Air Force concentrates on the big war, and neither special operation forces (SOF) or rescue forces (RESF) hold a position in the organization’s inner circle. Representative Dan Daniel, Chairman of the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, discussed this problem while he was championing the case for a separate service for special operations:

The "SOF Mafia" will never capture control of their parent services (see "Fighter Mafia," "Carrier Mafia," etc.). Thus while they may be beloved by their civilian master and the military leadership may sincerely champion their cause, they will never be admitted to the inner circles of power.  

Representative Daniel could have made a similar plea for ARRS, but Congressional interest at the time was focused on SOF. During the post Vietnam decline, special operations became almost nonexistent. Congressional influences in the 1980s resulted in the rapid rebuilding of SOF.

The impact of SOF on ARRS is the most prominent factor in the loss of ARRS combat capability. SOF took the best equipment resources from ARRS and took a large share of the ARRS active duty force. The Air Force met the demands of Congress by quickly building a strong Air Force Special Operations structure. Organizational theory may explain some of the AF doctrine and decisions that led to the large reduction in ARS.

No matter how crucial a capacity or activity, the organization need not attempt to incorporate it if the organization can be certain of its availability, when needed, on reasonable terms. Thus the organization with power relative to another which controls a needed activity need not formally incorporate that activity.
The above theory applied because the Air Force presumed that SOF would accomplish CSAR in future conflicts. At this time, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) did not exist.

Congressional response to the threat of terrorism resulted in the expansion of SOF at the expense of ARRS. During the beginning days of DESERT STORM, the men and women of the Air Rescue Service carried a sincere desire to be the "angel of mercy," but their leadership failed to acquire the equipment needed to operate in a modern battlefield. In contrast to the Southeast Asia conflict, the special operations forces (SOF) got the task of combat rescue.

The expression, "the same but different," applies to SOF and RESF. Myths and finger pointing between RESF and SOF have increased over the years because of mission similarities. As one theorist in military doctrine points out, "violent reactions" result when a rival organization tries to take the other's mission. The other factor that has kept SOF and rescue from joining hands is parochialism.

Today RESF blames SOF for their demise before DESERT STORM. At the same time, SOF condemns RESF for not coming sooner to take their roles in three ongoing deployments. This paper will help both organizations understand the many external factors that have influenced where each is today. Both organizations need to realize that they are not in competition. Today's world requires the differences in the way RESF and SOF train. The organizations should respect that each prepares for a different scenario. That difference in preparation will broaden total capability of the force in future conflicts.

The history of RESF and SOF since the Southeast Asia provides insights that may help us avoid rebuilding an organization that will prove to be obsolete in the next conflict. DESERT STORM CSAR and the recent combat rescues in other theaters, not only validate the need for rescue, they also show that rescue requires sophisticated force structure.

The current revitalization of CSAR under the Air Force Combat Command (ACC) has worked to build a good basic force, but ACC's
rescue squadrons still lack the capabilities of SOF resources. ACC may spend the moneys required to bring the equipment to the same capabilities of SOF, but until then, there are benefits of having both SOF forces and Rescue forces working as the CINC's preplanned CSAR team.

The Nation's interest in personnel recovery is demanding the CINC's focus on the rescue problem. Current doctrine and the Air Force's role as "executive agency for Combat Search and Rescue," requires that the Air Force take the lead in developing a Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) Plan. Dedicated Rescue and SOF are a team from the past that may have to join forces again.
VIETNAM'S HEROES BECOME THE VICTIMS OF PEACE

The years after Vietnam were extremely difficult for the United States military. Not only did the public view the military with distrust, Congress sought to pay the 300 billion dollar price tag of the war from the future Defense Department's budget. In an effort to deflect this threat from Congress, the Nixon administration proposed its own military cutbacks.⁹

Nixon-era doctrine was based on a one-and-a-half war strategy, as opposed to the old two-and-a-half war doctrine. With both China and Russia involved in conflicts on their borders, the traditional threats took a back seat to Congressional fiscal concerns.¹⁰ Under Nixon, the reserves started to grow under the "total force" strategy. Melvin Laird in his Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1972 stated, "Total force takes account of both active and reserve components of the U.S, those of our allies and friends through local efforts, or through...Security assistance programs."¹¹ Congress and the public liked the "total force" concept because future conflicts would require a reserve activation, and therefore, a political commitment to the situation.¹² By the mid seventies the majority of the Air Force's tactical aircraft belonged to the reserves. The Soviet Union, by contrast, carried out one of their largest force expansions during this period. In particular, the Soviet Air Force greatly increased their conventional aircraft. By 1980 the Soviet Union had 5000 combat aircraft compared to our 3,700. Not only did they have more aircraft, their fighter force was newer with over 2200 of 3850 fighters introduced after 1972. The U.S. had mostly F-4s introduced as early as 1963.¹³

The problem of the combat aircraft imbalance helps explain why the inner circles of Air Force did little to support their Special Forces or their Rescue forces. The fall of the Shah in Iran, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and discovery of 3,000 Soviet troops in Cuba effectively showed the failure of this policy and brought the end of our military decline. Unfortunately, the formula for rapidly regaining superiority did not include Air Force special operations or rescue.
ARS DECLINES AFTER SOUTHEAST ASIA

Initially hobbled by a doctrine which conceived of wartime search and rescue as an extension of peacetime procedures, air-sea rescue had by late 1966 established itself as a necessary and viable part of the Air Force operation. ¹⁴

At the end of the Southeast Asia conflict ARRS had made 2,780 combat saves and over 4000 total saves. The 3rd ARR Group, organized in 1966 to oversee operations in SE Asia, is one of the most decorated units in the conflict. The awards include 16 campaign steamers, five presidential Unit Citations, two outstanding unit Awards, and two Vietnam gallantry Crosses with Palm. Its crew members received one metal of honor, 38 Air Force Crosses and numerous other awards.¹⁵

The prestigious heritage and honor did not protect the ARRS. ARRS started its reduction along with the rest of the service as the United States implemented initiatives to get out of Southeast Asia. ARRS reached its peak personnel of 5700 during 1972 and its peak of 355 assigned aircraft in 1971.¹⁶ The military reductions began well before ARRS was out of Southeast Asia. During 1972 General John D. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, directed that the mission of ARRS be primary directed to combat rescue and later reduced many of ARRS's local base units. When the 3rd and 40th ARR Squadron, the last units in Southeast Asia, where pulled out on 31 January 1976,¹⁷ personnel for ARS was less than 4000 and aircraft down to 214.¹⁸ ARRS was eager to find a way to survive the onslaught of Defense Cuts.

ARRS STOPS THE DECLINE WITH PEACETIME ROLES

The ARRS found itself repeating history by moving to peacetime operations to prevent a continual draw down on their resources. Rescue's largest flying squadron, the 37th ARR Squadron at Warren AFB, with all of its detachments, assumed the missile site security and support mission.¹⁹ The 71st ARR Squadron assumed the
transportation and logistic support role for several remote sites in Alaska.\textsuperscript{20} The ARRS redesignated the 41st AAR Wing as the 41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing because of its added Air Weather Service function. \textsuperscript{21}

By 1976, ARRS had become the gaining command for 920th Weather Reconnaissance(WR) Group and the 403rd Wing, both of which were part of the Air Force Reserves. The 403rd had three rescue squadrons with ARRS since the mid fifties. They were not activated for the Vietnam conflict, although the 305th ARR Squadron(AFRES) activated from 26 January 1968 to 18 June 1969 to augment other rescue forces with their HC-97s during the USS Pueblo crisis in North Korea.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to gaining all the units with peacetime focus, the ARRS provided the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC). The AFRCC is the CONUS's centralized center for rescue information. The center coordinates efforts for the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), state and local agencies. The ARRS mission was so diverse that they removed much of their focus from combat SAR. The ARRS had one big initiative going for combat rescue and that was the HH-53H, PAVE LOW III, helicopter.

The early days of the Southeast Asia conflict demonstrated the need for better Rescue equipment. An operational requirement statement submitted by Military Airlift Command described an aircraft that combined a jet and helicopter. The evaluation indicated that the aircraft's cost would be too great to risk in combat.\textsuperscript{23} (The idea looks similar to the CV-22.) The HH-53 introduced in late 1967\textsuperscript{24} was the result of the search for a better rescue platform.

The HH-53 worked superbly but as the enemies' tactics and weapons improved it quickly became apparent ARRS needed a better system. Another operational requirement study in 1967 stated that the current systems were not capable of a recovery at night or in foul weather. A primitive night recovery system was developed for the HH-53 and the 40th ARR made its first night recovery using this system on 21 December 1972. The system still did not have the
defensive gear and all weather capability needed. The Pave Low III would provide that need.

The Pave Low III was no doubt going to be the world's most sophisticated combat capable helicopter. It was Rescue's future to successful CSAR and by far the most important combat related project in ARRS. On 9 August 1976 aircraft #66-14433 completed the initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) and all objectives were successful.\textsuperscript{25} Even in the period of Air Force budget reductions the ARRS leadership had the advocacy to persuade Air staff to proceed in the modification of Eight HH-53s, which were to become operational in 1980.\textsuperscript{26}

In the public's eye the ARRS had an important role in peacetime rescue. Their efforts were still essential in the mid-seventies because of the limited availability of state, local and civilian helicopters and SAR assets during this period. (The ARRS made its 20,000th save by 1981.) Several of these saves were "no cakewalk" as the \textit{Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service; 1946-1981 An Illustrated Chronology} by Donald D. Little summarizes. The heroics of ARRS resulted in ARRS personnel receiving several awards like the Chaney, and McKay trophy awards. Many in rescue observed that rescue was typically very conservative with its training program but "when it came to an actual rescue the crews had no fear and would disregard great risk to achieve the mission of saving a life."\textsuperscript{27}

The ARRS, which had better helicopters than SOF, participated in missions that today are being accomplished by Special Operations. The ARRS performed several noncombatant evacuation orders (NEO) operations and similar missions, such as the evacuation from Beirut Lebanon in 1976, a deployment to Turkey in February 1979 for possible rescue operations in Iran, and a deployment on the \textit{USS Saipan} off the coast of Nicaragua in June of 1979 for possible emergency rescue in that country. The AF SOF had declined after Vietnam to a point of almost no capability. The similarity of RESF missions with special operations contributed to some of the rivalry found between SOF and rescue as we look into events before and
after Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed mission to rescue hostages in Iran.

**RICHES TO RAGS SPECIAL OPERATIONS GETS THE AXE**

The 'boom' of the early 1960s when SOF, at the urging of President Kennedy, were rapidly expanded, was followed by a devastating 'bust' in the 1970s. Funding was cut by 95% and a list of SOF units too long to recount was deactivated.

-Representative Dan Daniel (D. Va. Aug 1985)²⁸

President Kennedy's direction to the Department of Defense to prepare forces to counter guerrilla warfare resulted in the establishment of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), nicknamed Jungle Jim on 14 April 1961 and of the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) at Eglin AFB on 19 April 1962.²⁹ The SAWC's first regulation defined the mission;

**USAF Special Air Warfare Center will command, organize, equip, train and administer assigned or attached forces to participate in and conduct combat improvement projects for air actions in counterinsurgency warfare and other special operations.**³⁰

The SAWC, which absorbed the Jungle Jim resources, became well equipped for its role in training and combat operations in a low intensity conflict. The Center had several aircraft that small foreign nations could use. The aircraft initially consisted of C-47s, C-46s, T-28s, B-26s and U-10s. The aircraft were old but effective for a small country's air force needs. By the mid 1960s A-1, O1, O2, A-37, C-46, C-119, C-123 and C-130 aircraft along with several different types of helicopters were added to the SAWC's inventory.³¹ In 1964 SAWC developed an Op-plan that was to prepare a SAWC combat strike force that could, "deploy within 24 hours to any selected area of the world."³² The center was active in many military assistance programs in several countries. Civic actions in Central America were
significant. The Air Force had a good team organized for foreign internal defense and military assistance until the demands in Vietnam redirected the primary attention of the SAWC.

"A lack of doctrine and the short time between SAWC's inception and its first operations are the keys to the problem that resulted in the misuse of this special organization." The Southeast Asia conflict began to devour most of SWAC's attention and by the end of 1964 the mobility training teams and foreign assistance programs had all but stopped. By 1965 the SAWC found its primary mission to be providing training for air crews for the expanding war in Vietnam. As the war moved from a war of insurgency to a more conventional mode, the need for special operations was reduced. Colonel Robert Gleason was an air commando from the Jungle Jim squadron assigned to a detachment nicknamed Farm Gate, which reported to Vietnam in November 1961. The mission of Farm Gate was to "train the Vietnamese Air Force in counterinsurgency tactics." Col. Gleason noted as we became more engaged in the Vietnam War special operations "soon ceased to be 'special.'" When Farm Gate's primary missions became interdiction, close air support and reconnaissance, the biggest difference between conventional and SOF forces was the age of the aircraft.

In 1979, active duty Air Force special operations consisted of one wing the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field FL with CH-3, UH-1, MC-130 and AC-130 aircraft, a small MC-130 squadron at Kadena AB, Okinawa and a small MC-130 squadron in Europe. The reserve forces consisted of one AC-130A squadron and one CH-3E squadron. The AF had no funding past 1990 for the proven gunship. The MC-130s were also "on the margins" of the USAF future program. The Air Force Special Operations Forces were on the verge of total collapse as the downward trend continued.

The event that finally arrested the demise of special operations and accelerated the devastation of Air Rescue and Recovery Service occurred on 4 November 1979. A mob of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran, taking over 60 American hostages. A conventional strike by our forces was out of the question and the President and Defense Secretary were looking for an unconventional
solution. Special operations was now in the spotlight, as rescue remained in the shadows of the Air Force organization! The "rescue" mission resulted in controversy and myths that increased the chasm between special operations and the rescue organization.

**SOF STOPS ITS DECLINE WITH IRANIAN RESCUE**

Colonel James H. Kyle, USAF, was the deputy commander and air component commander of the task force selected to prepare a plan and train a special operations team for the rescue of the hostages in Iran. The mission code named Operation RICE BOWL failed and as the air component personnel on the ramp of the Omani Air Base reflected on their previous night's failure some British mercenaries drove up and left two cases of beer. One case had a hand written message, "To you all, from us all, for having the guts to try." The message said it all: special operations had the men and the drive or guts to do a mission, but they lacked the resources to do the mission. Colonel Kyle in his effort to tell the public the truth about the mission with the hope that we would learn from history published *The Guts to Try.* He published his book ten years after the failed mission using the first three years of his retirement for research to assure its accuracy.

Colonel Kyle mentions the problem of "parochial service loyalties" that still exist today. In the eyes of ARRS in the aftermath of Operation RICE BOWL the parochialism was not just an interservice problem, but also an intraservice problem. Brigadier General Tedd L. Bishop, a former wing commander from Military Airlift Command, is quoted in a news article criticizing planning and equipment used on the mission. His quote may describe the thoughts of ARRS personnel after the failure:

> The Air Force Rescue Service is trained, and practices, and daily uses equipment that would have been far superior to what was used there. Why they were not used is hard to understand.

