them a highly effective weapon against the best that Hitler could offer.

In the beginning, the Carpetbaggers were attached to the 462nd Bombardment Group (Pathfinder), as a "Special Project".

When the new squadrons, the 36th and 406th Bombardment Squadrons, began forming at the Alconbury airbase, where the 462nd Group was located, rumors were rife as to the nature of the work they would be doing. At first, the change in squadron designation from "Antisubmarine" to "Bombardment" was indication enough for most men. But gradually, it became apparent that something quite special was in the wind. The existing squadrons of the 462nd Group were doing pathfinder work, but the two new squadrons did not seem to fit. Why were our B-24s painted such an uncompromising black? The men were told--"Just say 'night-pathfinding', if anyone asks." So it wasn't night-pathfinding. A major emphasis became the matter of security. Security talks were given frequently by the squadron CO's and S-2 officers, stressing the absolute necessity for secrecy. There was little to be secret about at first, since few men knew very many details, but as the work went on, it would depend on the strictest observance of the principles of security whether or not our mission would be successful.

What was the work to be, that even a careless reference to "Alconbury" in a Peterborough pub would be punishable by the severest penalties?

The newspapers have hints, if you knew which articles to read and could read between the lines. The Daily Express of Saturday, 15 January 1944, carried an inconspicuous item data-
lined Geneva. Under the headline, "Patriots Wreck Railways," it was reported that "French patriots last night attacked the German-held Annecy railway depot and blew up several locomotives. At Rumilly, in Savoy, patriots stopped a train, force the passengers to alight, then sent the train rushing uncontrolled along the line until it overturned. In Belgium, patriots, complying with directions given them by the Allied Command, carried out forty-one acts of sabotage in one week on the railway tracks in the province of Hainault. They stopped trains and started them again without drivers, placed bombs on the tracks, unbolted rails, destroyed signal boxes and put pumping stations out of action." And the next day the Sunday Graphic, in a brief item, referred critically to "Secret Airmen" whose work "is a close secret and will make amazing reading after the war."

And a listener to the foreign language broadcasts of the B.B.C. might well wonder why valuable time was taken up merely to inform "Marie" that "her Uncle Paul remembered to wear his galoshes." Things like that.

The following pages are a History of the Carpetbagger Project—its development from a sub-group of the 482nd Bombardment Group into the self-contained, four-squadron 801st Bombardment Group (Heavy) (Provisional); its changes of station, from Achenbury to Watton to Harrington. More than anything else, a history of the Carpetbaggers becomes a record of achievement; because, under the inspiring command of Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, the Group continually broadened the scope
of its operations and increased the proportion of its successes. By the nature of its work and by the manner in which that work was carried out, the Group speeded the arrival of D-day, and once D-day came, contributed an assurance of its success.

* * *

Not until 24 October 1943 did Colonel Heflin come to know what the new duties of his squadron (the 22nd Antisubmarine Squadron) and of the 4th Antisubmarine Squadron would be. Their patrol activities had been terminated since late September, and personnel of the two squadrons had been inactive since the move from Dunkeswell to Alconbury had been accomplished. Their policy was one of "watchful waiting", to see what would turn up.

Meanwhile, however, highly-placed military figures were arranging the destinies of the two squadrons. The following letter, dated 12 October 1943, sent from the Commanding Officer of the Office of Strategic Services in the European Theatre of Operations to the Commanding General of American Forces in that Theatre, is reproduced in full, not only because it is the document which set the whole Carpetbagger machinery into motion, but because it provides a concise summary of Carpetbagger work itself.

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

12 October 1943

SUBJECT: Supply of Resistance Groups.

TO: The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
I. **OBJECT:**

1. To deliver supplies to Resistance Groups, prior to the initiation of military operations on the Continent, for the purpose of building up stocks of equipment necessary for organized resistance and guerrilla warfare.

2. To transport the personnel of Jedburgh (*) teams and deliver supplies to Resistance Groups in conjunction with military operations on the Continent.

II. **FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED:**

1. **Authority:**

   By directive of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff the "Office of Strategic Services" is the U. S. Agency charged with "sabotage" and with the "Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare". By cable dated 26 August 1943 from the CG, ETOUSA, to the War Department, the exercise of the foregoing functions by the OSS in this Theatre was approved. By letter dated 29 August 1943 the OSS was directed to work out with G-2 and G-3, ETOUSA, the composition of Staffs for Army and Army Group Hq and to proceed with the organization and training of Jedburgh teams for the purpose of coordinating activities behind the enemy lines.

2. **Potentialities of Resistance Groups:**

   A brief discussion of the numerical strength and organization of Resistance Groups in France is contained in Tab "A". In general it may be said that the anticipated strength of Resistance Groups on D-day is conservatively estimated at 150,000 and that organization of these groups into well-disciplined teams controlled by an effective system of communications and capable of performing specific military operations such as disruption of enemy road, railroad and tele-communications, attacks on enemy headquarters, hindering the movement of Panzer divisions, the preservation of bridges from demolition, etc., is proceeding satisfactorily. The communications for the control of Resistance organizations is already well organized. Leadership is being strengthened by organizers trained in England, and already in the field or to be dispatched to the field in the near future. The Jedburgh teams will further strengthen the organizations by reinforcing them on and after D-day in leadership, communications and supplies.

3. **Equipment and Supplies required:**

   a. **Problem presented:** Resistance Groups can be effective only if they are properly armed and equipped to carry out the tasks assigned to them, and the success of the detailed plans which have been made for activity behind the enemy lines, including specific operations to be carried out in conjunction with the Jedburgh plan, depends upon the extent to which supplies can be delivered. The quantity of equipment which will
be required to implement these plans cannot be delivered in a brief period, and it will be necessary to build up substantial stock piles which will be known to and available to deperile organizations on the Continent. Delivery of supplies for stock piles is a continuous process which can only be carried out during certain phases of the moon and for which, in the case of each delivery, elaborate plans must be made for the reception of the articles under conditions permitting the receiver a good chance of avoiding detection by the Gestapo. The experience of the British SOE which has succeeded in delivering substantial quantities of supplies is proof that such operations can be successful.

b. Supplies required: The supplies required by Resistance Groups are largely small arms, light automatic weapons, ammunition, explosives, demolition equipment and incendiary material. The required items of equipment are available from stocks maintained by SOE or, through SOE BRUSA, from Army stocks in the United Kingdom, or from stocks of specially manufactured sabotage devices maintained by OSS in the United States.

III. PROPOSALS.

1. It is proposed that the SO Branch of OSS undertake the delivery of supplies to Resistance Groups in a plan coordinated with SOE [*]. The implementation of such a plan would entail, above and beyond installations already in existence:

a. A storage, packing and departure center. A detailed discussion of the requirements for such a center is contained in Tab "B".

b. Transportation by aircraft of the equipment and supplies.

Aircraft for this purpose would be operated by the Air Force of which it is part. In general, pin points suitable for dropping a certain number of containers or packages would be proposed by SO. If acceptable to the Air Force, arrangements would be made by SO for the organization of a reception party, and the packages or containers would be delivered to the airdrome for ultimate delivery by the Air Force.

2. Operations can be initiated on a modest scale and it is not believed that operational requirements will ever exceed the number of sorties which can be made by three squadrons of aircraft. An early decision on the advisability of initiating such a program is essential if even a limited number of operations are to be undertaken before the first of the year as past experiences has shown that considerable time is consumed in training crews for the type of operation contemplated. The ultimate scope of such operations must be decided at an early date in order that the necessary attendant facilities may be constructed and prepared and that the personnel to operate them be secured and trained.

&
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that:

a. Approval be given to the initiation of a program of supplying Resistance Groups on a limited scale.

b. Approval be given to the establishment of facilities necessary to supply Resistance Groups on a scope involving two squadrons of aircraft initially, with the possibility of expanding to three squadrons.

c. The details of operational procedure be determined by representatives of the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force in consultation with the SU Branch of OSS.

C. S. Vanderblue,  
Colonel, S. C.,  
Commanding.

2 incl:  
Incl 1-"TAB A": Organization and Strength of Resistance Groups in France.  
Incl 2-"TAB B": Requirements for a Storage, Packing and Departure Center.

1st Ind  
Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations, 19 Oct/43;

TO: Commanding General Eighth Air Force.  
Commanding General OSS  
Commanding Officer OSS Detachment, ETOUSA.

1. Project approved.

2. You are directed to implement this plan.

Jacob L. Devers,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

* * *

That brief endorsement marked the birth of the carpetbagger project. Five days later, at Bovingdon, Colonel Heflin received word of the assignment of the 4th and 22nd Antisubmarine Squadrons to their new duties as "Sabotage" Squadrons. The Carpetbaggers were on their way.

* * *
(*) "Jedburgh team", whom Carpetbagger aircraft would drop by parachute to Resistance Groups in enemy-occupied territory, consisted of three highly trained men, two officers and one enlisted man. At least one of the officers would be a native of the occupied country involved in the particular operation, and the enlisted man would be a qualified radio operator. Their duties would be:

1. Organization of a group for guerrilla activity.
2. Equipping a group.
3. Giving instructions in the use of arms and stores.
4. Communicating special orders.
5. Leading a group in operations against the enemy.
6. Providing radio communication.

(*) SOE refers to the British counterpart of Carpetbagger work and stands for "Special Operations - Executive"; SO refers to American activities and stands for "Special Operations".
CHARACTERISTICS OF CARPETBAGGER FLYING

The purpose of the Carpetbagger Project is to fly "Special Operations" to deliver supplies to resistance groups in enemy-occupied countries; to deliver personnel to the field; and occasionally to bring back personnel from the field. Combat with the enemy is avoided, as it only endangers the success of the mission. Enemy anti-aircraft installations and detector posts are skirted as widely as possible, in order not to reveal the presence or destination of a Carpetbagger aircraft.

To avoid action with the enemy, flights are ordinarily made at night and at low level. When it is necessary for an aircraft to cross enemy-held areas equipped with anti-aircraft defenses, a route is chosen which will expose the aircraft to the fire of light guns only. Thus, the altitude attained seldom exceeds 7,000 feet. As soon as a dangerous area is passed, the airplane drops down to 2,000 feet, or lower. A low altitude makes it more difficult for the enemy to detect the aircraft either by sound or by radar detection devices. Obstacles on the ground distort the sound of a low-flying aircraft far more than they do the noise of a high-flying one, because of the sharper angles of sound reflection. Radar and sound detection devices have less time in which to focus on a low-flying airplane, and the range of effective detection is shorter at low altitudes.

The majority of Carpetbagger flights are made during the moon period, or on those nights when the moon is out, making the ground visible to the navigator and bombardier.
In order that accurate drops may be made, pilots endeavor to get down to within four hundred to six hundred feet of the ground, and to reduce their flying speed to 130 miles per hour or less. The low speed reduces the chances of damage to parachutes, as the shock on opening is much less at the slower speed.

Non-noon period flights at night are made with the use of special navigational equipment — "Rebecca", S-phone and radio altimeter. By means of this equipment, the percentage of accuracy can be even greater than with ordinary visual pilotage. But reception parties must have the ground counterparts of S-phone and Rebecca equipment, and be able to use them expertly—something which is very difficult in territory occupied by the enemy. Thus, even in the dark periods, aircraft can fly—low altitudes with only a slight increase in risk. However, dark period operations are possible without S-phone or Rebecca provided the reception signals consist of bon-fires and provided there can be reference to prominent landmarks which can be distinguished accurately in the dark, such as large rivers and lakes.
Requests for supplies or personnel come from the field, or they may
start as the result of planning by a Country Section at OSS. "Country
Section" refers to the office at OSS Headquarters in London which directs
resistance activities in a particular country. There is a French Country
Section, Belgian Country Section, Norwegian Country Section and so forth.

The operational priority of a mission is determined by the Chief of
Special Operations (American) and the Chief of Special Operations Exec-
utive (British), London. The pinpoint section of Air Operations plots
the pinpoint on an operational map, and works out the latitude and
longitude of the location. The pinpoint is then given to Eight Air Force,
where the suitability of the terrain and the strength of enemy defenses
are considered. If Eight Air Force approves the pinpoint, the Air
Operations Section is notified and in turn, notifies the Country Section
concerned of the approval and of the number assigned to the mission. The
British Air Ministry is also informed of the pinpoint and cancels a
sortie if it should interfere with other operations.

When a pinpoint has been approved and the supplies are in readiness
at the airdrome, an operational order is made out and placed in a pool
of approved operations. The agent or resistance group in the field is
advised of the period in which reception committees should be prepared
to stand by, and of the code phrase they should listen for on the British
Broadcasting Corporation's news broadcast. The code phrases used are
pre-arranged and are called "crack signals". The day-to-day priority of
approved missions is determined by Colonel Heflin and communicated to
London Headquarters each morning. Headquarters advises the Country
Section of the missions proposed for the day, and the Country Section
arranges for the transmission of the appropriate crack signal in the B.B.C. news broadcast. Then the crack signal is heard in the field, the reception committee proceeds to the dropping ground at the proper time, prepared to receive the Carpetbagger load.
GROUND SIGNALS

Reception parties use pre-arranged signals to guide Carpenter aircraft to pinpoints. There are three types of reception signals, A, B, and C. The A system consists of a triangle of three white lights, with a fourth, red light at the apex flashing the code recognition letter. The lights are placed so that the wind is blowing toward the flashing light and across the center of the opposite side of the triangle.

The B system is the same as A, except that a white light flashes, and three red lights form the triangle.

The C system is the most commonly used. It employs three torches, usually red, in a row with a white signal flashing light set up at the down-wind light of the line. Aircraft always come in up-wind for their drop. Bonfires are sometimes used instead of torches. Normally, the signal lights are turned on when the aircraft is first heard. Sometimes, when there is danger of enemy discovery, the aircraft is asked to give an identification signal before the lights are turned on.

* * *

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NAVIGATION

There are four general methods of navigation used singly or jointly in flying, and they are all important to Carpetbagger operations. They are: pilotage, DR (dead-reckoning), radio navigation and celestial navigation.

Pilotage, or navigation by observation of landmarks previously known or recognized from maps, is especially important in low-level moonlight flying. DR is navigation by deductions arrived at from the application of ground speed, time and wind-direction factors to a known starting point. DR is the basic method of navigation and is always used either by itself or in conjunction with other methods. Radio navigation involves the use of radio and radar aids. Celestial navigation is the method of establishing the geographical position of an aircraft by observation of celestial bodies— the sun or stars.

Carpetbagger B-24's are equipped for and use all four methods of navigation. The crews are especially trained in the application of navigation to Special Operations. In addition, the aircraft have special equipment for Carpetbagger work.

All aircraft have Radio "Gee", or "Gee" Box, a radar navigational aid which picks up signals from ground stations. On the ground, in England are a "Master" station and two "Slave" stations, which send out combinations of signals. The ground signals are picked up and recorded on a grid
which indicates the aircraft's position within a quarter of a mile in England and with lesser accuracy over the Continent. The enemy has had some success in jamming "Gee" signals in their own territory, but by changing frequencies and other devices we have been able to maintain an effective use of the "Gee" radio.

The S-phone is a two-way instrument of air-ground communication similar in principle to the walkie-talkie. Its range is eight to ten miles, and it permits an operator on the ground, once he has heard the plane approaching, to direct the plane's course to the pinpoint with considerable accuracy. The S-phone has proved to be especially valuable to Carpetbagger work. The "Homing S-phone" is a new device which uses a radio compass in the airplane and permits the navigator to direct the airplane toward the ground operator as on a radio beam. (By the end of June, one Homing S-phone had been installed and used with success. The remaining aircraft are to be equipped with the device.)

Radio "Rebecca" is a radar directional air-ground device which records radar impulses or "blips" on a grid and directs the navigator to the ground operator. By varying the intensity or frequency of the blip, the ground operator (whose set is known as "Eureka") can transmit a signal letter to the aircraft. Some of the resistance groups and some aircraft are already functioning with Rebecca sets, and more installations are being made.
inaccuracies are bound to result. An example of good navigational teamwork is the completion of thirteen consecutive successful missions by Lt. Jackson and his crew of the 36th Squadron, up to the night of 3/4 July 1944. This establishes a new record of consecutive completions for the Group.)
THE OPERATIONAL CYCLE

Following events at Harrington for thirty-six hours provides a good picture of the Carpetbagger operational process.

Targets Received and Plotted

This process begins at 1700 hours, at which time the Conference Room at Air Operations Headquarters, OSS, in London, via the scrambler telephone gives S-2, Captain Sullivan, the list of approved targets for the following night. The targets are designated by names and numbers (e.g., "Heelwright 11", "Mixer 7") which refer to targets kept on file and described in detail on Air Transport Forms #6. During the evening, S-2 plots these targets on a large operational map covering a wall of the office of the Deputy Group Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Fish. The map is in a scale of 1 to 500,000, or about ten miles to the inch. It shows topographical features, such as elevations, rivers and forests. Any areas where "Special Operations" flights are prohibited are clearly indicated on the map.

When a target is plotted, it is indicated by a tab pinned to the map. The comparative priority of the missions is shown by bits of colored paper attached to the pins. British or "Special Operations, Executive" targets proposed for the same night are also plotted with distinctive tabs.

Night's Targets Laid On

At about 0900 hours the following morning, the Station Weather Officer advises Colonel Heflin, or his Deputy, of weather conditions anticipated in the target areas, and at that time it is decided where it will be practicable to send Carpetbagger aircraft. Then the Commanding Officer, or his Deputy, select the list of targets for the night,
considering the priority of requests for material in the field, the reception record of the particular ground, the possibilities of enemy opposition, the distribution of desired missions and the availability of aircraft and crews. The list of selected missions is then telephoned to the London Conference Room by Captain Sullivan and if London has no practical changes to suggest, the list is in effect for that night's operations.

**Targets Assigned to Squadrons**

At about 1100 hours, the Squadron Commanders, Majors St. Clair, Boone, McManus and Dickerson, are called in and meet before the map with the tabs pinpointing the targets for the night. Together, the squadron leaders select targets for their crews, balancing the difficult with the comparatively easy, the distant with the near, so that each squadron finally will have about the same work load. Any disagreement arising among the squadron commanders is decided by the toss of a coin; or, Colonel Heflin may be called upon to make the decision.

**Navigators Receive Targets**

At about 1200 hours, the navigators of the crews receive their targets from their Squadron Navigator, who has received his list from Major Tresemer, Group Navigator, who has been advised of the targets by S-2.

In the meantime, S-2 officers have been gathering briefing data, and preparing maps and special instructions.

At 1500 hours, each crew navigator turns in a flight plan to his Squadron Navigator, who brings all his squadron flight plans to the Group Navigator. The flight plans and courses are checked by the Group and Squadron Navigators, and if necessary, changes are made. A take-off time schedule is made up by the Group Navigator, who is an assistant S-3. The take-off time schedule is posted and distributed to Squadron
S-3's.

**S-2 Briefs Crews**

Also at about 1500 hours, S-2 officers begin meeting with officers and members of each crew. Crew maps are checked for location of the target (latitude, longitude and terrain features). The S-2 officers use large-scale maps, 1 to 500,000 or 1 to 80,000, to insure accuracy. Each crew is briefed separately by an S-2 officer and has the opportunity to study the S-2 map and to compare it with their own map. Their maps are called target maps and are on a scale of 1 to 250,000, or about five miles to an inch.

**Final Briefing**

At 1630 hours, a final briefing session is held for all crew members. A weather officer displays the weather map and gives a complete explanation of conditions for each target area, stressing expectations en route and at the home base on the return flight. Weather predictions cover direction and velocity of winds, cloud conditions, icing conditions, the likelihood of rain, sleet or snow. Then, Captain Sullivan gives any special information which may affect the crew. Next, Lieutenant Colonel Fish gives general flying and dropping instructions, and finally Major Tresemer gives instructions on the route to be followed while over England and the point and altitude for crossing the English coast. He ends by giving the men a "time tick", on which all crew watches are synchronized.

During the afternoon, enlisted crew members are briefed as necessary. The crew navigator briefs them on the course, the type of reception signal, the code recognition letters for the target, and terrain features approaching and around the target. The radio operators are handed a radio "flimsy" just before take-off. The "flimsy" details all signal
information including the code letters, the ground challenge and reply letter, and the colors of the day for flare signals over England, the navigational radio beacons, direction-finder stations in England, a list of the airdrome signals for England, and other navigational information, including the night's bomber code used in communication between bombers and home stations. If necessary, the Group Communications Officer, Captain Silkenbaken, briefs radio operators on special information.

The crew navigators plot their targets on the maps they will use on their mission, check the presence of flak from S-2 flak maps, select routes and check points on route to the target. The crew navigator does this under the direction of his Squadron Navigator, using the Intelligence Library as needed.

Dispatchers, when the aircraft carries special packages or personnel to be dropped, are briefed by the Group Armament Officer, Captain Cunningham, who is the Chief Dispatcher for the Group.

**Preparation for Take-Off**

During the day, as they have an opportunity, crews give their aircraft a pre-flight inspection. A half-hour test flight is made with each aircraft scheduled for a mission, in order to test all the equipment.

Crews have a meal approximately two and a half hours before take-off time, and arrive at their crew rooms, located in Squadron Operations, about two hours before the take-off. The navigator then receives up-to-the-minute weather reports on a weather card, and turns in a revised flight plan and estimated time of arrival to the Squadron S-3. The pilot receives and distributes to his crew kits furnished by S-2 and containing rations of candy and chewing gum, flares, purses and emergency packets. The radio operator receives his "flimsy" and the navigator his
"Cee" codes. It is now about forty-five minutes before take-off, and the crew is driven out to where its B-24 is parked.

About three hours before the first scheduled take-off, Group Operations telephones the flight plans of all aircraft to the Movement Liaison Officer of the Aircraft Movement Control Section of the Air Defences of Great Britain Command. This includes the "RT", which is the squadron letter and the aircraft letter for recognition, the times of crossing the English and enemy coasts, and the proposed landing times.

**Loading of Aircraft**

As soon as it is ready, the target list goes to the OSS Liaison Officer at Harrington, Captain Vaughn, so that he can draw up a list of required containers and packages for which he arranges delivery to the air-drome. The containers are consigned to the Group Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Watkins, whose men deliver the containers, first snapping on the parachutes, to the aircraft where Armament Section men stand ready to load the containers into the aircraft.

The packages are delivered to the Armament Officer of the Group, Captain Cunningham, and are taken to the aircraft for loading. The OSS Liaison Officer and his men check each aircraft to insure that the proper load is in place.

Leaflets or "Nickles" are handled by the Armament Section, who deliver them to the aircraft in bundles of 4,000, as received from the Cheddington warehouse of O.I./F.W.E, operating under the direction of SHAEF. Usually, six to ten bundles of leaflets are loaded according to the stock on hand, the length of flight, the time over enemy territory. For new areas, not previously well covered by leaflets, more leaflets will be dispatched if possible. (No leaflets are dropped near targets, for security reasons. After leaving the target thirty to fifty miles behind,

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the dispatcher drops the leaflets on villages and towns passed over on
the homeward flight.)

Personnel to be dropped are received at Harrington by the Armament
Officer and are controlled by his section until loaded on the aircraft.
Representatives from "Special Operations", London, escort all agents until
they are loaded, supervise their dressing and assist in their briefing
for the drop.

**Take-Off**

The aircraft are now ready for the night's missions. The crews warm up
their aircraft and take off on schedule, proceeding individually to their
targets. As each aircraft takes off, the Flying Control Section checks
it out and reports the take-off to Group Operations, who telephones the
information to the Movement Liaison Officer of the Air Defenses of Great
Britain Command at Stanmore.

**Interrogation of Crews**

When an aircraft has completed its mission and returned to the home
base, its crew are driven directly to the Intelligence Library for in-
terrogation by S-2 officers.

The interrogation finds the crews showing the strain of a hard,
dangerous mission which had lasted from five to eight hours. Free, frank
interchange of information is encouraged. The S-2 officers handle the
jumpy crew with a great deal of tact and flexibility.

Sometimes there is a comic relief. The crew of Lieutenant Merrill's
aircraft (of the 36th Bombardment Squadron) once returned from a mission
and told the story of the French girl-agent whom they were carrying. She
was slow getting to the heavy gear she was wearing and she was not allow-
ed to drop, as the reception lights went out before she was ready. She
sulked on the way back, until nature put her under pressure. She was
directed to the "relief" tube in the rear of the airplane. The dispatcher gallantly turned his back while the girl struggled with her zipped-up man's flying suit, in an effort to use the relief tube, which, unfortunately, had been made for the particular convenience of the male anatomy. Finally, the girl burst into laughter and when the dispatcher turned around, she demonstrated to him in rapid-fire French and with gestures that her personal "operation" had not been completely successful and that she was considerably dampened below the waist (but not in spirits).

Another time, Lieutenant Rabbitt's radio operator (406th Bombardment Squadron) reported that as the aircraft crossed over a target, he heard a woman on the ground S-phone yelling in a cockney accent, "For Christ's sake, come back 'ere! Turn around and come back!"

End of the Mission

After the interrogation, the crew go to the Mess Hall, where, under the supervision of a medical officer, each man is given a two-ounce medicinal ration of whiskey. The man signs a receipt for his whiskey, which is issued for operational use only and serves to relax tense nerves.

Then the men get a good breakfast, including fresh eggs, and go to bed. If any man has trouble getting to sleep, he is supposed to ask the Medical Officer for a sedative.

The operational cycle ends as the men return to their billets for a well-deserved rest.
ARTILLERY IN CARPETBAGGER WORK

The Artillery and Ordnance sections for the Group do not function at great variance to the sections in any other heavy bombardment group. But it is the load itself which distinguishes it.

In the heart of occupied Europe, underground groups scan the sky, anxiously waiting for the arrival of supplies. Perhaps even more anxiously, they wait for men and women who can bring them the latest detailed information and instructions which will aid them in acts of sabotage against the enemy.

The two sections combine to see that supplies and agents are put on the ships. Containers, loaded with guns, ammunition, food, medical supplies, etc., are loaded by the Ordnance section. Artillery steps in to load packages, nickels and dimes. The line Artillery and Ordnance crews have a peculiarly demanding job in loading the aircraft. Each "job" demands its own load and the loads must be carefully checked to make absolutely certain that the right stuff goes to the right place. In addition, each plane must be fitted with the straps and lines to which the packages are attached.

Loading hundreds of packages whose weight ranges from fifty to one hundred and fifty pounds makes hard work throughout the afternoon and sometimes after supper for the Artillery Section crew. Containers are loaded on by the Ordnance crew and it goes on throughout the afternoon.
After hours of checking and working, there is one word which can cancel all that has been done. After sweating out the loading of forty or more aircraft, one word sometimes goes out to the Farm and Bomb Dump. The word is "Scrub."

"Joe" is the name given to the agents who are dropped to their organizations in enemy-controlled Europe. Packages, which parachute down to them, bear supplies they will need in making war on the enemy behind the lines. Nickles - leaflets and pamphlets - are dropped on the sorties. In this case, however, their propaganda value is secondary, since they are unloaded at some distance from the target points, in order to give the enemy the idea that dropping leaflets was the prime purpose of the sortie.

Supplying the underground with its own particular brand of produce, perhaps caused the storing point for the loads to be designated as "the Farm." At any rate, the packages, leaflets and chutes are kept near the perimeter in well-concealed Missile huts. The loading crews check the packages and chutes here before they are taken out to the ships.

Key man in the business of dropping Joes and supplies is the Dispatcher, known as the First Gunner in ordinary circumstances. They undergo special training to fit them for their special kind of bombardiering. So that they will understand the procedure of jumping, they are required to complete two low-altitude jumps, before going out on their first operational flight. They also learn
to fit parachutes properly.

On the afternoon of his mission, the dispatcher is briefed by the Group Armament Officer, Captain Roy H. Cunningham, Jr. It is then that he learns of the type of packages he is to drop that night. It is also where he gets the news that he is to carry Joes. To some, of the men it is an onerous task, but others volunteer for it and enjoy fitting and "handling" the Joes. The dispatcher is carefully coached in procedure for dropping both packages and Joes. The packages must be dropped in the designated area or brought back to the base. "Run In", "Action Stations", and "Go" are the three phrases used in "dispatching" Joes from the airplane.

Joes arrive in the evening from three to four hours before they are to take off. Those who expect to see high drama in their behavior are doomed to disappointment. There is little of the heroic, on the surface, about them. With their escorting officers and members of the Armament sections, they go to the dressing huts. There, the job of fitting them to land under the nose of the enemy begins.

First, a loose-fitting "strip-to-sea" suit roughly resembling the accepted costume of a circus clown is donned. The suit is a drab green with splotches of camouflage print. Pockets and pouches are placed in odd places, in which to store guns, knives, compass, money and many other articles. In order to cushion the Joe's fall, a spongy rubber cushion is placed in the interior of the suit. A rubber helmet and goggles are also worn to protect the head and face. Rubber soled
boots which help to break the fall and protect the feet are also standard equipment.

With the suit zipped up, the man is ready to be fitted with his 'chute. The job is made difficult because of the awkward bulges caused by the scores of articles stored in the suit. Two men usually work together and a good fit is accomplished only after a tug-of-war and the expenditure of energy and sweat both by the fitters and the man being fitted.

The fitting is accompanied by a steady run of conversation. An interpreter stands nearby to translate instructions and requests. Fitters sometimes try their French on the Joes and they sometimes volunteer instructions in their own language.

After the fitting, the Joe is almost ready to go to the ship. He is a grotesque, top-heavy figure who lumbers about like a Frankenstein monster. But, before the take-off he is briefed again on the jump and given pills. Some of the tablets are lethal, some combat airsickness, others are to induce sleep and others for an opposite effect. As time for take-off approaches, the Joes shake hands all around.

Some of the men outwardly take the flight as a lark and attempt a few lunge-waltz steps. Others sit more quietly, smoking and saying little. On the whole, however, the atmosphere is not appreciably different from that of a routine practice flight.

Now the Joes and their accompanying loads are in the hands of the combat crews. It is not until the aircraft have returned and the interrogation forms are filled in, that
the two sections know whether the missions have been marked "Complete" or "Non-Complete".

* * *
328th SERVICE GROUP
Office of the Commanding Officer
AAF #102, APO #639, U. S. Army

3 March 1944

SUBJECT: Authority for U.S. A.A.F. Squadrons to drop bodies on operational missions.

TO: Colonel JOSEPH F. HASKELL, O.S.S. Detachment, APO #287.

1. The two (2) U.S. A.A.F. Bombardment Squadrons employed in the Carpet Bagger Project are now trained for dropping bodies.

2. The B-24D type airplanes used by these organizations are equipped for dropping bodies and have been thoroughly tested by Lieutenant John Boh of the O.S.S. Detachment.

3. By special agreement with your office operational mission "Bob 141" was successfully completed 2 March 1944, in which two (2) bodies were dropped.

4. On the basis of the above facts, authority to drop bodies on operational missions is requested for the organizations concerned.

CLIFFORD J. REFLAN,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Commanding.

SO BRANCH, OSSTET, ETOWA, APO #287, U. S. ARMY, 4 March 1944

To: Commanding Officer, 328th Service Group, AAF #102,
APO #639, U. S. Army

Approved.

JOSEPH F. HASKELL
Colonel, GSC
Chief, SQ Branch
To: Colonel Heflin  
From: Brig. E.E. Mockler-Ferryman

Searches to be conducted at Aerodromes

1. In view of the stringent restrictions placed upon all travel from the United Kingdom, it has been decided to inaugurate a new system for searching SOE/SO personnel departing from operational aerodromes.

2. The services of two Officers from the Custom Service have been secured. They will be stationed at Station 61, where they will carry out their duties under the direction of the Security Officer at Station 61.

3. It will be the responsibility of the Security Officer at Station 61 to ascertain each day what body operations are pending from operational aerodromes and to advise the searching Officers where they are to report. Care must be taken to include personnel sent direct to the airfields from London or elsewhere. The searching Officers will be provided with their own transport and will report to the Liaison Officers at aerodromes from which body operations are scheduled in plenty of time to carry out their search. The searching Officers will wear plain clothes.

4. The search will be carried out in the presence of the Country Section Conducting Officer and the searching Officer will present a card of authority. The form of this card is attached at Appendix "A". Women agents will be searched by the country Section woman conducting Officer as the Custom Service Officers are NOT permitted to search women. Also attached, at Appendix "B" is a form of Declaration to be signed by each agent. Will Country Sections concerned please obtain the concurrence of all Allied Governments with whom they deal to the procedure outlined, as a matter of principle, and to the forms of authority and Declaration attached.

5. After detailed examination by the Country Section concerned all packages, suitcases or brief cases, containing personal effects or papers, will either be sent direct by the Country Section to Station 61 for wrapping or will be retained by the Country Section and be given to the departing Agent at Station 61 or the operational aerodrome. Country Section representatives will also retain all personal items such as wallets or cigarette cases which may contain secret hiding places for delivery to the agent at Station 61 or the operational aerodrome.
APPENDIX "A"

NOTICE

SECRET

The personal safety of every resistance worker demands that he should not carry on his person articles which betray his stay in England. As the time for action approaches it also becomes more and more important to prevent leakage of information to the enemy. A careless word in a private letter or even in an Official document might give the enemy valuable information. The British Government have, therefore, instituted the most stringent travel and censorship restrictions.

It has been agreed between the British Government and the British and Allied Special Services that their members should not pass through the normal control but should pass through special controls manned by specially chosen and discreet men. The Security Controller who presents this card will ask you whether you have in your possession any papers other than those provided by your Section and will also ask you to submit to a thorough search. This search is necessary both for your safety and the security of Allied military operations. The procedure will be the same for all ranks and all nationalities. You are asked to cooperate.

APPENDIX "B"

FORM OF DECLARATION

I give an honourable undertaking that

(a) I am not carrying any articles other than those agreed by my Section.

(b) I am not carrying with me any document, paper or photograph other than those which I now produce to my Section Officer.

31
SUBJECT: Training of Combat Crews in O.T.U.

TO: O/O of O.T.U.

1. This training program will be conducted with the most meticulous care and planning. Great detail will be stressed with the idea in mind of turning out a well trained crew that will not malfunction on an operational mission due to lack of training, preparation of mission or ignorance.

2. You will be permitted a maximum amount of time to complete the training of combat crews consistent with the state of the tactical situation.

3. Above all else stress punctuality and thoroughness. Insist on the crews always getting off to classes and flights exactly on time. Plan thoroughly and well in advance. Training schedules should be posted from twelve to twenty four hours in advance. Allow and plan for interruptions due to bad weather so that crews will be idle at no time.

4. Plan night cross countries during the bright period of the moon so that night pilotage may be done. Perform no night cross countries until the crew has completed its day cross countries.

5. Make all training missions as realistic as possible. Hold a critique with the individual crews at various stages during the training period to learn and help them overcome their problems. Above all take nothing for granted.

6. A correct up-to-date visual record will be kept on all crews undergoing training.

ROBERT W. FISH,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Deputy Group Commander.
TRAINING DIRECTIVE

I. GROUND TRAINING.

1. Reporting to Squadron C.O. by all crew members.
   a. At this time they will be given no indication
      of the nature of their work.

B. Report to C.O. of O.T.U.


2. CO of O.T.U. confers with crew officers and helps
   select the CO and crew.
   a. CO of O.T.U. points out to crew the nature
      of the work (brief form) and the need to
      select certain type of men if possible.

3. After the crew has been selected the CO of O.T.
   U. indoctrinates combat crews on full nature of
   their missions.
   a. Security officer will give special security
      lecture to crew members being dropped from
      the crew and CO of O.T.U. will refer them
      to base adjutant for immediate transfer.

4. Security officer will give further security lec-
   ture to combat crews after indoctrination.

C. Crews will be settled in quarters with their respec-
   tive squadrons and set up housekeeping.

1. Indocrtinated on base policies and facilities.

2. Physical check by Squadron Surgeon for flying
   duty and "Dog Tags" (also dental identification, etc.


4. P.R. Lectures.

D. Class room work for crews as a whole unit.

1. Flying Control Lectures.
   a. This is to be divided into two phases, one
      for day and one for night and not to be
      given at the same time. They will be very
      complete and will be given by the flying
      control officer preferably F/L Cousins.

2. Outline discussion of complete S.O.P.

3. Lecture and demonstration of combat crew team
   work, to be given by an experienced combat team
   with a short talk by each member of the team.
   Stress interplane procedure.

4. Ditching lecture and demonstration.

5. Air Sea Rescue lecture by Flying Control Officer
   or Group Equipment Officer, either to be used as
   best qualified. Flying Control Officer, F/L
   Cousins is recommended.

6. Lectures and demonstration of planning a mission.
   a. The demonstration will be accomplished by
      assigning crew under training to an operati-
      onal crew and letting each crew member
accompany his corresponding member of the operational crew throughout the afternoon as the mission is planned. This will include the time right up until take-off.

* This letter to be handled individually with each crew and not excessive time lost in selecting crew members.

** Crews should be taken on conducted familiarization of the base.

7. Lecture on flying a mission. This is to be cross-section of what happens in the average mission and how it is flown as in regards to altitude, speeds, courses, etc.

8. Aircraft familiarization.
   (a) This is to be done at a modified aircraft, pointing out location and use of special equipment, etc. Suggest both empty and loaded aircraft to be used.

   (a) To be given by flak expert or S-2

10. Blinker cards. (5 words per minute.)

E. Class room work for individual crew members.

1. Pilots classes.
   (a) Crew discipline
   (b) Radar altimeter
   (c) ARCE
   (d) S-phones and procedures.
   (e) Compasses and their use.
   (f) Radios to navigation.
   (g) Map reading (1 hour lecture minimum)
   (h) Gee lecture and fill.
   (i) Rebecca lecture and fill.
   (l) Several of these may be combined into one lecture and should be followed by a demonstration.

2. Navigators classes.
   (a) Compasses and their use.
   (b) Swing compasses all methods.
   (c) Gee lecture and fill.
   (l) To include Gee charts, equipment, chains, studs, series, jaming and coding. All lectures to be followed by a practical demonstration. Use samples of equipment during lectures whenever possible. Make complete in every detail.

   (d) Gee trainer.
   (e) Rebecca lecture and fill.
   (f) Rebecca trainer.
   (g) Flight plans and logs. Insist they be kept for all practice flights to the same detail as in operational flights. Stress information required at de-briefing.

   (h) Navigational aids in detail.
   (i) Weather cards.
   (j) Proflight.
   (k) Reap courses. (British type maps familiarization)

3. Bombardiers classes.
   (a) D.R. navigation (short course)
   (b) Map reading complete
   (c) Bomb racks
   (d) Radios to flying
   (e) Night flying aids.
(f) Flight plans (practice flights).
(g) Dropping lecture against malfunction.
(h) Gee trainer.
(i) Gee lecture and film including Gee charts, chain judging.

2. Stud series and codeword.
(j) Rebecca trainer and lecture.
(k) Rebecca film.
(l) S-Phone.
(m) Pre-flight inspection.

4. Radio Operators classes.
(n) U.K. radio procedure.
   (1) Training flights
   (2) Operational
   (3) All this to include in detail HF/DF, NF/DF, R/T, Radio Compass, S-Phone, practice in changing frequencies.
   (4) W/T and light code used and speeds.
   (5) Air Sea Rescue W/T procedure.
   (6) QRC signals.
   (7) IFF.
   (8) Weather reports.

5. Engineers classes.
   (a) Duties.
   (b) Top turrets and night fighter defense.
   (c) Reading drift.
   (d) Spotting drops.

6. Dispatchers Classes.
   (a) Send away to school at home.
   (b) Instruction in work with rest of crew.

ROBERT V. FISH,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.
Deputy Group Commander.

-3-
TRINING DIRECTIVE

II. FLYING TRAINING.

A. Daylight training.
   1. Local transition check and practice.
   2. Five daylight cross countries of not less than 2½ hours duration each.
      (a) The crew will carry a check navigator and/or bombardier on its first day cross country.
      (b) The fourth cross country will be made entirely by pilotage without reference to Gee or HF/DF.
      (c) Each crew will be checked by check navigator and/or bombardier on the fifth day cross country.
      (d) Each cross country will be prepared and flown as a simulated mission in every detail.

B. Night training.
   1. Local night transition check and practice.
   2. Five night cross countries of not less than 2½ hours duration each.
      (a) The crew will carry a check navigator and/or bombardier on its first night cross country.
      (b) The fourth night cross country will be made entirely by pilotage without the use of Gee or HF/DF.
      (c) Each crew will be checked by a check navigator and/or bombardier on the fifth night cross country.

C. Dopping training.
   1. Each crew will make a minimum of 15 dry runs in the daytime. They should be shown the proper technique by an experienced Pilot-Bombardier team.
   2. They shall make a minimum of 15 practice night runs of which the last three will constitute actual practice drops of sand filled containers. On the first night dry runs they will be checked by an experienced Pilot-Bombardier team. On the last three night runs while carrying actual drop they will again be checked by an experienced Pilot-Bombardier team. These actual drops may be done on the Peterborough targets if it can be arranged through the Deputy Group Commander's Office. The schedule will be so constructed that there is never more than one airplane over the target at the same time.
D. Special Navigational Aids.
   1. Practice on Gee trainer and in the air.
   2. Practice on Rebecon trainer and in the air.
   3. Link trainer.
   4.actual instrument flight.
      (a) The pilot will fly instrument under the hood at every available opportunity.
      (b) The pilot will be given an instrument check ride before being turned operational.

5. S-Phone practice on the ground and in the air.
6. Each crew will act as a reception committee at least once during training.

E. Operational Experience.
1. Each pilot, bombardier and navigator will take at least one operational mission under the supervision of an experienced crew. In lieu of this the new crew unit may carry with them an experienced navigator and/or bombardier. This latter is desirable as it aids in finishing all crew members evenly.

III. Miscellaneous.
1. Any need for improvement of this training program which may arise from time to time will be immediately incorporated into it. Any changes however will always be brought to the attention of the Deputy Group Commander before being inaugurated.

B. The night flying training in navigation should be conducted during the bright of the moon period. Any night flying done during the dark of the period will not be counted as a basic part of this training program but only as additional training.

C. Although there have been definite directives laid down in parts of this training program, the instructor has still been granted a great leeway in preparing his instruction. He must make it complete in every detail and must demand exacting standards of his students whose progress will be closely checked by this office.

D. A final examination on all subjects will be given by this office and these exams must be passed with a minimum average grade of 80% before the crew may turn operational.

E. The O.C. of the O.T.C. will keep a close personal check on the progress of each of his student combat crews and on the methods and procedures of his instructors.

ROBERT W. FISH,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Deputy Group Commander.
JOE'S

HINTS FOR 50. HUBER

1. Joe's are dropped from 600 feet above terrain - any lower altitude increases the hazard of the jump - any higher altitude spoils the accuracy of the drop.

2. Standard procedure is:

   (1) Containers (point of release over middle light)
   (2) Joes - immediately after containers.
   (3) Personal Packages - after last Joe. (numbers of personal packages will be obtained from Capt. Cunningham)

   (4) Other Packages.

   ANY VARIATION IN THE ABOVE PROCEDURE WILL BE BY SPECIAL INSTRUCTION FROM S-2 ONLY.

3. Running in, Action Station, and Go is standard part-troop procedure and Joes are trained to jump on these signals - there can be no variation.

   (a) Running in should be given over interphone at the start of the final run. (approximately 2 minutes before dropping). At the command - "Running in", the Joe "scoots up" next to the hole and is in readiness to swing legs into hole.

   (b) Action Station is given two to five seconds before Go. Give Action Station clearly over interphone and by Re-Dispatchers' light. At this signal the Joe swings his legs into hole and is poised for jump.

   (c) Go is signaled by Green light and interphone. On a "Joe Mission" Go is usually given immediately after toggling containers and as slive handle reaches point
4. No member of the crew will give any operational information to the Joes. This includes flight plan, route, altitudes, etc., of the present flight.

5. Remember the main objective is to drop as much of the load as possible on the target on the first run. You may lose target or lights may be put out for second run. If exact location of target is not certain, bring the load back.

6. Do not ask Joes personal questions — or to sign your "short shorter", they can not do this.

ROY H. CUNNINGHAM, JR
Captain, Air Corps,
Gp. Armament Officer.
JOE'S

HINT FOR DISPATCHER

1. Dispatcher will help dress and fit his Joes.

2. Dispatcher will report to Group ARMAMENT Officer, Capt. Cunningham, two hours before scheduled take-off time.

3. Draw extra rations for Joes from S-2. (Bring extra cigarettes if possible).

4. Dispatcher must NOT allow Joes to jump with American or British cigarettes or candy in their possession.

5. Do not ask Joes personal questions. (For example: Questions concerning name, job, or background.)

6. Dispatcher will accompany Joes to aircraft and therefore must make arrangements to have flying equipment with him or already at plane.

7. Be certain BEFOREHAND how you want Joes to jump and that all commands will be given without hesitancy.

8. Talk over the mission with the bombardier and make certain he knows what you want in interphone procedure and signals. All bombardiers will use the three phrases —

   "Running In"

   "Action Station"

   "GO"

9. Give "Running In" and "Action Station" in a very loud and distinct voice — SHOUT — "GO".

10. Draw extra line west for each Joe.

11. Remember you can pull in Joe static line throughGallery Hatch.

12. Don't forget to obtain PINES to safety hooks on straps.
AN AMERICAN AGENT
LEAVES FOR THE FIELD

The time set for the departure from London was 5:00 p.m. of an afternoon in mid-May 1944.

At a quarter of five a uniformed captain of the United States Marine Corps, carrying a heavy suitcase, walked up the steps of an inconspicuous, shabby, private house in a London side street and rang the bell. The officer, Captain Howard Grell, wore two rows of bright-colored Belgian ribbons from World War I. His job for the night, as conducting officer was to give final instruction and to say good-bye to an American and British agent. In a matter of hours these agents were to leave, by aircraft and parachute, for sabotage work in plain clothes near the Swiss border in German-occupied France.

Captain Grell's ring was answered by a small white-haired man, he also wore World War I ribbons on the lapel of his blue civilian coat. Inside, the house was bare, cramped, drab. There was no rugs on the unfinished floors. The only furniture was utilitarian - cheap board tables, uncomfortable chairs without paint. The house was not now a place for living. It was a place where agents, brought to London, could be interviewed with security by officers from SOE/30 Headquarters.

A number of people stood about, some in uniform but the greater number in civilian clothes. There, three or four women among the men. They talked quietly, in small groups, obviously waiting to say good-bye to two of their own.
13. Bring back chute with static line into interrogation as proof.

14. Remember you are an experienced dispatcher and in no instance will you or any member of your crew give the Joes the impression that you are new at the business.

15. Neither you, nor any member of your crew, will give the Joes any information concerning past, present, or future operation. This includes flight plan, routes, and altitudes, etc., of the operation tonight.

16. Composition of crews must be standard. Dispatchers will remain in smallest gun compartment as long as Joes are on board.

ROY CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Captain, Air Corps,
Gp. Armament Officer.
On the second floor Captain Grell called for "Le Bret-on", and led the American agent into an empty room. The room was entirely bare of furniture, and the only decoration was a notice in red crayon thumbtacked over the fireplace.

"Restaurant Celeste on Queen Street is out of bounds for students."

Grell smiled and said "I have a little present for you from the Colonel."

From his trouser pocket the Conducting Officer brought out, unboxed, a pair of plain, very heavy gold cuff links. These he handed to Le Breton, who looked at them, embarrassed, obviously pleased. "Gosh, thanks, I never thought I'd have something like this."

"It's little enough," Grell nodded, "they make a nice souvenir - they might even be useful. In France, even today, they are worth seven thousand francs, a hundred and forty dollars. If you should get into trouble, get arrested, the police might take your money but overlook these. A good bribe for a guard."

"Yes, what about my commission, captain?"

Le Breton, the agent wireless telegraph operator, was a good-looking American boy, the kind who, in peacetime, would have been playing on the high school basketball team and taking his girl to the drugstore for a coke after the movies. At 18 he looked younger. Of medium height he was very strongly built. His hair, slightly long, was thick and truly brown. His eyes were blue and clear. He had a wide white grin that showed a gleam of gold at one side. He was wearing a cheap brown suit and a brown pullover.

43
Le Breton, of French parentage, was a Navy rating he had enlisted in the U.S. Navy from his New England textile town and in 1943 found himself taking the Navy course for radio-men in the Midwest. There he was picked up by the OSS which was seeking radio-men with language qualifications.

Volunteering for dangerous duty in enemy country, Le Breton went through the OSS communication and agent schools near Washington. In the fall of 1943 he reached England, where his training as a V/T operator, parachutist and agent was continued. Now he was ready for the field. Tonight, in company with a British captain called Andre he was going to the field by the parachute route, to act as V/T operator in an SOE sabotage circuit.

Le Breton was relaxed and wholly at ease. He was obviously untroubled by the equally obvious dangers of the immediate future. His only concern was the status of his application for Navy commission.

"We're doing what we can," the Conducting Officer told him. "You know these things are hard to do. They take a long time. I can promise you we will try like hell, and that we'll let you know by radio the minute we hear. Let's get going. It's almost five o'clock."

The London good-byes were brief. In the chilly, crowded hallway on the ground floor the British Colonel in charge of sabotage operations in France urged Andre and Le Breton not to hurry things. "Lie low and take your time until you know you are unsuspected. Then give them hell."

The colonel saluted and shook hands. Le Breton and
Andre shook hands around the circle of other agents. Andre kissed—ardently—one of the girls. The Conducting Officer, looking at his watch, said tentatively, "It's after five." The white haired civilian with the war ribbons opened the door. He saluted. "Good Luck, gentlemen."

Unescorted, Le Breton, Andre and Grell left the house and got into an automobile outside. The car was American-made but was painted in British army fashion and driven by a uniformed British girl driver.

The trip to the American airfield at Harrington took a little more than two hours. During it Grell, sitting in the back between the two agents, talked casually of this and that, sometimes in English, again in French. "The program," he said "is that we eat as soon as we reach the airfield. After that you get dressed. It will take an hour or more. The plane leaves at ten thirty-five."

Andre said, "I got married one month ago today."

Andre was a French Cannuck from Montreal. He was short, slight, wiry, excited but unalarmed. As an enlisted parachutist he had campaigned with the Canadian army at Kiska. Now, commissioned a captain in the British army, he was bound for German-occupied France as lieutenant to the organizer of the well established circuit for which Le Breton was to be W/T operator. The good-looking girl he had just kissed good-bye was his wife. In Hollywood fashion theirs had been a romance of secret agents.

"I met her in one of the training schools," he said.

"I was at parachute school with her. She was the first girl
I ever saw go through the 'hole'. She was scared. So was I. I get a butterfly in my belly every time I jump - but I told her there was nothing to it. She did a good job of jumping. They tell me women often do. She married me a month ago today and in another month she's going to join me in the field. By parachute, yes."

Le Breton said, "God, I'm hungry. When do we eat?"

The American airfield, exclusively devoted to the delivery of sabotage agents and supplies to France, housed the population of a small town, but its buildings were dispersed over a considerable area of British countryside. Narrow cement roads, whose shoulders of raw brown earth gave way their newness, wound through fields bright with new grass. The grass and the trees were of spring, but the raw damp wind was bitterly cold.

At the Administration Building, while the party waited for Lieutenant Reardon who did liaison work between OSS and the Eighth Air Force officers manning the field, a second car drove up containing a uniformed French officer and four agents in civilian clothes. Grell and the French officer talked together. The two groups of agents were asked to keep apart, then and later.

The mess hall was large, dark, bare and cold. The regular army mess was served in cafeteria style, and was eaten from uncovered tables. The food was good and was evidently enjoyed by Le Breton showing the state of his nerves by eating five desserts. "I like sweet stuff. It may be hard to get - where I'm going."
Immediately after the meal the agents were taken by car to a three-room Nissen hut for the long process of dressing. The men under the care of the French officer took over one room, Grell's charges another. The third room was occupied by two security officers— one a very tall civilian, the other a very short army officer. According to Lieutenant Reardon the pair were called variously "Sherlock and Watson" and "Mutt and Jeff."

First in the dressing ritual was the security check, the agents appearing separately before Mutt and Jeff who searched their clothing with meticulous care for evidence that would be incriminating if uncovered by the Gestapo. This evidence included such scraps of paper as London bus tickets or theatre stubs.

It is possible that a second and equally important function of the security examination was to make sure that no hitherto unsuspected "double agent" took with him into France written material of value to the enemy.

The security check completed for his two men, Captain Grell took charge.

First he sealed in Manila envelopes marked with the agents' names all personal belongings such as English money, pocket books and personal letters. These envelopes, he said without irony, would be available when called for at the London Headquarters.

Next, seating Le Breton in a chair close to his, the Conducting Officer opened his suitcase and speaking, in a quiet tone, began to explain certain items of equipment as...
he handed them over.

Money came first. In a white cloth belt to be worn under the suitcase like a life preserver was the considerable bulk of 100,000 francs in notes of various denominations. "This is quite a lot of money," said Grell seriously. "It amounts to 2,000 dollars in American currency or 500 pounds in British. We are not ever going to ask you for an accounting of this money, Le Breton. It is yours to spend as you like. I should, however, give you one warning. Be careful how you spend it. The quickest way to get yourself into trouble with the police will be to live beyond your means.

What would you think in your home town in America if a strange young man who was supposed to be a farmer begun to flash 100-dollar bills in the local lunch room? You'd think there was something fishy and you would want to know what was up. The same will be true for you in France. Don't make yourself conspicuous by spending too much money."

Personal papers followed. Each of these papers was necessary to any security of existence in German-occupied territory and each had been prepared with meticulous care to meet existing laws and to fit the identity that Le Breton was to assume in the field. These papers in Le Breton's case included:

Identity Card (Carte d'identite)
Ration Card (Carte d'alimentation, carte de veteement)
Census Card (Certificate de Resensement)
Occupation Card (Certificate de Travail)
Certificate of Residence (Certificate de domicile)
Birth Certificate (Certificate de Naissance)

When Le Breton had indicated that he understood his personal papers and had stowed them about his person, the Conducting Officer produced and handed over a rather large leather wallet. "You can put enough small denomination franc notes in this to last you for a time after your arrival in the field. Actually, of course, the wallet hides the sheet of silk carrying the code you are to use for W/T messages in the field. Remember that while the wallet will pass casual examination it won't stand a real search. I advise you to hide it with your radio set."

A package about 12" x 6" x 2" in dimension contained the crystals for Le Breton's radio set. "You carry this in the front of your jump suit," said Grell. "Those jump suits are roomy enough to carry a baby grand piano."

The Conducting Officer produced capsules, both blue and white, requiring Le Breton to sign for their receipt. He explained that the blue capsules were benzedrine sulphate to be taken in overcoming fatigue. The white capsules, on the other hand, were knock-out drops, capable of producing a quick state of unconsciousness which would last at least for six hours. "They are useful, these pills, but don't get them mixed up in your mind," Grell advised. "The results might be embarrassing."

Finally, Le Breton was supplied with a .45 caliber automatic pistol and a small .32 caliber revolver with a two inch barrel. Both weapons were loaded then and there. In regard to the revolver Grell warned that it would be effective only
at very close range. He also warned that it had no safety catch and would fire with the slightest pressure on the trigger.

"That's all as far as equipment is concerned," said Grel. "You might as well get dressed now while I give Andre his stuff."

The dressing process was lengthy.

Le Breton took off his shoes so that rubber heel pads could be inserted and so that his ankles would be bandaged against injury in jumping. This service was performed by a young man in khaki overall and peaked cap who introduced himself as the "Dispatcher." "I'm the boy who tells you how to jump and when," said the sergeant in a slow southern drawl. "This is my fourteenth trip over yonder, so I've done it before. Haven't ever jumped myself and don't reckon I ever will."

He grinned. "I'd jump quick, though, if they told me I was over Athens, Georgia. I'd jump without a chute to get back to Athens."

The jump suit—known as the "Camo-suit"—followed. This garment, a coverall of heavy canvas, was a mottled dark green and brown. When worn it hung loose, baggy folds, resembling more than anything else the dress of an under-water diver minus helmet. There were many pockets. Into these Le Breton slipped his revolver, a knife for freeing himself if he should land in a tree, a flashlight of French type with two extra batteries, a can of RAF emergency rations, a small flask of rum. A spade, with handle, which fitted into a back pocket was removed on order of the Conducting Officer,
who said that Le Breton's reception committee would take care of burying his jump paraphernalia. As accessories, there were ready at hand: a jump helmet with cushions of sponge rubber, leather gauntlets and goggles.

The sergeant-dispatcher called for help in adjusting the British-type parachute to be worn by the American agent. This help was supplied by an American Marine Corps sergeant who took his work seriously. He adjusted each strap with meticulous care and tested the release mechanism more than once. In the end he expressed satisfaction by putting Le Breton on the back: "This is one of our best chutes. Opens quick and easy."

"Yeah!" The agent was good-naturedly sarcastic. "I know all about that stuff."

By that time the room resembled that of a bride dressing for the wedding. Present, in addition to the two agents, were the Conducting Officer, the Liaison Officer, the dispatcher, the parachute adjustor, the pilot of the Liberator making the trip, and Colonel Heflin, commander of the field.

The pilot was saying to Andre, whose parachute was still being fitted: "When you get on the ground tell your reception committee that we'll try to make two more runs to drop packages. The first will come about 8 minutes after you are in. If it's safe we'll circle and make another."

To Le Breton the Conducting Officer was saying earnestly: "You must remember the message. It's important. I can't let you take a thing like that with you in writing. Too dangerous. Repeat the message to me."

For the first time Le Breton looked slightly bewildered.
He stammered, trying to reply.

"In a corner, Colonel Hefflin was talking about his boys and their job. "This work is harder than bombing—trickier. You're not following a formation—you're on your own. It takes a lot of training and flying ability to hit a pinpoint right on the nose. The best pilots for the job are those who have been on anti-submarine patrol. We've got some of them here. Good boys."

The Colonel had more than theory on which to base his remarks. As pilot he had made more than 16 operational flights dropping agents and containers to resistance groups ranging from Norway to the Swiss border. He admitted the danger involved. "We've lost 6 planes so far," he said slowly, but a lot of those boys aren't gone for good. We know that they go down safely and that the Underground is bringing them out."

In the Colonel's mind the most disquieting thing about flying an operation was not enemy flak or enemy fighters. "What gets me," he confessed, "is crossing the Channel in fog or cloud, in instruments, knowing that the stuff around you is busy with aircraft but not being able to see a thing. When you are dealing with flak or fighters you have so much to do that you haven't got time to be scared. When you're waiting for a collision in the overcast there isn't a thing to do but sit—sit and sweat."

At precisely 10:15 Lieutenant Reardon gave the signal for departure. "Let's go."

The procession struggled out into the cold, damp twilight. Le Breton and André moving awkwardly in their bulky jump suit.
and parachutes. Grell was still talking anxiously to the American agent. "You're sure you've got the message straight. Repeat it to me again."

The trip to the aircraft was made in the automobile which had brought the men from London. It swiftly circled the field on a broad cement runway. At the dispersal point the Liberat with a big block D on its side, engines idle, was waiting. Its crew, in coveralls and blue coat, stood by its side.

Out of its element the bomber appeared fat, clumsy, ungainly. "We're loaded to the ears," said the pilot, pointing to the bomb bay. "Twelve containers to get rid of at another ground before we drop the 'bodies'. We've got a tail wind, though, they say. The trip out should take less than three hours. We're due back here at 5:20 A.M."

One of the bomber crew drew the Conducting Officer to one side, pointing to Le Breton. "How old is that guy? He looks like a kid."

Grell smiled. "He's eighteen—just. How old are you?"

The crewman shook his head. "I'm nearly twenty—but that's different. Eighteen. By God."

Le Breton and Andre shook hands with Grell. They climbed into the plane through the hole in the bottom of the fuselage. It was the same hole through which, approximately three hours later, they would jump into the darkness over France.

The pilot again glanced at his watch. To the crew he said conversationally, "Well, let's go." He nodded to Grell. "See you for breakfast."

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Standing to one side, the Conducting Officer watched the Liberator motors come to life, one after the other. As the ship jerked forward and swung onto the runway Andre and Le Breton waved from the open waist window. Andre called out something unintelligible. Grell saluted.

From the balcony of the control tower on the west side of the field the Conducting Officer watched the plane take off.

It was almost dark. The lights of the flarepath made a road in the middle distance. The wet wind was colder, if possible, than ever. It almost blew away the sound of the Liberator's motors. At last, however, it became more insistent, grew louder. The bright lights on the wingtips wobbled and moved.

The plane took off, almost opposite the control tower, with a roar that was deafening, and then was gone.

Grell glanced at his watch. It was 10:36.

An American agent had left for the field.
24 October 1943 - Colonel Hefflin, Lt. Col. Fish, Capt. Sullivan (then Lt. Col., Maj. and 1st Lt., respectively) and Capt. Akers, all of the 22nd Antisubmarine Squadron, attend a meeting at Evington. There they meet with Col. Williams, A-3 of VIII Bomber Command, Grp./Capt. Fielden, RAP Special Unit (Tempsford), Col. Oliver of VIII Air Force, Col. Haskell and Major Brooks of the office of Strategic Services, London. Before attending this meeting, the officers of the 22nd Antisubmarine Squadron had not the remotest idea of what work would be assigned their Squadron and the 4th Antisubmarine Squadron. At the meeting, the two squadrons were assigned their duties as "Sabotage" squadrons, and the officers received, from the OSS men and from the Tempsford representative, a complete description of the work and what it would involve in terms of training crews and modifying the B-24 aircraft. For the most part, the Carpetbagger Project, which was the cover name given the new work, would be in the form of Special Operations - OSS. OSS would direct the work, arrange details of reception grounds (working closely with the British counterpart of Special Operations) specify the contents of the containers and packages to be delivered.

Period 25 October to 30 December - During the period, selected combat crews engaged in training at Tempsford. Major Boone (then Capt.) and crew are the first to be trained.

26 October - Ground section of the 22nd Antisubmarine Squadron leaves Dunkeswell (Devon) by motor convoy and arrive
Yettington. Combat crews leave to fly to Alcester, but are unsuccessful in landing there because of weather. They are therefore scattered over England at diversiary airfields. Weather remained fogged in for a week and forced suspension of operations.

1 November — Ground sections of the 4th Antisubmarine Squadron leave Duxeswell for Alcester, travelling by truck and train.

3 November — Aircraft captains, navigators and bombardiers are making two trips across with British crews in Halifux bombers, as part of their training. The first mission went out the night of 3/4 November and the aircraft in which Capt. James E. Estes was flying failed to return. No word has been received to explain what happened to the aircraft.

7 November — During the past week numerous training flights have been made, and the crews are being checked out in the proper procedures for the new job. Only lack of suitably modified B-24's is now holding up our crews from taking in their own missions.

9 November — The King and Queen of England visit Tempsford, where six of our combat crews are at present training. Each crewman was introduced personally and later the King and Queen had tea in the Officer's Mess.

10 November — Major Joyce, VIII Air Force Bomber Command Security Officer, and Capt. in Sten's of the Office of Strategic Services arrived at Tempsford to get information
December - Orders are published authorizing the 406th Bombardment Squadron (P) with Lt. Col. R. F. Wall and Captain G. W. H. F. H. Fish. The two squadrons will fly the B-24D medium bomber under the command of Maj. J. Smith. The 406th Bombardment Squadron (B) under the command of Capt. E. E. H. Fish. The two squadrons will fly the B-24D medium bomber under the command of Maj. J. Smith.

First Division. It has also been decided that for the next operational period (November) we will continue with the British at Tetsford, but this time using our own B-24s, as of November, the 2nd and 4th Bombardment Squadrons have been assigned to the British Air Force, and have been placed under the command of the 4th Air Division. The squadrons and the ground echelon of the 4th Air Division have been used for two new squadrons, the 3rd and 4th Bombardment Squadrons.

November - Lt. Col. R. F. Wall and Maj. J. Smith lead the sortie over France, which we made with British crews. This sortie was carried out by our crews because of lack of experienced crews. Missions were carried out by our crews over the period.
5 December - Capt. St. Clair returns to Tempsford with some of our combat crews who have not completed their training flights with the British.

14 December - Lt. Col. Heflin is relieved of his duties as Commanding Officer of the 406th Squadron and is assigned to the 482nd Group as Air Executive-Special Project. Capt. Robert L. Boone is appointed Commanding Officer of the 406th Squadron. Major Fish is relieved of his duties as Commanding Officer of the 36th Squadron and is assigned to the 42nd Group as Operations Officer-Special Project. Capt. Redman and St. Clair is appointed Commanding Officer of the 36th Squadron.

17 December - Lt. Glenn C. Nesbitt (406th Squadron) was cut off on operational mission with the RAF, Tempsford, over France. Upon return to England after completion of the sortie, it was necessary for the crew, including Lt. Nesbitt, to bail out because of weather over England.

20 December - Our crews who had been on Detached Service during the past month period are now returned to base. Because of bad weather it was impossible for our crews to complete any operational missions during this period.

25 December - The two Carpetbagger squadrons play host to a group of English children. Officers and enlisted men contribute several weeks' candy and rations, in order to brighten the Christmas of these children who have lived under war-time conditions for four years.

27 December - Abruptly after the majority of Christmas, the Carpetbagers experience their first loss of a crew.
An aircraft of the 36th Squadron, engaged in a navigational training flight over England, ran into extremely bad weather and crashed into the side of a mountain on the South Coast. All members of the crew were killed. They were: Capt. Robert L. Williams (Pilot); Lt. Joseph V. Hanley (Co-pilot); Lt. Hilton L. Reuling (Navigator); Lt. Louis F. Peterson (Bomber); T/Sgt. Jesse A. Wallance (Engineer); T/Sgt. Glen O. Wichner (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. Henry D. MacMillan, Jr. (Gunner); S/Sgt. Eddie P. Rush (Gunner).

25 January 1944 - The following promotions are announced: Capt. St. Clair to Major (Commanding Officer of the 36th Squadron); Capt. Boone to Major (Commanding Officer of the 406th Squadron).

1 February - Master Sergeant Cntko, line chief of the 36th Squadron, is killed when he was struck, while riding a bicycle, by a jeep.

7 February - Movement begins to the new station located at Watton, Norfolk. Skeleton ground sections and some combat crews remain to continue operations.

10 February - The airbase at Alconbury is visited by the King and Queen, escorted by Lt.-Gen. Doolittle. The royal couple inspect a plane of the Pathfinder Group. Capt. Tegstad’s ship and crew, of the Carpetbaggers, are also on display.

17 February - Movement to Watton is completed. However, facilities for operations are not adequate, and so operations in the approaching period will be carried on from Alconbury, with skeleton ground forces.
27 February - The Carpetbaggers are relieved of assignment to the 2nd Bombardment Group and to First Division Headquarters, 86th Service Group is designated as the acting Group Headquarters, per TM Message signed "Doolittle." Next higher headquarters is now VIII Air Force Composite Command.

28 February - Capt. Arnold Fletcher, Adjutant of the 26th is reassigned to become the new Group Adjutant. Also assigned from the 36th are Lt. Silkenskeen, Communications Officer and Lt. Bosworth, Statistical Officer.

1 March - Combat crews and a skeleton force of ground sections depart for Alkenbury to begin March moon-period operations.

2 March - The crew and aircraft of Lt. H.C. Donald, 86th Squadron, are missing in action from a sortie of this date. Crew members are: Lt. Frank C. Mc Donald (Pilot); Lt. Frederick C. Kelly (Co-pilot); Lt. Thomas H. Kendall (Navigator); Lt. Edward F. Shovlin (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Leroy S. Goswick (T/Gunner); T/Sgt. Warren L. Ross (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. Norman R. Gellerman (Engineer); S/Sgt. Edward H. DeCoste (Gunner).

3 March - Two crews and aircraft of the 36th Squadron are missing in action from a sortie of this date. Crews are as follows: Lt. Richard Carpenter (Pilot); Lt. Bernard A. Eshleman (Co-pilot); Lt. Lonnie Hallman, Jr. (Navigator); Lt. William D. Ross (Bombardier); Lt. Glenn C. Hosbitt (Bombardier); T/Sgt. Clarence L. Johnson (Engineer); T/Sgt. Eden C. Burris, Jr. (Radio Operator); Sgt. Edward Herdman (T/Gunner); S/Sgt. John W. Dudley (T/Gunner); Capt. Gerald
S. Nystedt (Pilot); Lt. Henry N. Walsh (Co-pilot); Lt. Edward Martinez (Navigator); Lt. Joseph P. Conner, Jr. (Squadron); T/Sgt. Cornelius F. O’Leary (Radio Operator); T/Sgt. Earl W. Underwood (Engineer); S/Sgt. Leo W. Roettger (T/Gunner); S/Sgt. Frederick H. Wynne (T/Gunner).

25 March - Advance echelons arrive at the new base located at Harrington, Northamptonshire. This is the first time the Carpetbaggers will have a base exclusively for their own use. There is general enthusiasm over the prospect of finally settling down in "permanent" base.

26 March - Orders are issued establishing the 601st Bombardment Group (Heavy) (Revised). This is the new designation for the Carpetbagger Project to be based at Harrington. As of this date, Lt. Col. Clifford J. Befflin assumes command of the new Group.

29 March - All personnel have returned from detached service at Aldenbury.

1 April - Remaining sections of crews depart Hatton and arrive at the new Harrington base.

4 April - General Orders No. 1, Headquarters, VIII Air Force Composite Command, officially assigns the 36th and 406th Squadrons to the 601st Bombardment Group (H) (Provisional).

5 April - The crew and aircraft of Lt. Nicoll, 406th Squadron, failed to return from mission over France. Crew members are: Lt. William J. Nicoll (Pilot); Lt. . . . .
K. Goebel (Co-pilot); Lt. William G. Harris (Navigator); Lt. Thomas F. Davis (Squadron); S/Sgt. Richard C. Biddle (Engineer); S/Sgt. Warren L. Brewer (Radio Operator);

25 April - Colonel Heflin, with Lt. Colonel Cable of OSS, flew in an E-21 to Algiers, Africa, to remain for three days, for the purpose of showing the Algiers Squadron (being set up to engage in Carportbomber operations) a modified B-24 and of discussing matters of coordinating operations flown by the London and Algiers missions.