-B.G. Tedd L. Bishop, U.P.I. Dec 19, 1981, Saturday, AM cycle

Byline; William Stracener
Statements like the one above gave Colonel Kyle the motivation to write his book. Most of ARRS's accusations are eliminated by Colonel Kyle's analysis.

Leaving ARRS out of the action happened at the onset of the planning. The now decimated special operations community saw the Iran Rescue mission as their chance. "Despite this gloomy scenario, the good news was at the time of the hostage crisis there was an abundance of Special Operations personnel still around, just itching for a chance to show what they could do." Colonel Kyle explains early in his book about his contempt for Air Force planners giving all of Special Operation's heavy lift helicopters to a tactical communications unit. This statement leads me to hypothesize if CH-53s and their pilots were in special operations at the early stages of Rice Bowl they would have been the obvious choice in the JCS/SOD air component. The Air Rescue units had men that were former special operators and many SOF H-3 crew members who were night vision goggle (NVG) qualified with recent C/HH-53 experience. The Air Force listed 96 helicopter pilots qualified in long range navigation and air refueling.

The selection of helicopter pilots followed the decision to use Navy Helicopters. The Navy's RH-53D's selection was rational because the RH-53 could fold its blades and tail boom to fit below the carrier's deck. The benefit of using mine sweeping as a cover for these helicopters also was very logical in the quest for security. The task force picked Navy pilots to command because of their familiarity with the RH-53D. They picked marine copilots because of their experience in unprepared landing zones.

After the first rehearsal, Colonel Kyle realized what he needed and went to his superiors many times with a request for ARRS and SOF helicopter pilots. The Holloway commission organized by JSC to study the reasons for the failure noted, "Transitioning from a HH or CH-53 to an RH-53 requires only learning a few new flight parameters and slightly altering already established procedures, something every experienced pilot has done several times." One of the members, Major General John L. Piotrowski, participated in "Jungle Jim," and his experience shows in the report. One comment
in the report notes training in a new complex mission skill is much more difficult than transitioning to similar designed aircraft.\textsuperscript{49} The commission thought choosing the RH-53 should not have restricted pilot selection.

The mission was restricted from departure from any country close to Iran in the early planning stages. Late into the planning process, the State Department obtained permission for staging SOC-130s from Oman. Many ARRS personnel felt that the mission would have been successful if the task force used their HC-130s and HH-53Hs. ARRS once again felt cheated, because their HC-130s and HH-53s could have done the mission or at least the HC-130s could have refueled the Navy RH-53s.

Once studied closely, we find helicopter air refueling raised more problems than solutions. The only Air Force helicopter pilot on the mission states that they considered air refueling but the RH-53s were not air refuelable. The Navy's RH-53s had the heavy weight landing gear needed for heavy loads and desert sand. The RH-53 also had a much greater weight carrying capacity than the ARRS's HH-53 with its heavy armor, rescue equipment and smaller engines. The additional helicopters and tankers required to carry the load made the possibility of covert operations virtually impossible with ARRS aircraft.\textsuperscript{50}

Rescue Personnel felt this was their mission because of actions that had occurred in the past. The mission resembled the one used in the Son Tay raid. Rescue units positioned in Incirlik AB, Turkey for possible rescue missions in Iran from 11 February through 11 March 1979.\textsuperscript{51} Those deployed in Turkey were capable of getting into Iran. The Air Rescue and Recovery Service also were preparing to send new HH-53Hs (PAVE LOW III) and Tankers to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for possible SAR within 30 hours after the Operation EAGLE CLAW.\textsuperscript{52} During this period the first Pave Low III rolled out the production line.\textsuperscript{53} One or two Pave IIs was where not enough for this mission and logistics were nonexistent.

The failure of Operation RICE BOWL resulted in some immediate actions by the Department of Defense that accentuated the rift between SOF and ARRS. Less than a month after the failed
rescue, ARRS's new HH-53Hs, Pave Low IIIs transferred from the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to Tactical Air Command's (TAC) 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW).
THE COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE OF SOF AND RESCUE

The ARRS even which its numerous peacetime concerns were still pushing the project they needed most for combat operations. ARRS developed a night recovery system during the last phase of the war and used it for the first time in late 1972. The system was extremely difficult to use. The aircrews desperately needed a better system. The HH-53H was the answer to the combat rescuer's prayers. The Pave Low III was born from the "Southwest Asia Operational Requirement 114, dated April 3, 1967" that stated the need for a combat recovery system for night and foul weather.\textsuperscript{54} In August 1976 the first Pave Low III successfully passed its Operational Test and Evaluation(OT&E). The Air Staff decided to buy a total of eight Pave Lows to be operational in 1980. The new helicopter was to be ARRS's "pride and joy," the most sophisticated helicopter in the world conceived by ARRS for combat rescue in any weather. The aircraft included a stabilized Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system, new Doppler navigation system and computer, projected map display, and terrain following radar. "These helicopters will provide a significant increase in ARRS capabilities and effectiveness."\textsuperscript{55}

SOF TAKES THE PAVE LOW III, THEIR PRIDE AND JOY

Operation EAGLE CLAW, Iran rescue mission, resulted in failure on the early morning of 25 April. In the wake of this episode the country's leaders were desperate to find a solution to special operations equipment shortfalls. "On 14 May 1980, the USAF Chief of Staff ordered the reassignment of the nine HH-53Hs from MAC/ARRS inventory to the 1st SOW of TAC." The ARRS transferred their number one creation to Hurlburt Field FL from Kirtland AFB on 17 May.\textsuperscript{56} The transfer of these Pave Lows had to be a source of great disappointment and bitterness for those in ARRS.
ARRS AND SOF HONEY BADGER TEAM

Besides the loss of nine HH-53Hs, ARRS had to send six more HH-53B/Cs and eight HC-130s to a mission test called HONEY BADGER.\(^57\) Honey Badger was the code name for the preparation of another hostage rescue team. Eight HC-130s modified for extensive NVG operations received an INS, Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) and Chaff and Flare dispensers. The HC-130 crews developed NVG low level navigation procedures later called Rescue Special Operations Low Level (RSOLL). The procedures were accomplished wearing ANVIS 5 NVGs initially. The mission required crews with very good situational awareness and flying capabilities. The training was difficult. The debriefs with the rescue and special operations crews after mission rehearsals were "quite intense."

HONEY BADGER lasted over eight months and cost MAC funding problems that curtailed other ARRS missions. More than 300 ARRS personnel were TDY for a total of over 23,000 man days. The operation ended in January 1981 and the men and TDY aircraft returned. Special Operations kept the new HH-53H. The specially modified HC-130s returned to their units where they continued to practice the RSOLL mission with select crews. Special Operations had no HC-130 tankers of their own so these RSOLL crews provided the only special operations refueling capability. The MC-130Es had their helicopter refueling pods installed much later.

ARRS PEACETIME MISSION, 20,000TH SAVE

After losing its Pave Low IIIIs, ARRS did not get an another new weapon system on the books until November 1980 when Hans Mark, Secretary of the Air Force, approved the mission need statement for a rescue UH-60A. The new aircraft was not going to be mission capable until 1986. Only nine UH-60s came into service prior to the demise of the HH-60 program. (These new helicopters ended up in special operations in 1988.) The lack of combat weapon systems was surely demoralizing for those in ARRS who were trying to focus on combat rescue. The peacetime operations also increased during 1981 with the first manned space flights since 1975. The ARRS provided 200 personnel to support the flight of Columbia.\(^58\) The "ARRS logged
its 20,000th Save" on 10-12 September 1981 for which President Reagan passed his personal congratulations. 59

INITIATIVES TO CONSOLIDATE HELICOPTER FORCES

The Air Force had been studying the possibility of consolidating all their helicopters under one command. Major Commands for the past five years discussed the method of consolidation without agreement. The Iran failures again encouraged the Air Force to focus on the helicopter consolidation and on special operations support. 60 ARRS watched this situation develop as an opportunity not only to get its Pave Low IIIs back but also TAC's special operations C-130 aircraft.

General Robert E. Huysen, Commander and Chief of MAC clearly did not appreciate giving his nine new Pave Low IIIs to the TAC. In his last quarterly update, 25 June 1981, to the Secretary of Defense stated that "all USAF helicopters--and the special operations mission--should be assigned to MAC rather than TAC." 61 It was probably not just coincidental that in a new AFR 23-19 the Air Force delegated to MAC and ARRS the responsibility "to advocate new equipment and manpower resources for combat rescue, weather reconnaissance, and special operations." The major responsibilities of ARRS were as follows:

a. Combat Rescue
b. Strategic Air Command (SAC) missile Site Support
c. Special Operations
d. Airborne Weather Reconnaissance
e. Atmospheric Sampling
f. Peacetime Search and Rescue
g. Other Requirements, which included operations of a specialized training and test wing, operation of the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) and support of other Rescue Coordination Centers, support for USAF survival training, Theater airlift support, and several other functions. 62
The controversy to consolidate all AF helicopters under one command was under consideration by those who produced ARRS's new mission directive.

Early in 1982 a report considering the needs of the Air Force in year 2000 forecasted the need for strong organizational support for special operations. It stated that the Air Force should make special operations an Agency or place it within a Major Command as a numbered Air Force. HQ ARRS suggested that to comply with the intent of AF 2000 they should receive all helicopters. They would then place them throughout the World with an overt rescue and military assistance mission and a covert or classified special operations mission. The special operations mission would include emergency evacuation orders and hostage rescue. The plan would have required a buildup of both fixed wing and vertical lift assets with day and night capabilities. This proposal was the first direct indication that ARRS wanted SOF's fixed wing as well as helicopter assets.

The release of the Air Force 2000 occurred as an inspection team reviewed the Air Forces Special Operations program. Pressure from the National Command Authorities forced the Air Force to direct a Functional Management Inspection (FMI) for special operations capability. The Air Force Inspector General and DCS/Operations, Plans and Readiness (AF/XO) with their teams worked from November 1981 to July 1982 to complete this inspection. The final report noted many shortfalls in organizational support and recommended that special operation forces (SOF) and rescue forces (RESF) be combined in a single numbered Air Force.

The Air Force Council met in August 1982 and subsequently the Air staff agreed to consolidate SOF with RESF under a single command. Shortly after the Air Staff agreement ARRS met with MAC and proposed a plan to administer a consolidated force at ARRS with only an addition of 35 manpower slots. Adding the Air Forces' entire special operations program to ARRS with of only an increase of 35 people is unrealistic. It appears that ARRS set out to capture the SOF community with little change to their rescue emphasis in their headquarters staff.
General Wilber Creech, CINCTAC, and General James Allen, CINCMAC, agreed in mid September to put special operations and combat rescue forces under MAC. Air Force established a joint MAC and TAC staff to develop the plan for the Air Staff. Colonel Ronald Fogelman headed the TAC team and Colonel Gary Lunt headed the MAC team. General Creech proposed several conditions, one of which was that Rescue and Special Operations would keep their separate identities. The MAC staff agreed to the proposals. MAC and ARRS had won the battle for the special operations mission and resources.

Major General Mall, ARRS/CC, suggested one special operations wing be added as the fourth wing equal to the other three ARRS wings already in his command. TAC disagreed with the ARRS suggestion. The staff agreed to a numbered Air Force with equal ARRS and Special Operations representation. The numbered Air Force Commander would report directly to MAC. Two Brigadier Generals, one representing ARRS and the other representing the 2nd Air Division, would report directly to the new numbered air force commander. The 2nd Air Division established to command Special Operations was to be at Hurlburt Field.65

An interesting side note was that the establishment of a Numbered Air Force required 82 personnel slots from ARRS. Establishing the Air Division cost the 1st SOW 73 slots, the total loss for TAC headquarters was nine slots and from Ninth AF two slots.66 The takeover by MAC definitely provided more staff opportunities for future leaders of special operations and gave them an organization above wing level supporting their needs. ARRS felt they had won their battle to get forces from special operations into MAC. Little did they realize the future would belong to Special Operations, which while growing, would eventually devour their rescue assets.

The significance of Gen Creeche’s demand to keep the separate identities of special operations and rescue seemed of minor consequence at this time. His decision to make this a condition before transferring his special operators to MAC reflects the TAC special operators concern regarding being absorbed into the rescue forces. This agreement had significant consequences later when Congress reviewed the number of special forces available in the Air Force
after Operation URGENT FURY, the liberation of Granada, and found the total number of aircraft dedicated to special operations had decreased.\textsuperscript{67} If SOF and Rescue were one organization this fact may have been less obvious.

To the ARRS staff, not using special operations helicopters for rescue made little sense: it would be like developing a multipurpose fighter and then letting it do only one job. ARRS, when contemplating how to get the special forces into ARRS, visualized a ARRS organization or agency with combined rescue and special operations forces. Gen Mall, commander of ARRS then, and later the first commander of 23rd Air Force, stated his thoughts is an Interview for \textit{Airlift Magazine}. In answer to why MAC created 23rd AF:

\begin{quote}
We created Twenty-Third Air Force primarily to enhance the special operations forces (SOF) mission. The move capitalized on the synergism that exist between SOF and the combat rescue forces because their mission, training and equipment is very similar.
\end{quote}

The interview continued and when asked what he saw as the benefit of consolidating his reply was:

\begin{quote}
The big payoff has been between SOF and combat rescue. Combat rescue has always augmented the SOF mission, but now we are training these forces in special operations tactics to greater extent than ever before. Additionally, some of our SOF equipment is compatible and can serve both roles. The SOF Pave Low helicopters, for instance, have the capability to rescue a downed pilot in combat and still perform a special operations function without extensive modification of equipment or crew changes. Another example of complimentary functions is our Rescue Special Operations Low Level (RSOLL) mission. Here we employ certain rescue aircraft (helicopter and Fixed-wing) to support special operations. For example we use the HC-130 to refuel SOF aircraft on extended missions, although they normally are employed in a rescue refueling scenario. It makes sense to manage the training, tactics, maintenance, and supply from one
\end{quote}
headquarters. By equipping and training our forces under a common, event centered standard, we provide the military with the capability to move our forces from one mission area to another to best accomplish both tasks. This actually gives us more assets and greater flexibility if a contingency arises.68

SOF'S RESENTMENT TO THE TAKEOVER

The new 23rd Air Force did not become the synergistic model expected by Gen. Mall. TAC's SOF forces felt the rescue men on the line were "mission hackers" and would take significant risk to achieve a save, but they did not train as they would have to fight. SOF believed MAC was an airlift command where leadership was just too conservative. They thought MAC's leaders were airlifters and were not warriors. An example is the aftermath of the combined HONEY BADGER operation. Rescue provided dedicated crews for this operation and their helicopter aircrews achieved mission qualification in NVGs tactics as well as NVG formation. MAC/ARRS leadership felt the risk was too high and stopped the NVG tactics and formation procedures after HONEY BADGER. SOF had a fear of incurring the same type restrictions if ARRS/SOF were forced to train to the same standards. Describing special operators as "rugged individualist in the mode of W.W.II and Vietnam era air commandos, they resented being commanded by a staff with virtually no SOF background." The resentment grew in the MC-130 community when 23rd AF modified their aircraft for helicopter aerial refueling. Many felt this modification's purpose was solely to make the MC-130 a rescue asset.69 This resentment is unfounded when one considers the possibility of hostage recovery operations like RICE BOWL.

SOF & RESCUE HISTORY OF TEAMWORK AND CONFLICT

One can understand the optimistic attitude of General Mall when reviewing the many operations SOF and Rescue worked together. The Southeast Asia conflict found that availability determined the call for SOF or ARRS to a mission. ARRS's forces accomplished the rescue of downed pilots as well as Special Forces caught behind enemy lines.70 The 1st Special Operations Squadron
(SOS) was constantly on alert with their A1 Skyraiders. The Skyraiders flew one of the most dangerous roles in the War while providing resort to ARRS helicopters. First SOS had up to eight aircraft on alert constantly for rescue and by 1967 the Skyraider had the highest overall loss rate of any aircraft in the conflict.\textsuperscript{71}

The most significant single special operations mission in the war was a combined special operations and ARRS team raid on San Tay. ARRS provided 42 men one HH-3, five HH-53s and two HC-130 to assist the SOF forces.\textsuperscript{72} Most of the highly qualified rescue crews were from the rescue training school at Eglin, AFB.\textsuperscript{73}

The idea of using SOF's AC-130 gunship in rescue developed with a ARRS HH-53 while searching for a gunship shot down over Laos in December 1972. The coordination with the AC-130 using their night vision devices resulted in the rescue of two crew members. The tactic proved to be so successful that the 16th SOS gunship squadron integrated search and rescue training into their training program.\textsuperscript{74}

The last significant ARRS/SOF combined effort was the raid on Koh Tang, Cambodia during the Mayaguez incident. Eight HH-53s from the 40th ARR Squadron teamed with eight CH-53s from the 21st SOS in the initial recovery force. This mission also reiterated the danger of using the slow moving helicopters in daylight operations. The daylight operation into the heavily armed area resulted in four helicopters destroyed and nine badly damaged out of the fifteen used for the assault. (A sixteenth helicopter had crashed on the initial deployment.) The raid highlighted that MAC took better care of their ARRS aircrews than TAC did of their SOF aircrews.

ARRS had better equipment than SOF at the end of the Southeast Asia conflict. The 40th ARR squadron's helicopters had air refueling capability, fuel tanks with foam, fuel lines capable of taking limited hits, and three gatling guns instead of two as on the 21st SOS CH-53s. Besides more guns, the gunners on the ARRS helicopters were more current because they received priority in gunnery range time. All these facts had significant consequences on the heavy losses of the 21 SOS. The Operation Commander tasked 21st SOS to
make the initial infiltration on Koh Tang because they wanted the infiltration mission and the 40th ARRS squadron with the air refueling capability was the better choice to move troops from and to ships. The infiltration of marines with CH-53s into a heavily armed area resulted in the loss of four SOF helicopters almost immediately. Two of the losses, the one that exploded near the shore and one that ran out of fuel before it could make it to Thailand,\textsuperscript{75} may have not occurred if they were ARRS helicopters.

Barry R. Posen, a renowned theorist on military doctrine states that in a military organization "\textit{attempts by rivals to take over an organization's primary task ... sometimes elicits violent reactions from threaten organizations.}"\textsuperscript{76} This fact seems to hold true especially for the men flying SOF helicopters. "These were typical high energy, competitive young men so the rivalry was also high energy" states Col Gary Weikle, a rescueman in Vietnam and later a SOF commander. Also ARRS took good care of their helicopter personnel. The SOF missions were as challenging and dangerous but with few awards for covert missions that were not as popular in the publics' eyes. With equipment and training, TAC just didn't take care of the helicopter forces and concentrated on the fighters.\textsuperscript{77} MAC on the other hand was extremely proud of its rescue force and it was easy to get awards through the system for rescue. MAC's ARRS was the most decorated unit in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{78} Conversations with SOF aviators from this era still indicate a hint of animosity toward ARRS.

That these competitive feelings prevailed after the war is no surprise. When one looks at the significant reduction of SOF forces along with the country's aversion to low level conflict, SOF must have believed they were on the path to destruction. ARRS on the other hand, was bigger and picking up more peacetime missions each year and therefore didn't see SOF as a threat until they took the Pave Low IIIs. The 23rd AF started with approximately 10,500 personnel, of which only 3,500 were SOF.

The consolidation of SOF to MAC was very beneficial because it finally gave officers more opportunities for jobs above wing level and therefore more promotion opportunities. Before moving to MAC he states only two positions were available at Ninth AF and one at
headquarters TAC and adds TAC often filled the SOF positions at Air Staff with Fighter pilots.\textsuperscript{79} No doubt the lack of representation at command levels contributed to SOFs decline and ultimately its capture by MAC. The lack of command level rescue billets is a matter that should concern ACC's rescue forces today.

ARRS HH-60D ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY-NOT!

During 1982, ARRS received nine new UH-60A, their first new production aircraft since 1974. The aircraft was an interim addition while they waited in earnest for the HH-60D program to reach fruition. MAC had requested the buy of 90 HH-60Ds during the next five year budget cycle.\textsuperscript{80} The total HH-60D program envisioned the delivery of 243 new HH-60Ds. The GAO put up the first effort to stop the big HH-60 buy. The GAO report noted a lack of confidence in the helicopter's ability to perform combat rescue with acceptable losses. The report also stated the force would be too small and that MAC had failed to accounted for related cost such as HC-130 refueling tankers and new simulators. The ARRS and Air Force rebuttals overrode the report and the program to buy 243 HH-60Ds remained. In addition ARRS was successful in getting modifications approved for 20 HC-130Hs to refueling tanker configuration.\textsuperscript{81} The ARRS was looking forward to building the combat rescue force but shortly after being combined in the 23rd AF the wheels came off the proposed HH-60D program.

After the AF established the 23rd AF, the commander of the 2nd Air Division (AD) wanted HH-53Es instead of HH-60D aircraft.\textsuperscript{82} The 23rd had fought too long to drop the H-60 buy and therefore continued to push their 1982 decisions on both HH-60s and tanker modifications. The HH-60 program again reached a critical phase in 1983 and CINCMAC made a personal plea to the Air Force Council avoiding a total cut in the program. The AF compromise was to program 69 HH-60D and 86 HH-60E reducing total HH-60s from 243 to 155 new aircraft. The HH-60D was quite a machine with Inertial Navigation System(INS), terrain following/avoidance radar, and forward looking infrared equipment. The scaled down version of the HH-60E was basically just another HH-60A. There was still
contention in 23rd whether the HH-53E would be a more suitable aircraft but MAC had put years into the HH-60 development so CINCMAC stood firm on the HH-60 program.\textsuperscript{83} To ARRS's dismay, the FY1984 Congress cut procurement funds to the HH-60 program delaying any production for another year. Congressional decisions again delayed ARRS's acquisition of a viable combat rescue platform.

Rescue forces (RESF) took three steps backwards in October 1983. One, when 23rd reduced ARRS function to running a the Rescue Coordination Center and supervision of the new worldwide Search and Rescue Satellite (SARSAT) system. The 23rd/CC made this decision to reduce job duplication and make more space at headquarters. All wings reported directly to the 23rd with the exception of the only special operations wing, 1 SOW, which continued to report to the 2nd AD. The 2nd AD reported to 23rd AF. The second event occurred when the command moved the test function from the 1550th test wing at Kirtland to Hurlburt forming a single test center for SOF and RESF. The Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC) worked directly for HQ MAC but its commander was also the 2nd AD commander. The third event was the SOF participation in Operation URGENT FURY, the rescue operations in Granada. Congress, who already had its watchful eyes on the services support of special operations, would now be looking closer.

URGENT FURY AND THE SPOTLIGHT AGAIN GOES TO SOF

Only a few weeks before URGENT FURY the Secretary of Defense reiterated "top level interest and concern relating to the special operations forces." In an address by Paul Thayer, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the top management of OSD, the JCS and the service secretaries, he listed four requirements for a special operations program.

1. Necessary force expansion and enhancements
2. Collateral activities will be enhanced
3. Resource allocation priority to SOF
4. Resource decisions for SOF once made by SECDEF will not be changed or reduced
HQ USAF directed MAC to assist their HQ in the development of a Special Operations Master Plan. They submitted the plan to the Principal Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The plan would include information and proposals for the development of SOF to the year 2000. The tasking by HQ added "almost as a postscript" that this information would also include Combat Rescue Force structure. SOF, the little dog, was, due to external pressures from DOD and Congress, rapidly growing in importance and becoming the big dog in 23rd AF.

Special operations was only a small part of 23rd AF in terms of aircraft. Out of a total of 361 aircraft, the 2nd AD, or, SOF claimed only 43. In 1984 Congress was unimpressed to find SOF's "rubber on the ramp" totaled less than it did after the Iran rescue attempt. The military's lack of attention to SOF frustrated Congress. Programs as the MC-130H, Combat Talon II, had been "slipped by the Air Force and therefore significantly delayed." The ARRS, although in possession of numerous aircraft, had no helicopter functional for combat rescue. The demise of the HH-60 program portrays the slow death of Rescue forces. During April 1984, the Air Force Council scaled back the HH-60 program from 155 to 99 aircraft. The biggest factor in the scale-back was the 22 million dollar price tag. The AF further reduced the 99 HH-60Ds to 90 HH-60As. The HH-60As were much less sophisticated and less capable but had a cost of only 10 million each. By August 1985 the Air Force Council eliminated the HH-60 program altogether. General Thomas M Ryan, Jr., CINCMAC, fought the Council's decision but could find no money for his HH-60s.

Verne Orr, Secretary of the AF explained the reason the AF did not support the HH-60 program in an interview published in the November 1984 Armed Forces Journal. He stated he was worried about transferring SOF helicopters to the Army and that the Air Force will have to do SAR with fewer full up or "the bare Nighthawk" helicopters. His concern of transferring SOF helicopters to the Army was initiative 17. Initiative 17 was one of 31 Joint initiatives agreed to by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. Initiative 17 published in May 1984, would have handed the Air Forces SOF
helicopter mission to the Army. Even Army SOF could not support this agreement because the Air Force had the only all weather, long range air refuelable helicopter and the only tankers to support the refueling. Congressman Earl Hutto and Congressman Dan Daniel had a conference with the Army and Air Force Chiefs on 3 December 1984 and temporarily suspended initiative 17.\textsuperscript{88} The Orr interview indirectly shows top Air Force management concern was for SOF and not with ARRS. SOF was the rising star of 23rd Air Force.

INITIATIVE 17 FINALLY PUT TO REST

The Services by 1984 were focused on terrorist activities and the big war with the Soviet Union and had reason to doubt the future of rescue in a MRC. The last stages of the Southeast Asia conflict the enemy got more manpads and better AAA. The helicopter doing CSAR seemed increasingly risky. The tragic helicopter losses during "Mayaguez" seemed to mark the end of helicopters in a modern battlefield. "In 1985 the war fighting CINCs were convinced the future battlefield was too lethal for the traditional quick reaction, stand-by type CSAR."\textsuperscript{89} The focus will be keeping helicopters for special operations.

The Defense Resources Board on 4 September 1985 issued a decision that Air Force would retain the long-range helicopter support instead of giving the mission to the Army and the AF would modify more H-53s to the enhanced PAVE LOW III modification.\textsuperscript{90} The decision to field more Pave Low IIIs ended the initiative 17 controversy. The Air Force now had the "go light" and congressional support to enhance its Special Operations forces.

Congress was threatening the entire Service structure if the Services continued to fail in making noticeable improvements to SOF. Representative Dan Daniel (D-Va), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, published an article in Armed Forces Journal proposing SOF as the "sixth service," (Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard being the other five.) This article published in August 1985 stated:
For the last four years, the current Administration has been actively pursuing the revitalization of our SOF capability. The Secretary of Defense has assigned the highest priority to this effort. Congressional support has been strong (and is growing); media attention has been intense (and generally favorable); and public interest is intensifying.\footnote{91}

All the services were keenly aware SOF must get the attention and resources it needed. For the Air Force, the quickest way to build on the SOF helicopter structure was to use the existing equipment that was currently in Air Rescue units. The need to transfer Rescue's best equipment to SOF may have been the understanding of many in key staff including the new 23rd AF commander Major General Robert B. Patterson.

General Patterson took over 23rd AF on 20 September 1985. Within months of taking command he developed a program called "Forward Look" that would do much to quickly enhance the SOF force structure and be the final blow to air rescue's combat capability. General Duane H. Cassidy, CINCMAC, quickly approved Forward Look on 30 December 1985. The Air Force Council approved Forward Look on 28 May 1986.\footnote{92}

The implementation of Forward Look would increase Air Force's SOF wings from one to three. It would absorb all of ARRS's active duty HC-130 tankers and HH-53s to establish two overseas wings. It also laid out long range planning for what was to be CV-22s. That ARRS could no longer performed combat rescue was a known fact. In a classified 2nd AD study titled "23 AF assessment of Air Force Combat Rescue Capability" all the assets remaining in rescue units were described as non-combat capable. It also stated that SOF could "Conduct combat rescue on a relative priority basis" and the Air Force structure has required that "downed air crews and other personnel requiring recovery must plan to survive and evade (as isolated personnel) until air forces can come get them." In other words, SOF, using detailed planning and covert tactics, would recover air crews.\footnote{93}
USSOCOM ESTABLISHED FORWARD LOOK VALIDATED

Congress approved the 1987 Defense Authorization Bill with amendments introduced by Senators Sam Nunn, William Cohen and Rep Daniel, and the President signed it on 14 October 1986. The law established United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as a unified command. The Forward Look of General Patterson lined up quite well with congressional intent.

Forward Look moved quickly after the Air Force Council approved the plan. On 5 January, the Air Force announced the 23rd Air Force would be moving to Hurlburt Field. This move came at the time of budget cuts in the Air Force. By moving to Hurlburt, the 23rd would be able to inactivate the 2nd AD. The myth of rescue trying to takeover SOF to enhance rescue was still strong at Hurlburt and there was much resentment when 23rd AF announced the move. The 1st SOW after years of waiting was on the verge of moving into their new headquarters building. To the dismay of SOF, the 1st SOW was to stay in their old unconsolidated locations while "MAC" took their long awaited structure.94

FATHER OF AFSOC

General Patterson knew about the entrenched feelings of his special operators and was aware he was having difficulty bringing "high quality" special operators to 23rd at Scott AFB due to their anticipation of being lost in the MAC system. "Patterson knew that to be accepted by the 'SOF Mafia,' he had to locate his headquarters at the heart of AF SOF."95 The 23rd AF inactivated the 2nd AD on 1 February 1987. The 2nd AD personnel transferred on paper to a 23nd operation location "H". This Hurlburt operating location served as a personnel buildup location for the move of 23rd AF to Hurlburt. The 23rd AF move the Hurlburt was officially complete on 1 August 1987.96 The 23rd now had a distinct "SOF" look to its staff and its future.

On 16 April 1987 DOD established the new unified command, the United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM. To many in SOF General Patterson is the father of AFSOC. He published a directive explaining the relationships of MAC, USSOCOM, and other
unified commands. The directive informally designated the Air Force component of USSOCOM the Air Force Special Operations Command. The "Forward Look" program would rapidly separate the combat capable equipment from RESF to fill needed SOF resources.