27 April - The Harrington Airplane is visited by Privy Councillor General Hill, Commanding General of VIII Air Force Composite Command. About two weeks before this visit, the entire personnel of the field had been put to work for a day on a program of beautifying the LS and living quarters. So, General Hill was greeted by a scion-and-in flower field, the spots of which could honestly be said to have been freshly seeded. The General made a tour of inspection and expressed his satisfaction with the way the show seemed to be running. He visited the S-3 set-up and made comment that it was all most interesting. Apparently, he was especially impressed by Lt. Sullivan, the Group Intelligence Officer, because the General asked Col. Heflin how it was that the S-3 officer was only a First Lieutenant. The Colonel explained that Lt. Sullivan's captaincy was in, but had not yet come through.

28 April - an aircrew of the 36th Squadron failed to return from mission of this date. Crew members are: Lt. George W. McBride (Pilot); Lt. Robert F. Poelstra (Co-pilot); Lt. Arthur E. Pope (Navigator); Lt. Peter Rocco (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Charles H. Wilson (Engineer);

30 April - Major Fish, Group Deputy Commander, is now a Lieutenant Colonel.

1 May - Flag-raising ceremony today. An official of the RAF, Squadron Leader F.D. King, turned the deeds to the Harrington base over to Col. Heflin, who received them on behalf of the U.S. Army Air Forces. The Union Jack was hauled down and the Stars and Stripes raised on the flagpole in front of Station Headquarters.

1 May - at night, practices were held, involving C-47 taking a night landing on a short stretch of runway, by flashlight, and unloading eighteen men, before quickly taking off again. Seven men, stationed on the ground with ordinary flashlights, guided the plane in for the landing. Col. Heflin was the pilot of the C-47 and he made a remarkable landing right on the mark.

5 May - an aircraft and crew of the 406th Squadron is missing from a mission over France. Crew members are: Lt. Murray R. Simon (Pilot); Lt. Frank H. Russell (Co-Pilot); Lt. John B. Reed (Bombardier); Lt. John A. Reitberger (Navigator); T/Sgt. Leo F. Dumoulin (Engineer); T/Sgt. Phillip E. Latta (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. Graham S. Easty (Gunner); S/Sgt. Peter G. Collier (Engineer).

6 May - an aircraft and crew of the 406th Squadron is missing from a sortie over Denmark. Crew members are: Lt. George Pipkin (Pilot); Lt. Israel N. Barron (Co-Pilot); Lt. Clair D. Vander Schaaf (Navigator); Lt. Floyd N. Holmes
(Bombardier); T/Sgt. Dale Halner (Engineer); T/Sgt. Jack
G. Vengert (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. James F. McCuskey (En-
gineer); S/Sgt. Vincent C. Gallozzi (Gunner).

8 Mv - Lt. Gen. Joseph Keen, highest ranking French
General in the United Kingdom, and responsible directly to
de Gaulle, visits the Harrington base. He was accompanied
by Col. Haskell, (OSS), Maj. Gable (OSG) and two aides - a
colonel and a civilian who acted as interpreter. The Gen-
eral showed a lively interest in the stories our crew had
to tell at their interrogations.

9 Mv - Word is received that Lt. Frederick Kelly
(co-pilot of Lt. McDonald's crew, 36th Squadron), reported
missing in action from a sortie of 2 March, is definitely
on his way back to England. Also, word has been received
that Lt. Chevlin of the 36th Squadron is a Prisoner of War
(via a letter from his family to Lt. Merrill).

11 Mv - Effective this date, the addition of heavy
bomber squadrons reassigned to the 601st Group to
carry out Carpet-bag operations. They are the 788th
Bomber Wing Squadron, commanded by Maj. Leonard H. Kinnus,
and the 650th Bomber Wing Squadron, commanded by Maj. Jack
Dickerson. The 788th has been doing high-altitude bombing
in the ETO, while the 650th is fresh from the east. Com-
bat personnel of both squadrons are being checked out in
Carpetbag procedures at Cheddington, under the direction
of Lt. Col. Fish.

The Harrington base is now assuming the pro-
portions of a full-fledged Group. Besides the two new
tactical squadrons, the following units are carrying on various aspects of maintenance and administration: 35th Station Complement, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the 35th Service Group, 352nd Service Squadron, 1139th Military Police Company, 1077th Signal Company, 1220th Quartermaster Company, 18th Weather Detachment, 1645th Ordinance Company, and 816th Engineer Fire Fighting Platoon.

(Attached is a copy of the letter which set the wheels in motion bringing the 768th and 850th Squadrons into the Carpetbagger Project).

15 May - Lt. Col. Heflin is now Colonel Heflin.

18 May - Search of base and site defense is instituted at Harrington Pointe. Squadron and unit meetings are held to which commanding officers explain the regulations and the reason for this period of impending invasion, the Germans, in desperation, might attempt to disrupt the Allies' efforts by dropping paratroopers on airfields. The Harrington drone, because of the nature of its work, would naturally have a high priority on Jerry's list. Accordingly, units are being affected whereby, in case an alert is sounded, the Tannoy public-address system, all strategic points on the site and on the drone are guarded by armed men. To make this defense set-up run smoothly, a series of practice alerts will be held during the coming month. All personnel are warned of the extreme danger in the event of a "cause climbing" order during a practice alert.

27 May - Word is received that Lt. Floyd Holmes and
SHERE HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

May 1944

SHEP/17240/1/ops

SUBJECT: allocation of additional aircraft for SOE/SE missions.

TO: Commanding General, USSTF.

1. The requirement has arisen for the allocation of additional aircraft to SOE/SE with the object of enabling the organization to meet its post-D-DAY requirements for the supply and nourishing of Resistance Groups in the Supreme Commander's sphere.

2. The Supreme Commander has approved the requirement of 25 aircraft. You are therefore directed to allocate this number of suitable aircraft together with the organizational and personnel which you consider necessary.

3. The crews of the aircraft will require specialized training in order to enable them to perform their duties with the requisite efficiency. You are requested to take the allocation at the earliest practicable date; the details of the assignment to SOE/SE should be arranged directly between yourself and the Headquarters of that organization.

By command of General Eisenhower:

For E.R. Full

"P. SMITH
Lt. C.In., U.S. NAVY
Chief of Staff.
Sgt. Jack Went (406th Squadron), missing since 3 May from a sortie over Denmark, are safely back in England. They were members of Lt. George Pickin's crew.

28 May - An aircraft and crew of the 406th squadron is missing from a sortie of this date. Crew members are: Lt. Henry L. Scott, III (Pilot); Lt. Robert F. W. Co-pilot); Lt. William C. Beckman (Navigator); Lt. Willis O. Cazzens (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Frederick J. Tuttle (Gunner); T/Sgt. Dale S. Leucke (Radio Operator); T/Sgt. Darvin D. Deihl (Engineer); S/Sgt. Richard G. Jenkins (Gunner); Lt. Carmen J. Vizzale. (Of the 788th Squadron flew with Lt. Vizzale for the purpose of receiving special operational instructions in visit.)

29 May - At tonight's interrogation of returning crews, General "Wild Bill" Donovan, Commanding General of the Office of Strategic Services, was present. High point of the interrogations was the report brought in by Lt. Henn's crew (406th) of having made an S-phone contact with Lt. John J. C. (Story of Lt. J. J. C. appears elsewhere in this history.)

An aircraft and crew of the 406th Squadron still missing. Crew members are: Lt. Ernest B. Fitzpatrick (Pilot); Lt. Richard W. Thirle (Co-pilot); Lt. James S. Shepherd (Navigator); Lt. Joseph J. Lasicki (Bombardier); S/Sgt. James E. Williams (Gunner); T/Sgt. Paul P. Kusza (Radio Operator); T/Sgt. Walter H. Swartz (Engineer); Lt. Cornell DeGrootly (Of the 788th Squadron flying navigational check-out).
1 June - It is official that Lt. Frederick C. Kelly is safely back in England. He had been missing with Lt. McDonald's crew (36th Squadron) since 2 March. Lt. Robert P. Sullivan, Group Intelligence Officer is promoted to the rank of Captain.

2 June - Word received that Lt. Murray Simon (406th Squadron) is now missing on 5 May is now back in England.

3 June - Seventeen successful sorties are flown by the Carpetbaggers in this one night. This is the largest number of successes in a single night to date.

5 June - Aircraft and crew of the 36th Squadron is missing from a sortie over Belgium. Crew members are: Lt. Kenneth Pratt (Pilot); Lt. Ralph Leindorf (Co-pilot); F/O Russell J. Byrne (Navigator); F/O Carlo C. Starkovich (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Ollie "W" Warren (Tail Gunner); T/Sgt. Joseph A. Guron (Radio Operator); C/Sgt. Roy C. Koens (Engineer); S/Sgt. James A. Warner (Gunner).

6 June - H-hour of D-day has arrived at last! The Allied invasion of Northern France is the sole topic of conversation. All ten of the Group are in a state of high excitement over this latest and greatest step towards victory.

and there is a new determination to deliver maximum of supplies to the resistance groups, who are bound to play an important role in the liberation of the occupied countries.

7 June - In operations of this date, a total of seventeen agents were dropped in five sorties. This is the largest number of agents successfully dispatched during one night.
15 June - The Red Cross Aero Club for Enlisted Men has opened. It is a very beautiful place, with fire-places, game rooms, library, lounges and writing-rooms, snack-bar and stage. The directress is Miss Nelda Kurtz, who was formerly in charge of the Aero-Club at Alconbury.

16 June - Master Sergeant Willis L. DeLano of the 36th Squadron becomes the first crewchief of the Group to be awarded a Bronze Star Medal. Between 6 January 1944 and 3 June 1944, N/Sgt DeLano's aircraft performed thirty-one consecutive operational missions without an abortion.

19 June - An aircraft and crew of the 850th Squadron are missing from a mission to France. This is the first operational loss suffered by the 850th since its assignment to the Carpetbagger Project. The missing Crew members are: Lt John R. McNeil (Pilot); Lt Glen O. Thompson (Co-pilot); Lt Joseph P. Bové (Navigator); Lt Robert F. Siebert (Bombardier); S/Sgt Henry H. Ricard (W/Gunner); S/Sgt Jerome J. Hannel (Radio Opr); Sgt Fred H. Lowery (Engineer); Sgt Fred Monaco (Tail Gunner).

25 June - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces directs Eighth Air Force to provide a number of B-17 aircraft for large-scale daylight dropping operation in Southern France, for the purpose of arming speedily the rapidly growing resistance groups in that area. On this date, 180 B-17 aircraft take-off from Eighth Air Force air-dromes of the 3rd Bombardment Division, to make deliveries to four targets. Fighter cover was provided. Each aircraft
carries twelve containers of various types of arms and ammunition. 177 aircraft complete the mission, delivering a total of 2,088 containers. Two B-17's are reported missing.

27 June - An unusual incident occurred, involving combat personnel of the 650th Squadron. Attacked by an enemy night-intruder over England, and their B-24 set on fire, Navigator Lt Robert Callahan and Bombardier Lt Robert L. Sanders bail out, using one parachute. Sanders’ parachute was rendered unusable by the fire and Callahan, in order to save the Bombardier’s life, instructed Sanders to grab onto him. They reached earth safely, Callahan sustaining a broken ankle. It was a real act of heroism, and Callahan has been recommended by Colonel Heflin for the Silver Star.

30 June - The month ending today has seen a banner record rolled up by the Carpetbaggers. Out of 424 sorties flown, 347 were successfully completed. Seven of these were to Belgium and 340 to France. This is a far cry from the results of last January, when eighteen sorties were flown by the newly born Carpetbaggers, and eight sorties were successful. In six short months, therefore, the scope of operations has been broadened by 2400%.

1 July - The following staff officers of the Group have been promoted to the rank indicated: Capt Wakefield (S-2); Major Tresemer (S-3); Major Teer (S-3); Major Sanders (S-3) Major Cummings (S-3) and Major Fletcher (S-1)

4 July - Three aircraft and crews, and six members of a fourth crew are missing from sorties over France. This is
Lt. Sanders and Lt. Callahan of the Piggy back-parachute jump fame. In the center is Radio Operator Sadler, who was badly burned in the incident of 27 June 1944.
the greatest number of losses sustained by the Group in a single night's operations. Crew members are: Lt John C. Broten (Pilot - 36th Squadron); Lt Edward Tappan (Co-pilot); Lt Roy C. Gehue (Navigator); Lt Alfred C. Emert (Bombardier); Sgt Jesse R. Ellis, (W/Gunner); S/Sgt William Freidaks (Radio Operator); S/Sgt Harry L. Sparks (Engineer); Sgt Michael J. Prazentelli (T/Gunner).

Lt John H. Peade (Pilot - 850th Squadron); Lt James I Lovelace (Co-Pilot); Lt Gerald E. Mitchell (Navigator); Lt John D. Bonnin (Bombardier); S/Sgt William R. DuBois, Jr. (W/Gunner-Dispatcher); T/Sgt Edward J. Jones (Radio Operator); T/Sgt Frank E. Lines (Engineer); S/Sgt Ellis H. Smyre (T/Gunner)

Lt Charles R. Kline (Pilot - 850th Squadron); Lt Clyde K. Schultz (Co-pilot); Lt Richard J. Bruce (Navigator); Lt Jesse H. Siler, Jr (Bombardier); S/Sgt Warren L. Rock (W/Gunner-Dispatcher); T/Sgt Don R. Benette (Radio Operator); T/Sgt Floyd E. Lauletta (Engineer); S/Sgt Arthur G. Abate (T/Gunner)

Lt Otis W. Murphy (Co-pilot - 850th Squadron) Lt. Joseph C. Danozo (Navigator); Lt William L. Granbery, III (Bombardier); S/Sgt Paul A. Strick, Jr (W/Gunner); T/Sgt Charles E. Cernik (Radio Operator); S/Sgt Laurie A. Salo (T/Gunner). The story of how the pilot of this crew, Lt. Oliver C. Comstock, brought his crippled ship back to England with the Engineer, T/Sgt Franklin J. Kastsy, is told elsewhere in this history.

6 July - Colonel Heflin is pilot of a C-47 on the first
"Dakota" landing operation flown by the Carpetbaggers. His crew consists of Captain Wilmer L. Stapel (406th Squadron), co-pilot; Major Edward Tresemer (Group), navigator; Major Charles Teer (Group), bombardier; T/Sgt Albert L. Krasevac (36th Sqdn), radio operator.

9 July - The "Dakota" operation successfully concluded. Colonel Heflin lands at the Harrington airdrome. One of his passengers is Lt French M. Russell (406th Squadron), who went missing with Lt Simon's crew on 6 May. The complete story of the "Dakota" operation is told elsewhere in this history.

13 July - During this night's operations, twenty-five completions were scored out of twenty-seven missions. This is the best record of completions in a single night to date.

18 July - An aircraft and crew of the 850th Squadron is missing from a mission to France. Crew members are: Lt. David A. Michelson (Pilot); Lt John P. Shaw, Jr. (Co-pilot); Lt Donald C. Boyd (Navigator); Lt Melvin Weiss (Bombardier) S/Sgt Arnold Marinoff (W/Gunner-Dispatcher); S/Sgt William J. Hovanec (Radio Operator); T/Sgt Duncan L. Patterson (Engineer); S/Sgt Enoch E. Wooten, Jr. (Tail Gunner).

24 July - Combat Personnel were assembled today to hear an address by an agent known as "Marksman", who is the British Major (Now a lieutenant-colonel) whom Colonel Heflin brought back to England via C-47 on 9 July. An account of Marksman's remarks will be found elsewhere in this history.

31 July - Today, payday, marks the opening of Eighth
Air Forces bond-selling drive, for the purpose of financing a new tactical squadron, to be known as the "Victory Squadron", entirely by personnel of Eighth Air Force. Response at the pay-line in each unit is excellent, and it is expected that Station 179's quota of 102,600 dollars will be filled without any difficulty.

1 August - It is learned, with regret, that Sgt Perry, the Marine sergeant formerly attached to the O.S.S. liaison office at Harrington, was killed when his parachute failed to open during an operational jump from a B-17 Flying Fortress.

2 August - The second "Dakota" landing operation undertaken by the Carpetbaggers is flown today. Crew members are: Captain Stapel (Pilot); Captain Kelly (Co-pilot); Captain Garnett (Navigator); Captain Shall (Bombardier); T/Sgt Garwood (Radio Operator).

A chief organizer of resistance in Denmark addressed a meeting of our combat crews. A digest of his remarks appears as a special article elsewhere in this history.

4 August - An unusual accident occurred during a mission of this date flown by Lt. Gilpin and crew of the 78th Squadron. When the aircraft returned to base, after successfully completing its drop, it was reported that Corporal Eugene Michalak, the dispatcher, was missing, having apparently fallen out of the aircraft while it was over the channel. The B-2 report on this incident appears in a special article.

5 August - The Carpetbagger Project receives a new designation. We are no longer a provisional group, and no
longer the 801st. Instead, we have become the 442nd Bombardment Group (Heavy). The four squadrons are redesignated as follows: The 36th to the 856th; the 550 to the 857th; the 406th to the 858th; the 786 to the 859th. No change of station is involved. Authority for these changes is General Order No. 743, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, this date.

6 August—An aircraft and crew of the 859th Squadron is missing from a mission to Belgium. Crew members are: Lt. Robert C. McLaughlin (Pilot); Lt Daniel G. Olenych (Co-pilot); Lt Leo J. J.lin (Navigator); Lt Bertram D. Knapp (Bombardier); S/Sgt Fred H. Heath (W/Gunner-Dispatcher); T/Sgt Donald C. Adamson (Radio Operator); T/Sgt John Y. Dear (Engineer); S/Sgt Warren H. Lee (Tail Gunner). Lt William R. Reagan (857th Sqn) was flying as passenger.

7 August—Captain Stapel returns from the Dakota mission on which he took off 2 August. The mission was successfully completed on 6 August after a stop-over in Corsica.

Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Spencer, a detachment of Navy personnel has moved into Harrington. They are part of a photographic unit attached to O.S.S., and will film the entire Harrington set-up, as part of a documentary being prepared for President Roosevelt and General Donovan.

8 August—The severest battle damage yet sustained by a Carpetbagger aircraft is reported in tonight’s missions. An aircraft of the 857th Squadron, piloted by Lt Bailes, returns from a sortie to Belgium with over one thousand flak tears and cannon holes in the fuselage. Damage was done by
ground anti-aircraft installations and by a twin-engined enemy aircraft camouflaged with invasion stripes. The tail-gunner, Sgt Stamper, and the radio operator, Sgt Ensminger, were both wounded, though not seriously. The containers were jettisoned over the channel.

11 August - Lt Callahan of the piggy-back parachute jump fame, and Lt Carscadden, who flew his crippled ship back to England in order to save his engineer's life, are each awarded a Silver Star, third highest award in the U.S. Army. Both men are members of the 857th Squadron. Authority for the award is General Order No. 478, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, this date.

13 August - Colonel Heflin officially assumes command of the 492nd Bomb Group (H).

14 August - An aircraft and crew of the 858th Squadron are missing from a mission to France. Crew members are: Lt Richard R. Norton (Pilot); Lt Connie C. Walker (Co-pilot); Lt Lloyd L. Anderson (Navigator); Lt Benjamin Rosen (Bombardier); S/Sgt James H. Husbands (Engineer); S/Sgt William E. Monoy (Radio Operator); Sgt John W. Gillikin (W/Gunner-Dispatcher); S/Sgt Wayman B. Skadden (T/Gunner).

15 August - A perfect score is accomplished. Out of tonight's eleven missions, eleven completions are rung up.

16 August - Three of the Squadron Commanders are promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. They are Lt Cols. St Clair (856th), Dickerson (857) and Boone (858th).

23 August - Paris is liberated by French Forces of the Interior. This historic event is the fruit of eight months
of Carpetbagger efforts to deliver stores of war lateral to the resistance groups.

31 August - More missions have been flown during the month past than in any previous month. A total of 442 missions were accomplished, of which 342 were marked successfully completed. 718 tons of material were dropped, as well as 6,292,000 leaflets. 227 agents were dropped in the field.

4 September - A record 39 completions out of 43 sorties was accomplished on this date. This record surpasses our previous achievements both numerically and in excellence.

9 September - Colonel Heflin, Group C.O. was awarded the Croix de Guerre and Legion of Honor in Paris by General Koenig.

14 September - 4 Aircraft took off on this date for the first day-light carpetbagger operation of this Group. Planes took off for a target in the heart of France at 0900 hours, successfully dropped, and completed the mission by returning to the drome at 1430 hours.

16 September - The Carpetbagger project is officially finished for this Group. With the end of these operations, OSS recalls their detachment from this drome and the Group awaits new operational assignment.

As this is the final entry in the Carpetbagger history, an item directly connected with the project occurred at a later date and it is only proper that this activity be recorded at this time.
The following picture appeared in the 10 Sept. issue of the Paris newspaper "LeParisien Libéré."

Le général Koenig, gouverneur militaire de Paris, serrant la main au colonel C.J. Heflin après lui avoir remis, aux Invalides, la Légion d'honneur et la médaille militaire.

Translation: "General Koenig, military governor of Paris, shaking hands with Colonel C.J. Heflin after having awarded him, at the Invalides, the Legion of Honor and the military medal (Croix de Guerre with Bronze Palm)."

* * *

The following item appeared in the 10 Sept. issue of the Paris newspaper "L'Aube."

Le général Koenig décore un colonel américain

Hier matin, au Hôtel des Invalides, le général Koenig a récompensé le colonel d'aviation C.J. Heflin, commandant d'un groupe de bombardiers B-17, qui a dû rester six mois à 책 aux Etats-Unis, d'une croix de la Légion d'honneur et la croix de guerre en or au colonel C.J. Heflin.

Translation: "Yesterday morning, at the Hotel des Invalides, General Koenig received Colonel of Aviation C.J. Heflin, commander of a group of Flying Fortresses (B-17s) which has for many months supplied arms and munitions of all kinds the Maquis of Ain, of Vercors and of the Haute-Savoie. The Military Governor of Paris bestowed the cross of the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre on Colonel Heflin."
On this, the last night of Carpetbagger operations, a plane from the 856th Squadron was MIA on a mission to France. The crew included: James H. McLaughlin (Pilot); Carl E. Lee, (Co-Pilot); George F. Bradbury (Navigator) Ernest G. Skwara, (Bombardier); Alforne A. DeVries, (Engineer); Henry Stee (Radio operator); James G. Pirtle (TGunner) and Merrill G. Brewer (Dispatcher).

Lt Mc Laughlin returned to Harrington on 23 September and reported that the ship had crashed due to flak barrages and he had safely parachuted out of the plane. Four bodies were found in the wreckage and identified by their dogtags as Lee, Skwara, DeVries, and Brewer. No other word was received of the remaining three men who must have bailed out of the aircraft and are unaccounted for.

22 September — General Koenin made the following awards of Croix de Guerre to members of the Carpetbagger Project at a formal ceremony attended by Lieut-General Doolittle, Maj. General Partridge and Brig. General Sanford:

**Ordre de l’armée**

Lt. Colonel ROBERT L. BOONE, 856th Bomb Sq.
Lt. Colonel ROBERT A. ST CLAIR, 856th Bomb. Sq
Major EDWARD C. TRESEMER, 492nd Bomb. Group.
Major CHARLES R. TEER, 492nd Bomb Group.

**Ordre de Corps D’armée**

Major BOSTON R. RUDOLFF, 856 th Bomb Sqn.
Major BENJAMIN A. MEAD, 856th Bomb Sqn.
Major LYMAN A. SANDERS, 492nd Bomb Gp.
Major CLAUDE H. CUMMINGS, Jr., 492nd Bomb Gp.
Captain WALTER L. GARNETT, Jr., 856th Bomb. Sq
Captain FRED W. EDWARDS (Dec), 856th Bomb. Sq.
Captain WILMER L. STAPLE, 856th Bomb Sqn.
AN ACCOUNT OF C-47 MISSIONS.

On the 8th and 9th of July, after a period of experimentation and demonstration to exploit the possibilities of C-47 landing operations in Occupied Countries, a Dakota piloted by the Group Commander, Colonel Herlin, left Harrington drone to initiate the first of this type operation. The mission was a great success and with this achievement behind them, Group Operations made plans to carry out similar operations whenever the occasion warranted such a mission.

About a month later, on August 2nd, another Dakota mission was laid on, this time to be piloted by Captain Stapel. The flight could not find their target on the way down and flew on to Corsica where they remained a few days awaiting instructions. They then flew on to their target and accomplished the mission and then immediately took off and returned to Harrington.

The last of these special or initial missions was on 8/9 August, when a C-47 piloted by Lt. Col Boone carried 1800 lbs of explosives to their target plus eight Joes. This was the first of the cargo missions as the others were primarily to carry Joes.

About the 18th of August, two more C-47's arrived for assignment to the Group. With the two already on hand, the additional two made a total of four, so that one aircraft was assigned to each Squadron. We were now ready for a large-scale operation.

The date of 25/26 August marked our full-scale operations.
ions on this project. From this date on, two to four Dakotas were dispatched daily, transporting Arms, Ammunition and other equipment to reception committee's located on fields and captured airdromes in France. The equipment carried included: 2 and 3 inch Mortors; ammunition for 2 and 3 inch mortar guns; Vickers Machine Guns; spare parts for Vickers Machine Guns; Belted Ammo for Vickers MG; Mortor Smoke Ammo; Bren Guns and Ammo; Piat Guns; Piat Bombs; Bazooka's and Bazooka Ammo; Grenades; Rifles; Rockets and two Jeeps. Accompanying all these missions were from 1 to 9 Joe's, both going in and coming out. At the end of this type of operation, on the 18th of September, the Group had accomplished 35 missions, transporting approximately 104,000 lbs of Arms and Ammunition, carrying 76 Joe's in and 215 Joe's out, operating out of 12 different bases and fields in newly liberated territory. Besides Joe's on the out-going journey, they also carried mail and special equipment.

The crews on these missions consisted of Pilot, Co-pilot, Navigator, Bombardier and Radio Operator. A relative small number of the Group's pilots flew the aircraft on the missions: namely: Colonel Heflin; Lt Col's Fish, St. Clair, Dickerson, Boone; Major's McNanus, Sanders, Mead, Rudolph,; Captain's Stapel, Secoafico, Holzworth, Darby, Bales, Smith and McKenny.

Throughout all these missions, not one enemy aircraft or other enemy activity was experienced and although all fields were without facilities and other aids for landing operations, the reception committees did an excellent job under the circumstances and equipment available. The only mishap co-
cured on 5/6 September when a Dakota piloted by Captain Stapel nosed over while landing. The Reception committee had set up flare path and landing light signal differently than briefed, and the ship landed on the soft ground instead of the runway. After rolling a short distance, the aircraft hit a ditch causing the ship to nose-up. Damage was sustained to the propellers and the nose section of the plane was badly crushed. Fortunately, no damage was done to the load carried nor any injuries to the crew or Joe’s. Maintenance and repair crews were immediately dispatched from Harrington, complete with Repair equipment, and the aircraft was repaired on the spot and returned back at Harrington on the 11th, only 5 days later.

In nearly every instance, Pilots and crews reported that field lights and receptions were excellent, indicating the eagerness of the committees to receive the supplies and equipment. At nearly every field a request for petrol was made, and each group was in great need of petrol. At one place, the Committee requested petrol which they were in desperate need of because "The Germans were only 50 miles away and petrol was needed to go after them."

An ironic item was reported by Captain Stapel when he returned from a mission on 27/28 August. He reported that on that very afternoon, P-38 Lightnings had strafed the field which served as his target’s landing ground and that they "did a good job of it".

With the final liberation of France, our Carpetbagger operations were ended and all crews were satisfied with the
successful completion of a much-needed job, which was well done.

* * *

Attached to this record of operations is an appendix which describes the procedures followed by reception committees and aircraft.
THE DAKOTA OPERATION

The pioneering "Dakota" operation flown by a Carpetbaggers crew on 6/7 July involved careful preparation of the broadest scope. It had been established that for a mission of this sort, a C-47 aircraft was the most suitable, because it could carry a large cargo, either of material or of passengers; and moreover, it could be landed in a minimum of space. But just how short a runway did it require, not only for landing but for taking off again? There could be no speculation about that; it must be known with certainty.

Accordingly, experimentation had been going on, covering every aspect of the proposed operation. On 1 May 1944, at the Harrington airfield, Colonel Kelin took off in a C-47 aircraft at night and made a landing on a short stretch of runway by flashlight, unloading eighteen men and quickly taking off again. Seven men, stationed on the ground with ordinary flashlights, made a sort of flare path to guide the airplane in for the landing. Valuable lessons were learned from this experimental operation. The minimum stretch of runway required for a loaded C-47 could be established, and the efficacy of the position of the flashlights on the ground could be gauged.

In the meantime, under the direction of Special Operations, Office of Strategic Services, instruction was being given to agents on the subject of recognizing suitable landing places for C-47's. In the course of this instruction, Captain Wilmer Stapel of the Carpetbaggers performed innumerable landings, as many as twenty in a day, in order to demonstrate the possibilities of the aircraft.

Whenever notice of a suitable landing place was signalled from the field, aerial reconnaissance would photograph it. A photograph of the field eventually deployed for the MIGER l job proved of
invaluable assistance.

The night of 6 July was selected as the time of the actual operation, and a crew was selected about two days before that date. Because of the distance to the target, WIXER 1, there would not be sufficient darkness in which to make the round trip in one night, and so a stop-over would be necessary. Since it was an unprecedented job and involved uncertainties and dangers beyond the range of normal operations, the Group Commander, Colonel Clifford J. Heflin, assumed for himself the task of piloting the aircraft. Captain Wilmer L. Stapel would be co-pilot; Major Edward C. Trusser, Navigator; Major Charles R. Teer, Bombardier; and Technical Sergeant Albert L. Krasevac, Radio Operator. This constituted a normal Carpetbagger team, since Major Teer would perform the bombardier's duties of map-reading and pin-pointing.

The sixth of July arrived and the weather gave every indication of remaining favorable. During the day, a fuselage tank holding one hundred gallons of petrol was added to the aircraft, because the nine-hour flight would add up to 1,000 miles for the round trip, and there would be no opportunity of refueling at the target. The C-47, with the addition of the fuselage tank, could now carry a petrol load of 906 gallons.

The crew was given a private briefing by Captain Sullivan, S-2, and by the Group Weather Officers, in order to maintain the strictest security. In addition to regular navigational maps, a map of the field and the photograph previously referred to were used at the briefing. By the time the briefing was over, the crew had a clear-cut picture of their destination and knew what to look for on their way to it. It was decided that final take-off for the mission would be at Bolt Head airfield on the Devonshire coast southeast of Plymouth. At Bolt Head
the aircraft would be refueled for its flight to France.

At 2000 hours the aircraft was ready. It carried a total of eleven passengers, all trained agents required in the field, 3,000 pounds of baggage, and the crew of five. The importance of the mission may be judged by the fact that each passenger represented long weeks of intensive training in the arts of organizing effective resistance to the German occupation. With the German High Command engaged in frantic efforts to move troops up to Normandy, it was essential that lines of communication be disrupted to the greatest extent possible. The passenger list of the C-47 piloted by Colonel Heflin represented a great deal of potential trouble to Hitler and his gang.

At 2030 hours, under very good weather conditions, the C-47 was airborne on its historic mission.

The flight to Bolt Head was uneventful. Having landed at 2200 hours the aircraft was promptly fueled to capacity. The Commanding Officer of the airdrome was on hand to wish the crew luck, when the C-47 was once again airborne at 2300 hours.

The channel crossing was without incident and the French coast began to loom up in less than an hour of flight. At 2350 hours, altitude 6000 feet, the French coast was crossed at Penvenan. There was no sign of enemy activity.

Now the most ticklish time of the flight was developing. It must be borne in mind that the C-47 was without armor, armament or self-sealing tanks: in short, easy prey for even the most unskilled Nazi fighter pilot. The area the aircraft was now entering was known as the night-fighter belt and because there was no observer possible in the tail there was serious risk on an unexpected attack from the rear.

However, a very important advantage was bestowed on the aircraft
by a kind Providence. At an altitude of 7000 feet, the C-47 flew the entire distance between Penvezan and the Loire over a solid undercast, which provided good cover from ground detection. And when the French coast was crossed, Major Teer had taken over the duties of co-pilot, in order to allow Captain Stapel to move to the astrodome where he could maintain a 360-degree look-out for enemy fighters.

At the Loire River, the clouds began to break up, and Major Teer was able to observe check-points on the ground. Fifty miles beyond the Loire, the clouds had disappeared altogether. From then on out, navigation was relatively simple, and maintaining an altitude of 4000 feet, the C-47 continued on its way.

The eleven passengers, who had been composed enough during the flight so far, became a bit restless, when at 0120 hours the engines began spitting. T/Sgt. Dr. Scovac, who was in the passengers' compartment, acted with coolness and instructed the passengers to fasten their safety belts. The men in the pilot's compartment realized, of course, that it was simply a matter of transferring petrol, and in a moment or two Colonel Heflin had relieved the situation and the two engines were humming again.

The terrain became mountainous and in the clear moonlight appeared very beautiful. Colonel Heflin kept his aircraft at an altitude of 1000 feet above the terrain, in order to avoid causing any disturbance among the civilians below.

Because of the obstruction of mountains, Major Truesner was unable to pick up a Rebecca signal at any great distance. But at four miles, his Rebecca scope registered a clear signal. The time was then 0257 hours. A moment later the row of four reception lights, set at intervals of 150 yards, came into view. The code letter "N" was flashed...
from the ground, and the aircraft's downward recognition lights replied with "R". The Rebecca signal had brought the aircraft on the downwind leg into the lights, so that, after the code letters had been exchanged, the pilot had only to swing his ship around and land. Altogether, the reception lights had been on for a total of one minute.

The Colonel achieved a perfect three-point landing on the improvised field, which a few days before, had been a wheat field and which, even now, was only fifty per-cent harvested. But the landing strip had been well prepared and proved satisfactory for the operation.

When the C-47 came to a halt, Major Tresener got out to direct the parking procedure. The first words Major Tresener heard when he stepped down onto French soil were: "Jesus Christ, Yanks, am I glad to see you!" The Major had the disturbing thought that somehow the crew had got back to England by mistake, but the man who had uttered the pious greeting proved to be a Canadian gunner, who was later brought to England in the C-47.

The first person to greet the aircraft officially was an American Lieutenant, who was known simply as "Paul" and acted as an agent in the field. Paul took charge and under his guidance, Major Tresener directed the aircraft to its parking place. It was a long way to taxi, but the place provided for the C-47 was the best possible. At the foot of a thousand-foot mountain, there was a grove of trees. The plane was parked at the edge of the grove. Immediately, two platoons of Maquis troops marched up, displaying a good bearing and high military discipline, stood at attention while the American officers got out of the C-47, and then set to work camouflaging the parked aircraft. This they accomplished speedily and effectively, making use of trees which they transported from a distance and set in holes around the aircraft. In
this way the grove was extended, completely enclosing the aircraft and preventing detection.

In the meantime, the eleven passengers had gotten out and had been taken in hand by Maquis officials. The agents were French and English. Immediately upon their stepping onto firm earth, a flurry of excitement, handshaking, cheek-kissing and rapid-fire French conversation began between them and the reception party.

In the meantime, a short ceremony was going on. When Colonel Heflin was greeted by Paul, the Colonel drew a pair of captain's bars from his pocket and pinned them to the agent's shoulders. This was the first notice Paul had of his promotion and he was justly pleased. His standard uniform was now a suit of civilian clothes, with the shiny silver bars pinned to his shoulders.

The crew was taken in two huge French automobiles to Maquis headquarters. Upon entering the building, they were struck by the sight of a large red-and-silver Nazi emblem—eagle and swastika. This, they learned, had been taken by Maquis forces from a Nazi headquarters two days before.

The Maquis headquarters was a large U-shaped building, which was known as "the Castle". In it were administrative offices, mess and club rooms, and barracks.

The Americans were led into a dining room and seated at a huge table. They were impressed by the festive appearance of the room. The table was expertly set with table-cloth and napkins. Roses were in profuse design over the table. And in promising evidence were twelve bottles of wine.

Colonel Heflin and his crew were introduced by Paul to the twenty people who were to dine with them. There was a great deal of handshak-
ing and an enthusiastic babble of French as the Americans were greeted by the various organizers and officials of the Maquis.

The meal, which began with extensive sipping of wine, was delicious. There was barbecued beef and potatoes, and needless to say, the American crew did full justice to the food.

Conversation at the table had to do mostly with details of the flight and with plans for the future. The crew members had wondered how they would be able to get along in conversation with the Maquis, since none of the crew could speak French. However, they experienced no trouble at all in that respect; some of the French could speak English and the gaps were filled in by Paul and by the English officers who were agents in the field.

The admiration of the French for the achievement of Colonel Heflin and his crew was tempered only by the regret they expressed that the C-47 had not brought a cargo of ammunition and heavy weapons in place of the personnel. The need of the Maquis for ammunition and heavy equipment is acute and continual, but they were assured that future operations would fill that need.

A crew member asked how long the reception would have been prepared to remain at the ground in the event the C-47 had not arrived within the time agreed upon, namely, between 0030 hours and 0330 hours. He was told that the reception would have stayed on until morning.

The Maquis were anxious to know how soon another Dakota operation could be flown. And there was a great deal of speculation about the possibilities of Dakota loads. They repeated that a cargo of arms, mortars, ammunition, clothing and shoes would have been invaluable to them.

There was universal praise for the manner in which Colonel Heflin
had landed his aircraft, and they expressed amazement that so large a ship could have been brought down so easily and in so short a space. The C-47 was undoubtedly the largest aircraft these isolated people had ever seen on the ground, and they were very curious about it. At the time of the landing, many of them had attempted to climb all over it, investigating its equipment and exclaiming at its size.

There were many toasts at the meal to "Les Americains", and at one point Colonel Hefflin arose to propose the toast, "Vive le Maquis!" The Maquis appreciated that.

It was then five o'clock in the morning and the crew were all naturally very tired. At that time, furthermore, they believed that they would be taking off for home that night. And so, the five men were led off to bed.

Before they made the flight, most of the crew had the suspicious idea that they would probably be hiding out in the brush. Instead, they had found themselves in an area held by the Maquis and secure from the Nazis, they had eaten well and had plenty to drink, and now were being escorted to real bedrooms with real beds. Moreover, the beds were equipped with inner-spring mattresses. Because the number of rooms was limited, however, some of the crew members had to share a room with a Maquis soldier. For example, Major Trexler found himself bunking in with a young man who had composed the Maquis Song. And Captain Stapel slept with a man who was bodyguard of a Maquis Chief. The bodyguard's brother had been captured and knifed to death by the Nazis, and so the man who shared his room with Captain Stapel had taken up the fine art of handling a knife. He demonstrated the next day to what a high degree he had perfected that art by making a few nuck thrusts in the general direction of Major Trexler's innards.
Put the bedrooms were large, with wash-stands and toilet facilities, and the Carpetbagger crew members had no trouble sleeping.

* * *

At 0930 hours, they arose, and found that the newly-made captain, Paul, was waiting for them with a car. First of all they drove out to where the C-47 had been parked. At first glance they could detect no evidence of the aircraft's whereabouts, the job of camouflage had been so expertly accomplished. But having been shown where the aircraft was hidden, they re-ensured themselves that everything was in order and re-entered Paul's car. Paul headed the car toward the nearby town of Nantua.

Nantua, in the Ain Department, held by the Laquis, is situated on the side of beautiful Lac de Nantua. The men were vividly impressed by the free and easy atmosphere of the liberated town. Shops were open for business, and people calmly walked about in the streets. And all this was going on in the midst of a country occupied by the Nazis.

On their way through the town, the men saw a gang of German prisoners, working. The sight of these members of the "Lastor Race" reassured the Americans that the town was secure. The prisoners were wearing sabots or were barefooted, and it was explained that this was to prevent their running away.

Paul told his passengers of a Laquis exploit which had taken place on the preceding day. The exploit involved the capture of a Nazi train containing a store of cigarettes which was being moved up towards the front. The Laquis brought the carload of cigarettes to their headquarters and then had steamed up the emptied car, sending it crashing into a Nazi train parked at the Belgrade junction. That was why there happened to be an abundance of cigarettes around Nantua.

By this time, the car had arrived at the house occupied by the
by the Governor of Nantua. Paul escorted the men in and introduced them to the Governor, who was a solidly built man, popularly known as "Big Jewel". The Governor was very proud of his town. One of his most strictly enforced edicts was that automobiles must not be parked in the open street, but under trees, in order to prevent the Germans from observing activity in the town by aerial reconnaissance. When the Governor told the men this, they all had the same thought - that their own car was parked at that very moment out in front and not under a tree. Paul had assured them that it would be all right. Accordingly, they spent time with the Governor, drank wine at his invitation, and finally took leave of him. When they came outside they found that their car was indeed missing. It had been driven off in accordance with the Governor's standing orders. However, under the circumstances, it was quickly returned and the men continued on their way.

Paul then drove Colonel Heflin and his men to a field at nearby Fort, to show them evidence of a bombing attack by Stukas which had taken place the day before. The field was under cultivation, but had a very good landing strip. Bombs had been dropped in train directly on the strip, leaving craters six feet deep and twelve feet in diameter. The crew members naturally wondered if Jerry had somehow gotten wind of the next day's Dakota landing, but it was more logical to assume that the field had been bombed because it had been one of the grounds for the large-scale daylight dropping mission which had been flown by B-17's of Third Division a couple of weeks before. There was very much enthusiasm on the part of the local French people for the perfect drops accomplished by what they referred to as the "Big Bombers".

Colonel Heflin stated that in his estimation the strip would have made an excellent alternate landing place for Dakota jobs.
When the Carpetbagger crew had finished inspecting the bomb damage, they returned to the car and Paul drove then on a tour of the area. Roads for automobile travel were invariably good. The roads were wide, and where such as traffic proceeded on the right hand side, the men felt quite at home. The only circumstance which tempered that feeling of being at home was the fact that every quarter of a mile, the road was barricaded, and the car was stopped by armed Inquisit civilians. But the Americans had all been issued passes and were, of course, allowed to continue on their way.

(The pass carried by Colonel Heflin is attached.)

At a place called Izernore they had been told they would find two American lieutenants, both pilots, who were scheduled to return to England in the C-47. When they arrived at Izernore, therefore, they proceeded to the hotel where the two pilots had been living. One of them, whom they knew as "Jim", was seated at a table when they entered. They were at the table, talking to Jim, when they heard the exclamation behind them, "You, too!" They turned around and found Lt. French H. Russell, who had gone missing in action with Lt. Murray Simon's crew (406th Squadron) on 5 May 1944. Russell's reactions at seeing the Colonel were mixed. He was naturally very glad to see his Group Commander, but his first thought was that the Colonel had been shot down and that was the reason he was there. When the excitement of the reunion had diminished somewhat, the Colonel related the story of the Dakota operation and said that Russell and Jim would be returning to England with him. Whereupon, the two lieutenant-pilots went wild with joy, and Russell reminded Jim of a prophecy Russell had made some time before. "Don't worry," he used to say to Jim, "my C.O. will be over to get us one of these days." So for a long time Jim could not get over the idea that...
Ordre de Mission
Permanent - Temporaire

Nom: [Handwritten name]
Véhicule n: [Handwritten number] essence - gozo
Mission: [Handwritten text]

Valable pour [Handwritten date]

Le Chef Départemental des F. F. I.

Pass issued by the Maquis of Ain to Colonel Heflin, authorizing him to circulate freely in the liberated areas.
picking up Russell and himself was the primary purpose of the Colonel's flight.

A celebration was obviously called for. The inevitable wine was served, and the table was graced by the presence of several lovely French women. Then Jim and Russell went to their rooms to get their gear together, and shortly afterwards all the men left in Paul's car.

It was 1300 hours when they returned to the Castle, and dinner was ready for them. This surpassed even the meal they had had the night before. It consisted of five courses, including medium rare steaks, and each course was washed down with either champagne or wine.

After dinner, the Americans, accompanied by various Léquis chiefs and organizers, went in three automobiles to a nearby village. The Americans had not been told anything of what was in the wind. The automobiles stopped at the outskirts of the village, and looking down the main street the Americans could see Léquis troops lining both sides of the street and civilians behind the troops. In a body, the Americans and their hosts began walking down the street. Immediately, a great cheer of "Vivat les Américains!" went up. The first person to greet them was a small French girl who offered bouquets of flowers to Colonel Huflin and to the French commandant.

At the end of the street there was a monument which had been erected to honor the memory of the Free French who had died in the anti-Nazi struggle. And behind the monument a platoon of German prisoners had been brought up. The prisoners included one woman, who had been the mistress of a German adjutant. French flags were being waved everywhere — in the street and from every window. The French commandant told Colonel Huflin how sorry the people were that they had no American flags to wave, and he asked that a quantity of them be included in a future
With simple but impressive ceremony, Colonel Heflin and the French commandant placed the flowers at the foot of the monument. Then the platoon of prisoners was marched off and the commandant made a five-minute speech. He told the people that the American crew had come to see the Laquis and to help them in clearing the hated Boche out of France. There were enthusiastic cheers and a great waving of flags. Then, standing before the monument, Colonel Heflin reviewed the march past. In perfect formation, the Laquis troops marched smartly up the street. The Colonel's appraisal is, "Their review could compare with a review of some of our finest troops."

The Laquis troops marched down the street again, and then took up their positions on both sides of the street as the Colonel and the Laquis chiefs returned to their waiting automobiles. During all this time, the civilians crowding the street kept up their cheering and their flag-waving. It had been a very moving experience for the Americans, and clear evidence of the high regard in which their efforts on behalf of the Laquis are held by the Laquis themselves.

On their way back to the Castle, the automobiles stopped at an inn, just outside the village where the troops had passed in review. Wine was served, although by this time the Carpetbagger crew was beginning to limit their intake, because they were still scheduled to take off on their return journey that night.

When they left the inn, they found that the people of the village were still in the street, cheering.

Having returned to the Castle, the men attempted to get a little rest, in preparation for their flight. It was now 1800 hours, and until 2030 hours, they all rested. Then they arose and prepared to listen to
the B.E.C. broadcast for final verification that they would fly home
that night. The flight had been approved on the 1300-hour, 1500-hour
and 1900-hour broadcasts; but now, as they listened to the 2100-hour
broadcast, they found that the flight was cancelled because of adverse
weather.

This turn of events naturally called for a champagne party in hon-
or of the Americans. The party was held in a private room containing a
long table, and about twenty people were present. Innumerable toasts
were proposed, and the singing never stopped. The composer who had been
Major Vesseyer's bed-room companion sang the song he had composed for
the Laquis. The Laquis officials came in on the chorus, and altogether
it made a very impressive effect.

A Laquis chief asked the Americans to sing "The Stars and Stripes",
which he apparently thought was the American national anthem. No one in
Colonel Helfin's crew ever in his life had made pretension to singing
ability, but under the circumstances they all felt moved to fulfill the
request. So sing they did, something, somehow, and were heartily ap-
plauded by the Laquis for their efforts.

The party consumed a total of thirty-eight quarts of excellent
champagne. And after a while the Americans began to wonder who would
be paying the bill. But that detail was taken care of, just as every-
thing involving the expenditure of money was always taken care of by the
hospitalable Laquis.

Towards the end of the party, the Americans noticed that in the
adjoining kitchen an unusual concoction was being prepared. After a
while, the concoction was brought in, and proved to be a mixture of
brandy and cheese, which had been heated on the oven and was to be
eaten by wrapping blobs of it around pieces of brown bread. It was a
fitting climax to a delightful party.

At midnight the celebration was over the Americans went to bed for their first full night's rest in several days.

* * *

Paul was on hand at 1000 hours the following morning to drive the Colonel and his men to the printing shop, where the Maquis newspaper, "La Voix du Maquis" ("Voice of the Maquis") was prepared. The Americans picked up bundles of the newspapers (a copy of which is attached) and drove to within five kilometres of the Maquis front lines to distribute them. Civilians paid one franc for the newspaper, but soldiers received them gratis. In the course of delivering the newspapers, the Americans saw recruits in training for the Maquis army. The recruits, who seemed to be either young boys or middle-aged men, displayed the utmost enthusiasm for their job.

At a small town, not far from the front lines, Paul took them to the headquarters of the Maquis Secret Intelligence, where they received a summary of activities of the preceding night. A group of Maquis soldiers had lain in ditches, waiting for a Nazi train. They knew that the train contained an armored car, and were somewhat worried about it. When the train came into view, about half the Maquis made a dash from the ditches to a clump of bushes across the tracks, in order to draw the fire of the Nazi machine guns. The other Maquis soldiers then threw grenades at the train, concentrating on the armored car. Intelligence reported that the train had not been totally destroyed, but it had been seriously damaged and they intended returning that very night to finish off the job. And they reported with great satisfaction that in the operation a great many Nazis had been killed, with the loss of not a single Maquis soldier.
L'Action Militaire dans l'Ain

La situation n’a cessé de s’aggraver. Les Allemands ont envoyé du renfort dans les Haute-Vosges et en Maurienne. En plus, ils ont élargi les zones de combats dans les Vosges et le Jura. Les Maquis, quant à eux, ont dû se déplacer pour se mettre à l’abri des attaques ennemies. C’est ainsi que l’Action Militaire dans l’Ain, qui était jusqu’ici relativement calme, s’est considérablement intensifiée.

UNE EMBUSCADE ÉSUÉLIE

Les 17 heures, au nord de Chalamont, un groupe de Maquis a surpris un détachement allemand, composé d’au moins 20 soldats. Après un bref affrontement, les Maquis ont réussi à pulvériser le groupe ennemi, tuant 15 soldats et blessant 5 autres.

DÉRANGEMENTS

La nuit du 18 au 19, une colonne de chars allemands a tenté de traverser la vallée du Rhône. Les Maquis, informés à l’avance, ont intercepté la colonne à 2 km de distance et l’ont détruite, tuaissant tous les occupants et utilisant deux chars allemands.

A LA VAIRETTE

Dans le secteur buisson, une forêt, les Maquis ont surpris un détachement allemand en train de se préparer à un attaque. Après un bref affrontement, les Maquis ont réussi à détruire le détachement et à en capturer plusieurs.

ATTAQUE DU TUNNEL VIRIEU-ROSSILLON

Dans le secteur Sud, un groupe de Maquis a surpris un détachement allemand dans une ruelle voisine du village de Rossillon. Après un bref affrontement, les Maquis ont réussi à détruire le détachement et à en capturer plusieurs.

QUELQUES CHIFFRES

Le nombre de combattants de l’Action Militaire dans l’Ain a grimpé à plus de 500. En outre, le nombre de victimes ennemies a atteint 300, dont 100 tués et 200 blessés. Les pertes des Maquis sont beaucoup plus faibles, avec seulement 10 combattants tués et 20 blessés.

SANS COMMENTAIRES

Les forces allemandes ont continué à augmenter leur présence dans la région. Les combats se poursuivent paisiblement, mais la tension est palpable. Les Maquis continuent de lutter avec vaillance pour assurer la sécurité de la population civile.
LA VOIX DE MAGUIE

NOUVELLES DES F. F. I. DANS LA RÉGION

Haut-Saint-Maurice

Des grandes cheminées d'une voûte qui court à la cour des murs, circulant des sons pour dissiper l'odeur du tableau dans la ruelle. Les habitants se plaignent de la pollution aérienne, c'est une odeur désagréable qui reste un jour et une nuit.

Trois camions frères en route pour le coin de la ville. Une dizaine de mètres carrés de maisons sont alignées le long de la route. Les habitants se plaignent de la pollution sonore, et de la poussière qui s'accumule sur les voitures et les maisons.

La gare du train est pleine de gens, tous habillés de couleurs vives. Les wagons sont remplis de marchandises, de marchés et de marchandises. Les sonneurs de cloches sont installés sur les toits des maisons.

La PLACE LAURENT-BOUCHARD est décorée d'une statue de l'archevêque de la région. La statue est couverte de feuilles d'or, et de feuilles de laurier.

Les trains sont des événements majeurs de la région. Les habitants se rassemblent pour regarder les trains passer.

ORDRE DE MÉDICAMENTS

Le 15 JUI 1914 - Anastasie Benoît, travaillant complètement avec l'agriculture, a été tué par une grenade. Pierre Fournier, 25 ans, a été tué par un obus à la tête.

Le 24 JUIN - Pierre et Albéric, travaillant à la ferme de la famille, ont été tués par un obus à la tête.

Le 28 JUIN - Étienne Jules, travaillant à la ferme de la famille, a été tué par un obus à la tête.

Le 3 JUILLET - André, travaillant à la ferme de la famille, a été tué par un obus à la tête.

Le 5 JUILLET - Édouard, travaillant à la ferme de la famille, a été tué par un obus à la tête.

Le 10 JUILLET - La famille a été tuée par un obus à la tête.

SAVON-VOS

AVEZ-VOUS

QU'IL VOUS FAIT plus de 6.600 litres de lait par jour précédemment, votre production a été divisée par 20.

P: NOUS ATTIRONS l'attention de vos clients pour le ravitaillement de la région.

QU'IL EN FAIT ENFIN pour les uns?

QUI LES ABATS de la viande destinée à l'armée sont destinés enfin à la population civile?

QUE LEURS pas la sortie de la France encore sous Vichy et les Allemands a vu descendre la production de pois pour juillet à 150 grammes, la vache en : "un libre"

QUE VOTRE raison de bravo est maintenant de 200 grammes par jour, voire de 500 grammes ?

NANTUA

STAT-CIVIL

NABANGERS

Paul-Émile Carlier et Lucien-Marie Daccès

Jean-Paul Michel, 11 ans; Gisèle Mardes, 11 ans; André Michel, 21 ans; Pauline Martel, 53 ans; Lucien Vigier, 19 ans; Armand Mardes, 68 ans.

RAVITAILLEMENT

JUTA - Estimation des consommations téléphoniques et des consommations sur les voies ferrées; arrestation de plusieurs agents de guerre; saisie de plusieurs armes; arrestation de plusieurs personnes. Un train a été arrêté, après que les voyageurs ont été prévenus de descendre; le train est arrivé à trois heures du matin.

Le 10 JUI 1914 - Jules, travailleur de la gare, a été gravement blessé à la tête.

Le 20 JUIN - Jean, travailleur de la gare, a été tué par un obus à la tête.

Le 28 JUIN - Louis, travailleur de la gare, a été gravement blessé à la tête.

Le 30 JUIN - Jules, travailleur de la gare, a été gravement blessé à la tête.

LA VOIX DE MAGUIE
Then the Americans were introduced to several of the men who had taken part in the train-raiding exploit. There was a great deal of handshaking since the French always shake hands even with people they had seen an hour before.

Then the Americans left the headquarters, they continued on their newspaper delivery route. It was ticklish driving because all the roads were heavily mined. Each quarter of a mile, the road guards would instruct them on how to proceed for the next quarter of a mile. It did not make for pleasure driving. On one bridge, crossing the River Ain, mines had been cemented in, and the Maquis were already worrying how they were going to remove the mines after the war without blowing up the bridge.

They crossed the River on a power-plant bridge. High up on top of the power plant was a huge crane and a mass of granite blocks. In the event of danger, the crane was kept ready to pick up the granite blocks and drop them onto the bridge.

As they continued their paper deliveries, they managed to see a good part of the Ain area held by the Maquis forces. The towns had a wild-west flavor, since most of the men walked about with knives and naked guns stuck in their belts. Everywhere, the Americans were greeted in a friendly, even enthusiastic, manner. There was only one untoward incident, and that occurred when the car drove into a farmer's yard and ran over one of his ducks. He complained in voluble French, until he heard who the unexpected visitors were. Then he seemed entirely appeased.

When the newspapers had all been distributed, Paul headed the car back to the Castle. On the way, he pointed out places where houses had been burned by the Nazis in reprisal for Maquis activities, where executions of Maquis soldiers had taken place, and where skirmishes had
been fought with Nazi troops. He also pointed out a place where, at one
time patriot sentinels had been posted, equipped with walkie-talkies,
to warn the Maquis of approaching Germans. Paul told the story of a
Maquis soldier who had recently been captured by the Nazis. He showed
a photograph to prove the extent of Nazi barbarism. The soldier had
been unbelievably tortured — his eyes gouged out, his testicles cut off,
his body brutally burned — but he had died a hero, without giving the
Nazis the satisfaction of one uttered word.

Throughout that morning, in conversation with Paul and with the
French people to whom they had delivered newspapers, the Carpetbagger
crew had come vividly to understand why it was that the French patriots
hated the Nazi occupation with such an uncompromising hatred. Colonel
Weilin aptly summed up the feeling: "I understand why the hatred the
French hold for the Germans is so very great. Because in every village,
homes have been burned to the ground by the 'Master Race'. Nearly every
family I talked to had had one or more of its members tortured or killed
by Germans."

Then the party returned to the Castle, they had lunch and rested
briefly.

In the afternoon, the Americans were escorted on a tour of the
political prison. It was not a pleasant place. The building was square,
made of stone, with two large court yards. The prison was crowded, each
room containing about twenty people. Most of the prisoners were guilty
of black-market or collaborationist crimes. One of the prisoners greeted
Paul when he saw him. Paul explained that the man had once been a
Maquis hero, but he had fallen from grace when it was discovered that he
had been active in the black-market. Paul considered the fact that this
man had been imprisoned a good example of Maquis discipline.
From the political prison, they proceeded to the German prisoners' camp. This place was considerably worse than the first prison. The German prison had formerly been a theatre. All the seats were gone, and there was only a table running down the middle of the auditorium. Straw was spread on the floor and even on the stage, and on this straw the German ex-conquerors spent their days. The prisoners seemed old and shabby. They presented a picture of utter dejection, but that was understandable in the light of the new Inquis policy of executing three Germans for every Inquis who was killed or tortured by the Nazis. The previous day, fifty-seven Germans had been shot, in line with that policy.

The Inquis who were guiding the party were eager to provide the Americans with souvenirs of the visit to the prison. They rounded up German caps, but the Americans felt impelled to decline them, since there was no evidence that the former wearers of the caps had been deloused. But uniform insignia which the Inquis ripped off at random from the prisoners made interesting souvenirs, which several of the crew-members brought back with them.

There were approximately one hundred prisoners in the building. Later in the day, the Americans heard that some of the Germans they inspected had been shot, pursuant to the Inquis policy of retribution.

Then they left the prison, they went for a last visit to the Big Jewel, Governor of Mantua. The husky Governor was pleased to see the Americans again, offered them the customary wine, and presented Colonel Meilin with a Luger pistol which had been taken from a captured German officer.

From the Governor's house, the party proceeded to an inn situated on Lake Mantua. There was a beautiful view of the mountains from the
terrace of the inn. Big Jelsa's legal code for Pantun included a stern prohibition on drinking out-of-doors. But an exception was made in the case of the visiting Americans, and so they sat on the terrace, sipping their wine and enjoying the superb view of lake and mountains.

Then it was 1700 hours and the crew decided they had best not drink any more wine, inasmuch as their take-off was planned for 2300 hours that night. And so they left the inn, returning to the Castle, where they managed to get some rest.

They arose in time to hear the 2100-hour B.B.C. broadcast, which brought them final approval for the return flight that night. Accordingly, they went out to their parked aircraft to make a last check-up. At 2200 hours the Maquis began renewing the skillful camouflage of the C-47. Again the French displayed the utmost curiosity about the ship, clambering all over it and into it. It appeared that someone who had gotten into the ship had made off with Major Tresomer's garrison cap, to keep as a souvenir. When Paul heard of this, he went off and returned in a short while carrying a beret. The donor of the beret was a young Frenchwoman, and in accordance with local custom it was necessary that a check-kissing ceremony take place between the donor and the recipient of the beret. The young woman was somewhat shy, but the ceremony was concluded by both parties.

Then the passengers for the return trip to England were loaded. There were ten passengers: Lt. Russell and "Jim"; a Canadian gunner (the man who had first greeted Major Tresomer when the C-47 landed); a British gunner (of RAF 3 Group); an RIF Bomber Command navigator; a British major who had been going organizing work among the Maquis; a young French girl and a Frenchman, who were to attend a "School for Suboteurs" in England; and two Hindus, who had been in a group of hindu-
rescued from the Germans by the Maquis. Originally, it had been planned to send a captured Nazi First Sergeant to England in the C-47, but the Maquis had already disposed of him in quite another way.

Then the aircraft was set for the take-off, the youngest Maquis soldier was brought up as a sort of official representative. He was not more than fourteen years old, wore a caliber .32 pistol in his belt, and was a full-fledged fighting patriot. He was shown all over the C-47 and was very impressed by what he saw.

It was now 2245 hours and weather was closing in badly. Rain began to fall and by the time the C-47 took off it was raining heavily.

At 2315 hours, in the rain, with visibility restricted to two-hundred feet, Colonel Peflin made an instrument take-off, clearing the high hills which surrounded the field. The return flight over enemy-defended territory had begun.

Behind them the Americans had left the Maquis of 1941, who had proven themselves fighting men of the first rank and hospitable hosts.

For two hours the aircraft flew through solid overcast and with no winds from which to gain navigational information. But at Portiers, below the Loire, the C-47 broke through the clouds. Major Tresomer's skillful navigation had kept the aircraft directly on its course.

Beyond the Loire, the flight was uneventful, if that word can be applied to a flight across German defenses in an airplane unequipped with guns or self-sealing tanks. There is a tremendous strain on a crew flying in circumstances such as these.

But with expert navigation and incomparable piloting, and with good luck which is often given too much of the credit properly belonging to sheer flying skill, the C-47 at last crossed the French coast at Penvenan. The time was 0240 hours.
It had originally been planned to land at Exeter, but since the petrol supply was sufficient, the Colonel continued on to Harrington, where he landed at 0430 hours, after a history-making flight. With him, the Colonel carried the red-and-silver Nazi emblem which had been on display that first night at the Castle. The emblem was now inscribed, in black crayon: "A mes amis américains, ce trophée du l'Inquis de l'Ain — 7 Juillet 1944. Pris aux Allemands dans la nuit du 5 et 6 Juillet à Billay par l'ain." (To my American friends, this trophy of the Inquis of Ain. Taken from the Germans in the night of 5/6 July at Billay by the Inquis of Ain.)

The heroism of Colonel Heflin and his crew requires no panegyric — their deed speaks for itself, most eloquently. In conclusion, therefore, these words of the Colonel are quoted:

"I recommend that every assistance be given l'Inquis troops, as I have never before seen such spirit as was displayed by these people. By giving them much needed supplies, I think it will shorten the war and save thousands of Allied lives."

* * *
Colonel Hefflin and his Dakota crew upon their return to Harrington. They are carrying the Nazi emblem presented to them by the Maquis of Ain.
French Village 'Killed'

Zurich, Wednesday. — The destruction of French villages by the Germans continues, says Swiss Press reports. Nantua, on the Swiss-French frontier, about 27 miles west of Geneva, which was occupied by Partisans a few days ago, has been bombarded with heavy guns, and is in flames. — a Reuter.

The above newspaper clipping makes a poignant postscript to the Dakota story. . .
This is the first of a series of publications which will endeavor to consolidate in booklet form the activities of this group on a monthly basis. Insofar as night bombing is concerned. Early in October 1944, this group was assigned the project of becoming a night bombing organization, employing essentially the same system as used by the R.A.F. in its night bombing. Aircraft in this type night bombing fly in a "Bomber Stream" rather than in formations as do day bombers of the A.A.F. They also use special navigation and radar equipment as do the R.A.F. In fact, this project is parallel in system and equipment to that of the R.A.F. with the exception of the type aircraft used. This Group uses forty (40) B-24's which have been modified in many respects. In order that the reader might more readily understand the background of this project, this summary will include all vital information starting with October 1944, the beginning of the project, through 31 January 1945 and thereafter will be published strictly on a monthly basis. It will be noted that the changing over of a Group from one type project to another of entirely different character is no simple matter as it involves many difficulties such as modification of aircraft, procuring of equipment, training of crews in R.A.F. tactics, weather, and other factors which will be covered in this and future publications.
Operations and training have been combined in this summary as the three operational missions of the Group have participated since converting to night bombing in October 1944. A large part of the training program has been devoted to conversion to very low level night work. Consequently, the completely different equipment required the setting up of an intensive training program. The need for a great deal of new equipment delayed the training program a great deal and a good percentage of the Group was constantly on the base at modification depots. However, with more aircrews available, the two squadrons were kept busy giving transition to the eighteen new crews who had arrived during the month of December. This training, firstly, included the usual transition to the U.K. flying control system, and secondly, transition to night R.A.F. tactics at high altitudes.

In order that the Group could work more closely with the R.A.F. and more readily obtain the proper information on R.A.F. tactics, three officers from the Royal Air Force were assigned. They were S/L Blaise of the R.A.F.; S/L Trilsbach and P/L Booth of the R.A.F. Their services and cooperation have been indispensable and have greatly facilitated the task at hand.

As fast as the receipt of modified equipment would permit, bomber stream missions over the U.K. and the continent were practiced at altitudes around 18,000 feet. These flights incorporated the use of Loran Navigation aid, H2X (Mickey) dry run and the dispensing of chaff. During the month of January, aircraft were equipped with WRF and this facility has been used mainly by A.P.O. in giving latest wind information to the main force generally just before the P.F. Through R.A.F. coordination, this Group is now able to participate regularly in R.A.F. training missions. To date the 492nd has participated in three (3) "Pulls" training missions; the first being 7 January 1945.

On 24 December 1944, the Group flew its first bombing mission on German held coastal guns in France. This was a day mission in which night tactics were employed. Target indicators were dropped and the main force bombed on them. An undercast existed and results were very difficult to observe; however, from a procedure and training standpoint the mission was very satisfactorily carried out. The bombing is believed to have been fairly accurate. Subsequently, two night missions on the same target were flown. One on 25 December 1944 and the other on 5 January 1945. Some observers feel excessive bombing accuracy is concerned. The general procedure of the mission was that successfully carried out. With regard to bombing accuracy, it must be borne in mind that pinpoint targets were assigned and R.A.F. saturation type bombing was employed. The present training program stresses practice missions over France, the Group generally consists of an average of six (6) H2X (Mickey) and fifteen (15) main force aircraft.
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<td>Physical Training</td>
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<td>Engine and Emergency Procedure</td>
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<td>Lecture, Malfunction of Gen.</td>
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## END TRAINING - 1 November 1944 thru 31 January 1945, Cont'd.

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<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. Hrs</th>
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<td>A-5 Trainer</td>
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<td>1:00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gunnery, turret check-out</td>
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<td>Lecture, Mechanics of Radio</td>
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<td>Lecture, Duties of Aerial Engineer</td>
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<td>Lecture, 50 Cal. Machine Gun</td>
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<td>Electrical System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Homing Study</td>
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### FLIGHT TRAINING - 1 November 1944 thru 31 January 1945

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<tr>
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<td>Local Flights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navigational Flights</td>
<td>404</td>
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<tr>
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<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bombing (Practice Drops)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>297:10</td>
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<td>Night Local Flights</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night Navigational Flights</td>
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<td>Night Bombing (Dry Runs)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>122:50</td>
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</table>

#### Number of Bombs Dropped

### ACCIDENT STATISTICS

Following is a list of the three (3) accidents that have occurred since the conversion to Night Bombing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Nature of Accident</th>
<th>A/C &amp; Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 October 1944</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Flew into high ground</td>
<td>A/C complete wreck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October 1944</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Taxi accident</td>
<td>9 of crew fatal, 1 severely injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 November 1944</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Overshot runway on</td>
<td>Nose wheel damage, no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>landing</td>
<td>Major damage, no injuries to crew.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the summer of October, up to this point, we would operate as a single group playing a part in setting up of a P.O. X office prior to the war.

On November 12th, 1944, six (6) Group to institute radio navigation center in the S-8 building where it was located center up a basic file of R.K. scope photography map. This done, the room was prepared to plot their courses for missions and is the center of operations for this Group.

In addition to the P.O. X room to keep all pertinent data on targets attack. Immediately, I Air Division began to receive target maps, illustrations and photographs of targets in Germany. These maps were the only industrial targets were received but inter tactical target materials and folders were the biggest problem; faster than space could be found to store were received through the Quartermaster Supply.

Through the help of a R.A.F. Sergent, our men were oriented to the use of codes and procedures used by the British. In practice, the S-2 Officers had trial runs a degree of efficiency so that every man a target room.

The S-2 set up remained much the same in material for briefings and interpretation were concerned. The group participated in 45 (5) operations, missions and numerous practice missions that required briefing by the S-2 Officers.

As new crews were continually arrived it was necessary to hold weekly lectures and give various talks or briefings in the event of being shot down over enemy territory. Also, the Officers were visiting different stations that had similar set ups. This way it was possible to solve administrative problems that came up in the course of the work.

The War Library was still maintained and the situations now were rapidly changed. This room was used for staff meetings, lectures, orientation talks, news clippings, and as a place for combat crews to relax and read the latest information in combat planes and many of the innovations that have recently come to light. It is one of the most important functions of S-2 as it gives the men the opportunity to get together and discuss the problems that have come up in regard.

Through the training period, classes in Aircraft recognition have been held for the combat crews. This instruction is very important and cannot be stressed too highly. Also, many opportunities have been placed in advantageous places in the library to give the men a chance to brush up on enemy and friendly planes.
On 20 November 1944, six (6) Mickey Operators from Groups in the first air division were assigned to the 858th Bombardment Squadron (H) of the 492nd Bombardment Group (H), to help form a night Pathfinder squadron. These men had combat experience in B-17's in daylight bombardment. They are as follows:

1st Lt. Edwin E. May from the 457th Bombardment Group with 13 missions.
1st Lt. Nelson C. Galloway from the 305th Bombardment Group with 16 missions.
1st Lt. Harry Alkowitz from the 879th Bombardment Group with 19 missions.
1st Lt. George B. Sibley from the 381st Bombardment Group with 14 missions.
2nd Lt. Donald K. McGough from the 384th Bombardment Group with 7 missions.

Lt. May was subsequently appointed Group "Mickey" Officer. At this time there were three (3) PFF aircraft on the base, all of which were B-24 H's. On 25 November 1944, three (3) more B-24 H's PFF aircraft came to the base. Four (4) of the Mickey Operators spent four days at R.A.F. Bomber Station Warters to study R.A.F. night technique. The experience of the Eighth Air Force and R.A.F. Bomber Command was pooled to find a suitable technique for this group. The following is a resume of the conclusions arrived at and the technique adopted by the Mickey Operators.