Forward Look left ARRS with no active duty tankers and only one overseas combat mobility rescue squadron in the Pacific. The 23rd's SOF now had three wings, two of which were overseas. ARRS, which started in 1981 with three wings now only had one.
ARRS ALMOST DEAD BUT THE HEART IS STILL BEATING

AFSOC growth left no combat capability for ARRS. The only helicopters remaining in rescue squadrons were considered non combat capable. Forward Look left RESF no active duty tankers and inadequate helicopters. The active ARRS force structure now contributed to only 28% of ARRS's capability. This disproportional "Total Force," continues to haunt RESF's active duty components today by causing a discouraging TDY rate to the active force.

Two factors tend to be the most influential on U.S. national security decision making: the decision maker's perception of the threat before the United States and his assessment of what the nation is willing or able, to afford in meeting the threat.—Maurice A. Mallin

Who in 23rd was number one in the eyes of the Department of Defense was clear after the HH-60 buy dwindled from 250 plus to zero. Major Michael J. Martini, a rescueman, in his Air Command and Staff paper in 1987, expressed some of his fellow rescuemen's feeling during this period. By 1986, all those in rescue now felt "combat rescue was a subsidiary function of special operations." Although the support for ARRS was declining after combining with SOF, many rescue men felt that SOF was where the money was going and in turn they may find new combat survivable equipment in their hands. Even those who saw the benefits of combining noted "a combined SOF-combat rescue organizational arrangement removes a large measure of the 'esprit de corps' that is generated by air rescue units whose sole mission is dedicated to the saving of life."

Colonel Richard Knight, commander of Air Rescue Service from December 1946 through July 1952, said "Once you're a Rescue man you're a missionary for the rest of your life. If it could be done on a voluntary basis, Air Rescue could be manned three times over." Many in the rescue units felt exactly the way Colonel Knight described rescue men in the 50s. Some men from ARRS disliked being transferred to SOF. They believed with the constant tasking by
JCS for special operations exercises would lead to the loss of the rescue capabilities they had achieved. They were proud men of rescue who had served with heroism in the Vietnam conflict and were happy with their life saving mission. Many at 23rd and MAC were also proud of rescue's heritage and would continue the battle to keep rescue alive.

After the Air Force Council stopped the procurement of H-60s for rescue in August 1985, CINCMAC continued to plea his case for the need of HH-60s for rescue. The age and maintenance cost for the older helicopters were other reasons to buy some bare bone H-60s. If ARRS continued on this downward trend, they would not be able to accomplish even austere location recovery for pilots.

When given the "Forward Look" briefing by General Patterson, PACAF's 5th AF commander was not comfortable with the a status of air rescue. The 5th AF presented their rescue concerns to PACAF. Tactical Air Force Commanders addressed the rescue issue at their meeting and the 5th Air Force presented its air rescue road map. This plan suggested ARRS become an agency of MAC. Finally at the 1987 CORONA, the Air Force commanders conceded the need for new rescue aircraft and agreed to buy ten per year at ten million each. Major Donie Wurster at JCS was one of ARRS's prime proponents in the cause for buying new HH-60s and not letting rescue die. Using innovative resource initiatives and some extra Guard funding, Major Wurster found a way to purchase 16 H-60s with air refueling probes. The initial buy occurred in 1988 and the first of the new UH-60As were sent to Sikorsky Support Services for installation of an aerial refueling probe, auxiliary fuel tank, and fuel management panel converting it to the MH-60G. The first MH-60Gs were fielded in 1989 in national guard units according to the congressional buy.

The ongoing buy of MH-60s provided the catalyst to those in MAC that wanted to save ARRS. The toll on rescue in building SOF was great and 23rd had deactivated, redesignated or moved many units during the Forward Look program. MAC, in support of its most decorated unit in Southeast Asia, started to work to resurrect Rescue in their command. USOCOM was now a unified command and MAC
anticipated AFSOC would soon be subordinate to USSOCom. MAC published its Rescue Programming Plan only days before the AF designated the 23rd AF as AFSOC, a major command, on 22 May 1990.

ARRS LEAVES SOF RENAMED ARS AND GIVEN A NEW HOME

Programming Plan 89-18 once again established a Headquarters, designated Air Rescue Service (ARS), which would report directly to MAC, as it did before 1 March 1983. The plan redesignated all ARR squadrons as Air Rescue Squadrons (ARS) on 1 June 1989 and on 1 August 1990 it would remove all rescue forces from 23rd AF and assign them to the ARS. MAC activated the ARS by deactivating the 41st Rescue Weather and Reconnaissance Wing (RWRW) which at this time had all the remaining Air Rescue Squadrons. MAC established the ARS at McClellan AFB using the personnel and equipment of the deactivated 41st RWRW. Also the 1730th and its detachments realigned under ARS at this time.104

The buy of 10 HH-60s per year had saved ARS, but what about its combat rescue tradition? The following is from Annex ALPHA of the MAC Programming Plan 89-18.

b. This new structure will be the focal point for worldwide USAF rescue forces. HQ ARS will be responsible for managing the entire spectrum of USAF rescue to include support for NASA space shuttle mission, SAC missile site support, USAF Combat Survival School support, and worldwide USAF rescue coordination center activity.

GENERAL CASSIDY CLARIFIES ARS MISSION

Although the P-plan did not focus ARS on the need for combat rescue capabilities, the remarks of General Duane H. Cassidy at the ARS activation dinner made it clear.

"We owe it to our men and women to provide them with the best and most capable rescue forces possible--there is no more serious pledge made by any combat
commander than that he will endeavor to rescue a
downed aircrew member or a captured soldier.\textsuperscript{105}
---General Cassidy ARS activation dinner, 8 Aug 1989

General Cassidy was confident that "pride, dedication, bravery and
professionalism would prevail" and secure ARS's future. ARS still
had the weather mission, missile support and space support missions.
The active and air reserve component (ARC) ratio was challenging
with 1200 active personnel and 1900 ARC.\textsuperscript{106} The active helicopter
inventory consisted primarily of the 44 HH-1Hs and UH-1N
helicopters used for missile site support.\textsuperscript{107} With only a few H-3s
and zero active duty HH-60Gs, ARS would have to obtain many new
assets before becoming combat capable. Colonel John Woodruff,
Vice Commander of ARS and later commander, said "there was a
conscious effort to put 'Combat rescue' into all the rescue unit's
mission statement."

The ARS directed all levels to think combat
readiness.\textsuperscript{108}

ARS knew they had a big challenge ahead. They identified
their most critical task as finding the manpower and funding to bring
H-60s into the units and finding some active duty tankers. SOF had
stripped ARS of all its active duty tankers. The mission statement
for ARS was reaccomplished in MACR 23-7 and unlike the old 1983
mission statement was "distinct in that it removes any mention of an
ARS's tie to the special operations mission."\textsuperscript{109}

**ARS BEGINS TO REBUILD**

ARS had many things beside combat rescue on their daily
agenda. ARS, in their first full year's history, stated it considered
four units to be combat rescue units, the 71st ARS at Elmendorf AFB,
Alaska, the 33rd ARS at Kadena AB, Japan, the 39th ARS in Osan,
Korea and the 56th ARS at Keflavik, NAS, Iceland. The first active
duty unit (other than the 55 ARR Squadron who is now the 55 SOS, a
SOF unit) to receive the new HH-60G was the 39th ARS at Osan,
Korea, in February 1990. The 71st ARS began transferring its
equipment to 210th ARS, ANG, which activated on 4 APR 1990. In
order to save money and activate other combat rescue units the 71
ARS would deactivate in 1991 and the guard would pick up their peacetime alert requirements for the State of Alaska. The 66th ARS was activated on 1 January 1991 with the new MH-60 and was the "first combat mobility unit based in the Continental United States (CONUS) to fly the MH-60."\textsuperscript{110}

Although the guard received their MH-60s first, they were a long way from deployable. The quick congressional buy of HH-60s resulted in the aircraft coming with no spare parts. The training program stalled due to the lack of parts, simulators and training plans. The Guard’s HH-60s would need many upgrades before they would be combat ready. Late 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the country’s military was spinning up deployments for war, ARS was in a hectic transition and not combat capable. The myth at SOF, that the Guard and the Reserve had combat ready HH-60s was not true.

The 106th Rescue wing was an example. Jim Finkle who was personnel director for this wing had "80-90 percent of all aircrews volunteer for duty". They were "extremely disappointed not to receive the call up." They had received their first HH-60G just before DESERT SHIELD and their crews were not mission ready. He also states "the operation gave everyone a good poke in the eye to wake up and understand the role of the traditional guardsman is no longer one of being a part-timer."

The Air Force Reserve, who owned over 40 percent of ARS resources, would not be combat ready in HH-60Gs until much later. The AFRES ARS did not start their transition to the HH-60Gs until February 1991. The AFRES units used loaner H-60 aircraft starting in May 1991 until their first HH-60G was delivered on January 29, 1992. The AFRES continued receiving HH-60s until 1994.\textsuperscript{111}

In addition to a continued program building the Guard and Reserve forces ARS continued to activate new units. The 305th ARS, an AFRES unit, was deactivated on 1 September 1992 and its resources were transferred to active duty with the activation of the 71 ARS at Patrick AFB. The reactivation of the 71st met one of ARS’s first objectives of finding some active duty HC-130 tankers. The
39th ARS at Misawa AB, AB Japan completed the activation of new squadrons.

The ARS has accomplished a lot since it was reactivated in August 1989. The service had only a few bare bone HH-60s in their guard units. The first active duty units to receive HH-60 were the overseas units in the Pacific and Iceland and it was starting to put HH-60s in the CONUS at Hollomen AFB and Patrick AFB. It established a Combat Rescue School to help guide the units in combat tactics. ARS accomplished the near impossible task of moving AFRES tankers to active duty. It takes time to do all this and build an experience base and instructor core to maintain a safe organization. The criticism of ARS not moving faster to relieve SOF was loud but when one reviews the size and complexity of the task of building a combat force out of nothing they will know all their complaints were not justified. We were lucky to have SOF with their superb all weather long range capability during DESERT STORM but is that not what the 2nd AD said SOF would do in a hostile environment?
DESSERT STORM UNTIL ????:

WORLDWIDE NEEDS

SOCCENT PRIMARY CSAR PROVIDER

Iraq invaded Kuwait at 2 a.m. on 2 August 1990. The invasion shocked the world and it was obvious that the UN would not tolerate the military takeover of the small oil rich nation. In addition, the media expressed concerns of the invasion continuing to Saudi Arabia resulting in Iraq controlling much of the world's oil supply. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) reacted by sending fighters, army paratroopers, aircraft carriers, marine brigades and armored brigades to Saudi Arabia. President Bush at the time did not appear to be contemplating direct military action and stated "our mission is wholly defensive."\textsuperscript{112}

During the first few days after the invasion it appeared that special operations would not be deploying. Many of us felt this was a straight conventional situation therefore we had little chance of participating. The show of force in Saudi Arabia was serving its purpose and the forces deterred Saddam's army from further conquest. President Bush and other world leaders were in agreement that strong economic sanctions would force Iraq to leave Kuwait.\textsuperscript{113} Soon Central Command would give Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT) a task that would involve most of AFSOC's European and CONUS forces.

One week after the invasion two AFSOC personnel, Major Robert Stewart and Captain Randy O'Boyle, reported to augment the USSOCOM staff. These two developed the initial concept of operations for Combat Search and Rescue.\textsuperscript{114} Shortly after their arrival, the AFSOC Commander called Colonel Woodruff to inform ARS that SOF forces were going to provide the combat rescue as decided by the CINC Central Command, CINCCENT. It was a courtesy call to let rescue know AFSOC was not the one deciding to take the primary rescue mission.\textsuperscript{115}

On 13 August 1990 a AFSOC ADVON (advanced echelon) team landed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. After unloading one of three aircraft
they found the plan was already changing and they needed to be in Dhahran. On 15 August there were four MH-53Js in theater ready for special operations or rescue. The HC-130 and the MC-130 tankers arrived between 20-24 August. Airlift for the rest of the rescue forces would be slow because the priority for transport turned to conventional forces after the initial four MH-53Js had arrived. The airlift delays resulted in the last four MH-53s not arriving until 20 September. The MH-60s arrived in theater on 11 September.\textsuperscript{116}

With the arrival of the last MH-53s, the forces that would do special operations and combat rescue in the southern half of Iraq were located at King Fahd,(KFIA), airport. SOF were the first aircraft ever to land at this airport. Initially AFSOC special tactic squadron (STS) personnel ran the control tower and airfield and CENTCOM placed its headquarters here. The place was not empty very long as forces from TAC and Army 101st Aviation Division came in to join the SOF forces. SOCCENT would have eight MH-60Gs, eight MH-53s, four MC-130s and four HC-130 from the AFSOC (1SOW) and several MH-60s and CH-47s from ARSOC. (160SOG) CENTAF also had five of AFSOC's gunships located at King Fahd.

The 39th SOW would be on the north side of Iraq to provide combat rescue for European Command (EUCOM). Theoretically the 39th SOW commander as commander Air Special Operations Europe (COMAIRSOCEUR), reported to Commander Special Operations Command Europe (COMSOCEUR) and SOCCENT was to have tactical control (TACON). This TACON to SOCCENT did not happen because EUCOM would not release his forces.\textsuperscript{117}

The Turkish government did not let the 39th SOW into theater until after the air war started. After many false starts they finally got to Turkey on 17 January with five MH-53s, four HC-130s and two MC-130s. They forward deployed to a place called "Batman." Batman was a "tremendously austere and bare location. "The Turkish government expected the 39th SOW to get out of their planes and pitch tents." No hot food, no running water, raining, 22\textdegree F, ice and mud everywhere made this camping trip miserable for these special operators.\textsuperscript{118}
After the SOCCENT forces had settled down at Fahd they prepared for combat rescue and special operations. "Two special tactics personnel and a (USAF) survival instructor established the Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) within the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC)." The special tactics units were composed of Pararescue (PJ) and combat control team (CCT) personnel. Many STS personnel have previous Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) experience. Many PJs were from ARS. ARS provided 24 pararescuemen from the 1730th Pararescue Squadron to augment AFSOC forces in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This preliminary JRCC established the initial communications network for rescue in the area of responsibility (AOR). After the dedicated JRCC staff from the AFRCC arrived the STS continued to "augment the JRCC" and served as SOCCENT's liaisons.\(^11^9\)

**PREPLANNED SPIDER ROUTES KEY TO SPEED**

The rescue plans for war were completed during October and briefed to those flyers throughout the AOR. Through careful intelligence collection and analysis SOF planners prepared several routes throughout Iraq. These air corridors went throughout the areas of Iraq a helicopter would be able to penetrate. These routes called spider routes had code names for the AWACs and crews to quickly coordinate their flight paths. The aircrews stored the flight plans in the aircraft's computers which *allowed quick reaction launches*. The planners sectioned Iraq into areas where rescue would be possible in daylight conditions, where rescue was only probable at night, and where rescue would be unlikely. AFSOCCENT briefed these areas to the crews in hopes they had a chance to point their aircraft in the correct direction prior to punching. This proved to be a good system but constant updating of threats was critical.