It was decided not to use a Bombsight as a timing device in making a Mickey - Bombsight coordinated run because at night the primary purpose of PFF aircraft is to drop bombs but to mark the target for the main force which follows. Also the PFF aircraft drops sky markers and target indicators and the Bombsight cannot be set up for both simultaneously. In fact, the Bombsight cannot be set up for the sky markers because wind effect on the suspended flare must be considered. A stop-watch, then, was to be the timing device, used in conjunction with a five (5) mile circle. By means of H2X equipment a circle may be placed on the screen which is exactly five (5) nautical miles from the center of the screen. Then any scope signal which touches this circle will be five (5) nautical miles from the point on the ground directly below the aircraft. In making a run on a target, the Mickey Operator would start a stop-watch when the target signal touches the five (5)-mile circle and at the end of predetermined time, would drop sky markers and target indicators. The time delays were to be calculated on the ground before take-off using forecast meteorological information. The calculations were too involved for a Mickey Operator to perform in the air before getting to the target. The factors to be considered were: the wind and ground speed at flight altitude, the surface target wind, the wind at the altitude at which the sky markers burst. All these factors were combined with the desired course over the target and the true airspeed of the airplane to determine first, the trajectory of the markers and indicators and secondly, the time delays for release. The Mickey Operator was to use the predetermined times, regardless of the conditions at the target.

The six (6) Mickey Operators acquainted themselves with this technique and set about building an H2X Operations Office and preparing a training program for new Mickey Operators which were to be sent from the 482nd Bombardment Group. The Office was to be the center of Pathfinder activity. In it was kept everything pertaining to H2X equipment, operation and technique, including a basic file of scope photographs of most of Western Europe to be used for target study and navigational aids.
The Training Program was divided into Air Training and Ground Training. The Ground Training consisted of target study, operation of ground trainer, first at the 584th Bombardment Group and then at the 380th Bombardment Group, and classes at which the ‘Mickey Operators’ discussed and learned new techniques and were to about new equipment and otherwise brought up to date.

Flight Training was divided into two (2) parts: Navigation and Bomb Run. On Navigation flights, the Mickey Operator concentrated mainly on using his equipment for Navigation. On Bomb Runs, the Mickey Operator made dry runs on different targets, striving to improve his methods and results.

On 8 December 1944, one (1) B-24 L PFF aircraft arrived at this station, the first of its type. This airplane, as well as all L’s following had an improved version of H2X equipment - the so called AN/APS-15A. By 31 January 1945 this Group had a total of eighteen (18) PFF aircraft and twelve (12) Mickey Operators, some of whom were assigned to this station as fully trained and others who were navigators and bombardiers at this station and were trained at H2X school.

On 24 December 1944, three (3) PFF aircraft were dispatched to lead a force of bombers from this station to attack German Casemated Coastal Guns on the West Coast of France. All three PFF aircraft made PFF runs over the target.

On the night of 28 December 1944, three (3) PFF aircraft were dispatched to lead a force of bombers from this station to attack the same target. All three made PFF runs over the target.

On night of 4/5 January 1945, five (5) PFF aircraft were dispatched to lead a force of bombers from this station to attack the same target again. Of the five (5), one (1) aborted, one (1) had H2X set failure and the other three (3) made PFF runs over the target.

From the point of view of the Mickey Operators, these missions were in the nature of a test or experiment. Following is what was learned:

From the standpoint of hitherto accepted technique, the PFF runs were satisfactory. Accuracy of results, however, was not good, due to the reliance placed on forecast meteorological information. It was clear that if accuracy was to be attained, either there must be better forecasts or a method using information found in flight. Experience has shown us that forecast information is often unreliable. Then the job was to simplify the necessary mathematics for the Mickey Operator. A series of tables and graphs were compiled for this purpose and the old technique was revised. During flight, information would be sent back to the base by several of the PFF aircraft. Base would weigh and sift this information and send to the PFF aircraft the information to use in dropping. The Mickey Operator would use this information in his graphs and tables to get his dropping information.

Although this Group is in its infancy so far as actual H2X missions are concerned, it is believed that definite progress and knowledge has been gained and the future will bring forth the desired results on actual operations.
Upon being instructed to carry out night bombardment, the Group Bombing Section was confronted with many problems the solving of which was started immediately.

Ground schools had built in the group bombing, bombsight construction and operation, bombing procedures, bomb-sight controls. Three (3) 4-2 trainers were in operation and two (2) had trainers were under construction. Approximately one (1) week later, ten (10) aircraft were ready for bomb. The ten (10) aircraft were to be used by forty (40) combat crews of three (3) squadrons. Because of modification demands, these ten (10) aircraft were all that could be obtained for two (2) months. The weather, together with the number of aircraft available, restricted the amount of bombing that could be accomplished during the months of November, December and January. To improve the efficiency of operations, all Norden and C-1 automatic-pilot aircraft were put in one (1) Squadron. Technique of fixed angle bombing was explained in detail to all Bombardiers.

On 24 December 1944, aircraft of this Group were dispatched to attack German Caserned Coastal Guns on the West Coast of France. Results to the target were nil but observations and statistics obtained proved that future attacks, using the same methods, would be successful. This target covered the area of 806 feet by 540 feet. Bombardiers were briefed to bomb target indicators even though the target could be identified. Target indicators were approximately one (1) mile from the target. Some aircraft had trouble with bomb racks. This trouble was immediately corrected.

On the night of 28 December 1944, the 492nd Bombardment Group (H) again attacked the same target. This mission proved to the satisfaction of everyone concerned that any target could be attacked at night successfully. On the night of 4 January 1945, the same target was attacked at night. Results were practically the same as target indicators were approximately one (1) mile from the target. This mission was very helpful because of a wind shift. Norden's and flares being dropped on night date, the distance between target indicators and target would have been very much greater than the previous times. The Mickey Operators compensated for this change and gain the target indicators averaged one (1) mile from the target. From the results obtained on this mission it was decided for several aircraft to obtain a wind and send it back to base, the average of all winds being broadcast to all aircraft. The Task Force Commander would also broadcast the same results over VHF. At this time it was also decided to attack pinpoint targets by another method. This method would require PFF aircraft to illuminate the target with illuminating flares dropped by B-25. A visual bomber would then identify the target and mark it with target indicators. The Master Bomber would then tell all aircraft where to aim in relation to TI's.
1. Bombing on Fanganui will be in a predetermined fixed angle.
2. Bombing on TI's will be synchronized on the Geometrical Center of TI's.
3. New Haven Attack will consist of synchronized bombing on TI's which are planted by light of illuminated Flares instead of being dropped blind.
**TRAINING ACHIEVED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Training</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. Men</td>
<td>Eq. Man Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMT and A-2 Trainer</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racks and Control</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Identification</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation Lecture</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCE Lecture</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing Lecture</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombsight Instructions</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Flight Training**

| Practice Bombs                              | 55       | 172.50  | 49       | 117.00  |
| Camera Bombs                                | 1        | 5.00    | Neg.     | Neg.    |
| Navigation Practice                         | Neg.     | Neg.    | 15       | 48.00   |

No. of Bombs Dropped: 284
NAVIGATION

At the time of conversion, Navigation Training for Night Bombardment was immediately started. Emphasis was put on Loran and H2X training as both were new in this Group. Because of the lack of equipment, training was difficult and H2X operators were trained before arriving but additional training was slow because of the lack of H2X aircraft. Loran training was hampered because of the lack of Loran sets.

As equipment began to arrive, Navigators were receiving the training and were gradually becoming experienced in this type of operation. Mass cross countries were flown on every available day. This Group's bomber stream, being so small, made Navigation even more difficult, the reason being that the smaller the bomber stream, the more exact the timing of each aircraft had to be. Control points and target times had to be made good within five (5) minutes or the aircraft would be scattered.

The three (3) attacks made by this Organization proved to be very valuable and especially proved the necessity for precise timing.

During the first part of the training the flight plan called for the PFF aircraft to reach the target one (1) minute before the main force. This proved wrong and at the present time, two (2) minutes are allowed. The PFF aircraft proved to be slower than the main force aircraft, therefore, on future missions, it was decided that PFF aircraft would probably have to cut off the corner of at least one (1) leg of their flight plan to make good their target time.

Timing is the important factor in all Night Bombardment Missions as without perfect timing a mission cannot ever be successful. After flying many Mass Cross Countries, the timing has greatly improved. Operational missions no doubt will change Navigational policies somewhat as new problems arise.
When the Engineering Section of this Station was notified that three (3) of the four (4) Bombardment Squadrons of the 492nd Bombardment Group would be made into Night Bombing Units, it was decided that in view of the fact that the height of the missions were not to exceed 10,000 feet, it would be possible to use the B-24 JSA and B-24HSA Carpetbagger type aircraft which the Squadrons possessed. It was decided that by keeping the modifications simple it would be possible to get into operations at an earlier date. The following modifications were agreed upon and the staging letter submitted that date to A-4 to prevent further delay.

a. Installation of "Walk-around" type oxygen system by using large size G-1 oxygen bottles at each crew members station with a "Walk-around" type regulator.

b. Installation of side guns.

c. Installation of stops on side guns to prevent hitting aircraft when firing at night.

d. Installation of resin light for identification.

e. Installation of bomb sight and associated equipment.

A short time later it was decided that we would operate our own HX equipment so six (6) B-24HSG aircraft were obtained from the 2nd Air Division.

These aircraft were in extremely poor condition and it was quite a problem to give them a D.I.R. and at the same time, keep them flying for training purposes. Besides these six (6) HX aircraft, only eleven (11) other really weary B-24S aircraft were on the station which were equipped with oxygen and bomb sight equipment suitable for training. Also, none of these aircraft were modified or equipped with the Navigational Equipment necessary for night flying. This fact greatly curtailed our training until some actual high altitude aircraft were received.

In the mean time, Carpetbagger aircraft were flown to Warton for modification and upon arrival of the staging letter, after two weeks delay, the modifications were started.

While the make-shift oxygen system was being installed, Command suddenly decided to boost the operating ceiling to 18,000 feet, an altitude at which a good oxygen system is essential. Command was notified of this deficiency in the current modification and it was requested that regular bombardment aircraft be provided for modification and the Carpetbagger aircraft be dropped as it would take much too long to install a complete oxygen system under existing depot facilities. This suggestion was not met with much favor but an attempt was made to obtain sufficient equipment to install a complete oxygen system in the Carpetbagger aircraft. Meanwhile, the unsatisfactory modification of the Carpetbagger aircraft proceeded. After a period of approximately two weeks, a call from Command was received, stating that the oxygen system in the Carpetbagger aircraft was inadequate.

Command then gave Warton orders to provide the aircraft with the conventional twenty (20) bottle oxygen system but before they were completely organized on this tremendous job, Warton received orders to cancel the modifications on all Carpetbagger aircraft and that other aircraft would be used. Three (3) Carpetbagger type aircraft were finally completely equipped and delivered to this station.
In the meantime, twelve (12) unused Night Turret aircraft were located in storage at Harton and were transferred to this project. The only modifications necessary were the removal of the belly turret, installation of side-gun windows and movement of bombardier's pencil. At this time it was December 1944 and the aircraft situation was rather critical.

Two (2) new B-24H aircraft were received, minus modifications and they were immediately pressed into training.

By the 20 December 1944, one of the three squadrons was removed from the Night Bombing Project and placed back on Carpetbagger status. It was provided with eighteen (18) Carpetbagger aircraft and transferred from the 8th AF to the 15th Air Force. This necessitated changing the total aircraft needed in the project and transfer of the excess aircraft.

The staging letter for the B-24H Night aircraft was as follows:

a. Blackout curtains in nose of aircraft between turret and navigator's compartment.

b. Blackout curtains around radio operator on flight deck so light would not reflect into pilots compartment or upper turret.

c. Install ring and post gun sights on side guns (ordinary reflector or computing sights are not satisfactory at night as the light affects night vision and in an attack, no time is given for tracking target so is necessary with a computing sight).

d. Install flux-gate compass with Air Position Indicator and Ground Position Indicator or D.R. compass with Air Position Indicator and Air Mileage Indicator. (D.R. Compass equipment is the R.I.P. equivalent of our Flux-gate Compass)

e. Reflective type sights in turrets but no computing type sights required (See par. c. We made an attempt to obtain R.I.P. sight sights for our turrets but the sight is entirely too large for installation in our turrets).

f. Install resin lights.

g. Install flame dampeners but not the tail pipe.

h. Aircraft to be painted with anti-searchlight synthetic enamel. The white in the Air Corps Insignia to be painted grey.

i. Install de-icer boots.

j. "Carpet" radio installation (For jarring enemy radar devices).

k. Loran radio installation (Long range navigational aid).


m. Install "Chaff" discharge chute.

n. Camera installation for night work (Special night camera).

o. 100 hour inspection.
The following modifications, in addition to those necessary for B-24/L aircraft, are required for B-24/LSH aircraft:

a. One flare chute in rear fuselage for special flare (RAF) with releasing switch on H2X operator's table.
b. Secondary bomb release switch on H2X operator's table.
c. Fishpond radio installation (attachment to H2X for use to tell of approaching aircraft).
d. Blackout curtains around H2X operator's equipment on flight deck so light will not reflect into pilots' compartment or upper turret.

These aircraft were finally delivered during the month of January 1945 and the Squadrons were equipped as follows:

a. 857th Bombardment Squadron (H).
   19 B-24 H Night aircraft, Main Force.
   1 B-24 aircraft, training.

b. 858th Bombardment Squadron (H).
   12 B-24 LSH Night aircraft, H2X installation.
   6 B-24 HSH Night aircraft, H2X installation.
   1 B-24 H Night aircraft, Main Force.
   1 B-24 H aircraft, training.

In February 1945, twelve (12) more B-24 HSH aircraft were to be modified for this project and a staging letter for this type was submitted. The staging letter was as follows:

a. Blackout:
   1. Blackout curtain around H2X operator and equipment on flight deck so light will not reflect into pilots' compartment or upper turret.
   2. Blackout curtains in nose to blackout Navigators compartment.
   3. Blackout curtains between Navigators and pilots' compartment so light will not reflect into pilots and copilots' compartment.
   4. Blackout curtain around radio on flight deck so light will not reflect into pilots' compartment or upper turret.

b. Navigation:
   1. Move navigation table into nose compartment and mount to rear of nose turret as in B-24 L aircraft.
   2. Mount Navigators instruments and equipment so they are readily accessible in flight.
   3. Install flux-gate compass and position indicator and ground position indicator.

5. Install Loran Radio installation. (Long range navigational aid).
   b. Armament and Bombardment.
      1. Install ring and post sights on side guns.
      2. Install stops on side guns so aircraft will not be struck by own gunfire.
      3. Computing sights not necessary in turrets.

4. Install bomb fusing solenoid on rear of bomb rack at all stations with switch on bombardier's panel.

5. Flare-chute installation in rear fuselage for special RAF flare with bomb releasing switch on H2X operator's table.


d. Special Radio and Radar Identification equipment.
   1. Install resin lights.
   2. "Carpet" radio installation.
   3. Install APS-13 installation.
   4. Install "Fishpond" radio installation.
   5. Install "Chaff" chute.
   6. British type "F" night fighter identification unit. (Transmitter Units only).
   7. Install localizer and glide-path radio installation.
   8. Tail gunners. "Evasive action" warning signal to pilot.

9. Move radio operators compartment from command deck to flight deck.

10. Install VHF Radio installation.

11. Move radio altimeter to H2X operators position on flight deck.

e. Airplane.
   1. One thousand hour inspection and T.O. compliance to date.
   2. Install flame damperers on engine but do not install tail pipes.
   3. Install De-icer boots.
   4. Install windshield wipers for pilots and bombardiers' compartments.
5. Weight and balance check.


7. Aircraft to be painted with anti-searchlight synthetic enamel gloss black. Aircraft serial number to be painted in chrome yellow on outside of vertical stabilizers. It is requested that the depots refrain from painting designs on the fuselage as this defeats the purpose of the camouflage.
## Statistics

### Comparison of Daily Status Reports by Squadrons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>857th Bomb Sqdn</th>
<th>858th Bomb Sqdn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Average time of A/C (hours)</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>18.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. of assigned A/C</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>12.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. A/C in commission</td>
<td>17.96</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % A/C in commission</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. A/C out of commission</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. A/C in depots</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average No. A/C awaiting parts</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Engine Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time required (days)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Turbo changes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Auxiliary Tank Changes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. De-icer Boot changes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fuel consumed (gals. total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>134,031</td>
<td>84,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>6,045</td>
<td>12,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hours flown (total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>565:50</td>
<td>306:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>21:50</td>
<td>39:54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fuel consumed (Gals. per hour)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>274.17</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. A/C Transferred</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. A/C Received</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Average time accept. checks (Days)</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Due to the receipt of eight (8) A/C in two days, the 858th's time on acceptance checks was increased materially.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. No. of Battle Damaged A/C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Information received at this station from 1 A.D. recently indicates 80% of C-10 power plants turned in to 2 SAD have had frozen pistons. In the majority of the cases, frozen pistons resulted from use of improper gasoline or not mixing gasoline with oil. (T.O. 19-45-5) Repair parts are not available.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/6
14. Capt. Phillips found that the B-24 H series, modified to use K-13 gunsights at waist positions, created a hazard in that guns stowed were pressing against ammunition chutes, causing the chutes enough to prevent proper passing of ammunition. In addition, guns hit the chute at the trigger set screw of the adapter assembly. In the event the safety switch was off, the trigger was pressed down, resulting in automatic firing. A safety bracket was installed that corrected this situation very satisfactorily. This modification applies only to the B-24 H, having the ammunition chute around the window.

15. Cause of Engine changes:
   a. Pilot error - Hit asphalt spreader; average time 151:55 (One).
   b. Internal failure, allowing oil to drain into blower section - Average time 321:15 (One)
   c. Excessive oil consumption - Average time 352:55 (Five)
   d. Metal particles in sump - Average time 312:30 (Two)
   e. Bent Rods - Average time 257:00 (One)
   f. Accessory Drive Failure - Average time 468:50 (Two)

16. 858th Bombardment Squadron reports three (3) sheard generator shafts.

17. Cause of Turbo Supercharger changes:
   a. Metal particles due to engine failure (Three)
   b. Failure of impeller bearings - Average time 370:00 (One)
   c. Cracked nozzle boxed - Average time 789:00 (Six)

3. Two (2) Carburator failures reported by the 857th Bombardment Squadron.
COMMUNICATIONS

Radio Operators flimsies and special briefings were furnished for three night, high altitude bombing missions and for numerous Chirpethbagger missions by the 850th Bombardment Squadron.

Operational Radio Control for all aircraft of this Group is accomplished through R.A.F. 5 Group, located near Newmarket. The reason being the necessity for a night frequency, 3190 KC's Call Sign 3 S E, which 5 Group operates on. Operational W/T call signs and aircraft letters are passed via direct Ops speech line to 5 Group, using a Scrambler Telephone. For recalls or diversions, the necessary information is given over the direct Ops line to the W/T cabin, 5 Group, who will then transmit the message on the next half hour time signal.

A procedure was evolved the latter part of the month to receive corrected winds from the aircraft in flight and then transmit back to all the aircraft a mean average wind for the target area. This is expected to increase the bombing accuracy by a large percentage. Briefly, here is the procedure outlined: Three or four (4) Mickey planes are assigned to send at a pre-determined time, the wind speed, wind direction and altitude they are flying to the radio control station. From this information a mean average wind is computed and transmitted to all aircraft under the Group collective W/T call sign DQUC. Only the Mission Commander will receive the message. For a double check to be certain all aircraft receive the new winds, the Mission Commander will, upon receipt of the W/T message, transmit on VHF channel "A" in the clear the corrected winds. No aircraft will receive for this as it will be repeated several times in the broadcast. The theory of the procedure is excellent but due to several factors, it has not worked completely. This is mainly due to excessive interference on the H/F D/F frequency and also of equipment failure in the reporting aircraft. In one instance some of the reporting aircraft did not take-off. On operational missions using 5 Group control, the procedure should work successfully since a regular high powered control station transmitter will be used.

Training of Radio Operators on procedure, equipment, code, blinker, etc., and other air crew members on code and blinker is carried on by the Communications School under the direction of Lt. Graves. One primary deficiency in the school is the lack of competent instructors. Steps are being taken to obtain from I.A.D. several lead operators who have finished a tour of operations to act as instructors.

The point to point W/T system to the continent with Lyon and Amancy has been experiencing a great deal of interference throughout the entire month of January 1945. The H/F D/F frequency was dropped 5 KC's at the request of USSTAF to decrease the amount of interference. This has not been too successful but action is being taken by 8th AF and USSTAF to further clear the frequency.
PART I.

RADIO MAINTENANCE RECORD

The following listed failures include those noted not only in flight but those found in the routine inspection of aircraft by ground radio maintenance personnel. It is noted that the command set is especially susceptible to corrosion and shorting out of circuits due to excess moisture. Linison set failures were mainly due to side tone circuit breakdown in which the equipment is still serviceable for operational use. Also three cases of lost trailing wire antennas, due possibly to improper operation by the radio operators are included under Linison set failures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>No. of flights</th>
<th>No. of failures</th>
<th>Percentage successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linison Set</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Set</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Compass</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interphone</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. App. Equipment</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marker Beacon</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART 2.

INSTALLATIONS FOR THE PERIOD

- Glide Path Receiver: 5
- VHF Sets (Complete): 5
- Crystals Installed in VHF sets: 57

PART 3.

STRENGTH OF RADIO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

- 857th Bombardment Squadron: 8
- 856th Bombardment Squadron: 9
- Inst. App. Maintenance (Ground Equip): 5
- Signal Supply: 2
- TOTAL: 24

PART 4.

REMARKS

It is noted that failure of either channel, 1 or 2 on the Command Set, is not a valid excuse for aborting or cancelling any scheduled flight. In the opinion of this Office, the radio operator would get some good experience if he were to tune up his Linison set on voice and use it in lieu of the Command Set in case of complete Command failure. Of course the pilot would not be able to be in on the conversation but the radio operator has an interphone jack box like every one else and can pass information to the pilot and vice versa.
PART 4.

Continued

Instrument approach ground equipment, including Localizer Transmitter, Glide Path Transmitter and Marker Beacon Transmitter, operated continuously from 0600 to 2000 hours daily.

PART 5:

EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Installed in aircraft</th>
<th>Spares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN/APS-15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APS-15A</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEE MKII</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APN-4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APN-1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APN-2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/AFQ-9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APT-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APR-4</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/APS-15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR-718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR-5107 (Inst. in flight contr)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART 6.

OPERATIONAL RECORD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>No. Sorties</th>
<th>Failures in Flight</th>
<th>Percent Successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HZL</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEE</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loran</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Altimeter</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART 7.

INSTALLATIONS FOR PERIOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>857th Bomb Sqn.</th>
<th>858th Bomb Sqn.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loran</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spot-jamming</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART 8.

STRENGTH OF RADAR PERSONNEL IN NIGHT BOMBING SQUADRONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>857TH SQMN</th>
<th>858TH SQMN</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>867 (HZE)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>865 (Navigational)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>852 (RCM)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>862 (IFF)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock and General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**PART 9.**

TRAINING

All Navigators of the 857th and 858th Bombardment Squadrons have been trained in operation of modified Loran Indicator 1D-63.

Seven (7) Waist Gunners have received three (3) days instruction in Carpet Spot Jamming at station 179.

One Officer, Capt. Ader, has attended Special Officer's Course in Spot Jamming Carpet and has subsequently assumed responsibility for Carpet Training Program as per 1 A. D. Instruction 100-54.

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**PART 10.**

REMARKS

Loran installation program has slackened, awaiting procurement of cable and plugs.

Remaining twenty (20) old-type 1D-6A Loran Indicators have been exchange for twenty (20) improved version 1D-6B.

Eighth Air Force is arranging for prototype installations of AH/APS-15 in two (2) aircraft of this Group at station 102. Sufficient Units have been procured by 8th AF to allow one (1) installation per aircraft of this Group.

Recommended window type CHA 25-3 (Chaff) has been stored in quantity in Group Signal Supply. Recommended window type CHR-1 (Rope) is available at 2nd SAD for issue to this Group, pending installation of AH/APS-15.
ORDNANCE & ARMAMENT

For the Ordnance and Armament Sections, three (3) main problems were involved in the conversion to Night Bombing.

a. Determining the bomb load for the PFF aircraft, determining and making the modifications necessary to carry this load and arrangement of supply channels for special items.

b. Determining the defensive armament to be carried by each aircraft and determining the type of and the procuring necessary gunsights and accessories.

c. Training of Ordnance and Armament personnel and assisting in training and indoctrination of Bombardiers on PFF aircraft.

In determining the load to be carried by PFF aircraft, conferences were held with the Group Bombardier and the British Liaison Officers. Several trips were made to 1 A.D. to R.A.F. Station Upwood and to 8 Group at Huntingdon. It was decided that each PFF aircraft would carry six (6) British No. 4 MK II 250# Target Indicator Bombs and One (1) 4.5” Skymarker Flare (Wanganui flare). Two (2) colors of TI’s were to be stocked which were Red and Green. If Red TI’s were carried, the skymarker would be Green with Red stars, if Green TI’s were carried, the skymarker would be Red with Green stars. British 860 (Type A to J) barometric nose fuse and 867 barometric tail fuse were to be used in the TI’s and the 878 aerial-burst fuse in the skymarker. On “New Haven” raids, a combination of 867 tail and 874 nose fuse would be used in the TI’s. It was decided that American AN-M26 Night Bombardment flares would be used as “illuminators” with the M III fuse. One American M 46 Photoflash bomb also with the M III fuse, would be carried in each main force (and possibly PFF) aircraft.

In order to avoid tying up one section of the bomb bay for one skymarker, it was decided to install a flare chute in each PFF aircraft. The Group Engineering Officer made arrangements for the modification to be done at Wharton. This modification consists of a miniature bomb bay 8 inches wide, 6 inches deep and 42 inches long, located on the left side of the tail skin. One 4.5” flare is suspended in the chute by a B-9 shackel and controlled by an A-2 release. The flare release is located in the H2K operator’s compartment. The chute has a small wind-screen, an open bottom and a spring-loaded top.

Lt. Col Morrow, 1 A.D. Ordnance Officer, arranged for supply of British 250# TI’s and 4.5” skymarker flares. An initial supply of 200 TI’s of each color (approximately three (3) missions) was furnished. Also, 200 skymarker flares (100 RED - 100 GREEN) were supplied.

It was decided that the Armament for the B-24’s in Night Bombardment would include Top Turret, Waist Guns and Tail Guns. The Ball Turret was removed and replaced by Radar Equipment. Conferences regarding the sights to be used in these positions have resulted in the decision to use K-6A sights in the Turret positions and replace these with K-15 sights when they are available. The Waist Guns now have ring and post sights with K-6 mounts but the K-15 sight with K-7 mount is now being experimented with and a decision on replacement will be made after completion of the tests. The present policy of this Group is to use straight API, M-8 Ammunition in all positions. This policy was established at a Group Conference at which the use of Night Precorer and other types of Ammunition were discussed.
In order to give Ordnance and Armament men a refresher course in handling demolition bombs and fuses, small groups of NCO's, accompanied by Squadron Ordnance and Armament Officers, were sent to other stations to observe procedures and techniques used. Ordnance men were sent to 1 A.D. Stations and Armament men to 2 A.D. Stations. Upon their return from D.S., the Ordnance and the Armament Officer in each Squadron conducted a training course for his entire section, assisted by the NCO's who were sent on D.S. as observers. These training courses covered fully, safety precautions, nomenclature and construction of bombs and fuses, technique of loading, etc. At the conclusion of the course, written examinations were given, covering the material studied.

A complete schedule of practice loading and fusing was then carried out, using drill bombs and inert fuses at first and later, (due to lack of sufficient drill bombs etc), using live bombs and fuses. Each loading crew was required to completely load an aircraft several times with each size of bomb in stock and to fully fuse same. Time studies were made with a view to eliminating unnecessary delays. All loading and fusing was done under the immediate supervision of Officers with particular emphasis on safety precautions.

Technical information on British Munitions was obtained from the Armament Officer at Upwood and from Air Ministry Publication 2650A, Vol. I and Confidential Document 298, Vol. I.
During the past three (5) months, resurfacing of the perimeter has been in progress and because of this, one-third (1/3) of the perimeter and as many as half the hardstands have been unserviceable at the same time. This necessitated one of the runways being used as a parking area and taxi way. On many days, take-offs and landings were made extremely difficult as enroute to takeoff position or after landing, a number of planes had to cross the runway in use. This obviously called for extra alertness on the part of all flying control personnel as each plane had to be told, over the radio, how to taxi and when and where to cross the runway. The problem has been simplified a great deal since the end of the month, as on the 51 January 1945, a section of the perimeter was completed, making the whole East side of the field serviceable from one end of the main runway to the other.

During the past month an extensive program has been in operation to get all the pilots "checked out" on the proper use of the SCS-51 Blind Landing Equipment. The weather during the month has been very poor but each suitable day has been used to its fullest advantage in getting the pilots familiarized with the entire "Blind Landing Procedure". This procedure, as worked out by Operations at this station is for use in landing a number of planes when the cloud base is down around 500 feet and the visibility is 2000 yards or less.

While aircraft from this station were practicing the let-down, on several occasions, planes from other fields came over to use the equipment at the same time. Whenever this happened it was noticeable that a standard let-down pattern should be laid down for use on all fields equipped with SCS-51 so that visiting aircraft could fall right in the pattern with the base planes.

Since this station is doing a large portion of its flying at night and the SCS-51 is not used really for blind landings but more to break cloud in line with runway all set to land, it has been found helpful to use the Hi-lighting at the same time to give the pilot something additional to line up by.
The months of November, December and January are normally the months with the highest fog frequency throughout the year. This year, however, it was less prevalent than usual; only in December, traditionally the foggiest month of the year, was fog experienced in the classical English fashion. Visibility troubles were common throughout the month and the field literally "souped" in about half the cases. If these months lacked their usual severity insofar as fog formation was concerned, they certainly compensated for it in the form of bitter cold weather. Frost was particularly bad during the last week of December, but it was in January that the real record-breaking weather occurred — record breaking in its severe cold and frequent snow storms. In general, the weather was very poor for flying during the months in review. Nevertheless, the planes took to the air on any and every day that the weather permitted.

Hereafter, these summations will be submitted monthly and will include a statistical summary of the correlation of forecasted weather and the actual weather encountered at the base and targets. Any other point of interest, such as flights, take-offs and landings, etc., made in extremely inclement weather, will also be noted.
PHOTOGRAPHY

With the advent of night bombing, it was necessary for this Group to procure the services of an Officer with much experience in night aerial photography. Lt. Jerome L. Bushman was the Officer assigned as head of the Photographic Section on 16 December 1944.

During the month of December 1944, sixteen (16) K-19 night photographic cameras were received by the photographic section for installation in thirty (30) aircraft of the 857th Bombardment Squadron (B) and 858th Bombardment Squadron (H). The aircraft were B-24 D's and B-24 H's and the following difficulties were encountered in installing the cameras.

a. The skin of the aircraft had to be cut and a view-finder ring installed to hold the photo-electric cell.

b. The electrical wiring to the camera junction box had been removed in all aircraft and had to be replaced.

c. The relative positions of the camera mount and the camera port made a backward tilt of the camera impossible. This was corrected by moving the camera mount forward 1-2 inches. This made a backward tilt of six (6) degrees possible.

On the mission flown on the night of 4/5 January 1945, four (4) cameras were sent out and two (2) photo-flash bombs were placed in each camera aircraft. The weather encountered was bad and only one usable photograph was obtained. On the other cameras the target was completely obscured by clouds. On the usable photograph the coverage of the photo-flash was excellent.

During the period of 14 thru 29 January 1945, six (6) B-24 H's and eleven (11) B-24 L's were brought to this Group. Modification of these airplanes for night photography is almost complete.

K-24 cameras and A-17 mounts have been obtained and are ready for installation in the aircraft for the purpose of practice camera bombing.

In addition to this work, the Photographic Section has accomplished all ground photographic work required at this station.
Immediately following the first mission to be flown after the conversion, a news story covering the details of both the change-over and the initial mission was prepared by PRO. It was approved for publication by the Commanding Officer, given a Secret Classification and forwarded to PRO, First Air Division. After submission of the story, it was learned that the classification of the account could not be changed and that all details of the Group's activities would remain Secret for an indefinite period, insofar as news releases are concerned.

Division PRO, recognizing the Group's handicap in this connection, said that the Group personnel would be given priority in special radio programs and features, generally originating in London. The first results of the pledge were the appearances of Capt. Barber and later, Sergeant Marchak, 357th Bombardment Squadron, on special nationally-broadcast radio programs originating in London. Other such opportunities for Group personnel are promised.

Since Armament and Ordnance personnel were especially concerned with modifying the aircraft, individual hometown stories with pictures were prepared and forwarded. Stories of the men on duty at the 552nd Service Squadron's hangar were also prepared and sent out.

In addition, the PRO continues to follow up promotions and awards with hometown stories.
SUMMARY
OF
492ND BOMB. GP.
AAF

FREIBURG
EMDEN
DORTMUND
MUNSTER
WIESBADEN

ALTITUDE
NIGHT
BOMBING

Dowagers
RestRICTED
as per W.D.C. 23
dated 23 June
Robert H. Jr
Cal 41
OPERATIONS

During the month of March, the 492nd Bombardment Group (H) attacked seven targets from high altitude. These included Munster, Weisbaden, Dortmund, and Emden. The timing and accuracy on these attacks were greatly improved over the previous month's attacks. In fact, this month's work was considered excellent in most phases. An indication of this is the fact that R.A.F. 100 Group, one of the Units most experienced in high-altitude night bombing, dropped their bombs on our target indicators and sky markers on two of the attacks; Weisbaden and Munster. Now, having been stood down on high altitude night bombing, we reflect with great satisfaction upon the splendid coordination and cooperation of R.A.F. 100 Group in this effort. It is felt that we were able to add a great deal of "sting" to their "spoof" raids and they in turn gave us much knowledge about that type of bombing with which our Air Force has had little to do, heretofore. We now certainly have a basis upon which to expand for high altitude night bombing in other theatres.

With further reference to the high degree of cooperation between the R.A.F. and this Group, the following teletype is appended which has recently been received from Air Vice Marshal Addison, A.O.C. R.A.F. 100 Group:

"A26 10 April from A.O.C. THE OPERATIONS LAST NIGHT PROVIDED AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF THE VALUABLE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THAT CAN BE AFFORDED TO BOMBER COMMAND BY OUR SPECIAL OPERATIONS. THE ENEMY REACTED STRONGLY AND WITH GREAT DETERMINATION BUT IN THE WRONG PLACE WITH THE RESULT THAT THE MAIN FORCE DESPITE ITS GREAT STRENGTH WAS UNHINDERED WHilst THE WHOLE OF THE ENEMY CONSIDERABLE FIGHTER EFFORT WAS EXPENDED ON THE FEINT FORCE CONSISTING OF HEAVY BOMBERS FROM 492ND U.S.A.A.F. GROUP AND NO 4 GROUP R.A.F. AND HEAVY JUPITER AIRCRAFT OF THIS GROUP. TO ADD TO HIS DISCOMFORT HE LOST THREE NIGHT FIGHTERS DESTROYED AND ONE DAMAGED TO BRITISH NIGHT FIGHTERS.