**COMBAT RESCUE NOT CSAR**

I use combat rescue and not CSAR when I discuss SOF's initial activities in DESERT SHIELD and STORM for a reason. Early in our planning stages the staff made a determination that our SOF
helicopters would not go on search missions. The plan was not to go after a survivor unless we knew he had a good chance of being alive and a reasonable location fix. We would depend on the AWACs to direct fighters to the area. The fighters would in turn use their radio and the survivors' beacons to locate the position. When the fighters or AWACs passed the position to the helicopters the helicopters would move to the survivor. Our initial intention was not to move into hostile airspace unless we had some type of radio contact with the survivor. This idea seemed good but as the war progressed we found the SOF helicopters searching in "bad guy" territory without any contact.

The rescue plan would position the SOCCENT helicopters at five different forward operating locations (FOL) on Iraq's southern border. The locations supported out of King Fahd were King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Rafha, Al Jouf and Arar. Ras Al Mishab on the Kuwaiti border was also utilized as a FOL. SOCEUR would be responsible for the north half of Iraq a West-East line drawn across Iraq just North of Baghdad. SOCEUR's FOL was Batman less than a hundred miles from the northern border.

**AFRES SOF UNIT ACTIVATED AUGMENTED BY ARS**

When and if the war was ever going to start was on every one's mind as the weeks rolled by. The MH-60Gs in country needed to get home in early January for some important modifications to integrate GPS and FLIR into their navigation systems. ARS had only one mobility unit not in transition, the 33rd which belonged to Pacific Command. To accomplish this rotation the AFSOC/DO requested the Air Force activate the 71st SOS (AFRES) from Davis Monthan with their H-3s. "The general idea was to activate five HH-3s and eight crews." When the 71st SOS got word that the DOD may activate them they let AFSOC know that they had only "three night tactically qualified crews and two mission ready aircraft." The unit said it could have up to four mission ready crews and would need to borrow two aircraft to make five. There were plenty of volunteers from active ARS to fill the void. "Seven pilots and five flight engineers from ARS were selected." These ARS men "provided 39 percent of
the pilots, 29 percent of the engineers and 40 percent of the flight time" for the 71st SOS while in the AOR.¹²⁰

SAREX

SOCCENT accomplished several Search and Rescue Exercises (SAREX) before the air war began. The exercises would involve pilots from the Air Force fighter units that acted as survivors. The SAREXs failed to bring in fighters such as A-10 as rescue escorts. (Rescort, traditionally have call sign "SANDY") This is an opportunity SOF missed and later A-10s proved to be highly effective in the search and rescort role. The A-10 did work with the gunships on close air support exercises ¹²¹ but the coordination was easier because both A-10s and AC-130 were CENTAF assets. The SAREX's were quite useful in the establishment of multiple communication networks, coordination with the coalition forces for their ISOPREP information, and working with the JRCC and TACC at Riyadh.

On 17 January all forces were in place and special operations had the honor of starting the war, along with their joint partners the Army Apaches, by destroying two radar sites 23 miles inside Iraq. They accomplished this mission flawlessly and at 22 minutes before H-hour they opened the door for air operations.¹²² Although not considered a rescue mission we could credit this first mission of the air war with SOF's most "saves." The hit reduced the CSAR taskings on night one of the air war to zero. The coalition air forces flew 2,388 sorties ¹²³ on the opening night of the war. One Navy F/A-18 was reported lost and the pilot was considered unrecoverable.

ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY NEEDED FOR FIRST RESCUE TRY

The first combat rescue opportunity was the attempt to rescue a F-16 pilot shot down near Talil Airfield on 19 January 1991. The MH-53s had to penetrate the border in Instrument meteorological conditions flying low to the ground to avoid detection. The mission was not successful. They searched the shootdown area for nearly 30 minutes as Iraqis began collecting around them with search lights. When SOCCENT knew the Iraqis sighted the helicopters, Brigadier
General George Gray, the commander of SOCCENT's air component ordered the MH-53J home. Later the F-16 pilot revealed the MH-53s had flown close to the Bedouin tent holding him.\textsuperscript{124} The next day SOF made a rescue attempt for another pilot in daylight conditions with the cover of a A-10 escort and F-16 CAP. The MH-53 arrived in the search area and searched for 30 minutes and they made no visual or radio contact.

**FAILURE WITH CORVETTE 03**

On the other side of Iraq the SOCEUR folks didn't get their first rescue opportunity until the next day. Colonel David E. Eberly, known to us as "Corvette 03" was shutdown while hunting scuds in the panhandle northwest of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{125} He was shot down on the night of 19 January in a area too hot and far away to get to from the Southern FOLs. Unfortunately, the MH-53s would not get to Batman until 20 January. The Turkish government would not let them in country until after the war started, so for the first three days of the war there effectively was no rescue capability up north. The first night they tried to launch for Colonel Eberly and his weapons officer Colonel Thomas E. Griffith they found diplomatic clearance from Turkey delaying the takeoff and then problems with passing through Syria. This was a high threat area which would accommodate only a night recovery so when the takeoff delays prevented a night recovery SOCEUR canceled the flight. The next day they tried again and actually went through Syrian airspace prior to receiving diplomatic clearance.\textsuperscript{126} The Iraqis were waiting for them, for as soon as they transmitted for "Corvette 03" the Iraqis greeted them with a barrage of antiaircraft artillery (AAA).\textsuperscript{127}

Colonel Ben E. Josey, Batman's FOL commander, stated "I think we would have picked Corvette 03 up had we been able to get out the night before." The MH-53s had developed an ingress route from the North but without going through Syria there was almost no possibility of getting to the western part of Iraq without detection.\textsuperscript{128} Syrian and Turkish mistrust of special operations is understandable when one looks at their own use of special operations. The question must be asked is if this was a rescue unit instead of a SOF unit would
the mission have gone quicker and would the FOL at Batman have been established earlier. The delays of this mission resulted in an Armed Forces Journal International article "No USAF Combat Rescue Aircraft in Gulf; It Took 72 Hours to Launch One Rescue." The article gave a black eye to the USAF's rescue situation.

FIRST RESCUE "SLATE 46": AIR FORCE SAVES NAVY

On 21 January the JRCC got the call "Slate 46", a F-14 from the USS Saratoga, had been shot down. The AFSOCCENT rescue coordination cell was informed that a A-10 had established voice contact with the pilot. The survivor was 130 miles deep in Iraq, 60 miles northwest of Baghdad. A MH-53 with Captain Tom Trask pilot and Major Mike Homan copilot launched in early daylight for a dangerous three hour round trip to get the pilot. This again was a IMC departure because of dense fog. Two F-15s were directed to provide overhead CAP. The MH-53 got into the area given as the survivors' locations and searched for nearly a half hour until "BINGO" fuel. "Flashbacks of previous save opportunities drew frustration again--wrong location."

Captain Trask's aircraft returned to a Arar field for fuel. The crew was refueling when they were notified that an A-10 not only had radio contact but also a visual. SOCCENT launched two MH-53s to go north for the rescue with two F-16s and two A-10s providing cover. AFSoCCENT watched the mission unfold on the Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS) and placed the helicopters in a safe location while they waited for their escort. The package that would escort their mission became much larger than expected because bad weather prevented many aircraft from dispersing their ordnance. At one time there were 12 F-16s, four A-10s and two F-15s standing by to help the AFSoCCENT helicopters.

Captain Trask had to cross a large four lane highway and did so after waiting for a break in traffic only ten feet above the ground. The AFSoC history tells the rest:

Fifteen minutes later, "One mile now," Slate 46 called after spotting the helicopter. "Ten o'clock," a position 25
mile further north than when they went in the first time. "Roger," Major Homan replied. For the first time in the entire mission, AFSOCCENT had solid voice contact with the survivor. However their elation was quickly changed to apprehension as the Pave Low's left door gunner spoke, "We've got a mover to the west." It was a mud splattered truck with a tarpaulin cover. This had to be a radio direction finding unit.

The A-10 pilot (Sandy) shouted, "the truck is going right at him." Major Homan then called, "Smoke the truck!" The A-10 rolled in on the truck and fired -- destroying the enemy vehicle.

Captain Trask was back on course again, flying north. "Sandy, where's the survivor now,?" Captain Trask called. "Fly right at the smoke," Sandy radioed back. "At the Smoke?," Major Homan questioned. "yes: fly right at the burning truck," said the proud A-10 pilot.

Rearing the helicopter back on its tail, Captain Trask air taxied slowly toward the smoldering vehicle. To his amazement, less than 150 yards away, he saw a man in a green flight suit pop up from a hole. Lieutenant (Lt) Devon Jones of the U.S. Navy stood there with his radio in hand. As soon as the wheels touched gravel two PJs (one from Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and one from McClellan AFB, California) [both PJs from ARS] exited the helicopter, one to assist the downed pilot back to the helicopter, the other providing cover. Within 30 seconds the survivor was on board en route back to Al Jouf Airfield.

Captain Trask had flown over 6.5 hours in enemy territory before this rescue was complete.129

The A-10 pilot that "smoked the truck" had also put in a long day. The A-10, after finding the survivor the first time, returned for fuel and then returned to guide the MH-53 to Lt Jones. Lt Jones after eight hours on the ground had a great team working for him.130 His backseater was not so lucky and was captured around the time the MH-53 was making its first search.

The AFSOCCENT did not concentrate on working with the A-10 initially while in DESERT SHIELD. The concept of teaming with the A-
10s took shape as the results of coordinating A-10 and SOF helicopter scud hunt and destroy teams. "We started working A-10s as Sandys with much more enthusiasm after we deployed to Al Jouf and realized what a great CSAR asset they were." The F-15s and the F-16s could not hold a candle to the A-10s capabilities in the Sandy role.\textsuperscript{131}

**ARMY SAVES AIR FORCE--NAVY SAVES AIR FORCE**

The AFSOCCENT had its "only other save on 17 February" when two MH-60s launched and located a F-16 pilot shot down 40 miles across the border. An Army CH-47 from the 160th SOAR picked up the F-16 pilot and returned the pilot to KKMC. The round trip took less than an hour.\textsuperscript{132} It was reported later that the helicopters radar warning receiver was used to avoid a threat on their return and two IR rockets were fired which the IR jammers made ineffective.\textsuperscript{133}

There was also a save by the Navy during the war. On 23 January an Air Force F-16 pilot ejected over the Northern Arabian Gulf and the Navy launched a SH-60 Seahawk to find and rescue him. The entire mission took only 35 minutes.\textsuperscript{134}

**DEDICATED RESCUE PREVENTS ADVENTITIOUS LOSSES**

The value we Americans hold to another human's life can not be overstated. The desire to save a life sometimes overcomes rationalization. Historically rescue has lived up to its motto, "That Others May Live," by giving the ultimate sacrifice. Since the Korean conflict, where helicopters were first used for combat rescue, the battlefield has become increasingly dangerous for slow moving helicopters.

Helicopters were first used for rescue in the Korean conflict. The rescue pilot flying the mission made the determination of what risk was acceptable. Many pilots chose to attempt rescues that their commanders probably would not have directed due to high risk. The Korean war was quite successful for Detachment F, Air Force's only helicopter unit designated to rescue downed airmen. This unit was credited with 102 aircrew rescues from behind enemy lines. Detachment F lost only three crews throughout the war and only two
of those were lost to enemy action. Today's battlefield is too lethal to give the crew the "GO" decision to make alone. In our era of expanding information the RESF commander with the facts needs to step forward on rescue decisions.

Without dedicated combat rescue the stories like "Bat 22" or more recently "Bengal one-five", will end with the same degree of tragedy. Bengal one-five was an unnecessary event that resulted in the loss of five crew members and capture of three when Iraqis shot down their Army Black Hawk in DESERT STORM. The thrill of saving a life was overpowering to the crew. One of the crew who survived, Major Rhonda Cornum, describes how the crew got spun up in doing this impossible rescue in her book that she wrote after the DESERT STORM.

She explains the "Jazz (excitement) of rescue" after a Sgt Troy Dunlap found out they were going on a rescue mission and begged for permission to join the seven person crew.

I understood how Dunlap felt: this was the real thing, combat search and rescue. There was no mission that we trained for that was more important, more exciting, or more dangerous. My heart beat faster, and my stomach tighten. This was it. We were doing it for real.

Major Cornum explains that the reason they were doing the rescue was the special operations units who were in charge of CSAR could not get there in time or were not in the area. Actually, the area was too hot and SOF described it as a "RED" zone that made successful rescue unlikely and probably impossible in a daylight operation. A trained combat rescue unit air crew most likely would have checked the latest intelligence before proceeding. If the fog of battle in the fast moving battle field prevented accurate updates a rescort will survey the area before just heading to coordinates with a helicopter in daylight.

The F-16 pilot which Bengal one-five was going to rescue along with Bangle's three survivors were returned from Iraq after being held captive for eight days. Bengal one-five took this risk because
they understood dedicated rescue forces were not available for the F-16 pickup. One must wonder what would happen in a war when dedicated rescue command and control and forces trained in combat Search and Rescue are not available.

When Saddam Hussan refused to get out of Kuwait by the established deadline it was obvious that the coalition would start a ground war and it did so on 23 February. CENTCOM and SOCCENT tasked AFSCC and SOCCENT for several infiltration and exfiltration missions, although AFSOC was still on alert for CSAR. The success of the ground war exceeded all of our expectations and by 27 February, Iraq agreed to the terms of the cease fire. SOF had been in the AOR for nearly six months and they expected orders to returned to the states soon. After six months of having units in the desert their training had significant shortfalls. The lack of mountains had degraded our AFSOC unit's capabilities. The lack of airdrops and austere airland missions were degrading the C-130s capabilities. In addition all units were getting significant changeovers in personnel so getting back to the States meant a lot more than just personal preferences.

SAUDI ARABIA, TURKEY NOW BOSNIA BLEEDING AFSOC

AFSOC tanker and helicopter forces were to remain in Saudi Arabia and in Turkey for rescue support while the coalition enforced the UN's sanctions. As if the post DESERT STORM commitments were not enough, the situation in Bosnia started making demands on the AFSOC forces. The airlift operation PROVIDE PROMISE began on February 28, 1993. The United Nation's imposed the "no fly zone" during October 1992\(^1\) and operation. DENY FLIGHT, the operation enforcing the sanctions, began with its first flight of F-15s over Bosnia April 12, 1993.\(^2\) EUCOM again tasked AFSOC to provide tankers and helicopters for these operations. AFSOC desperately needed some relief from CSAR to reach its full combat potential.

ARS TAKES THE IRAQ MISSION

The ARS finally built a force structure large enough to take the mission from Saudi Arabia in early February 1993 four months prior
to their allowed transition period. Also, the ARS and all its subordinate rescue units now called Rescue Squadrons (RQS) transferred to ACC during February 1993. The ACC's RQSs took over the mission from Turkey during the spring of 1996, over five years after DESERT STORM.