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE BULK OF OUR OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT WERE SPREAD OUT OVER THE COUNTRY ON THE PRECEDING NIGHT AND DID NOT RETURN TO THEIR HOME BASES UNTIL A FEW HOURS BEFORE THEY WERE DUE TO TAKE OFF ON LAST NIGHTS OPERATIONS THIS SUCCESS IS ALL THE MORE GRATIFYING. IT SPEAKS VOLUMES FOR THE DETERMINATION AND PERSISTENCE OF THE AIR CREWS, AND TO THE DOGDED ENTHUSIASM AND HARD WORK OF THE GROUND CREWS IN GETTING THESE AIRCRAFT TURNED ROUND IN SO SHORT A TIME. MOROEVER THIS ACHIEVEMENT IS ALL THE MORE STRIKING IN THE REASON OF THE VERY SMALL NUMBER OF EARLY RETURNS LAST NIGHT. I WOULD LIKE ALL STATION COMMANDERS TO CONVEY MY CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL PERSONNEL FOR THIS FINE FEAT, AND TELL THEM THAT WE HERE AT HEADQUARTERS ARE PARTICULARLY PROUD OF THEIR GRAND WORK.

Air Vice Marshal Addison
A.O.C. 100 Group.
## FLIGHT TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. of A/C</th>
<th>No. of Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Flights</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigational Flights</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>94:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Flights (Dry Runs)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Flights (Practice Drops)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Local Flights</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Navigational Flights</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>150:30</td>
</tr>
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## GROUND TRAINING

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<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
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<th>No. Hours</th>
<th>No. Men Hours</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Bombardiers Training</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1:35</td>
<td>54:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament Training</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>155:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers Training</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>21:00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navigators Training</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1:16</td>
<td>125:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots Training</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>71:00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications Training</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>254:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Training</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>187:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Training, Lectures, etc.</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>1:07</td>
<td>417:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditching Emergency and Oxygen Training</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>236:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2 Lectures and Reading</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>289:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sketch</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>130:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Nature of Accident</th>
<th>A/C and Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1945</td>
<td>Does not apply</td>
<td>Taxi accident</td>
<td>No. 1 and 2 Prop damage and damage to bulkheads. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 March 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Taxi accident</td>
<td>Aircraft declared salvage. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1945</td>
<td>Training flight</td>
<td>Landing accident</td>
<td>Nose section wrecked. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 March 1945</td>
<td>Training flight</td>
<td>Flow into high ground</td>
<td>Complete destruction of aircraft. 4 of crew fatal, 5 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1945</td>
<td>Does not apply</td>
<td>Towing accident</td>
<td>Tail skid and fuselage damage. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Emergency forced landing</td>
<td>Complete destruction of aircraft. 7 of crew fatal, 1 severely injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# RESULTS OF NIGHT BOMBING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of A/C</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1945</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Railway docks at Emden</td>
<td>Very successful. Several fires observed in target area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 March 1945</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Railway station at Weisbaden</td>
<td>Unobserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 1945</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Railway sidings at Dortmund</td>
<td>Unobserved. One crew reported a very large explosion in target area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 1945</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Marshalling yards at Dortmund</td>
<td>Unobserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1945</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Goods warehouse and yards at Munster</td>
<td>Unobserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March 1945</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Goods depot at Weisbaden</td>
<td>Bombing inaccurate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1945</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Passenger station at Munster</td>
<td>Very good.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OBSERVATIONS**

There is not available at present, except to R.A.F. Organizations, a fuse capable of functioning with the Nanganui. Flares at less than four thousand (4,000) feet below the flight level. With the available type of fuse, if an undercast were less than four thousand (4,000) feet below the flight level, it would be impossible to sky mark the target. For any future night bombing operations it is strongly recommended that an American type of sky marker and a fuse capable of functioning at any desired distance below the aircraft be developed.
The month of March marked the culmination of the training program in "Blind bombing" procedures. In three of the seven missions flown (Freiburg, Enden and Munster), photographs showed excellent results in regard to pathfinders markers. All of the target indicators were within 3/4 miles of the immediate MPI (Main Point of Impact) and very well grouped to give the main force an excellent aiming point.

Of the 68 aircraft dispatched on night bombing missions in March, there were six set failures. One FFF aircraft aborted and one went MIA (Lt. Imperato, lot, 656th Bombardment Squadron (H)).
1st mission – Emden - attack took nine (9) minutes which was very good, considering the fact that the main force was, for the most part, on D.R. for a good part of the trip across the North Sea.

2nd mission – Weisbaden – Seven (7) minutes – Good Navigation.
5th mission – Munster – Six (6) minutes – One airplane bombed wrong target.

6th mission – Weisbaden – Four (4) minutes – Excellent.
7th mission – Munster – Five and one half (5½) minutes – Excellent.

Range for the seven missions was four (4) to nine (9) minutes, the average being six (6) minutes, showing that our navigators have become proficient in the art of navigating night bombardment missions.
As in the past, close coordination continues between this Group and R.A.F. 100 Group in regard to night-bombing intelligence.

One problem which exists is the limited time (sometimes only thirty minutes and on one occasion a scant seven minutes) between the receipt of the target's aiming point and the time scheduled for the briefing of crews.

The plotting of German flak and searchlight installations is maintained up to the minute, in spite of the difficulties presented by the swiftly changing front lines.
The introduction to high altitude bombing brought up several maintenance problems hitherto unknown to the Group and materially increased many of those already existing.

Oxygen systems and servicing equipment had to be manned and maintained by personnel new at the business who were trained as we went along. Around fifty bomb-sights installed brought up new problems with their additional load on the electrical systems which were found to be more susceptible to malfunctions at higher altitudes and for a short time generator failure threatened to become more than serious. This was largely overcome by an extensive training program for Aerial Engineers on the proper paralleling and use of the generators.

Engine, turbo supercharger and propeller governor failure took a sharp rise due to increased power settings necessary, longer periods of continuous cruise and much lower temperatures encountered at higher altitudes. Each of these, in turn, presented an individual problem which had to be dealt with either by further training of both air and ground crews or new maintenance procedures.

Last, but by no means least, high altitude proved the undoing of our conventional exhaust flame suppressors; these units last very few hours at altitude due to the increased use of turbines and a large percentage of aborts were caused by this failure. The Group is now working on the development of stainless steel shroud to hide the turbo and waste gate flame rather than suppress it.
Radio Operator's flimsies and special briefings were furnished for seven (7) night bombing missions.

Operational radio control for night bombing aircraft continued under R.A.F. 100 Group.
FLYING CONTROL

The recently initiated Plan "A" lot-down procedure has been working extremely well although its use in adverse weather conditions has not yet been experienced. However, the satisfactory results being obtained now are providing the necessary operational assurance to warrant its success in the weather conditions for which it was primarily designed. In conjunction with the plan, the control tower personnel have developed a standard timing procedure whereby the position of each aircraft and its time in that position is recorded and accurately studied from the time the aircraft is first known to be over the base until it is parked in its dispersal. The Plan "A" procedure, designed for use with the C-51, is theoretically successful, since the weather conditions necessary for its use have not yet been experienced so as to determine its practicability.

At present, a temporary lighting system of battery lamps is being used each night on the perimeter track and will continue this way until the amber-blue permanent taxiway lighting is completely installed and serviceable.

Occult and Pundit flares are being furnished for both operational and non-operational flights during the hours of darkness. In addition, a continuous effort is being made to include all navigational lighting aids that are available on a regular operating schedule on the continent. Although there are numerous airfields there that are equipped with occults, a definite schedule of their operation cannot be obtained.

The reconstruction work on the perimeter track has been completed on all sections and runway approaches making the entire taxi track serviceable and unobstructed. As a result of this, every dispersal was released for use excepting one which the construction engineers will be using until they leave the base. Runway 05/23 has been cleared of aircraft and is now open for traffic.

The VHF installation in the tower has been provided with a direct power supply. A station control frequency has been obtained on which the tower will maintain a continuous watch. Difficulty has been experienced in contacting aircraft for recall on VHF from our HF/DF and control station R.A.F. 3 Group. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that radio operators should monitor these stations as briefly to pick up a recall or diversion message on the first transmission.

On March 2nd the left landing gear of a taxying aircraft, collapsed; the aircraft blocked the perimeter track on one side of the take-off runway, the other side being blocked by construction. It was necessary to scrub a mission because of this.

The new "Cardox" crash truck was given its first use on 10 March. The nose-wheel, of an aircraft returning from a cross-country flight, collapsed and the nose of the aircraft burst into flame after coming to a stop on the runway. The fire was quickly brought under control. A foam truck and water trucks were standing by.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

- Lectures on Flying Control ........................................... 120 Man
- Lectures on Divers Gun Areas ........................................ 26 Pilots
- Non-operational Flights to Continent ............................ 24 A/C
- Operational emergency landings on Continent .................. 5 A/C
During the month of March, cameras were installed in aircraft of the Group on seven (7) occasions. Good results were achieved three times; at Emden of the night of 3 March, at Weisbaden on 14 March and at Munster on 15 March. Failure on the other occasions was caused by poor weather conditions and by the evasive action taken by the camera aircraft in the target area.

The Photo Section has requisitioned K-19 B cameras to replace the outmoded K-19. The greater lens speed and shorter rewind cycle of the "B" model should prove of great value in obtaining better results.
WEATHER

During the first half of the month persistent light pressure areas, periodically penetrated by weakened fronts, covered the British Isles and the Continent. This synoptic situation, uncommon at this time of year, permitted extensive flights and regularly scheduled missions.

Seven (7) high altitude bombing missions were completed and were considered successful from the point of view of weather forecasting. Interrogation of the crews indicated the accuracy of the forecasts as follows: On six (6) missions the weather was essentially as briefed; on the seventh mission the weather was better than briefed.
PUBLIC RELATIONS

Public Relations has continued its regular function of sending out stories concerning base personnel. These stories, which are forwarded to newspapers in the man's home community, have dealt with promotions, awards and decorations and feature material on non-classified activities on the base. The photo lab has cooperated by supplying a number of photographs of presentations and "On-the-line" photographs to accompany the stories.

First Air Division Public Relations was questioned several times during the month as to the Group's status. It was stated again that the Group's activities were still secret, so far as giving them any publicity was concerned. No date was set for the possible removal of the ban.
492ND BOMB. GRP.

AAF

LOW ALTITUDE SUMMARY

MARCH 1945

SECRET
Beginning in March, the Group was informed by higher Headquarters that night bombing would have second priority, the emphasis would be placed on Carpetbagger missions.

On 9 March the 857th Bombardment Squadron (H) was ordered to cease operations, preparatory to moving from Station 179. The movement was accomplished on 12 March.

The loss of one Squadron naturally reduced the scope of bombing operations. Moreover, on 10 March a large-scale training program was begun in order to indoctrinate all crews in Carpetbagger techniques. This also limited operations, since it made crews unavailable for night-bombing.
OPERATIONS

During March the Group was informed by Higher Headquarters that the night bombing project would be stood down and that Carpetbagger work would receive first priority. Because of efforts contemplated for exceptionally dangerous territory, it was decided to make use of A-26 type aircraft already in use over the usual target areas. It was moreover decided to make use of British Mosquito aircraft for special high-altitude Carpetbagger missions to be laid on in coordination with the low-altitude missions.

Carpetbagger operations with B-24 type aircraft have been going on steadily and successfully, averaging from ten (10) to fifteen (15) sorties every night, weather permitting. A-26 missions have progressed at a slower pace, because of the necessity of training crews and modifying the aircraft for night work. The first A-26 mission attempted resulted in the crew's and aircraft's going MIA. This left the Group with four (4) A-26 aircraft and one (1) crew.

Meanwhile, training of A-26 crews and modifying of the aircraft were progressing, and the Group was able to meet the schedule of operations to which it had been committed. Another A-26 aircraft was lost a short while later as a result of nose-wheel failure upon landing. In nine (9) attempts, the Group was able to score "Cowpilotings" on five (5) of the targets assigned.

In conjunction with the A-26 Carpetbagger work, the Group has been running high-altitude Mosquito missions called "Red Stacking" missions. These flights are run on an average of three (3) a week. Of the total number of missions flown, about 50% have been successful.

Although the Group was given little time in which to prepare for A-26 and Mosquito missions, definite progress has been made in spite of all difficulties. The Group has not failed to meet any target assignments.
## FLIGHT TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. of A/C</th>
<th>No. of Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Flights</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>110:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigational Flights</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>109:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb. Flights (Dry Runs)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb. Flights (Practice Drops)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Local Flights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Navigational Flights</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>144:50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## GROUND TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>No. Men</th>
<th>No. Hours</th>
<th>No. Man Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombardiers Training</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1:35</td>
<td>54:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament Training</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>155:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers Training</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>21:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots Training</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1:16</td>
<td>125:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigators Training</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>56:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Training</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>254:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Training</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>187:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crew Training, Lectures, etc.</td>
<td>747</td>
<td></td>
<td>846:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitching Emergency and Oxygen Training</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1:07</td>
<td>417:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2 Lectures and Reading</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>236:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skeet</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>289:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link Trainer</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1:00</td>
<td>150:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Accident Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Nature of Accident</th>
<th>A/C and Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1945</td>
<td>Does not apply</td>
<td>Taxi accident</td>
<td>No. 1 and 2 Prop damage and damage to bulkheads. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 March 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Taxi accident</td>
<td>Aircraft declared salvage. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 March 1945</td>
<td>Training flight</td>
<td>Landing accident</td>
<td>Nosed section wrecked. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March 1945</td>
<td>Training flight</td>
<td>Flow into high ground</td>
<td>Complete destruction of aircraft. 4 of crew fatal, 5 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 1945</td>
<td>Does not apply</td>
<td>Towing accident</td>
<td>Tail skid and fuselage damage. No injury to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Emergency forced landing</td>
<td>Complete destruction of aircraft. 7 of crew fatal, 1 severely injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Carpetbagger phase of the month's activities began with the moon period on 18 March. Use of pathfinder techniques had been made on several practice missions and was considered helpful to Carpetbagger operations.

Accordingly, on 18 March, three (3) aircraft were dispatched with 'Mickey' operators. One operator was able to try the set at the low altitude required for Carpetbagger work and he found it satisfactory.

On all the following missions of this type during the month, pathfinder was used and proved of very great help to the crews, not only in crossing the coast at the right point, but in finding the target and in crossing the enemy coast at the right point. With PFF equipment, FPs can be used out in the water for very shallow penetration of the coast.

Missions were flown on the following dates: 20/21 March, 23/24 March, 24/25 March, 26/27 March, 27/28 March and 30/31 March. On these missions, 47 aircraft were dispatched with only one set failure. One aircraft was recalled. 27 aircraft successfully accomplished drops over their targets and 19 were unsuccessful. The percentage of set failures for the month was 2 percent.

March operations have for the first time seen Pathfinder equipment used at the extremely low altitude of 300 to 500 feet and used with outstanding success in accordance with Carpetbagger requirements.
The essence of Carpetbagger Navigation is knowing exactly where the aircraft is at all times, since the target is a pinpoint usually no larger than a section of a meadow or a clearing in a woods.

In recent Carpetbagger operations, the Navigator has depended upon "Gee" and "IR" to take his aircraft over the North Sea and the Bombardier has depended upon his own eyes to take the aircraft into the target, once the Danish or Norwegian Coast was crossed. The Bombardier has reference to lakes, woods and roads, together with terrain features such as mountains, for piloting to a pinpoint. On missions into Germany piloting has been possible from take-off to landing, but this has not been possible on northern operations.

In the month of March, a navigational technique entirely new to Carpetbagger operations was introduced, and that was the use of H2X as a navigational aid. This has proven very effective, for its 1,000 foot range of 30 miles is, of course, much greater than that of the naked eye in the moon as well as the non-moon period.

During the month of March, moreover, A-26 and Mosquito aircraft were introduced into the 452nd Bombardment Group (H). Navigational training for Mosquito operations consists of indoctrination in mission procedure and cockpit familiarization; Loran training on the ground, Loran skywave flights and target procedure flights. The A-26 missions are very similar to B-24 missions, the chief difference lying in the greater speed of the A-26 aircraft, which necessitates anticipating check points and turning sooner.

Personnel of this Group have been engaged in Carpetbagger operations since November 1943, and an effort is constantly being made to discover new and more efficient techniques of hitting the target. Nothing, however, changes the Group's formula for a successful operation - combat crew coordination.
Radio Operator. Flimsies and special briefings were furnished for numerous night Carpshotter missions during January.

Operational Radio Control for Carpshotter aircraft continued under R.A.F. 3 Group. On several occasions recall was broadcast for Carpshotter missions, all of which were successful.

With the introduction of A-20 and Mosquito-type aircraft into the Group, changes in the crystallization of the VHF (SGR-321) were made. This was accomplished because the VHF set was the primary navigational aid to the Pilot. The present VHF set up in all aircraft of this station is as follows:

- Channel "A" Harrington Tower
- Channel "B" 1st Air Division Common
- Channel "C" World Wide Guard
- Channel "D" Air/Sea Rescue

This arrangement was arrived at after class cooperation between 8th Air Force and 1st Air Division Communications Officers. It is believed to give the maximum amount of navigational aid for flying during the hours of darkness. Several maps have been made, showing VHF facilities in the U.K., and on the Continent. These have been photographed and put in the Pilot's flimsy. This will give the Pilot information quickly and easily to understand. A special VHF frequency has been obtained for tower work since the Mosquito-type aircraft has no command set. The VHF set in the tower has been improved with a new type antenna. Several reports of good reception thirty to forty miles from the base at low altitude indicates that excellent results will be obtained.

A new frequency, 3415, was obtained for the base HF/DF station and has proven to be very good. Numerous reports of strong signal strength all the way to the targets and back to base have been made by Radio Operators. This has made the obtaining of base weather by operational aircraft while a good distance away from the base almost a certainty.

The point to point net with the Continent is still operating on 4620 KCS and has experienced less interference than in previous months. As a result of the new HF/DF frequency a separate VHF station had to be set up for this end of the point to point net. The station is located in the Group Communications School and is operated 24 hours a day by school personnel and radio operators detailed from the Squadron.

Radio Maintenance Record

The following listed failures include those noted not only in flight but those found in the routine inspection of aircraft by ground radio maintenance personnel. Again, a large number of headset and microphone plugs, headset adaptors and microphone switches have been damaged through carelessness by crew members. Nineteen of the above listed plugs, switches, and adaptors were repaired or replaced during the month of March. Eleven of the fourteen compass sets reported defective, ground-checked OK; nine of the thirteen command sets reported defective, ground-checked OK.
## Communications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Imagined</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Compass</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interphone</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. Approach</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailing Wire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Installations for the Period

Modification of Radio installation in two A-26 Aircraft.

### Strength of Radio Maintenance Personnel

- 856th Bomb Sqn: 9
- 858th Bomb Sqn: 9
- Signal Supply: 3

**Total: 27**

### Radar Operational Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>No. of Sorties</th>
<th>No. of Set Failures</th>
<th>% Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HZX</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gee</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loran</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altimeter</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boozer</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not used during March.*

### Installations Made During March

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>No. of Installed</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loran</td>
<td>B-24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gee</td>
<td>A-26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFF</td>
<td>Mosquito</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altimeter (AFN-1)</td>
<td>B-24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca</td>
<td>A-26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS-13</td>
<td>Mosquito</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 20

**In Progress:** 21
**The outstanding change during March has been reversion to Carpetbagger Miquac. This includes full use of Macheeda and the low-range radio altimeter.**

Thus far, a new and vital radar aid to Carpetbagging has been utilized, the operation of H2X for navigational purposes. This has proven invaluable in coastal approaches, avoiding flak positions and locating pinpoints. Ranges have been surprisingly good from low altitudes. H2X maintenance may now be considered at peak efficiency. During all Carpetbagger operations of the past month only one mechanical failure has been reported. The special Mosquito and A-26 missions we allowed the opportunity of checking Loran efficiency inside Germany. It was found to operate accurately and with good strength far beyond Gee range. With de-emphasis on H2X bombing, the attention of the radar section has been focused mainly on installation work. During March the radar section of the 406th Bombardment Squadron (H) was incorporated into Group Radar. This has marked the introduction of British type Bocor equipment into this section, a warning system capable of monitoring enemy early warning, fire control and night-fighteradar.
The month of March brought what was likely some of the most difficult obstacles a Group would experience from the maintenance engineering viewpoint. Starting the month there were three (3) Squadrons with fifty-three (53) assigned B-24 aircraft of which eighteen (18) suddenly became orphans when the 857th Bombardment Squadron (H) was stood-down from operations on the 9 March and ordered to move on the 12 March. This rapid movement of a Squadron, leaving their aircraft behind, had several unsatisfactory results. The maintenance personnel could not possibly inventory and properly pack all the thousands of C.O.I. items and at the same time put their aircraft in a favorable condition for transfer. The processing of their aircraft had to be accomplished by the remaining two (2) Squadrons who, at the same time, were maintaining their own airplanes on a regular operational basis.

The program was only started when notice arrived that the Group would receive and operate two (2) new types of aircraft; Mosquitoes and A-26's, in addition to the B-24's, P-47, UC-61 and C-47 already on hand. The A-26's required extensive modification but since we had been most fortunate in welcoming a new member to the family during the early part of the month in the person of the 475th Sub-Depot, who brought with them a vast amount of experience, ingenuity, organization and equipment, it was decided to make the modifications on our own base. The first modification rolled out in a little over five (5) days, giving rightful cause for pride by all those concerned with the project. It is anticipated that the succeeding corresponding jobs will go out even more rapidly.

Around the middle of the month we had such extra-curricular activities as readying three (3) airplanes for a trip to the S.B.I. and ten (10) aircraft for D.S. to the A.T.C. All this as well as giving proper remote-control care to several of our four-engined brood assigned for duty on the continent.

The 406th Bombardment Squadron arrived on the Station during March. Although not working on operations with us, mutual assistance in matters of maintenance, supply and inspection is progressing admirably so that a continuation of first class aircraft condition on their twenty plus B-24's and B-17's is assured.

From a record standpoint, our percentage of aircraft "in commission" for the month leaves much to be desired. Certainly we have a long way to go in getting our tech-sites, hangars and hardstands up to the par we set for these matters but now that the large movements of units on and off the base, the transfer of numerous aircraft and the complicated modifications to new type aircraft are becoming stabilized, we should offer a very presentable Engineering Organization in the near future.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>658th</th>
<th>24.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Aircraft assigned</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of aircraft &quot;IN&quot;</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average aircraft In/day:</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average aircraft Out/day:</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average aircraft Depot/day:</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine changes:</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Day changes</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel cell changes</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft lost or damaged</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft received</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Transferred</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>554.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supercharger changes</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>234.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time on aircraft:</td>
<td>170.364</td>
<td>365.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used in Combat, 5-24's:</td>
<td>733:55</td>
<td>860:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>253.0</td>
<td>284.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>74.526</td>
<td>56.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used in Training, 5-24's:</td>
<td>282:110</td>
<td>208:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>270.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>10.534</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used for freight, C-47:</td>
<td>120:50</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>87:00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>4.522</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used in Combat M.K XVI:</td>
<td>40:35</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>112:00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>3.382</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used in Training M.K XVI:</td>
<td>351:50</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>96:00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>6.998</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel used in Training, A-26:</td>
<td>50:10</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours flown:</td>
<td>122:00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average/hour:</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the month of March the Group's main emphasis once more became Carpetbagger work. Accordingly, Group S-2 reverted to the intelligence procedures which had proven very effective during Carpetbagger operations ending last September. C.S.S. liaison personnel, Special Force Headquarters and 492nd Bombardment Group S-2 Officers have worked very closely in the coordination of Carpetbagger intelligence.

A forward S-2 intelligence is now based on the Continent under the direction of Capt. Shapiro.

The effectiveness of the Group's renewed Carpetbagger operations is being demonstrated by newspaper articles which appear almost daily on the subject of increasing sabotage and resistance in Denmark and Norway.
FLYING CONTROL

The recently initiated Plan "A" let-down procedure has been working extremely well although its use in adverse weather conditions has not yet been experienced. However, the satisfactory results being obtained now are providing the necessary operational assurance to warrant its success in the weather conditions for which it was primarily designed. In conjunction with the plan, the control tower personnel have developed a standard timing procedure whereby the position of each aircraft and its time in that position is recorded and accurately studied from the time the aircraft is first known to be over the base until it is parked in its dispersal. The Plan "E" procedure, designed for use with the SG3-51, is theoretically successful, since the weather conditions necessary for its use have not yet been experienced so as to determine its practicability.

At present, a temporary lighting system of battery lamps is being used each night on the perimeter track and will continue this way until the amber-blue permanent taxiway lighting is completely installed and serviceable.

Occult and Pundit flares are being furnished for both operational and non-operational flights during the hours of darkness. In addition, a continuous effort is being made to include all navigational lighting aids that are available on a regular operating schedule on the continent. Although there are numerous airfields there that are equipped with pendants, a definite schedule of their operation cannot be obtained.

The reconstruction work on the perimeter track has been completed on all sections and runway approaches making the entire taxi track serviceable and unobstructed. As a result of this, every dispersal was released for use excepting one which the construction engineers will be using until they leave the base. Runway 05/23 has been cleared of aircraft and is now open for traffic.

The VHF installation in the tower has been provided with a direct power supply. A station control frequency has been obtained on which the tower will maintain a continuous watch. Difficulty has been experienced in contacting aircraft for recall on V/T from our HF/DF and control station R.A.F. 3 Group. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that radio operators should monitor these stations as briefed to pick-up a recall or diversion message on the first transmission.

On March 2nd the left landing gear of a taxiing aircraft, collapsed; the aircraft blocked the perimeter track on one side of the take-off runway, the other side being blocked by construction. It was necessary to scrub a mission because of this.

The new "Cardox" crash truck was given its first use on 10 March. The nose-wheel of an aircraft returning from a cross-country flight, collapsed and the nose of the aircraft burst into flame after coming to a stop on the runway. The fire was quickly brought under control. A foam truck and water trucks were standing by.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lectures on Flying Control</th>
<th>Lectures on Diver Gun Areas</th>
<th>Non-operational flights to Continent</th>
<th>Operational emergency landings on Continent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120 Mon.</td>
<td>25 Pilots</td>
<td>24 A/C</td>
<td>5 A/C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WEATHER

In the latter two weeks of March, the resumption of Carpetbagging required the most accurate type of forecasting. The sensitiveness of cloud heights to change and the intensity of fronts in the target areas covered by these missions due to the surrounding water areas and mountainous terrain, demanded close observations and accurate analyses of the data on hand, which in many cases were woefully limited.

Scrubbing of several Carpetbagging missions due to weather was subsequently upheld by observations, except in one case when an undercast of low stratus was anticipated but later observations proved the clouds to be well broken and higher than forecast.

In addition, numerous special Mosquito flights at very high altitude over enemy territory were held, and the pilots reported reasonably accurate forecasts both enroute and at the target.

The statistical summaries compiled below, a correlation of the forecast and actual weather, are based on the interrogation of the crews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Mission</th>
<th>Number of A/C to Reach Target</th>
<th>Failed due to Weather</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16/17 March 1945</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17**</td>
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<td>20/21 March 1945</td>
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<td>30/31 March 1945</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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*Does not include "abortions"
**Low stratus was forecast but mission was dispatched in spite of the adverse conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHY

The Photo Section has handled all ground photography on this Station.

During March, 1271 prints were produced for use by the Engineering Section, Public Relations, and other sections of this Group.
In an effort to remove this Group's activities from the Secret list, PRO, this month, submitted a resume of the organization's history from the time of its activation as an Anti-Sub Group, through the colorful exploits of the 801st and including the present duty assignment. Until this clearance, if given, no releases about this Group will be approved for publication.

Individual releases continue to be sent to interested newspapers; releases this month covered promotions, caricards of medals and certificates of merit to members of this Command. Whenever possible, pictures taken by the Photo Lab, accompany these stories. A featurette appearing under "Spamland Shavings", "Stars & Stripes", 22 February 1945, described the "Suggestion Box" system instituted by Colonel Upham.

A teletype was sent to 1st Air Division giving the names of personnel on this base who have either invented or improved mechanical devices which have proved useful in the maintenance of aircraft.
increased. Roads were blocked and everybody was directed and for questioning. They had been living in the barn for several days when another American was brought in. It was Lt. Sherwood.

Sherwood had landed unhurt in an open field, buried his chute and walked for an hour. Then, coming to a wood, he hid himself and slept until daylight. Then it was light he cut out again, walking eight kilometers to the village of Lens St. Remy. It was still early in the morning and the only person in sight was an old man. Sherwood approached him for help. The old man quickly understood Sherwood’s predicament and took the American to his house. Sherwood received food and suit of civilian clothes. In the afternoon he was visited by an officer of the White Army, who asked Sherwood various questions in order to establish the authenticity of his claim to be an American flier. When the officer was satisfied, he advised Sherwood to spend the night in the old man’s house and promised that help would be forthcoming.

The following day a guide came for Sherwood, and the two men travelled by bicycle to Falaise, ten kilometers away. It was here that Sherwood met Thiriot and Kasza.

While plans were being made for the disposition of the three men, they remained in hiding. There was only one untoward incident. An eighteen-year-old Belgian boy, whose patriotism had been corrupted by the Germans, discovered their hiding place and wanted to divulge it to the local Gestapo. Fortunately, he was stopped in time by White Army
men and threatened with quick and violent death if a word. The threat was effective.

Finally, the three men were moved to a village near Yellie, Kasza and Sherwood lived together and Thiriot lived in a house not far away. They remained here for eight weeks meeting once a week but for the rest of the time keeping under close cover. While they were here their passports and identification papers were prepared. For the most part they lived comfortably and had enough to eat. Occasionally they were visited by chiefs of the White Army and heard first-hand accounts of the exploits carried out by that heroic group of Belgian patriots. And one night Kasza helped a White Army man retrieve a radio set from a cemetery where it had been dropped by an RAF supply airplane. Then Kasza helped put the set together.

Finally, contact with the escape organization centered in Brussels was made and arrangements completed. During the first week in August a representative of the organization appeared, accompanied by a guide. They started out on bicycle Thiriot, Sherwood and Kasza following the two men single-file, at 200 yard intervals. In this manner, they reached the city of Namur, where they spent the night. Next morning they continued on their way, this time led by two girls who acted as guides.

They passed through Namur and continued on to Dinant. At one point, Kasza, who brought up the rear on his bicycle, was stopped by a Belgian gendarme. To the gendarme's questions spoken in French, Kasza...
Finally, the procession reached Dinant. Bicycling through the main street, Thiriot found the road blocked by a knot of German soldiers. Thiriot's reaction was to do what he would have done if he had been bicycling in Harrington — he sounded his bell. The Germans cleared the way, and Thiriot rode past them, his heart in his mouth and his fingers figuratively crossed.

On the outskirts of Dinant the three men spent the night in a cabin, well concealed in a woods. The following day another guide appeared and they set out again. Their destination was twenty-five miles to the south. Half-way there they met four more Americans who were also evading, and all seven of them followed the guide in a large bicycle procession to a woods. There they found they were to stay until further arrangements could be made. They remained for two weeks, living in a shack and supplied from a nearby chateau in which a patriotic family lived. While they were there, eighteen more American evacuees joined them. After two weeks, they learned that the local German forces had learned something of their whereabouts. And so, in the dead of night, the band of Americans left their hiding place and walked single-file, to a camp in the Ardennes Forest. They had been in this camp for a week, when they began to hear a great deal of commotion, and they heard that they
Germans were retreating on all sides. At that, on September, an American patrol of sixteen soldiers found the camp. They were safe!

This accounts for all but two members of Lt. Fitzpatrick's crew, Sgt. Williams and Lt. Do rothty. It is known that they both bailed out without mishap, but at this writing, 3 October, no word has been received of them.

O-C-O-C-O
In June of 1944 an aircraft of the 856th Squadron was missing from a mission to Belgium. Crew members were: Lt. Kenneth Pratt, (Pilot); Lt. Ralph Leindorf, (Co-pilot); F/O Russell J. Byrne, (Navigator); F/O Carl C. Starkovich, (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Ullie W. Werman, (Dispatcher); T/Sgt. Joseph A. Caron (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. Roy C. Koons (Engineer) and Sgt. James A. Wagner (Tail Gunner). Nothing definite was heard of what happened to the aircraft until early in September, when the pilot, Lt. Pratt, returned to England and told the story.

In the vicinity of Liege, Belgium, the aircraft had been hit by flak. Number 4 engine was knocked out. Then number 2 and 3 engines were hit and caught on fire. In another minute the aircraft exploded. Three men are known to have been blown out of the aircraft by the force of the explosion and to have parachuted safely to earth. They are Lt. Pratt, Lt. Leindorf and Sgt. Warren. It is also known that Leindorf and Warren were ultimately taken prisoner by the Germans and are now in a POW camp. What happened to the rest of the crew — whether they perished in the explosion or were also blown out — is not known.

In spite of the shock he had suffered as a result of being blown out of the aircraft by the explosion, Lt. Pratt had the presence of mind to pull the rip-cord on his parachute. He descended to earth, sustaining a sprained right
In 1944, about six months after he began walking south and continued for about five miles, it began to get light and he hid in a haystack. At about 0930 hours a dog nosed about the haystack and began barking noisily. Attracted by the barking, a woman came out of a nearby farmhouse and approached the haystack. There she found Lt. Pratt. She quickly understood that he was an American flier, in need of assistance. Motioning him to remain where he was, she went back to the farmhouse, returning in a few minutes with food. Pratt asked for civilian clothes and medical attention. The woman returned to the house and came back with her husband. The farmer showed a great willingness to help and told Pratt to remain hidden in the haystack. Then the farmer left.

At 1400 hours he was back, accompanied by three young men who were members of the White Army of Belgium resistance. They spent some time talking with Pratt by means of a combination of French, English and pantomime. Finally, they told him they would be back at 1930 hours that night.

Punctually at 1930 hours they were back. With them they brought clothes and a temporary passport for Pratt. He set out with them on bicycles and they reached Havre, and made their way to an empty house. Pratt remained in a room of this house for the night. At 1000 hours the next morning the men brought him food and again left him. They returned at 1900 hours that night and the four of them set out again on bicycles. They reached Bonlez without incident. Pratt was taken to the house of a patriotic farmer. Here Pratt spent the rest of the month.
Toward the end of his stay at Nure, Pratt was joined by a P-47 pilot. Shortly thereafter the two Americans left, moving to another farmhouse just outside of Nure. Here they were to meet three more Americans and a guide from Brussels. Pratt and the P-47 pilot waited two days, but the leg did not appear. And so the two of them walked to Nils St. Vincent, a distance of twenty kilometres. They stayed for three weeks, living in three different places. Then they were provided with bicycles and travelled to a spot where they lived for a short while in the house of an old farm. It was at Spy that they learned how the Belgian agent who had helped them at Nure had been captured by the Germans.

A young girl came to the farmhouse. With her was a guide the two men left Spy and travelled through Bassigny to the vicinity of Gincey. Here they were put up in a house and given a cup of white wine. It was dangerous to stay there, however, and soon Pratt and his companion were on their way to an unknown location.
woods, and the two Americans lived with the Liquis in relative security for some time. The camp was well supplied with food and tents, but the Liquis were always short on guns and ammunition, a circumstance which seriously hampered their forays against the enemy. Once, being especially low on ammunition, the Liquis radioed to London for a delivery by airplane. When the time came, Pratt was a member of the reception party sent out to receive the supplies. But, to Pratt's intense disappointment, the aircraft did not appear although the committee remained at the ground most of the night.