ONGOING RESCUE OPPORTUNITIES AFTER DESERT STORM

These peacekeeping deployments were not without some rescue opportunities. AFSOC selected Major Todd A. Bolger as AFSOC's pilot of the year 1995 for his crew's action on 14-15 April 1995. The JTF commander gave Turkey alert helicopters the mission to pick up the remains of 26 coalition victims after the tragic shootdown of two Army Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq. The formation of MH-60s led in by Major Bolger found the crash sites just before sunset allowing the dignity of recovering all 26 bodies before sunrise the following day. One of the crash sites was on such steep terrain that the helicopters could not possibly land. Major Bolger, using NVGs, placed his air refueling probe between two trees to get close enough to use the hoist to recover the bodies. To accomplish this mission the helicopters took fuel from the HC-130's four times and Major Bolger's crew logged 15.3 hours of flying time.\textsuperscript{142}

The HC-130s covering overhead kept vital communications going between the JTF/CC and the helicopters and they kept the helicopters refueled. It was just the HC-130s and H-60Gs in Iraq alone at night with NVGs. The fighters and AWACs did not have the fuel and crew day to stay with the AFSOC aircraft. There were Iraqi troops reported near the shootdown location and both HC-130s and MH-60s observed small arms fire while egressing the area. The crews felt satisfaction in getting the victims out of the area before the Iraqis could interfere.\textsuperscript{143}

BOSNIA O'GRADY NO QUESTION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

"I'm alive, I'm alive!" was the call that came from Captain Scott O'Grady to his squadron mate, Captain T. O. Hanford flying overhead. This call came six days after his shootdown on 2 June 1995, and
resulted in one of the most spectacular and publicized rescues ever. Forty aircraft launched to bring Captain O'Grady to safety. "The cost of weapons and machinery used to find and rescue the downed pilot was, conservatively estimated, $6 billion." The rescue helicopters consisted of two CH-53E Sea Stallions with 41 marines and two AH-1W Seacobra gunships. In addition to these marine helicopters, Air Force, Navy and Marines put fighters, radar jammers and AWACs over head. The daylight mission was successful. The nation rejoiced at the recovery of one of their flying heroes, and the safe return of those that rescued him. No one complained about the cost!

If any mission exemplifies the extraordinary value the US public places on saving a life this would be the one. The mission also illustrates the eagerness all of us in the military have to participate in a combat rescue. Leadership must evaluate the hype of getting a save with some degree of rationale. The helicopters selected for this mission must not have the Personnel Locator System (PLS) because once they arrived in the area O'Grady had to "pop smoke," which would have certainly compromised his location if Bosnian Serbs were nearby. Morning fog was a blanket shielding the helicopters from guns below as they skimmed above the layer. The same fog could have been disastrous if the CH-53s encountered it in the objective area. The final matter is the unimaginable criticism that the public would give the military had the Bosnian Serbs shot down one of the helicopters with the young Marines, average age 19 years. The possibility was real, on egress "racing just above the fog, the helos suddenly burst into clear air" and the first of three surface to air missiles went past the left. The helicopters also began to take gunfire from below. Reports state that the enemy fired two more SAMs at the helicopters. One bullet went into a helicopter then into a marine's canteen. The Marines found bullet holes in the rotor blades after landing.

Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic's aide stated, "We understood this was a humanitarian mission and orders went out not to interfere." The reader should take the aide's statement with much doubt, but I mention this because this mission's success may
not be the "good" example of a CSAR procedures that the Air Force should use in the future.

BOSNIA AGAIN ALL WEATHER PLATFORM STILL NEEDED

UN forces supporting rescue had the opportunity to try to recover the two French Pilots, Ebro 33, on September 6-8. The first attempt was led by Navy HH-60s from the USS Theodore Roosevelt with Air Force MH-53Js as backup. The HH-60s turned back due to bad weather. One of the helicopters was hit by ground fire. The next attempt, led by the AFSOC MH-53Js, made it into the area but bad weather and gunfire were factors in giving up the search. On the third attempt the helicopters searched the area and groundfire injured two AFSOC crew members the egress. On all three missions a small strike package including AC-130, A-10s and F-18 as well as airborne tankers supported the helicopters. All three attempts were NVG and terrain radar type missions.\textsuperscript{148} The missions failed from the beginning, as the Bosnian Serbs had captured the two Frenchmen after they parachuted from their aircraft on August 30. The two flyers were released on 12 December 1995 just before the signing of the Bosnian Peace Accord in Paris.\textsuperscript{149} Rumor is, that the desire to save these aviators resulted in an over optimistic data interpretation which resulted in the rescue attempts. Again this is another example how the passion of saving another human can overwhelm good judgment.

The past few years' events prove trained combat rescue forces and leadership skills are needed continuously for military operations other than war. Let us not have any doubt that combat rescue and personnel recovery are two areas of increasing public support. Now is the time to mold an enviable Air Force combat rescue force and an organizational structure that has advocacy. CSAR is not an item to put on the shelf until the next war anymore. The AFSOC has sophisticated forces for CSAR but continuous deployments are not possible with current AFSOC force structure with today's SOF demands.

It was not long after the war that USSOCOM started seeing the effect of numerous combat rescue commitments on its AFSOC units.
"In the spring of 1991, the Deputy CINC, USSOCOM, sent a letter to Air Forces Chief of Staff for Operations (XO) outlining issues that should be looked at by the Air Force with regards to CSAR."\textsuperscript{150} The USSOCOM letter stated that the CSAR mission in CENTCOM was having a negative impact on SOF. Now in 1996, AFSOC finds itself still in the CSAR business. The GAO echoed SOF concern in a report to Congress in 1994 stating that constant CSAR commitments can reduce SOF readiness. ACC must take the peacetime challenge.
ACC TAKING THE RESCUE CHALLENGE

When the ARS left SOF to become an organization reporting directly to MAC it had only a skeletal force. The buy of HH-60s was just starting to put some new combat capable equipment on the ramp. Three years later ARS had made great strides in rebuilding the force. The ARS activated another overseas unit for PACAF with the 39th Rescue Squadron, RQS\textsuperscript{151}, at Misawa AB, Japan. ARS activated the 66th RQS, Nellis AFB in January 1991 and 48th RQS at Holloman AFB, New Mexico in February 1993. The 66th and 48th were the first CONUS mobility capable helicopter squadrons to come after "Forward Look." ARS had started the initiative to bring the 41st RQS from a NASA support unit to full combat mobility. Every ARS rescue squadron received or was scheduled to receive the new HH-60. The ARS got its active duty tankers with the deactivation of the 305th ARS, AFRES, and transfer of their HC-130s to active duty in 1992. ARS had built five new squadrons, four in the CONUS, which Combat Air Forces (CAF) needed to meet the worlds ongoing deployments.\textsuperscript{152}

ARS COMMANDER SEEKS VOICE FOR RESCUE IN ACC

Concerned about the rescue units becoming too fractionalized thus preventing any effective advocacy, Colonel John Woodruff, Commander of ARS, asked ACC to combine all rescue squadrons under one wing. The wing would provide centralized rapid rescue mobility and provided career growth billets for rescue personnel. His first choice was Beal AFB since the base had room and the mountain training was excellent and convenient. Other alternatives were Nellis AFB and Patrick AFB. The one rescue wing was not supported by the ACC.

Rescue needed a central home. The ARS had about 125 people taking care of the rescue mission. ARS proposed the next option. Headquarters ARS would organize as a new Combat Rescue School under the Weapon and Tactics Center and the 57th Fighter Wing.\textsuperscript{153} The school would develop tactics, complete test and evaluation, and accomplish advanced training. Colonel Woodruff was hoping that the
school would offer some rescue advocacy and rescue would continue to develop.\textsuperscript{154}

The March 1993 issue of \textit{Combat Edge} described the realignment of rescue to the Combat Air Forces (CAF) or ACC. It listed HQ ARS, AFRCC, and 16 flying squadrons. Eight squadrons were missile site support units flying H-1s. ACC transferred the H-1s to United States Space Command on 1 July 1993. The remaining active flying units are as follows:

- 33rd Rescue Squadron
- 38th Rescue Squadron
- 39th Rescue Squadron
- 41st Rescue Squadron
- 48th Rescue Squadron
- 56th Rescue Squadron
- 66th Rescue Squadron
- 71st Rescue Squadron

KADENA AB, JAPAN
OSAN AB, KOREA
MISAWA AB, JAPAN
PATRICK AFB, FL
HOLLOMAN AFB, NM
KEFLAVIK AB, ICELAND
NELLIS AFB, NV
PATRICK AFB, FL

The 71st RQS was the only HC-130 tanker squadron in active ARS.

The AFRES units were all under the 4th Air Force's 939th rescue wing with the 304th RQS and 301st RQS flying both tankers and HH-60s. In October 1993 the wing transferred to the 10th AF and on 1 January 1994 the 71 SOS at Davis Monthan became the 305th RQS with HH-60s,\textsuperscript{155} a first for rescue taking something from SOF. The ANG had three rescue units the 210th RQS in Alaska, 106th Rescue Group(RQG) in New York and the 129th RQG, California all guard units had tankers and HH-60s.\textsuperscript{156}

The 66th RQS and the 71st RQS were the only combat capable active duty units available and they were the first RESF deployment to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. The other RESF unit's availability depended on the theater CINC's discretion or with ANG and AFRES approval. AFRES didn't get the last of its HH-60s until 1994. The 71st SOS AFRES was helping with the AFSOC's Turkey rescue alert deployments until they transferred to rescue mission in 1994 and were return to train for the conversion. The unit at Holloman was only recently activated and needed time to develop.

The AFRCC moved to Langley AFB on 15 September 1993. Although it provides guidance for the multiple theater RCCs, the
theater RCCs belong to the CINCs. The staff at ACC believe the command and control of RCCs is not a problem as they provide standardized guidance and instruction as well as deployable personnel to build JRCCs during contingencies. The move to Langley was also beneficial since the boss (ACC) is right down the hall.¹⁵⁷

PACAF REDUCES CAPABILITY

The PACAF received all the overseas RQS except the one at Keflavik, Iceland. ARS gave PACAF three units when rescue transferred to ACC. The Misawa RQS, the number one choice for PACAF’s rescue roadmap, recently deactivated and surprisingly, the unit at Osan Korea also deactivated. Now the 33rd RQS from Kadena AB Japan flies to these locations and sets alerts when tasked. Closing the combat rescue unit at Osan is baffling. Osan offers a much better and more challenging environment for training. The logistics of moving the helicopters from PACAF’s only RSQ to Kadena to the mountains is impractical.¹⁵⁸ Staying combat ready for those Korean hills and weather will be difficult from Kadena AB.

RESCUE LOSES CENTRALIZED VOICE: WIC IS FORMED

The place of advocacy for the rescue forces did not last long. The combat weapons school started as the "Center of Excellence," activated on July 2, 1993. The school divided itself into three divisions, advanced training, tactics development, and test and evaluation. Colonel Woodruff’s desire to bring 120 personnel was not to be and the center’s maximum personnel were around 55. The Center’s commander was equivalent to a group commander at this juncture.

The school never really got out of the chocks in the HC-130 training program and the HH-60G training program had just built up to 4 students when a review by ACC weapons school reviewed the curriculum. The school did not meet the expected standards of a Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) and 57th FW made big changes.

During July of 1995 the organization changed drastically. The HC-130 program moved to become the responsibility of Combat Airdrop School at Little Rock AFB. The test division deactivated and
a few people would move to a HH-60G section in the 57th Test Group. The HH-60G advanced training would become another WIC under the Weapons School. The commander of the WIC is a squadron commander billet with only 16 personnel assigned. The changes significantly reduced the position of advocacy for Rescue. Now only about half of the 56 people who started the Center remained.

"What we may have lost in advocacy, has made up by the greatly increased quality graduate we now produce," proudly states Lieutenant Colonel Tom Finnegan, commander for the HH-60G WIC. The students' standards for course completion are much higher than they were before the WIC. The students are not just better pilots but they also know more about CAF command and control. They also know more about each fighter's capability, along with greater weapon knowledge. These guys can go work in a JAFACC and fit right in with the fighter.

The benefit of HH-60 WIC working together with the fighter community on a daily basis enhanced the transition to ACC. The fighter weapon school graduate patch is the mark of ACC's highest flying standard. The opportunities for these graduates should be good in the future. The patch is going to be difficult for a HH-60G pilot to acquire, not only because of the high standards, but also because of the class availability.

The WIC is only able to handle four students per class with each class lasting six months. The entry level experience also reduces the opportunity for most of the inexperienced HH-60 force so the classes may have only three students. The Rescue squadron's have 30 plus positions coded for weapon school graduates. Unfortunately this means it will be difficult to get a cross flow of RESF's best into SOF because ACC will not release them to another command. The WIC's emphasis on flying is much different from what SOF would emphasize. Out of 22 required flights only six are night and six are defensive air to air. The air to air emphasis surely indicates the HH-60s are fitting right in with ACC.\textsuperscript{159}

The WIC offers no training for enlisted crew members. The unavailability of enlisted training for this weapon system is troubling. For example, when asked why the WIC did so much
defensive air the reply was that the mission develops coordination with the pilots and their enlisted gunners and engineers. But, without the enlisted crew members participating, there is not much benefit in this exercise. The staff acknowledge they would like a mechanism to train gunners and engineers and Lt. Col. Finnegan is pursuing that issue.

The HH-60 personnel appreciate being in ACC and showed pride in their accomplishments in the past two years. They feel they are ready for combat recovery. Overall they will bring an emphasis in the CAF that will have all fighters ready to assist in CSAR. The WIC holds a great deal of confidence in the SARTF procedures. Their ability to work together with the fighters would have been a benefit during DESERT STORM.
CSAR FOR THE NEXT WAR

DOCTRINE AND CONGRESS

Joint Publication 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue does little to encourage jointness in CSAR operations, other than the establishment of a Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). Each service is provides its own CSAR and each service establishes their own rescue coordination center (RCC). The doctrine requires the service keep the JSRC informed and if the task falls outside the Service component's capability then they will notify the JRSC.\textsuperscript{160} Then the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will task another component or multiple components within the joint task force (JTF). The JFC may give the authority and responsibility for this tasking to the JRSC or to the designated commander operating the JRSC.

JFC can give JSRC responsibility to any service component commander's RCC. The example that I think most closely represents what the CINC's would choose is depicted in the publication as shown on the following page.\textsuperscript{161}

The JP 3-50.2 describes each service's current rescue capabilities. The Air Force has the HH-60G or Pave Hawk listed as its primary rescue platform. The concept of operations for the Pave Hawk appears very similar to the special operations concept of operations. The AF section continues to state that the SOF commander controls the Air Force's most capable recovery aircraft\textsuperscript{162} and the tasking of SOF is appropriate when the operation requires the special capabilities of SOF and the priority of recovery warrants a special operation.\textsuperscript{163} Saving a fellow serviceman will always warrant a special operation.

Air Force Doctrine 34 states that the AF component is the most likely candidate for CSAR.

"Today the U.S. Air Force organizes, trains and equips a dedicated CSAR force, which includes aircraft, aircrews, support personnel, and an established command and control mechanism (the RCC). Therefore the AFCC should be prepared to exercise theater CSAR responsibilities.\textsuperscript{164}"
LEGEND:

OPCON/TACON —

COORDINATION ·····

NOTES:

(1) Includes USCG forces assigned to the joint force
(2) Has been designated as JFACC
(3) Has been assigned joint force CSAR responsibilities
(4) Has been designated as JSRC
(5) Also performs component RCC duties as required
(6) CSARTF performing a joint CSAR mission (TACON)

The Air Force does have the best resources for theater CSAR but the SOF commander controls the AF's best rescue aviation assets. Which will the CINC choose for wartime operations?