Pratt remained with the Belgian Liquis for a month. His stay was not without incident. Once, two German airplanes flew low over the woods. It was believed that they were aerial reconnaissance airplanes which had probably taken pictures of the encampment. The Liquis, not wishing to take unnecessary chances, moved that night to another part of the woods. Another time, the railroad tracks at Ciney were blown up at a point on the outskirts of the woods. Although the blowing up was accomplished by another Liquis group, who made good their escape to their own distant hide-out, the Germans marched 2,500 troops in to surround the woods. The Liquis sent diversely columns in different directions, allowing the two Americans an opportunity to escape. They slipped out of the woods and walked in a pre-arranged direction for ten miles to a woods where the Liquis had an alternative hiding-place.

It took the Liquis three days to reassemble and re-form in the new woods. There had been some sharp fighting with
Fortunately no further trouble was encountered from the German guns. Finally, on 7 September, an American tank column rolled through the nearby village of Sohet, where they stopped for a few hours. The Germans were retreating everywhere in the area. Pratt walked to Sohet and introduced himself to the American tankmen. They were on the point of moving on to Senur for refueling, and so Pratt went with them. His ordeal of three months was over at last.
On 5 April 1944 an aircraft of the 853th Bomb Squadron (then the 403rd Bomb Squadron) took off from the Harrington dome. Crew members were: 2nd Lt. William T. Nicoll (Pilot); 2nd Lt. A.W. Kelbieisich (Co-Pilot); 2nd Lt. William G. Harris (Navigator); 2nd Lt. Thomas F. Davis (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Richard C. Hinkel (Engineer); S/Sgt. Warren A. Brower (Radio Operator); S/Sgt. Ralph L. Kittrell (Tail Gunner); S/Sgt. Joseph E. Porter (Tail Gunner-Dispatcher). It was to be a normal carpet-bagger mission to a target considerably below the Loire River. The only exception 1 circumstance was that this marked the crew's first operational mission. But they had been well trained for their job and they felt confident of their ability to complete the operation successfully.

The takeoff took place somewhat later than originally scheduled. At the last minute, Nos 1 & 4 engines needed adjustment, but finally, at 2200 hours, the aircraft was airborne. Then altitude was 1800 feet the automatic pilot was turned on, and the aircraft winged on its way. An overcast condition began to develop as the aircraft crossed the English coast. The automatic pilot was turned off, and the aircraft was kept at an altitude of 500 feet over the channel. Approaching France, the aircraft began to gain altitude and at 0200 hours it crossed the French coast. Everything appeared normal. The aircraft was flying at an air speed of 315 knots, 1000 feet altitude, when it crossed the Western Front.

70
Suddenly, at 2320 hours, the bombardier's voice yelled through the interphone, "Hard right!" But it was too late; the aircraft had been trapped in a deadly concentration of enemy fire. From the very beginning of the unexpected attack, the aircraft was doomed. Evasive action was out of the question. In the first burst of fire, the B-26's tail was shot off, killing Kittrell, the tail gunner. Then the nose was hit, and the bombardier's voice came over the interphone again, "Get out! Get out!" But the navigator was silent.

The fuselage had become an inferno of flames. The aircraft was at an altitude of only 300 feet and still falling. The pilot, Lt. Sicoli, gave the bailout alarm. Lt. Kalbfleisch, the co-pilot turned on the automatic pilot and sounded the fire alarm.

The men survived the German attack - Lt. Kalbfleisch and Sgt. Porter. This is their story.

"Everything happened too swiftly to permit remembrance of all the details. Porter heard the bailout alarm and jumped. That much is easily remembered. And it is also not difficult to remember that as he descended to earth in his parachute, the German flak opened up on him with machine-gun fire. He wasn't hit, which can be attributed to the Germans' bad aim and not to their goodwill, and when he landed, unhurt, he made fast tracks out of the vicinity.

Lt. Kalbfleisch, in the meantime, had gotten out of the
soon, one of his jacket burned off. He stepped into the compartment, but there was no sign of the radio man. He remembered seeing the Engineer and observing that the Engineer was having difficulty finding his parachute. Kelbleisch made his way to the bomb-bay. He remembered seeing Lt. Piccol standing on the cat-walk, buckling on his parachute. The bomb-bay doors would open up only for a short space. Kelbleisch ducked under the cat-walk, and as the aircraft began tipping over he stepped through the hole and immediately pulled his rip-cord. It was by sheer good fortune that his parachute did not get caught on the aircraft. He had no sensation of falling through space. He pulled the rip-cord and the next moment he hit the ground. And a moment later the burning B-24 crashed to the ground beside him.

He heard guttural shouting and sporadic gun-fire and he was unable to run at first because he had injured his ankle. Somehow he managed to get his parachute harness off and stagger to a creek which was nearby. He removed his life vest (which had Lt Joseph Hartley's name stencilled on it) and threw it into the creek. Then the crashed B-24 blew up and the force of the explosion hurled Kelbleisch five feet across to the other side of the creek. The sky was brilliantly white as a result of the explosion, and in this artificial daylight Kelbleisch, dazed though he was, observed many things. He saw t'at the B-24 had crashed in front of a German radio communication station. And he saw that...
over the crashed airplane, back away, and one of them sustained a flesh hit in one ear.

It was clear to Lt. Kalbfleisch that despite his physical condition, he had to move away at once. And so he set out across open country. Progress was slow, because the trail was a cross-patch of barbed wire, ditches and streams. But he kept going and did not stop until 0300 hours, when, utterly exhausted, he came to a pile of faggots and crawled in, intending to rest a while. He lay there for an hour becoming colder by the minute. His injured ankle was beginning to bother him, and so he decided it would be best to force himself to keep moving. When he left his refuge of faggots, he found that he could not step down on his ankle. He tried using a faggot for a cane, but the ankle still could not be stepped on. Therefore, he began crawling, determined to reach a house and enlist assistance. At this point he got the compass out of his escape kit and set himself on a southerly course. Somehow his mind began conjuring up pictures of bloodhounds pursuing him. He came to a creek, and with the idea of causing the imagined bloodhounds to lose his scent, he crawled up the creek.

After a short distance he saw a group of houses. He lay quietly for a time, studying the houses, trying to detect possible traps. Everything appeared quiet, and he began to make his way painfully toward the nearest house. As he approached the house, a dog began barking. Kalbfleisch stopped, but the dog ran up to him. Fortunately, Kalbfleisch
twenty minutes making friends with the dog. Within that time, the dog was licking Kalbfleisch's face and Kalbfleisch continued on to the house.

He rapped at the door and at first there was no response from within. Then a window opened above him. Kalbfleisch locked up, and pointed to his collar insignia. A man's voice said, "Attenue!" (Wait).

A moment later the man was at the door. He asked no questions and showed no hesitation. Bringing Kalbfleisch into the house, he built a fire, brought out wine, while his wife began preparing a batch of eggs for the weary and injured flier. Then Kalbfleisch had finished the food and drink, the Frenchman and his wife put the American to bed.

At 0600 hours the following morning, a second Frenchman appeared at the house. Using a French-English dictionary, he explained to Kalbfleisch that he would take him to a German-speaking truck driver who could drive Kalbfleisch to the Pyrenees, where he could cross over into Spain. Thereupon, Kalbfleisch was given civilian clothes and a blue patterned scarf. He was told that in the course of his journey about France he must speak to no one who did not wear a scarf of the same pattern as his. Then he was taken to the home of a sympathetic doctor, so that his ankle could be treated. Kalbfleisch was afraid the ankle was broken but when the doctor examined it, he was unable to diagnose the extent of the injury and made only a superficial treatment.

From the doctor's house, Kalbfleisch was taken to another
Porter. In the light of future developments it was very fortunate that the two men had found each other. At times they would have become fatally discouraged and therefore easier prey for the Gestapo. If they did not have each other's companionship and help.

When the first joy of reunion had abated somewhat, the two men were taken out into a field, where they remained that night buried in a haystack. They lay low all the following day, and at night the doctor returned in an automobile. He drove them for some distance on a dangerous journey to another town. Every point along the way was a likely spot from which inquisitive Germans might gape. But the journey was without incident and at last the doctor's car arrived at its destination, a large prosperous-looking house.

The house was owned by a wealthy French woman, who was a member of the secret French Intelligence Service. It was her job to transmit information concerning German activities to London. She greeted the two Americans in a friendly manner and threw open the hospitality of her house to them.

One of the first things she told them was that she herself on three separate occasions had reported to London the position of the flak installation which had brought down their aircraft. But unfortunately, nothing had been done about it.

Karlofitch and Porter remained with this patriotic Frenchwoman for more than a month. They were very well treated, had plenty to eat and time to rest, so that they
Kalfleisch's fine French-made photos were lost. However, by the time they left the Frenchwoman's house they were both equipped with passports and with identification papers which established them as workers on authorized leave from the Renault factory in Paris. One distinctive feature of Kalfleisch's French-made photos was that the background was out of doors, rather than the bare studio-background of American P.T. photographs.

After the first couple of days, the men heard the story of what had happened to their fellow crew members. Five of the men had been killed outright. The Germans would not permit a decent burial, and referred to the dead men as "Brigands." But the French secretly carried out a burial mass and a Catholic curate said a blessing over the common grave, risking his life to do so.

This accounts for seven men. The eighth man (whose identity is not known) suffered the sort of fate which came to be identified with Nazi barbarism. He had bailed out of the stricken aircraft and had become entangled in the branches of a tree. The Germans found him, extricated him from the tree and deposited him on the ground. Although he was suffering, cut off from a crushed chest, the Germans made no attempt to help him. For two days he remained there...
firing, the unnamed hero would not give his German tormentors any bit of information. On the third morning, the officer again began his inquisition, and when the American persisted in his silence, the German drew out his Luger pistol and shot him through the head. This infamous act took place at Chateau de la Rochelle. The date was 8 April 1944. This place and this date will be remembered forever.

The Germans plastered the countryside with posters and newspaper advertisements to the effect that a 25,000 franc reward would be paid for information leading to the apprehension of the two men remaining; that is, Kalbfleisch and Porter. But the loony French people, out of their four years experience, had come to understand the worthlessness of German currency and German promises, and no one ever came forward to claim the reward.

In the early days of Kalbfleisch's and Porter's stay at the home of the wealthy Frenchwoman, many plans were put forward for their escape. The original plan was to contact an English torpedoboat which made regular runs to the French coast. But this plan had to be discarded before it had developed very far, because the torpedoboat service was stopped. Then it was planned to move the two men to the Pyrenees, but this plan was deemed impracticable, because the Germans were present in strength over the whole route which would have to be travelled. Another plan was to move the men into Switzerland, but they themselves vetoed this idea, since they did not relish being interned for a
In all this planning, a French officer who had travelled the house from Geneva took an active part. It became his responsibility to make other arrangements which would be practical.

In the meantime, Kalbfleisch and Porter were leading more or less uneventful lives. They were forced to remain hidden for the most part, but they had a comfortable room of their own and enough to eat. At eleven o'clock each night, which was the customary time for the Gestapo to make their fateful visits, the two men would adjourn to a chicken coop in the back yard, where they would hide out until the time of the Gestapo's visit was past. Then they would return to the house. But during their stay they were never bothered by the Gestapo.

The only time they appeared at all in public was on Sundays, when, dressed in stylish civilian suits, they were allowed to saunter in the garden accompanied by specially invited ladies. To the casual observer, they were simply Sunday visitors.

Inevitably, restlessness set in. The two men were anxious to get going, to make an attempt at least to return to England. They decided that travelling to the Pyrenees and crossing into Spain was the most practical and they were determined to begin the journey as soon as possible. The French captain told them that if they would learn French in two weeks he would take them to the Pyrenees. Kalbfleisch and Porter sat about diligently to study, memorize...
the French captain had made the proposal simply to keep occupied.

After the first couple of weeks they had stopped the practice of going out to the chicken-coop at night. For use in case of emergency, they had spent a great deal of time digging a great pit which they camouflaged imaginatively. In the course of their digging they also buried four hundred quarts of their hostess' champagne, which she wanted hidden against possible German depredations. She was very generous to the Americans, however, and they had ample opportunity to discover that the champagne was of excellent vintage.

So the weeks went by. The two men had regained their strength through the ministrations of the hospitable Frenchwomen. A Mustang pilot had joined them at the house, and so there was no dearth of things to talk about. Much of the time, Kalbfleisch spent making airplane models. But the realization never left them that they were safe only from minute to minute. One day, for example, a truck pulled up in front of the house, filled with German soldiers. The truck started off again immediately, but the nervous tension under which the men constantly lived was intensified by the experience.

Then D-day arrived! There was great excitement in the house and a new determination on the part of the Americans to return to their units. Shortly after D-day, allied bombers appeared over a nearby city, dropped bombs on the city and railway station but, left untouched a skillfully camou-
flagged German airfield on the outskirts.

A new feeling! if they could only get back to the Allied lines to give what information they had of German positions and German strength!

At last the time for them to leave. Two Frenchmen arrived from the Normandy front, who would guide them to the Allied lines. The Frenchmen were very happy about the invasion, carried "invasion money", and spent much time toasting the Americans with "bon sante".

The three American fliers with their two French guides finally set out. They had not walked very far when they were halted by a German soldier who demanded to see their identification papers. The man made the startling discovery that they had walked by chance into a munitions dump. All around them they could see piles of 38 millimetre shells. But the German soldier did not cause very much trouble, even though one of the guides was wearing a jacket which seemed conspicuously British to the Americans. What concerned the German soldier most was not the jacket but the fact that the guide's identification picture showed him wearing a mustache and glasses with neither of which he was at present adorned.

The guide must have explained the metamorphosis satisfactorily, because the German soldier passed them through.

They made their way through piles of 38 millimetre shells had their papers checked again, but managed to get through the area successfully. One German soldier, looking at the Mustang pilots over, leaped and said, "Schmeiling", but
The first time they noticed that the Mustang pilot did in fact bear a slight resemblance to that Teutonic hero whose superior Aryan strength had been brought low by Joe Louis.

And so, the men exchanged laughter with the German soldier, but theirs had a somewhat different significance from his.

Their destination was Caen, from where they hoped to be able to cross over to the Allied lines, and they headed in that direction. On the road leading into the town they were not by a furious shelling from Allied guns, and they were forced to spend a long time in roadside ditches.

Finally, they entered the town and proceeded to the house which was their destination. But the house was already overcrowded with refugees, so they made their way to an alternate house. Here they stayed for a few days and then moved to another house three doors away. Their stay in these two places was marked by discomfort, hunger and downright fear. The sky seemed constantly filled with Allied planes. In one week they experienced a major attack by Typhoons and another by Harsudors, besides scattered smaller raids. A thousand pound bomb hung up on the ceiling of the first house in which they were staying, and that was the cogent reason they moved. Another bomb landed close by and left a huge yawning crater where a large house had been standing just a moment before. Once a bomb struck quite near and the blast blew in the windows of the house they were staying in. Kalbfloesch, standing in the middle downstairs room, saw a room-in-room hurtling in a
direction. He jumped aside just in time.

To make matters worse, the Germans chose the house as
the place in front of which to park a dummy Tiger tank, to
serve as a decoy for Allied bombers. The men in the house
had the disturbing realization that from the air the tank
would look like the real thing.

But for the time being there was no other place to go.
Another American flier joined them - a B-17 pilot. Moreover,
they were now in the company of five Englishmen, making a
total of nine men in the house.

Three months had passed since Lt Kelbfleisch and Sgt
Porter first found themselves on foot on French soil. It
was now the Fourth of July, and the Americans celebrated in
what way they could. Somehow they obtained wine, and drank
to victory.

Events of the next few days assumed a nightmarish
quality. Relations with the British were not, unfortunately,
of the best. Disagreements arose; there were recrimina-
tions about the division of food. The Fortress pilot was
beginning to show the effects of his twenty-five sorties
over the flak defenses of Germany and France. He was jumpy,
unpredictable.

Two SS soldiers appeared over the back-yard wall with
lugers in their hands. The British spotted them from the
water closet and locked himself in. Kalbfleisch, Porter and the Mustang pilot were asleep in their room. The Jerrys entered the house, gathered up whatever appeared edible or saleable and then made a tour of the house. The British and the Fortress pilot were nowhere in evidence. The Germans thrust open the door of the room where the three Americans lay sleeping. Kalbfleisch was awake by now, but he considered it the better part of valor to simulate a discreet slumber. One of the stormtroopers barked something out in German. Getting no response, he proceeded to kick Kalbfleisch vigorously. The latter, struggling to keep calm, stirred drowsily and murmured amicably and unintelligibly out of what appeared to be a deep sleep. The German made a scornful remark, probably reflecting on these decadent Frenchmen who sleep their lives away, and left abruptly.

A few days after this incident, the men were moved to another house, located on the western edge of the town, not far from a river which marked the outskirts of Caen. They had been there only a short time when an aerial bombardment of terrific dimensions began. Then British troops moved up, and though German resistance was not great, the British stopped short on the western bank of the river. The German set up machine gun emplacements on the eastern bank and a staccato, unending conversation of guns began back and forth across the river. One day, a Frenchman attempted to cross from the German to the British side in a small boat. He was cut to pieces by Jerry's machine guns. All this the
n the house could be heard the steady whine of the German machine-guns. Porter and the others took to sleeping in a bomb crater across the street from their house. Shelling was continuous, and Allied aircraft maintained a regular schedule of raids. Once they saw a Typhoon shot down. They looked for a parachute to open and descend but none did.

At last, a barrage of artillery fire developed from the west bank, lasting a day and a night. The men huddled miserably in their shelter, not daring to leave while the shells screamed through the air and shrapnel ricocheted from walls all about them.

When the barrage abated somewhat, they decided it was high time to leave the town, which was obviously a hot spot. Kelbfleisch was elected to find the Frenchman who had been their guide. After an extended search, Kelbfleisch located the guide, who seemed reluctant to go anywhere. Kelbfleisch pointed out in his newly acquired and inadequate French, the disadvantages of remaining in Caen and finally succeeded in convincing the guide. They sealed the agreement with a pint of cider.

When they returned to get Porter and the two pilots, they found that the three Americans had been involved in
When Kalbfleisch returned, the men started out. They had not gone very far when they seemed to be caught in a barrage of gunfire. They were indeed in the No Man's Land between the British and German lines. In the crisis, the French guide proved not entirely helpful, and the men came to the rueful conclusion that they had best return to Caen. They started back. Running into some 33 troops of the 83rd Panzer Division, engaged in trying to hold the British back at Caen. They asked permission to stay in a particular house. The Germans readily agreed and the Americans wondered at this willingness on the part of the Germans, until they realized that the house they had pointed out was situated on a corner and acted as a sort of buffer against the shells from British guns. However, having been granted quarters by the Germans, they moved into the house.
went on most of the time.

As soon as they had moved into the house, the French guide left saying he would return the following morning. The men spent an uncomfortable night, and the next morning waited in vain for the Frenchman to return. Finally, when it was apparent he was not going to come back, the men set out on their own. With amazingly few incidents, though under constant peril of gunfire, they continued through the German lines. As they went further and further south, they met groups of Germans bound for the Caen sector. Invariably the Germans would ask how the battle of Caen was going. Once they were stopped by a patrol and a soldier, apparently an Alsatian, questioned them. By their answers, spoken in atrocious French, he surely must have realized who they were. But he gave no sign, offered them cigarettes and ordered them to keep moving.

They were stopped several more times and ordered to produce their identification papers, but each time they were passed through. At night, they lay down to rest in a wheatfield next to a German encampment. They could hear the German soldiers singing, and they worried all night about tanks rolling over them in the darkness.

Next morning they set out again. The Fortress pilot had become so weak that he had difficulty walking. The others took turns pushing him along. At last, after walking...
So, for the next few days, they remained at her house recuperating from the effects of their time at Sten. But one day, two German trucks pulled up in front of the house. The tracks were filled with young soldiers, who were brought into the house. A German captain made a tour of the house but showed no curiosity about the men who were living there. The Americans began to feel the tension of a situation which had them under a roof teeming with German soldiers. One husky soldier, with an arm, unfortunately, in a cast, was overheard making the moronic remark that he'd like nothing better than to meet an American.

At last, their hosts decided that they should leave the house, before the Germans became suspicious of their continued presence. Accordingly, they slipped out of the house and the Frenchwoman brought them into the fields, where she showed them a short trail into the forest, where she said they could lie low.
The two guides brought the men circuitously to a town. Their contact in the town was a man named Andre who was "almost Lord Mayor" and could speak a broken English. The town had been heavily bombed by Allied aircraft, and Andre would look over the ruined places from his window and shaking his head sadly, say, "All this crash. All this crash" naturally became his nickname, as far as the Americans were concerned.

He was ordinarily a genial fellow, however, and offered his guests a warm hospitality during the time they were with him. He loved to serve wine and say, in his uneven English, "Like hell we drink; we drink like hell."

Finally, all the arrangements for the Americans' departure were made. They were given a course to follow, necessary provisions, arms, and at the last minute Sgt. Porter found a baby thrust into his arms. The purpose of the baby was to provide an excuse for the journey in case the men stopped for questioning. The men set out.

They rode for a good distance without incident until the
The fortress was reached, not without tension. The English direct.

The Frenchman, with a sword, entered the fortress. Suddenly, he fell from the plank, but managed to grab on with one hand as he fell. He hung there, until the others maneuvered on the narrow plank and finally reached him. Then they bolted across and hid in a ditch by the side of the road, as the Germans and the French policeman passed by. Porter's baby responded valiantly to the affection Porter had previously displayed towards her by remaining perfectly quiet. It was a narrow escape.

They walked for a long time, but no further incident took place. And at last they met their contact in the hill. There they learned that "All-this-crash" Andro had been arrested by the Gestapo and was being tortured. But he was not talking. The Americans somehow knew that Andro never would, no matter what barbarism the Nazis attempted.

The weary fliers were promised that they would be taken to the American lines immediately. When they inquired how this would be accomplished, they were told, "Hands in 20 pockets we go to 20 Americans".

"And it was really as simple as that," The Frenchman, that very afternoon, led them along a road, through a chaos of alleys, where the only Germans they saw..."
out the Americans, crying foul and asking "Don't billy-club us!". They could not believe they were finally safe at last. They did not dare sing yet. But the Frenchmen broke into a lusty rendition of the Marsillaise, and finally the Americans began singing too.

And that is the way they were when they found the first American patrol, marching down the road, Porter wearing a German helmet which he had appropriated along the way and all of them singing. The patrol consisted of a group of rough and ready looking Yanks who were engaged in frying eggs when the fliers came across them. Jeeps loaded with equipment were parked nearby. When the identification of the fliers was established, the Yanks said their patrol had come up forty-seven miles since the day before.

The men were then brought in the jeeps back to field headquarters. All the way back they were handed out cigarettes and candy by Yanks whom they passed. It was as if they were entering the promised land.

And that is the end of the story of Lt. Kalbfleisch and Sgt Porter, who took four months to get back to England, from their first sortie over France.

There is only one thing to add. When they came to the field headquarters they gave the interrogating officers a great deal of information about German positions and strength.
there was not so much, and of "All-this-Crash" Andre, and
of "Twoles" Rene, and of all the many heroic French people
who had risked their lives to render assistance to the
Americans; and they thought that those tanks and half-tracks
would perhaps repay some of the debt.
Graves in France of Lt. Nicoll and four crew members.
This is the story of 2nd Lt Edward Tappan, reported missing in action from a sortie over France on the night of 4 July 1944. This is the story of how he alone survived an incident in which his seven comrades were destroyed with their airplane. This is the story of how Lt Tappan escaped from enemy-occupied France and made his way to safety.

* * *

It was Independence Day. But this year, instead of brass-bands and fireworks and ice-cream, the event was to be celebrated in a manner appropriate to the times – by continuing operations against the Nazis, who threatened the independence of all countries and all peoples. Among the Carpet-bagger crews taking off from Harrington on the night of 4 July was that of 2nd Lt John C. Broten of the 856th Squadron. Besides Lt Broten and Lt Tappan (Co-pilot), the other crew members were: 2nd Lt Roy C. Genue (Navigator), Alfred C. Elwert (Bomber), Sgt. Jesse R. Ellis (W/Gunner-Dispatcher), S/Sgt William Freidkas (Radio Operator), S/Sgt Harry L. Sparks (Engineer) and Sgt Michael J Franzetelli (T/Gunner).

It was the crew's ninth mission.

The mission was begun in a routine manner, and flight across the enemy lines to the target area was uneventful. The pinpoint was expertly established and the correct reception signals observed. Coming in low over the target, the aircraft circled for the drop. Everything went off without
It was in the vicinity of Orleans, while the airplane was still climbing for altitude that the attack came. At an altitude of 2,000 feet, a Nazi night-fighter suddenly appeared behind and below the B-24 Liberator. The fighter came in fast, its guns spitting flame with deadly accuracy. Only the first three rounds went short of the B-24. In the next split second, the Nose bomber had been raked from nose to tail. Hits were sustained in every vital part of the ship, rendering it helpless, making it impossible to engage in any kind of defensive action. Shells whistled into the cockpit, ripped through the control wires and up through the ship, so that they clipped Lt. Tappan's sleeve off and nicked his wrist.

In another second the plane's left auxiliaryaccumulator was caught on fire, filling the cockpit with flames and black smoke. The whole airplane was a mass of seething flames. Lt. Broten instructed Tappan to sound the call-out alarm. Tappan did so. Then Broten told his co-pilot to get out. Tappan made his way to the top escape-hatch. At that moment there was a tremendous explosion. By some miracle, the blast's combustion propelled Tappan out of the escape hatch. The rest of the crew were doomed. They died in their ship.

Tappan had no memory of pulling the rip-cord on his parachute. After the blast he must have blanked out, because his first recollection is of being almost to the ground when consciousness returned. When his eyes opened,
He could feel his body, trembling violently, one of the bullets floating beside him as he fell to earth.
had eaten the bread and drunk the coffee, the Frenchman instructed him on the route into town. They told him to proceed directly to a certain café, located on this side of town. In this way, Tappan would not have to go through the town itself.

Then the two Frenchmen left, and Tappan began walking toward the town. Finally he reached the café to which he had been directed. He was recognized immediately by the proprietress, and because of the café was filled with customers, she led him into the back room. A Frenchwoman who lived next to the café was summoned, and when she arrived she saw Tappan's condition and brought him to her house. There she dressed his burns with olive oil and honey, which had a very soothing effect.

Tappan did not remain at this woman's house very long, however, because her husband was a prisoner of war in Germany and it was believed that Tappan's presence in her house was too risky for both of them. Accordingly, he was moved to a large farm outside of town. He remained there for three days, well cared for by a patriotic farmer and his wife. In the meantime, contacts were being made with an underground organization.

After three days, Tappan was called for by two men, members of the organization. They set out at night, and the first night the three of them walked a total of thirty-eight miles. Arriving at a town in the early hours of morning, they remained in the town until darkness. Then Tappan...
The following day, at 1400 hours, one of the men set out with Tappan on bicycle. Their destination was a certain windmill twenty-four miles away, where they were to rendezvous with a man who would conduct Tappan on the next leg of his journey. They met the man as scheduled, and Tappan and he, riding a tandem bicycle, rode another thirty-eight miles to a small railway station on the outskirts of a town. There they were met by a man, dressed in civilian clothes, who was actually an RAF Wing Commander, in charge of a group of British and American airmen who were hiding out in the deep woods four kilometres from the railway station.

Tappan and the RAF officer made their way to the main place. There, accessible only to those who knew the way, was an encampment, complete with tents which had been taken from the Germans by resistance forces.

Tappan remained in this forest hideout for five weeks. Living conditions were not luxurious, but neither were they inadequate. Besides the tents, the men had beds of faggots and sufficient food and drink. But there was often cause for nervous tension. For example, there was a German munitions dump located a scant two hundred and fifty yards from the woods, and groves of P-47's were continually strafing and flying near the hideout.
The next day, in an attempt at reprisal, a force of Germans entered the outskirts of the woods and combed the place with machine-gun fire.

But for the most part, the men were not troubled, since the Germans were reluctant to go very far into the woods.

Several times, Tappan went into the nearby village on shopping expeditions. On one occasion he heard that five inhabitants of the village had been taken out by the Germans and shot to death, on the suspicion that they had harbored allied airmen.

On the thirteenth of August, a little more than a month and a week after he had bailed out of his aircraft, Tappan happened to be in the village, when his astonished eyes beheld what was unmistakably a Yankee. Tappan ran out into the street, hailing the jeep-driver. It was then that Tappan heard the good news - that the allied line of advance had caught up with him.

Tappan rode in the jeep to Divisional Headquarters, where he told his story to a Colonel. The latter dispatched six trucks to return to the forest hideout in order to pick up the remaining fliers.

When the rescued men had all been assembled, they were given supper, and brought back to a large town and placed in a Prisoner of War enclosure. This was the interrogation point for the Third Army. The men's identities were quickly established, so that none of them had to spend a night in the enclosure.
After the evacuation on the Châlons Peninsula, the next
trip, the Ferrying Command completed the job of return
the men to England.

In another few days, Tappan was back at Harrington.

* * *
16/19.7.44  DICK 28r

Lt. Dillon
Lt. Richardson.

A message from the field states that nothing was dropped on this ground on the one in question. The missing apparently collided with one from Tempelton on the way to Dick 69. The two aircraft flew over the Dick 69 ground without replying to the calls heading towards the Burekas 3 kms from the ground. The first turned over a near-by village, probably in order to drop its load on Dick 69. The other turned towards Burekas, crossing the area of Dick 69 and the accident occurred over the village. Bodies have been found and it is not thought that any crews could have escaped.
18/19.6.44
Historian 14

Information has been received from the field that the aircraft flew too low and hit a tree before dropping the containers. The crew of eight were all killed.
Corporal Michalek is missing from Lt Gilpin's crew on the night of 4/5 August 1944. Lt Gilpin's mission was Salesman 15b.

The operation at Salesman 15b was successfully completed and Corporal Michalek dispatched the 6 packages that were in the aircraft. At this time, the radio operator reports that Cpl Michalek was wearing a back-pack 'chute and was west, and had his safety belt attached. After the drop, the Joe-hole was closed and the static lines were in the aircraft. The radio operator witnessed this fact.

On the return trip, Michalek brought some juice to the tail gunner. The aircraft had just passed Loire at that time.

About 3 minutes past the French coast, the aircraft made a violent maneuver. No reason was given by the pilot for this action. At this time the tail gunner saw the casualty bag fly out of the aircraft, but saw nothing else.

About 30 minutes past the French coast, it was learned that Michalek was missing. The Joe-hole was found half-open, the safety belt was dangling, and the camera hatch closed. The interphone lines were dangling out the Joe-hole.

The aircraft turned around and searched area for two to three hours. Air-Sea-Rescue was called immediately by radio. Aircraft was flying at 8,500 feet all the way back.

No other facts concerning the disappearance are known.
On 18 September 1944, the last night of Carpetbagger operations, an aircraft piloted by Lt. Mclaughlin of the 358th Squadron failed to return from its mission to France. Crew members were: James A. Mclaughlin, (Pilot), Carl E. Lee, (Co-pilot), George F. Bradbury, (Navigator), Ernest G. Skara, (Bombardier), Alforne A. Devries, (Engineer), Henry Stee, (Radio Operator), James G. Partie, (TGunner) & Merrill G. Brewer, (Dispatch). 

Nothing was heard to indicate what happened until the pilot, Lt. Mclaughlin, arrived at Harrington on 23 September and told his story.

The aircraft had taken off on its crew's thirty-fifth mission - the last mission before completing a tour of duty and returning to the States. The weather was extremely bad, and the pilot was flying by instruments. The Channel was crossed and flight continued over France. The navigator called ten minutes to the initial point, and the pilot climbed to 4500 feet. They were then over the town of Chartres.

It was at this moment that a barrage of flak came up and raked the aircraft. No evasive action was possible - the aircraft was mortally damaged. The elevator was shot off in the first burst, and the pilot had no control of the aircraft, which fell off to the right and continued falling. Accordingly, the pilot sounded the bail-out alarm. He attempted to stir the co-pilot, who seemed stunned or possibly hit by flak, since the cockpit windows were broken, but Mclaughlin...
received no response. It was then decided to make a telephone call to the radio operator of the stricken aircraft.

McLaughlin landed in a tree, unhurt. He extricated himself from the tree, and since it was quite dark and he did not know into which side of the lines he had fallen he remained hiding in the woods until morning.

When it was light, he investigated the area. Finding empty K-ration boxes, he felt reasonably certain that he was behind the American lines. Shortly after this, he was met by American soldiers who escorted him to the 313th Regimental headquarters of the 79th Infantry Division.

He told his story there and was taken to his crashed airplane. Four bodies were found and were identified by their dog-tags. They were: 1st Lt Carl L. Lee, 2nd Lt Ernest G. Skware, Pfc Alfonse A. DeVries, S/Sgt Merrill G. Brewer.

Later, McLaughlin met members of Battery A, 115th AA Gun Battalion, whose fire had brought his aircraft down. The Battery had moved into Leenduville, (military coordinates: 69-34) that very morning and had orders to fire at any aircraft not showing IFF. Unfortunately, our aircraft had orders not to use IFF over the continent.

At this writing, 25 September, nothing has been heard of the three remaining crew members who must have bailed out of the aircraft.
Encountered 3 JU-88's, 15 miles inside French coast at 0039 hours, altitude 8000 feet. Were engaged by them after passing Seine River. Aircraft received several hits in No. 2 engine which caught fire and was feathered. Enemy aircraft continued attacks till over Elbeuf when plane encountered light flak. After passing Elbeuf, the enemy aircraft again attacked No. 2 engine was still burning badly and fire broke out in the bomb-bay. Aircraft at the time was approximately at 49° 05' N, 01° 25' E. JU-88's broke off and Captain ordered crew to bail out. All men jumped but T/Sgt Hesty whose chute had been damaged by flak. Captain then decided to return as aircraft was flying O.K. and fire had died down somewhat. He took aircraft down on deck and headed for home. Encountered machine-gun fire and occasional flak until the French coast was crossed. Not certain of point of crossing as instruments were out. Boomed by 1 searchlight just as channel was reached and also received machine-gun fire. Took evasive action all way out. Fires had been put out. Hit English coast at Shoreham, and was guided to landing at Ford airfield by friendly planes and searchlights. Landed with 10° flaps and no brakes and bomb-bay doors open. Aircraft rolled past runway and hit a ditch stopping in a planted field with nose of ship smashed in and right wheel buckled part way under.

Reported a multi-engine aircraft afloat in channel about 15 miles out from Shoreham. Wing lights were on and at 105°.
T/Sgt Hasty claims 1 JU-88 probably destroyed. Fired approximately 400 rounds at enemy aircraft which was at same altitude, 150 yards away at 3 o'clock. JU-88 fell off in a tight spin, apparently out of control, though no fire or smoke was seen while in view.

Examination of aircraft disclosed three 20mm cannon holes around No 2 engine. Cannon holes under pilot's cockpit, right wing, a large jagged hole on top of left wing and 1 hole approximately 3 x 2 feet on belly near tail turret. Also approximately 6 small holes around ship evidently made by machine-gun fire and hundreds of small tears made by cannon fire explosion and light flik bursts.
Saville. I hid in a field of wheat on the other side of town and stayed there all that day, all the next night and all the next day. While here I opened my aid box, examined my map, ate some candy tablets and biscuits. That afternoon I saw a Frenchman working in his garden at the edge of the town so decided to contact him.