These doctrine publications are only two years old and still are not keeping up with the current upswing of congressional interest in personnel recovery. Recently the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the armed forces suggested that the Air Force become the executive agent for CSAR. The CORM recommended "that the Secretary expand the Air Force's executive agent responsibilities for
escape and evasion to include responsibility for CSAR. It also suggested the AF develop and build a capability to accomplish CSAR in multiple military operations other than war (MOOTW) and relieve SOF from "day to day" steady-state requirements. The concern of using SOF for CSAR during major military conflicts did not appear to be the issue here. The CORM's concern was using SOF in situations that didn't require SOF's degree of training.

EXECUTIVE AGENT ACC OR JSSA

The executive agent for CSAR is the Air Force. This is an expansion to the previous executive agent responsibility for escape and evasion (E & E.) The AF has tasked E & E to a field operating agency, the Joint Services S.E.R.E Agency (JSSA). (S.E.R.E. is the abbreviation for survival, evasion, resistance and escape.) A field operating agency (FOA) is a subdivision of the Air Force that carries out field activities and has the "administrative and organizational responsibilities" equivalent to a major command. JSSA started its history when the AF made AF/XO the executive agent for joint escape and evasion training. In 1980 AF made AF/IN executive agent for Code of Conduct (COC) oversight. AF/XO later assumed both executive agent duties and formed JSSA as the office of primary responsibility (OPR).

The Secretary of Defense in his 25 August 1995 report to Congress in response to the CORM designated the Air Force as the Executive Agent for CSAR.

The Air Force has been designated the executive agent for Combat Search and Rescue(CSAR). This will ensure one organization is responsible for most CSAR force structure, equipment, and procedures (a few exceptions exist such as the retention of CSAR afloat). Implementation should be completed by November 1995. The Air Force will identify budgetary requirements to support its additional CSAR responsibilities.
JSSR advocated that it should assume the duties to promote interoperability and jointness. CSAR was compatible with the other phases of personnel recovery they were already working. ACC advocated it had the primary CSAR responsibility. The AF gave ACC the responsibility for executive agency for CSAR.

EXECUTIVE AGENT DUTIES ARE JOINT

General Joe Ralston CINCACC in a briefing prepared for the 1996 CORONA in February outlined the AF executive agent responsibilities. The following is directly from one of the briefing slides:

- THE EXECUTIVE AGENT IS NOT INTENDED TO HAVE THE FUNCTION OF MANAGING THE CSAR FORCE STRUCTURE OF ANY SERVICE

The EA emphasis is on jointness, interoperability and making CSAR a part of each CINC's personnel recovery program. The ACC staff has taken up quite a challenge in taking the EA responsibilities while continuing to build their own rescue force.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY

Even as the EA duties are being sorted out, other initiatives for enhancing personnel recovery are being developed. A proposed Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)\textsuperscript{170} requires each CINC to have a standing personnel recovery infrastructure and concept for his theater. The requirement may result in a standing Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) to permit training, development, planning coordination and to conduct theater E&E and personnel recovery operations. Current doctrine does not address the combat recovery of coalition, allied or friendly military. Which service will have CSAR responsibility for these personnel? As we continue to draw down our forces, Coalition warfare will be a must! We must include CSAR when we talk personnel recovery for our allies. CSAR is only one of many facets of personnel recovery as shown in the diagram and definition provided by JCS/J3SOD.
Scope of Personnel Recovery

Personnel Recovery (PR) - The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of captured, missing, or isolated US allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary personnel from uncertain and hostile environments and denied areas.

The attention to personnel recovery continues. The 104th Congress in the FY96 Defense Appropriations Act required the DoD establish an office for missing persons. The office will be under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The OSD has already displayed its interest in CSAR by funding a three year study for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) through the Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E). The study will look at ways to enhance a CINC's capability to conduct CSAR. The recent inputs by Congress and OSD are moving to more preplanned jointness in future conflicts; an issue not emphasized in
our current doctrine. The Congress and OSD with their quest for jointness will scrutinize the CINC's future CSAR effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS and CONCLUSIONS

The Air Force with its rescue assets in ACC and its SOF assets in AFSOC, has the most capable resources for deep battlefield recovery. The question is, "How do we best utilize the forces?" Neither ACC forces, due to limitations in weather capabilities, nor SOF, due to inexperience in search and rescue task force (SARTF) utilization, make an optimum combat rescue force alone. Three options are offered as a solution to give the future CINCs one stop tasking for CSAR. The first option, is to keep the CSAR assets in ACC but enhance their capabilities and organizational structure. The second option is to transfer the rescue assets to AFSOC and make AFSOC/CC the proponent for CSAR. The third option is to keep SOF and Rescue in their current commands and combine assets in war. Today's mission focus and training remain intact. In a conflict that requires the full spectrum of combat recovery, RESF and SOF should be combined as a synergistic team.

ACC KEEPS THE RQS

As of April 1996, RESF is in two of the three current locations requiring deployed rescue forces. These deployments have allowed much of SOF to get back to their ongoing intense training programs. ACC is meeting the directions of the GAO and CORM to relieve SOF of day-to-day SAR.

The biggest benefit of the RESF being in ACC has been the indoctrination of these forces in the Combat Air Forces (CAF). The best example of this indoctrination is at the HH-60 weapons instructor course (WIC). The WIC is teaching the HH-60 pilots how to talk the talk and walk the walk of the ACC pilots. These WIC graduates will be comfortable in a tactical air control center (TACC) or on the joint force air component commander (JFACC) staff. RESF have brought an awareness to the fighter world that on any given strike mission someone may have to stay around to support rescue. They have encouraged development of rescue escort (RESCORT) and use of Sandys to enhance combat rescue. The WIC's integration and standardization of tactics for AWACs, jammers, fighters and bombers
in the search and rescue task force (SARTF) mission will let our rescue forces quickly accomplish a mission similar to the O'Grady rescue.

**DANGER OF SATISFICING**

ACC has done good things for rescue but there is the danger of "satisficing."

Maximization or optimization is replaced by satisficing. In choosing human beings do not consider all alternatives and pick the action with the best consequences. Instead they find a course of action that is "good enough" -- that satisfies. Organizations are happy to find a needle in a haystack rather than searching for the sharpest needle in the haystack.\(^{172}\)

A commander in the Pacific recently stated that there was no need for rescue in a conflict\(^ {173}\) in his theater. He should have stated the problem with a question; "How we could do rescue in his theater?" The question is not easy to answer, but that should not prevent a search for answers. Is this a CAF key leader's example of "satisficing?" Today CAF needs to continue to develop its wartime rescue capability. Three things the rescue forces need most are advocacy, better equipment, and a better distribution of active and reserve component force structure. If ACC does not correct these items then CSAR will remain heavily dependent on SOF.

**CORRECT THE LOSS OF ADVOCACY**

Advocacy was a major concern of Colonel Woodruff when he turned ARS over to ACC. GAO and Congressional influences concerned with the use of MFP11 forces doing MFP2 work has provided the advocacy during the past few years. The little advocacy the Combat Rescue School generated is now stifled. The school which had a 06 billet now is a WIC with a 05 commander. The combat rescue school that originally proposed 120 people now has 16 personnel in the WIC and a few distributed in the host wings testing and tactics divisions. ACC HQ recently dissolved the rescue division (ACC/DOH) to reduce manning.
When you call ACC and ask for the rescue section, those few that know direct you to Lieutenant Colonel Mark W. Hodges. Colonel Hodges is the chief of the integrated product team (IPC) which is sometimes referred to as "Team Combat Rescue." Team Rescue is an effective way to get ideas for the implementation of the rescue force but it has little power. The CSAR executive agent should bring in around 20 to 30 positions including a O6 position, but the EA function is not the answer for advocacy. Under the directions of SECDEF the EA function is not to manage any service's CSAR structure. Rescue forces need advocacy to prevent "satisficing" and open the doors for better equipment.

Air Force's doctrine states that rescue should ensure its capability by "equipping forces with the state-of-the-art weapons." The requirement for all weather capability, speed, such as offered by the CV-22, self defense, and tankers for range have been documented clearly in Vietnam and more recent conflicts. The desire to push the limit is a typical characteristic of a rescuer. Weather is one of those limits that a rescuer will push. In DESERT STORM we lost an Army MH-60G that was making a SF medical evacuation from Iraq. It crashed in IMC near its Saudi FOL killing all on board. The MH-53s needed all weather capability for its first rescue attempt in Iraq.

The tanker force size needs to be increased and some tankers need modifications such as the AFSOC special operations modification. The installation of air refueling receiver systems on the few active duty tankers would do much to enhance the force.

The need for speed was another Southeast Asia finding. The analysis "found that forty-seven percent of all unsuccessful rescues were the result of the slow speed of the helicopters." Who will get CSAR tasking if AFSOC has the only CV-22s? The concept of CAF's A-10s combined with the CV-22 would be an extremely hard to beat team in either SOF or Rescue operations.

Other items needed that are not major ticket items for HH-60s are better guns, enhanced defensive systems, hover infrared suppression system (HIRSS), and better satellite communications.
The ability to communicate real time intelligence to helicopters in flight is a definite need for covert missions.

"TOTAL FORCE" NEEDS ADJUSTMENT

The force structure needs to adjust to allow proper training in active duty units. The HC-130 squadron's rotations to Saudi Arabia allow no time for tactics development and fine tuning flying skills. The active HH-60 helicopter squadrons tasking are doable but the stain is enormous when you have relatively inexperienced aircrews. The Guard and AFRES did not sign up for ongoing operations. It would defeat the purpose of total force even if they were able to accomplish long deployments. The CINCAF is acutely aware of the problem in the tanker force. Active duty stateside crews have deployed up to 194 days per year.\textsuperscript{177} Cooperation with SOF, Rescue and the reserve component is required to solve today's tanker problem. RESF need more active tankers or a better cooperation of AFRES when the active component need to borrow tankers.

In fairness to the reserve component, some of the problems of filling the rescue commitments are the result of the theater CINC's desire for long rotations. The active tanker forces at the 71st RQS are angry that they will remain in Saudi Arabia (Turkey is heaven after being in Saudi 180 days a year) and the ANG and AFRES will go to Turkey. This is not the fault of our citizen soldiers, but a result of CENTCOM policy against short rotations.

The ANG claims to have 29% of the AF rescue capability\textsuperscript{178} and AFRES claims 41%.\textsuperscript{179} If a CINC believes 70% of the AF's combat rescue forces are citizen soldiers, he may hesitate picking CAF forces for rescue. The force may be ready, but will the CINC want them? Here is a concern from the Strategic Studies Institute that can be framed to a CINC's position on rescue;

Concern that all commanders share the responsibility for ordering unprepared troops into battle and the resulting high casualties. Sending active Army soldiers to fight and die is one thing and the American public understands that consequence. Lending unprepared citizen-soldiers into combat without having done
everything possible for their readiness and not having committed every reasonable active duty soldier to battle is another matter and the American public will not accept the consequences.\textsuperscript{180}

There is now only two permanent rescue squadrons located overseas, one at Kadena Japan and the other Keflavik, Iceland. These squadrons are a long way from the fronts. EUCOM still does not have a permanent RQS. RQS must convince the CINC\textsuperscript{s} that they can do the job.

ACC must accomplish some of the previously discussed actions. Without change, the RQS may not even mobilize into theater until after the shooting ends. AFSOC or SOCCENT provided the primary CSAR function in DESERT STORM. Should AFSOC acquire the AF rescue mission and forces today?

A REPEAT MARRIAGE FOR SOF AND RESCUE

Moving all the Air Force's rescue structure to AFSOC is an issue that the CORM studied. The CORM considered assigning USSOCOM the "function for theater-level CSAR." The committee's final recommendation made the Air Force the CSAR executive agent along with the recommendation to increase CSAR forces to meet today's ongoing needs.\textsuperscript{181} AFSOC forces at this time were in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Italy supporting rescue missions. The CORM wanted RESF to take these ongoing missions to allow SOF to concentrate on their missions.

In the early 1980s, the AF advocated placing SOF and rescue together in one command because neither had the equipment they needed to perform their primary mission. The rescue forces were keenly aware that they needed the HH-53H for its all weather capability and SOF needed the tankers for their long range mission. Had the command reviewed support for the original all-weather HH-60 program or even part of it the results of the SOF and Rescue union may have been different.

Combining SOF and Rescue forces today would appear to again have several advantages including:
a. Single logistic management of HH-60s
b. Single logistic management of HC-130s (SOF MC-130P)
c. Greater availability of total active tankers
d. Penetrating Tankers for Rescue
e. More opportunities for leadership development
f. Advocacy in the command staff
g. Standardization of Tactics and Procedures

The benefits of common logistic support is a advantage that is obvious. The peacetime availability of tankers will not be resolved. AFSOC needs all of their tankers to serve the needs of a growing number of Army air refuelable helicopters. Large Joint special operations exercises often require every tanker on the ramp. The Congress, GAO and USSOCOM disapprove MFP11 funded equipment being used for day to day operations that the services should normally provide. AFSOC would be a proponent of better equipment for RQS, but unless funds other than MFP11 are available, the Command will not receive new equipment for rescue.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND OPPORTUNITIES

Bringing rescue to AFSOC does provide more opportunities for leadership development. The recent selection board for future SOF Wing and Group commanders had four personnel selected; three of these were helicopter pilots. Helicopter aircrews will move from rescue to SOF units or vice versa so more command continuity would help opportunities. Wing and Group commander positions are available in AFSOC. ACC has only one rescue group at Patrick AFB and it may disappear when Patrick RSQs move to Moody AFB as announced recently. The number of HH-60 and HC-130 command positions, as well as senior officer positions in AFSOC, is greater than at ACC.

STANDARDIZATION OF TACTICS NO BENEFIT

Standardization of procedures and tactics is not an advantage. "Once a military organization has prepared a set of standard scenarios" they will try to impose that scenario. Putting Rescue in SOF would result in each trying to fit combat recovery in their
"standard scenario." Many aspects of the mission, such as using NVG low level to avoid detection, is similar for both SOF and Rescue. The differences in training are significant. SOF needed to pull out of the day-to-day rescue business because they were falling behind in their intense training requirements. The constant joint interfaces with SOF units throughout the Services require heavy exercise and training commitments. The large NVG tanker and helicopter formations are complex and not required in the realm of rescue.

On the other hand, RQS training involves meticulous coordination with AF tactical forces including Sandys, Rescort and SARTF. The evaluation of the use of different procedures is ongoing at the WIC and Nellis test center. The ACC fighter force now plans for rescue in strike operations and they know to support a possible CSAR, but they must hold some forces in reserve. The coordination we see today with ACC would not be happening if Rescue was not a part of ACC.

Currently SOF and Rescue focus on what they do best. Each will take skills into the next conflict that will enhance our overall capability to conduct combat rescue. The CAF dedicated rescue force can do it all only if they receive significant equipment upgrades. Current Congressional and OSD actions seem to be moving from the doctrine for combat rescue as we look towards jointness for rescuing US soldiers and those of our coalition partners. Rescue and SOF would not benefit in a peacetime consolidation, but a combining SOF and Rescue for the warfighting CINC would offer an expanded combat rescue spectrum. New doctrine must consider the possible synergy of this combination for the warfighting CINCs.

**COMBAT TEAM ; RESCUE AND SOF**

The ACC rescue forces need an all weather capability and more tankers to meet the war fighting CINC's combat rescue needs. ACC will find spending the DOD dollars for these improvements may not be as smart as buying equipment like the F-22. The F-22 should even reduce the need for rescue. Spending for the prevention of shootdowns instead of combat rescue improvements is without question logical. The future AF budgets will determine how much we
can put into Rescue forces. The equipment shortfalls of RQS will require a tremendous investment to develop a capacity to accomplish the full spectrum of CSAR.

SOF will continue to modernize their forces because it is and will continue be involved in activities of national interest. AFSOC is still receiving top level support for their 50 CV-22s that will start being fielded in the next five years. The CINCAF said "the CV-22 will improve our SOF warfighters' abilities to move troops or conduct a rescue operation."\(^{183}\) In the meantime, MH-53s are receiving improvements and life extension modifications. A war would heavily task SOF, but if SOF are not operating at 100% capacity it is inexcusable not using their equipment to augment combat rescue.

**SOF'S DONE IT BEFORE AND EXPECTS IT IN THE FUTURE**

The myth that SOF will only do missions if given 96 hours notice and that SOF refuses to participate in combat recovery is false. The USSOCOM commander has stated CSAR is a "valid tasking by a geographic CINC."\(^{184}\) SOF does desire the 96 hour mission request, planning and execution cycle on a normal complex SOF mission. The 96 hour window is not mandatory or expected for all missions. In contingencies, SOF is constantly making emergency infiltration, exfiltration and resupply. SOF plans carefully how they will safely accomplish emergency missions on short-notice as they did for CSAR in DESERT STORM.

**ADVANTAGES NUMEROUS**

Combining Rescue and SOF forces in wartime will provide the war fighting CINC the ability get the full spectrum of AF combat rescue capability in one stop. The CINC will have the expertise of SARTF, covert capability, all weather capability and tanker support under one operations center. The common umbrella for the helicopter forces resolves the following problems:

- a. Common Logistic support including Army added
- b. Intelligence support that focus on low level and ground order of battle for rescue site
c. Tactical Information Broadcast System and other real
time intelligence capabilities
d. Joint and better dispersal to FOLs
e. Shared communication links
f. Penetrating tankers
g. Senior leadership in command positions that know
helicopters
f. Mission sharing that will enhance both operations
g. Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander
(JSOACC) benefits

There are several commonalities in logistic support for the SOF
and Rescue MH/HH-60Gs and HC-130s. One added benefit will be
common support required for the Special Operation Aviation
Regiment's (SOAR) MH-60.

A war will inundate all operations centers with a massive
amount of intelligence data. The SOF emphasis on data interpretation
for infiltration missions, as well as ground team support, should
provide the aircrews with better information than will be found in
the CAF organization concentrating on the air war. My intelligence
officer in Turkey explained why he spent so much time plotting data
in our operations center; data that the Wing disregarded in their
operations center. The example given was an army division: the
division is at the wing but we needed more, the battalions,
companies even platoons are important when you are flying low
level in a helicopter. The SOF intelligence filter is through AF
planners and Army planners who detail what to expect when we are
low level and when we off load our rescuers in a hostile location.

Getting the right intelligence data to the rescue team is
important. SOF will sometimes place the TIBS on their aircraft to
assure the crew gets the information quickly. TIBS can be on a
tanker with the Airborne Mission commander or directly on the MH-
53. Also AFSOC has developed on board systems to monitor
communications in the area that aircraft are operating. Monitoring
area communications can help determine if the enemy detected the
aircraft.
The more FOLs placed along an enemy's border gives us better opportunity to make a rescue more quickly. Having more helicopters to disperse should offer significant increases in capability for SOF and Rescue. The RESF may be doing both rescue and special operation infiltration, exfiltration and resupply missions in one area and SOF may be in another area where it has to do it all. When the CINC combines forces, SOF can support all weather operations and HH-60s will support operations requiring SARTF procedures. The special operations commander may find a SARTF is the only way to emergency exfiltrate a SF team.

Communications hardware and personnel support can be common in the FOLs. If SOF and Rescue remained separate they probably would end up at the same locations. The communication plans and FOL logistic support for CAF in austere places is a complex problem and it is unreasonable to duplicate this support.

Tanker support is easier for both forces and many times a tanker can support more than one mission from prearranged border refueling orbits. The SOF have the only penetrating tanker, as well as the low threat capable Special Operations Improvements, SOFI, tanker.

Leadership in the AFSOC air component will be most likely a wing or group commander with a vast knowledge of low level operations. His staff will consist of helicopter and tanker planners from both SOF and Rescue. The staff should include at least one senior officer from the RESF. The AFSOC component commander will likely be the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC), the commander for all SOF air. This will bring the expertise of Army operators into the mission reality check stages. Even if the AFSOC/CC is not JSOACC a close relationship will exist with our fellow ARMY aviators.

**CAF KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATIONS**

The RESF will benefit from CAF operational knowledge. They will help SOF and CAF coordinate missions on the ATO, JFACC and TAOC. RQS leaders know the type of CAF capabilities that will help
both special operations and rescue. This knowledge would have been very useful in DESERT STORM.

The mission information sharing will be both formal and informal. If a SOF aviator has been in a particular area he can share his knowledge directly with the next pilot going to the area. Information on the whereabouts of our special forces teams may result in their contact with an isolated aviator. We may even find we chose an Army aviator who is most familiar with the area to pick up our AF flyer.

AUGMENTATION BY SOF ARMY POSSIBLE

The "Army Special Operations Aviation is fielding the MH-60K and the MH-47E, the most modern capable transport helicopter anywhere." This possibly brings more than MH-53s to the all-weather game. The JSOACC will assure USSOCOM that the combat mission will come first. Putting the mission first will be a lot easier knowing you always have some dedicated rescue forces setting alert when all your SOF assets are needed. The JSOACC with RQS augmentation will have more options for successful combat recovery than anyone in the War. The new interest in joint personnel recovery will most likely be looking to an organization such as this in the future wars.

MOBILITY PRIORITY EARLY

The issue of priority in initial mobility leads to another reason for a preplanned merger of SOF and Rescue. We can expect special operation aviation forces will have priority in the logistic line up when we go to war. SOF may make up the majority of the rescue equipment early in the war, but a good mixture of RESF and SOF planners and staff should be together from the start to build the best combat rescue force organization structure. Bringing these forces together early will help the transition to immediate operations when the rescue forces arrive and later allow an easier exit of SOF. The preplanned jointness of SOF will enhance combat rescue capability and not force the CINC to choose only USSOCOM for rescue.

CINCS ONE STOP FOR JCSAR
The OSD has chartered a three year study on the subject of Joint Search and Rescue (JSAR). The study will examine how to optimize jointness in combat. The CINC will have much to gain by tasking ACC's RQS to the AFSOC in major war plans. There is AF precedence for tasking forces under a different command during war. In DESERT STORM the command tasked AFSCC's EC-130s and AC-130s to CENTAF. The AC-130s are chopped over to CAF in many other plans. Moving a RQS to a command with similar weapon systems is easier than AC-130s going to CAF. The synergy from the SOF/RQS results in a team that the a JFC will likely designate as JSRC for the theater. If our leaders plan for the future, the fog of who is doing combat rescue will clear.

CONCLUSION

The time to plan for the next conflict is now. Forward looking planners in our Air Force are thinking that, with the coming age of information warfare, and fewer and more stealthy aircraft, there will be little need for combat rescue in the future. We must remember the price of getting our prisoners back is sometimes higher than we wish. Once we have a downed pilot or isolated warriors, historically we have made valiant efforts for their return. Combat rescue will continue to be an important function in our Air Force as long as we have manned aircraft with ejection seats.

The price of equipment to accomplish the entire spectrum of combat rescue is very high. In this period of declining DOD dollars we should continue to look for the most "bang for the buck." The forces we have today may best serve with a peacetime and wartime structure to optimize their capabilities.

Current doctrine has each service responsible for its CSAR. When the real shooting starts, as it did in DESERT STORM, joint and coalition combat recovery demands a "team of teams" to accomplish the theaters full spectrum of personnel recovery. This team will fit best under USSOCOM. Today's doctrine already tasks SOF when CSAR falls out of a service's capability and SOF will accomplish the recovery mission if wartime tasking's permit. The last war found
SOF at times overextended. Combining RQS with SOF alleviates much of this problem.

Placing Air Force's helicopter and tanker forces under one command in peacetime dilutes both SOF and RQS focus on their primary missions. In war, the uniqueness of their training programs will enhance each other. SOF will bring the all-weather capability and RQS will bring a superb knowledge of working with CAF. The blend will help both special operations missions and personnel recovery. Putting the JSRC under this team of teams will allow the commander full attention to winning the war and put the decisions for combat recovery under one joint air operations center.
ENDNOTES

3Ibid., pp. 156-157.
7All ARR Squadrons redesignated ARS on 1 June 1989.
10Ibid., p. 187.
11Ibid., pp. 189, 211.
12Ibid., p. 189.
13Ibid., p. 197.
14Tilford, p. 76.
16Ibid., pp. 71, 72.
17Little, p. 51.
18Ibid., p. 71, 72.
19Ibid., p. 46.
20Ibid., p. 50.
21Ibid., p. 50.
22Ibid., p. 51.
23Tilford, p. 82.
24Ibid., p. 82.
25Little, p. 76.
26Ibid., p. 77.
28Daniel, p. 72.
30Ibid., p. 92.
32Dean, p. 95.
33Ibid., p. 89.
34Ibid., p. 93.
Ibid., p. 96.
37Ibid., p. 89.
38Ibid., p. 101.
41Thigpen, pp. 27-28.
43Kyle, p. xi.
44Kyle, p. 24, italics mine.
45Kyle, p. 23.
46Kyle, p. 121.
48Kyle, p. 59.
50Russell E. Rakip, Jr., Colonel, USAF, JCS/J3SOD. Interview, 26 January 1996.
51Little, p. 55.
52Kyle, p. 224.
53Little, p. 79.
54Tilford, pp. 92-93.
56Little, p. 59.
57Ibid., p. 59.
58Ibid., p. 61.
59Ibid., p. 62.
61Ibid., p. 1.
63Ibid., p. 8.
64Ibid., p. 13.
65History of the Twenty-Third AF, 1983, pp. 2-5.
66Ibid., p. 5.
67Thigpen, p. 41.
68"Interview: Major General William J. Mall, Jr., "Commander Shares Insights", Airlift, Fall 1984, pp. 1-3.
69Thigpen, p. 51.
70Terry White, Swords of Lighting: Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare, (Brassey's U.K., 1992), pp. 188-189.
71Tilford, p. 73.
72Little, p. 42.
73Tilford, p. 105.
74Ibid., p. 135-136.
75Colonel Gary Weikle interview 15 March 1996. Col Weikle was a pilot on Jolly Green 11 at Koh Tang. He also notes the intelligence was poor and they had not expected to face a large concentration of enemy troops.

77
76 Posen, p. 46.
77 Colonel Gary Weikle interview.
78 Dean, p. 110.
79 Thigpen, p. 40.
81 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
83 Ibid., p. 54.
84 Ibid., p. 141.
85 Thigpen, pp. 41-42.
90 Thigpen, p. 70.
91 Daniel, p. 70.
92 Thigpen, pp. 70-71.
93 2nd Air Division History, 1 January-31 December 1986, insert "23 AF assessment of Air Force Combat Rescue Capability", SECRET, items used in this paper are not classified.
94 Thigpen, p. 51.
95 Ibid., p. 53.
96 Ibid., p. 64.
98 Mallin, p. 4.
100 Ibid., p. 104.
102 Fredrick E. Peterson, Lt Col USAF, Chief Pacific Rescue Coordination Center, Interview 20 March 1996. Lt Col Peterson was working for the 7th Air Force Commander when the Forward Look brief was given. He worked a rescue roadmap project for the PACAF which was briefed at the Corona that decided to buy HH-60s for rescue.
103 Donie Wurster, Colonel USAF, Interview 25 March 1996. During this period he was assigned to MAC/XPQA and prepared the HH-60 brief to the Air Force Council. Wurster was one of the most active proponents for the HH-60 buy.
105 Ibid., Insert.
106 Ibid., organizational chart.
107 History ARS, 1990, p. 28.
111 939th FACT SHEET.
115 Colonel Woodruff interview.
117 Ibid., p. 257.
118 Ibid., p. 301.
119 Ibid., p. 271.
120 Ibid., p. 296.
121 Ibid., p. 311.
122 Ibid., p. 364-367.
126 Ibid., p. 38.
128 Ibid., pp. 373-374.
129 Ibid., pp. 376-378.
131 J. V. O. Weaver, Lt Col USAF (Retired). Interview 21 March 1996. Lt Col Weaver was Chief of Operations Plans for the 1SOW and deployed to Desert Shield/Storm. He was also forward deployed to AL Jouf during beginning of the Air War. He is now President of SOF Action Inc.
136 Rhonda Cornum as told to Peter Copeland, She Went to War; The Rhonda Cornum Story (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1993), p. 7.
137 Ibid., p. 6.
138 Ibid., Photos unnumbered and page 158.
141 Colonel Woodruff interview.
142 John W. Zahrt, Lt Col, 55SOS/CC, Nomination Narrative for Bolger's, Air Medal.
143 Debrief to author, 9SOS/CC, after these HC-130 aircrews returned from
Turkey.

145 Ibid., p. 32.
146 Ibid., p. 32.
147 Ibid., p. 32.
150 Renuart, p. 16.
151 Air Rescue Squadrons were redesignated Rescue Squadrons February 1992,(304thRQS Fact sheet).
152 Woodruff, interview.
154 Woodruff, interview.
155 United States Air Force Fact Sheet 939th Rescue Wing (AFRES).
157 Joe Hampton, Lt Col USAF, Chief AFRC. Interview on 14 February 1996.
158 AFSOC looked at this same problem when they were considering putting helicopters with their group at Kadena.
159 The author visited the WIC on 28-29 March 1996. The personnel at the WIC were very receptive to the questions I asked. The commander Lt Col Tom Finnegan worked together on past deployments. Several of the instructors had recently left AFSOC and were quite happy with ACC.
161 Ibid. fig III-3.
162 Ibid., Appendix D 3.f.
163 Ibid., Appendix F 4.b.
166 Ibid., pp. 2-22.
168 Taken from 1995, JSSA organization briefing slides.
170 CICSI 3270.01 (DRAFT), SECRET, comment unclassified.
173 Ken Taylor, Gen, USAF, Commander Alaska Air National Guard: "Rescue Trips and Concerns" e-mail letter copy acquired from PACRCC on 3 March 1996: Gen Taylor visited a number of RSQs in the Pacific and reflected on some of the problems with the rescue organization today. He referred to a numbered AF commander who made the comment and the lack of morale in the RSQ units.
175 Jeffrey R. Smith, "U.S. Special Forces Carried Out Sabotage, Rescues Deep in

Tilford, p. 82.


178ANG Homepage @ http://www.ang.af.mil (March 1996).

179AFRES Fact Sheet 95-2R.


182Posen, p. 46.


185Ibid.