I waited for darkness to approach then crawled up to a stonewall around his garden and hid under a tree. Next morning the Frenchman came out into his garden and started to dig potatoes. I waited until he got pretty close to me then stood up and in my worst French said "Bonjour Morsuier."

The old Frenchman was so surprised he threw up his arms, potatoes, basket and all and stood there shaking. He finally motioned me down and resumed his potato picking. He was really scared and it was about 10 minutes before he came over to me. I showed him my wounded leg and told him I was thirsty so he went inside and returned with a jug of coffee, bottle of wine, cheese sandwich, and some cooked eggs. He told me to remain hidden while he contacted the local mayor.

The Mayor came to see me later in the day bringing a bundle of civilian clothes. He was able to speak a few words of English and I a few words of French so together we made out O.K. He asked for identification so I showed him my dog tags, compass, map, and escape aids. He wanted to see my escape photos also.

After the Mayor was satisfied with my identity he told me to follow him and we went through the field and woods and
The doctor came late in the afternoon, sterilized his instruments, and removed the shell fragments from my leg. I stayed here 3 days in bed and they brought me food, water and wine. During this time, they made contact with the underground and I was taken to the village of D____. I stayed in this village 2 days and one night, but because the place was full of SS troops and Luftwaffe they decided to take me elsewhere. That night B-26's bombed the village but I didn't observe any hits.

I was taken by ox cart to the edge of the village where we contacted another party who took me to the next village west. This seemed to be a real contact and they quizzed me for agout an hour. They wanted the number of our airplane, where I landed, organization, location of base and all details. They were pleased when learning what my group was and seemed to know all about it. They said the Germans offered 50,000 Francs and a two weeks furlough to any man capturing an airman from our outfit. This Frenchman was an old professor and was a fine old fellow.

I stayed there two days and was kept in one room, then for safety reasons was taken to the home of another party. That same night the Jerries came to the house of the old professor and took his wife and daughter. The old man was shot for having a radio in his home. They had been suspicious of him I guess.

After the episode of the professor they decided to...
At the home of a railway employee about 100 miles from the front lines, I was accommodated in a wire, motor and electric girl and they were very nice to me.

An important railway ran through this town and every day and night the place was bombed and strafed. B-25's and Mosquitos did most of the work and the B-25's did a lousy job. I never did see them hit anything. I stayed here until the 17th of August when the Americans came.

The underground fixed up phony passes for me but I stayed pretty close to the house. One day when I was hiding in the bedroom, three Jerries, 1 Lt. and 2 Under Lt's came to the house and asked the Madam to cook a rabbit for them. They said they would back in an hour so the Madam told me to come out of the bedroom and eat before the Jerries returned. I was sitting in the kitchen eating when in comes the Jerries 40 minutes early. I was trapped so had to stay at the table and eat with them. The Germans were interested in me and said that a good strong healthy boy like me should be in the German Army. The Madam was quick on the conversation and told them I was a railway employee and had been caught in one of the bombing raids, injuring my hearing and injuring my leg. I showed them my wounds. The questioned me and blamed the American terrorists for the bombing. When they left they gave me a 100 francs to give to the little girl.

One other day I was in the backyard chopping wood and the Madam had gone to town, when two Germans came to the back gate and asked to buy some eggs. I went to the chicken house and gathered all I could find and gave them to them. The
gave me 27 francs for the eggs which I turned over to the
Madam when she returned.

The French contacted the American lines for me, an
advance artillery spotting outfit. Some fellow landed in a
L-4 and they sent a note and my pilot identification card
back to headquarters. I was later taken approximately 18
miles thru the German lines to meet the pilot in the L-4 which
flew me to back to the CCB (Combat Control Battery).

I rode a bicycle thru the lines following a Frenchman
who rode ahead of me. They had men posted all along the
route who would come out of the woods or field and wave us on.
I stopped once to allow a German patrol to pass on the highway.

The advance Headquarters was a hot spot and German Su's
came over all night long. I was interrogated and talked
to General Oliver. Headquarters was quite interested in what
I could tell them of the Germans in the area.

That night I was put in a jeep to be driven back to Divi-
sion Headquarters. The driver made a wrong turn and we ended
up by driving thru the German lines. We were stopped when
we came upon the wreckage of a German ammunition truck on the
highway. We were afraid to touch anything for fear of booby
traps and it was then the Germans opened up with machine guns.
We just took off in the jeep across a field made a big circle
and drove back to CCB.

Next morning I left CCB again by jeep and went to Division
then to Corps Headquarters. I was interrogated again and gave
my whole story at Division.

I was then driven back through the British sector, thru...
I was flown back to England from a beach landing strip in a C-47.

The jerrys in France lived like kings and all of them that went thru our village said they were going back to defend the Fatherland. I saw 5 SS officers one day retreating in an ox cart. The roads were lined with wreacked and burned vehicles. The jerrys were sure scared of the strafing done by the P-47's and P-38's. They really took to the ditches and cover when planes appeared.

While I was staying with the French I was taken on walks and one day they took me to the cemetery. I was kissed here by a woman who had lost three children that were killed when a P-47 strafed the truck in which they were riding. The children had only been buried there the day before and this woman with no hatred and only grief in her heart kissed me because I was an American. They are wonderful people and every Sunday they put red, white and blue flowers on every American and British grave in the cemetery. I am grateful for the treatment I received.

* * * * *
At 16:00 hours on 2/28 April 1944, Captain Mayer cabled from Baker Street (OSS Headquarters), London, to say he had some late information about A/C 42-40997, which has been missing in action the night of 27/28 April 1944. This airplane was on an operational mission to target "Lockey 3A". Captain Mayer said he had received some parts of the airplane and some information on it from the field. He said he had a plate from some piece of radio equipment and also a note written in French from the field. The number of the airplane was 42-40997, as near as he could make it out. I verified this as being correct.

According to the French note, the aircraft arrived over the target and made three descending circles. On the third circle, it struck the ground about 500 metres from the reception party, and burned.

From this point, the information seems to be not quite clear. But one other airplane had already dropped on this target before the airplane 42-40997 crashed nearby. The reception committee had to gather up the load of this former aircraft and get it hidden before the Gestapo arrived. This they managed to do, and then they sent one of their men back to the scene of the crash. However, for a long time this man could not approach the burning airplane closer than 50 metres, due to exploding ammunition.

The story is rather vague, but it seems that five members of the crew were killed and apparently three are still alive. One of those three is known to be a Prisoner of War. He was helped away from the burning airplane by a woman, and then was either captured or turned in
that he was from Cincinnati, Ohio. There was a Sergeant James
Hooney (Gunner), who went with this airplane.

The message went on to list as definitely destroyed with the air-
plane, the following Officers and Enlisted Men:

Charles H. Wilson 13108714  T.C. 43420
Robert H. Redhair 0-622997
A. B. Pope 56476
G. V. Ambrose 0-302693
One number unidentified.

This makes two members of the crew unaccounted for, and they are
believed to have escaped. However, at the time of origin of the in-
formation, they were not as yet in the hands of the underground.

This information tallies in very nicely with the actual facts of
the situation. The crew of the airplane in question was as follows:

Pilot: 2nd Lt George V. Ambrose 0-302693
Co-Pilot: 2nd Lt Robert H. Redhair 0-622997
Navigator: 2nd Lt Arthur B. Pope 0-806135
 Bombardier: 2nd Lt Peter Roccio 0-679657
Engineer: S/Sgt Charles H. Wilson 13108714
Radio Operator: S/Sgt James J. Hedlund 15324373
Gunner: S/Sgt George W. Henderson 39255490
Gunner: S/Sgt James C. Hooney 12085824

It is logical to assume that the unidentified body was that of
2nd Lt Peter Roccio, who would be riding in the nose of the aircraft,
and would probably be badly injured. This then leaves S/Sgt Henderson
The report which Lt. Col Fish received concerning Lt. Ambrose's aircraft of the 356th Squadron (then the 36th Squadron) was substantially correct. The aircraft had reached the target area, had identified the reception lights and was coming in for the drop. The ground consisted of a clearing surrounded by high hills and as the airplane banked in descending circles a wing struck a hillside and the airplane crashed.

Sgt Henderson, the tail-gunner, was hurled from the tail to the bomb-bay by the force of the crash. Sgt Hadderson, the radio operator, was jolted halfway through the camera hatch and then back into the airplane, when it struck the ground and bounced and crashed again. Henderson, after the initial shock, climbed out of the wreckage. He looked around for other crew members and saw Hadderson, who was struggling in a maze of cables. With Henderson's help, Hadderson extricated himself, and then the two men, despite their bruises and the severe head-cuts Hadderson had sustained, began running away from the crash. They were not more than twenty-five yards from the airplane when it blew up, illuminating the entire night-sky and showering the two men with sparks and fragments.

For a mile and a half they ran at random, motivated by fear and shock. Then they stopped. Calmly now, they sat on the ground and began to plan, determined to evade capture by the Germans and to escape to England. From their emergency kits they drew compasses and set themselves a heading for the Southeast, where the Pyrenees and Spain lay. Then, having rested a short while, they began walking in the
kept to woods and out-of-the-way paths. They walked under when they stopped in a woods to hide and rest. Later they found out that the Germans had blocked off all roads within a radius of ten miles from the crashed aircraft, and that Dornier 210's and Ju-88's were reconnoitering the area for the men who had escaped from the crash.

Henderson and Huddleston remained in the woods until 0830 hours. Then they left the woods, walked up a hill and at the summit looked down upon a group of houses. There was too much activity around the houses, however, and they remained hidden, watching. Finally, at 1130 hours, when the way seemed clear, they decided to approach a house which was somewhat removed from the others. However, Sgt Huddleston's wounds had weakened him so much that it was difficult for him to move. And so, he remained behind while Henderson left the hiding place alone and advanced to the house, holding his flier's wings in his outstretched hand.

The farming people who lived in the house knew about the airplane crash, and as soon as they saw Henderson's wings they understood who he was. Immediately, the men of the house went with Henderson to the hiding place where they got Huddleston and helped him to the house. The two men were given water with which to wash their wounds and Henderson, using a knife sterilized in cognac, extracted four pieces of steel from the back of Huddleston's head. He patched the skin together with the adhesive tape from his aid-box. Then the two men returned to their hiding place in the woods, and, while the farmer stood guard, they slept.

At 1400 hours, they were awakened by the farmer. Handing them
Henderson and Beddleson could see a platoon of German soldiers load the unrecognizable remains of their B-24 into two lorries and then drive away.

They did not have much time to brood over the scene, however, because the farmer had become nervous at the presence of German soldiers, and he told the two men they would do well to leave rapidly and at once. They left in accordance with his wishes, and traveled for the rest of the afternoon. They did not cover much ground, because it was hilly country and their legs were so cut and swollen that they could cover only two hundred yards at a time. At a stream they were able to fill their water bottles. By 1700 hours, they had managed to travel about a mile and a half, and entirely exhausted, they laid up under some trees and rested, keeping a watchful eye on the adjacent road. At 1800 hours they started out again across an open field. They progressed slowly for about an hour, came to a creek which they jumped with difficulty, and at last saw a farmhouse. They decided to approach it. A small boy was the only one about, but he managed to convey that his mother would be back soon. In about half an hour the mother returned. She acted in a friendly manner toward the two Americans, fed them and allowed them to put up for the night in the hay gathered in her barn.

At 0800 hours the following morning the men were awakened. The farmwoman gave them breakfast and pointed out a direction for them to follow. They thanked her for the help she had given them and set out again cross-country.
cover. The tracks led to a tunnel and the two men followed through the tunnel, coming, to their astonishment, in the center of a small town. Realizing it would be conspicuous to turn suddenly and retrace their steps, they continued following the tracks through the town. They were still wearing their gabardine flying suits and leather jackets and while most people stared and some even waved, they were not stopped and no one spoke to them. On the far side of the town they approached a man and asked for help. The man was jittery, however, and said, "Partez, partez" (Leave, Leave!). The two men immediately left the tracks and continued cross-country through a woods. They came to a road and decided to follow it. But before very long, a German truck approached, and the two men quickly jumped into a roadside ditch in order to prevent detection. When the danger was safely passed, they realized it was not wise to follow an open road and accordingly they took to the hills again.

They came to a narrow stream and stopped to drink and wash up a bit. Then they set out again.

They passed by a Frenchman working in his garden and asked him for help. The man appeared reluctant to do anything, and they left. They had gone only a short way, when the man called them back. He had decided to help them. Accordingly, he showed them a clump of bushes in which they were to hide and indicated to them that they were to wait there. Then he left.

Huddleston and Henderson remained in the bushes, wondering if they were being doublecrossed, wondering if the man was trustworthy, speculating about whether they were being trusted. But they decided to wait. They
After what seemed an interminable wait, the Frenchman returned. He carried a note, written in English, which he handed to the two men. It read: "Teacher of school will come at five o'clock. Courage. We are your friends." It was the real thing. They had made the contact they had hoped for ever since they had landed on French soil.

Impatiently they waited for five o'clock. At last it arrived, and punctually on the hour a man came to them, carrying a large suitcase. It was the school-teacher. The suitcase contained food, weapons, ammunition,没错urachrome, and whiskey.

They were led from their hiding place to a farmer's house where they were given bread, cheese and wine. The teacher rode off on his bicycle.

At 2120 hours the teacher returned, accompanied by another man who was in effect a walking arsenal. Stuck in his belt were pistols and knives, and from his pockets grenades stuck out. Hedilason and Henderson were given guns and escorted from the farmer's house, through a town, to the teacher's house on the other side of the town. They had not been at the teacher's house very long, when a car arrived, and the two Americans were driven to another town some distance away. There they were joined by an English-speaking Frenchwoman and taken to a farmhouse, where they met the leader of the local resistance organization. That night they slept in beds with real sheets.

The following morning, the resistance leader came to the farmhouse accompanied by two women, an elderly man and a doctor. The doctor examined the two Americans.
That night the two men were moved to an old abandoned house, where they were to remain hidden until arrangements could be completed for their removal. For five days Hedleison and Henderson lived in total discomfort, waiting to be moved. Since there was no furniture in the house they slept on a cement floor. Once a day, a Frenchwoman and a man came to the house, bringing a bowl of soup, a chunk of bread and a quart of water. Those were their provisions for each twenty-four-hour period. They used the water for drinking, washing and even shaving. Behind the house was a good-sized lake, but the men could not leave the house to get to it.

At the end of five days, the resistance leader, accompanied by an English-speaking Frenchwoman, came for the men. The date was 5 May. Hedleison and Henderson were taken to the Frenchwoman's house where they were treated with every consideration. The Frenchwoman was eloquent in her condemnation of the plan which had kept the men for five days on the cold, cement floor of an abandoned house.

During the time they spent here, all the necessary contacts and arrangements were being made for their eventual journey out of France. However, their stay at the solicitous Frenchwoman's home came to a premature and abrupt end. On the 14th of May, a woman visited the house and before evening the whole town knew that two American fliers were being harbored in their midst.
moved, early the following morning, to a farmhouse six kilometres away. There, a rendezvous was made with the chief of another resistance organization which had agreed to take over the two Americans.

Heculeson and Henderson remained at this farmhouse for twelve days. During this time, Gestapo men made regular visits, since it was this farm which supplied them with fresh eggs. But the Americans simply remained in their room until the Gestapo men had transacted their business and had left.

On the 24th of May, the resistance chief brought a young, English-speaking Frenchman to the house. Heculeson and Henderson were asked for their name, rank and serial number, and for their photograph. It was explained that the photographs would be sent to London for corroboration.

The next night they were moved from the farmhouse into a nearby town. Here they remained for more than two months, while verification of their identity could be received from London and, when verification had been received, transportation out of France could be arranged. During these two months, several interesting incidents occurred.

On the 29th of May, they were visited by the people who had sent the report of their aircraft's crashing. These people had been hunting Heculeson and Henderson for a month. They told now five members of the crew had been killed outright by the crash and now Jim Rooney, the dispatcher, had been helped away. A Frenchman but had been betrayed.
the Germans by a collaborationist and was a prisoner of war. The collaborationist had been dealt with by the underground. His house, with him in it, had been blown sky high.

At times Headleson and Henderson were taken on guided tours of the town. Their only activity in town, however, was occasionally to purchase cigarettes, which set them back 150 francs (three dollars) for a package of twenty. It was a far cry from the three-penny package of American cigarette at the Harrington PA.

Then, the 19th of June arrived, Headleson's birthday. Their host rounded up champagne and cake, and the occasion was celebrated appropriately.

One day, a patrol of six mean-looking German stormtroopers came to town. It was reported that they were looking for "Two men". While it was not clear exactly which two men were being hunted, it was decided not to take any chances, and accordingly, Headleson and Henderson were spirited out of town at once. As the patrol arrived, the German patrol left. Before the Germans left they visited a house where an old woman lived alone. Desiring to gain information about her son's whereabouts, they proceeded to beat up the old woman, displaying their vaunted Teutonic efficiency during the operation. The old woman would not talk, but her son gave himself up, in order to spare his mother. When the Germans left with the son their prisoner, Headleson and Henderson returned from their assignation.
On the 13th of July, the two men — with a resistance group. The group consisted of four Frenchmen and the two Americans, armed with assault rifles. They mounted bicycles and rode twelve kilometres to their destination, a bridge employed by Nazi supply trains. The Frenchmen placed bombs at strategic places and set the fuses, while Henderson and Henderson acted as guides. Then they waited, hidden in nearby bushes. But the fuses were barely set, and as the men retreated, two German trains passed safely over the bridge, a circumstance which visibly irritated the leader of the group. In the next moment, however, the bridge blew up, so that future trains at least, would be delayed. Then the group remounted their bicycles and rode the twelve kilometres back to town.

Again on the 23rd of July, Henderson and Henderson accompanied the same group on another operation. Their destination this time was the home of a collaborationist family. The purpose of the operation was to drive the family out into the countryside, to take all necessary information. The six men reached the house and surrounded it. The leader called out his duties; the Frenchmen people inside the house refused to come out and began to throw chairs and assorted bits of furniture out of windows as the men surrounding the house. The leader threatened to set fire to the barn, and this threat chastened the collaborationists, so that they came out of the house. Mr. Henderson, armed with a machine-gun, took the women in charge, while the men were being questioned. The result of the operation was completely
successful. The necessary information was obtained, and Henderson returned with the machine-gun in one hand and a glistening nail in the other. The nail had been pressed upon him by one of the women as a token of her essential coolness.

On the 27th of July, the group who had sent the report on Lt. McGowan's aircraft which Lt Fox first received at Arlington arrived to take Henderson and Henderson on a reception operation. They drove their car, which contained a lurcher set in the back seat, to the reception grounds and waited.

There was intensive air activity in the vicinity, and no aircraft arrived for the dropping operation at the ground, which was an 'atrocity' target. Finally, the reception committee left. Next morning, the BBC signal was received, "Atrocity fell in the well", meaning that the previous night's operation had been carried out, probably because it might have interfered with the air activities. Later in the day, another signal indicated that the same operation has on for that night. Accordingly, the committee, accompanied by the two American sergeants, posted themselves again.

After a tense period of waiting, the Bureau indicated the presence of an aircraft. It was an X6-Cairine. The aircraft circled the reception area, from the unusually high altitude of 2,000 feet, made its drop of twenty-four containers. While conditions were favorable, however, and none of the containers went astray, until a few seconds the reception committee worked, gathering up the containers and marking them, in a horse-drawn wagon, to 10,000 air-metres away, where the containers were made in an old barn.
Just as the last of the sun came up and people of the town were sticking their heads out of windows.

The following day, word was received that Henderson and Meiklejohn would be leaving the next day to make connections with an airplane which would fly them back to London. Accordingly, at 0730 hours on the morning of 20 July, the two men were taken in a lorry to the rendezvous point, 120 kilometres away. The truck moved around wooded places, stopping to look around and out-of-the-way lines. It stopped only once and that was to allow Meiklejohn and Henderson to see the five small crosses marking the graves of their fellow crew-members who had been killed. The graves were neatly trimmed and decorated with fresh flowers. Three kilometres further on, the truck passed by the scene of the crash, and the men could see bits of wreckage around the buried place on the ground.

Finally, the truck reached a town which was its destination and the men spent the night comfortably in a small hotel.

They spent the next day waiting for the radio signal which would confirm the flight. In the course of waiting, they sat for a while in the entrance of a cafe. As they sat, sipping drinks, a group of German soldiers rode by on bicycles. The Germans carried English mail bags, which they had taken from the mailbags. As they rode by, they looked over in the direction of the two Americans, but saw nothing and did not stop.

At 1330 and again at 1400 the radio signal approved the flight, but at 1415 cancellation was signalled. Rather
The scene moved to a farmhouse on the outskirts, and his wife had a large brood of children, and when everyone gathered for a meal the table groaned beneath the combined weight of nineteen people. Ten quarts of wine were consumed at each sitting. And in these domestic settings, Henderson and Henderson lived for three days.

Then a car arrived and they were again driven back to the hotel in town. The flight was again cancelled and they spent that night in the hotel. On the following day, the flight was laid on, but later in the day was cancelled for the third time. Again they spent the night in the hotel. They were beginning to get restless and nervous. The noon period was waning, and they looked with dread upon the prospect of remaining in France for another month.

The next day they were driven to a Maquis-liberated town where they remained for three days. They walked freely about town, and everyone seemed to know that they were Americans.

At last the great day arrived, the flight was approved all the way! From the Maquis-liberated town, Henderson and Henderson were driven ten kilometres to rendezvous with a Maquis chief, who, it turned out, had been recently to London and had spoken with Colonel Kelvin. Protected by carloads of Maquis soldiers, they were driven out to the landing field. The entire route was secured by sentinels and all around the field a total of four hundred Maquis soldiers stood guard. It was known that quite nearby a group of
At the field, Henderson met the men who were to be their fellow passengers. These included, besides a group of agents, a Canadian Spitfire pilot and a Lancaster navigator.

Precisely at 01:40 hours, an aircraft arrived and began circling for a landing. It was a Lockheed Hudson and, with its landing lights turned on, presented the most beautiful picture that Henderson and Henderson had seen for some time.

The Hudson landed, and the two Americans, who had been given 4 and 5 priority numbers, boarded it. Shortly afterwards, the Hudson took off. The flight to Belgium was uneventful and in a few hours Henderson and Henderson were safely back on English soil again.

It had certainly been "the long way home", but the two sergeants had made it.

* * *
On 28 May 1944, the aircraft and crew of Lt. Henry W. Wolcott, III, 858th Squadron, failed to return from a mission to Belgium. Crew members were: 2nd Lt. Robert F. Auda (Co-pilot); 1st Lt. William G. Ryckman (Navigator); 2nd Lt. Wallis O. Cozzens (Bombardier); S/Sgt. Frederick A. Tuttle (Dispatcher); T/Sgt. Dale S. Loucks (Radio Operator); T/Sgt. Dirvin D. Deihl (Engineer); S/Sgt. Richard G. Hawkins (Tail Gunner); 2nd Lt. Carmen J. Vozzella (Navigator of the 858th Squadron, flying a check out mission). By 11 September 1944, all members of the crew were safely back to England, with the exception of Sgt. Hawkins, who was found dead, his parachute unopened, on the ground at Maigem.

The Target was "Osric 53", in Belgium. A gee signal was obtained at twenty miles. The aircraft made three DR's, but there was no evidence of a reception at the target. The aircraft had just swung around to begin its homeward journey, when it was suddenly attacked by a night fighter and received three damaging bursts. This occurred at the checkpoint, Enghien. The fighter was shaken off, and the B-24, with another Gee fix obtained, turned North. Another sudden attack came from the side. Caliber .50 shells ripped through the right wing tanks, through the fuselage and navigator’s compartment. Violent fires broke out and the airplane quickly became unflyable. In a few moments, the bail-out alarm was sounded.
Lt. Wolcott jumped from his doomed airplane. At exactly 0200 hours, 29 May 1944, he landed in a Belgium wheat-field, one-and-a-half miles north of his crashed airplane. All that night he could see the red sky-glow from the burning wreckage. Wolcott hid his 'chute and Mae West and immediately began walking. He continued in a southeasterly direction until 0530 hours, when it began to get light. He decided to approach a house and found an isolated one, surrounded by woods. The people in the house were Flemish, but they spoke French and quickly understood when Wolcott told them who he was. They took him in, gave him food and civilian clothes and showed him where he could get a few hours' sleep. That night arrangements were made to transfer him to another house. Wolcott remained in the latter's house for two days and then was taken by a farmer into the village of Winove to a rendezvous with a white army man. Escorted by him, Wolcott found himself at the Catholic University in Enghien. Here Wolcott remained for four days, hidden in a priest's room. At the end of this time, the white army man returned and took Wolcott to a farm South of Enghien.

At the farm were eighteen Russians who had escaped from forced service in the German army, and also an American pilot. The day after Wolcott arrived at the farm the whole group left, having been warned that the Gestapo were only a mile away. The men travelled in three trucks to another and safer farmhouse, the Russians carrying with them all their German equipment, which provided good cover for the trip.
At the next farmhouse, we split up, three of them remaining with the two Americans. Wolcott and his fellow pilot, together with the three Russians, remained at the farmhouse for three weeks. One Sunday morning, 150 German soldiers surrounded the house. As a result of a denunciation by a traitor, the Germans suspected the presence of a White Army man in the house. Warned in the nick of time, Wolcott hid in the attic in a secret hiding-place under the floor boards. The Germans entered the house, searched it thoroughly, and a couple of them even walked over the floor under which Wolcott was hiding. But they did not find Wolcott or his comrades. Finally, the Germans left, taking with them the farmer and all the food and money they could find. Wolcott later found out that, after two weeks of questioning, the farmer was released. Shortly after the incident, the two Americans and three Russians went to another farmhouse in another town. They had been there only a few days when the Mayor of the town visited them, warned them that everyone in town knew of their presence and advised them to leave.

The group split up at this point, Wolcott being escorted by a White Army man from one farmhouse to another. After a week of moving about, Wolcott finally came to a house on the outskirts of Brussels. Here he remained for five weeks. Then, a treacherous escape-organization, unsuspected by Wolcott's helpers, came forward with a plan to get him into Switzerland. Wolcott was thereupon taken to an apartment in Brussels, which later became known as the infamous "dog house."
the place from which Allied evaders were -German hands. Wolcott remained in this apartment for three days. He was well treated, even lavishly treated. Then he was taken to a second house, where Secret Service interrogators, posing as members of an escape organization, asked him many questions. They brought out a questionnaire, which included questions about Wolcott's squadron, group and commanding officers. Wolcott filled in the questionnaire. The next day he was a prisoner in St. Gilles prison. Fellow prisoners were Lts. Ryckman, Auda and Cozzens, all of whom had been betrayed in the same manner that Wolcott had been betrayed.

* * *

Lt. Ryckman had landed in an open field, twisting his knee and spraining his back. After burying his chute and equipment, he painfully began walking in a northwest direction. The burning wreckage of his airplane lighted the sky. Ryckman went on a short distance, but his injuries gave him much pain. Coming to a grain field, he hid himself and spent the night and the following morning. At 1300 hours the next day he set out again, this time in a southwest direction. He passed through a small village without incident, although he was still dressed in A-2 jacket and OD trousers. On the outskirts of the village, Ryckman was taken in hand by a man and woman who brought him into a house, fed him and gave him a suit of civilian clothes. Then he was taken to a castle where he met Lt. Cozzens. From the castle the two lieutenants were taken to a town where they remained in hiding for three.
Then they were shuttled to a farmhouse, spending eight days there and moving on to another house where they spend seven days. After one night at a third house, they were taken by train into Brussels. Their destination was a very prosperous apartment in the city. Here they remained from the fifth to the fourteenth of July.

A plan was brought forward involving escape into Switzerland and accordingly Ryckman and Cozzens were moved to another apartment, which was the "dog-house" of Lt. Wolcott's story. On the 18th of July the two lieutenants were taken in an automobile by their false "benefactors" to another apartment in Brussels. Here they were met by five men in civilian clothes, whom they naturally took to be members of the underground. Over a bottle of cognac, the five men asked Cozzens and Ryckman a great many questions. Finally they brought out a mimeographed form. The two lieutenants filled in their names, ranks and serial numbers, and handed the forms back. The men became angry and insisted that the rest of the form be filled in. Ryckman and Cozzens answered the question on religion and the question on names of other crew members. The men asked for the name of their base. Ryckman replied, "England." The men asked for the name of their Commanding Officer. Ryckman replied, "Wolcott!" The questioners attempted to get further information, but Ryckman and Cozzens remained close-mouthed.

Then they were taken to another house in Brussels. They walked to a third floor apartment where the first sight they saw was a large picture of Hitler on the wall. Their escorts
was a Gestapo Officer. The suspicions which Cozzens and Ryckman had begun to have were confirmed—they were in the hands of the Gestapo!

The Americans were again questioned, when they refused to give any information, they were removed at once to St. Gilles prison. They were in prison for five and a half weeks before their first interrogation. Their diet during this time consisted of coffee, carrots, potatoes and sour bread. And four times a week they were treated to watery, tasteless soup. They slept on the floor, cushioned on straw sacks crawling with lice. Four or five men were crowded into one dirty cell. Once a week the men were allowed to bathe—but they were strictly limited to five minutes in the bath. Once, when Cozzens was slow in leaving the bath, he was slapped across the face by one of the guards.

At last the two lieutenants were called in for interrogation. At 0800 hours one morning they were brought to Luftwaffe Headquarters. They were not interrogated until 2130 hours that night, and throughout the day they were given neither food nor water. At first the questions were of a purely military character, having to do with fleet and fighter aircraft encountered. Then the questioner asked for the names and addresses of the Belgian patriots who had helped them evade. Ryckman and Cozzens refused to answer. When they persisted in their silence, the questioner became infuriated and ordered them confined to dark cells.
manifestation of the Nazi mind. Ryckman

well, because it was his father's birthday. Each dark cell
was six feet long and four feet deep, the only ventilation
three small holes in the door. The Germans did not permit
blankets in their dark cells, so the men slept, uncovered,
on the cold cement floor. In a corner of the cell was a
bucket, which served as sanitation. Ryckman and Cozzens were
confined in dark cell for five days, during which time they
were given no water. One day they asked a guard for a bit of
water, he laughed at them. They had only bitter coffee to
drink, and they had to save part of it in order to wash out
their eating platters. But it was so dark, they never knew
whether the platter was really clean or not.

On the evening of 1 September the men were removed from
their dark cell and again interrogated. There were only a few
questions asked this time, mostly about the crew's duty posi-
tions in the aircraft. Ryckman and Cozzens were then returned
to regular cells.

The next day, forty-two Allied airmen, including Wolcott,
Ryckman, Cozzens and Anda, were taken from the prison and
locked into the baggage car of a train. The men realized at
once that they were being transported to a prison camp in Ger-
many. The talk was that British airmen was begin-
ing to invest Brussels. The train departed Brussels at 0800
hours and by evening had covered a zigzagged distance of only
thirty kilometres. The night was passed on a siding and in the
morning the train began rolling back toward Brussels.
The German garrison was in a panic. They located a truck-load of cognac and looted it. The train, with its drunken German guards and its carload of prisoners, made several more attempts to break through the ring of British tanks now encircling the city, and each time it was forced back. White Army snipers began to subject the train to their fire.

The Germans made a last attempt to break through the British line. The train rolled slowly until it was three kilometres outside of Brussels. Through a small window the prisoners in the baggage car could see Verey pistol signals. Then the train stopped. The tracks had been blown up by White Army men. The train went into reverse, causing the baggage car to become derailed. Fortunately, none of the prisoners was injured. The guards, completely frightened and demoralized, abandoned the train. Sporadic shooting broke out in the woods beside the tracks and the prisoners had to keep low in the baggage car.

At 0400 hours, the men decided to make a break. Using a pocket knife, they picked the lock and in groups of three and four slipped unobtrusively out of the car.

Welcott, Ryckman, Luda and Cozens walked along a road alongside of which a canal ran. They came to a large warehouse with a fence around it. Suddenly, they saw a torch-light through the darkness. Desperately, they looked around for means of escape. The fence around the warehouse was too high to scale, so they ran to the canal and jumped into a barge which had fortunately been
tied up at the precise point in the canal. Seconds later, twelve Germans passed by on the road. The Americans, had they been so inclined, could have reached up and practically touched them.

The Captain of the barge was a patriotic Hollander. When he discovered the men, he told them that open fighting had broken out in the streets of Brussels and that it would be safest for them to remain hidden in his barge for the time being.

They remained overnight in the cabin of the barge. The next morning, the Captain’s son came rushing in, shouting “Tommy, Tommy, Tommy!” The British had completed the liberation of Brussels.

The four lieutenants left the barge and walked into the center of town. They were taken in charge by an MG officer and put up in a hotel. The next day they caught a ride with a British supply lorry going to France. Reaching Liége, they met an RCAF officer who told them of an airfield offering shuttle service to England. They made their way to the airfield and before long found themselves on a C-47, heading for England. It was the sixth of September, and for the first time in many months, Wolcott, Ryckman, Aude and Cozzens felt free again.

* * * *

The remaining survivors, Lt. Vozzella and Sgts. Loucks, Deihl and Tuttle were hidden in various places by patriotic Belgians, until the liberation of Belgium by the Allies.
On the morning of the eight of thirty and seventh of August, 1944, Robert C. McLaughlin and his crew failed to return. Below will be found the stories of the adventures and misadventures of the various members of the crew during their sojourns in France and Belgium.

It. McLaughlin and his crew were very surprised at the bursts of flak so close to their target area. Though it was previously known that the French operated close to enemy units, it was the unanimous opinion of the crew that this was just a little too close.

It. McLaughlin, as pilot, gave the order to bail out while they were on their thirty-third mission. The only regret, as later ex- by the entire crew, was that their return to the United States was delayed and that the co-pilot, Lt. Olenych, was and still is a prisoner of war.

These narratives are their experiences from the time the aircraft was hit until the day they were sitting in the S-2 Office at Harrington recounting them.

Lt. McLaughlin’s successful escape, as told by him follows:

A satisfactory run was made over our target. The packages were dropped all right, but the containers hung up. When the excitement began latter, we salvoed the containers. We were told that the patriots got part of the load and the Jerry got the rest. After our partial drop at the target, we began climbing.

At an indicated 2500 feet, ten miles from the target, we were suddenly hit. At least two of the gas lines to engines one and two were hit; then they burst and the stream of gasoline fired. Immediately I told the co-pilot to hit the fire extinguishers, which
allow control, either by trim or manually, so I punched the alarm signal. At that time the whole plane seemed to be on fire.

I was the last to bail out; and I’ll admit it was with a great deal of regret that I left, for everything that mattered seemed to be attached to the airplane—getting back to the base safely and going home. I was in a low mood, for there seemed to be little prospect of anything good coming of this.

I landed beside a wooded area and immediately hid my parachute and mae wevt; I put them in a small gully and covered them with sticks to keep the silk from billowing and then covered both with dirt and leaves.

The feeling that came over me then was one of being chased and so I started walking, keeping well within the shadow of the forest. After about a half-hour it began raining so I started looking for shelter. Soon I came across a farm yard with a small shed filled with straw, so I crawled in and slept.

Next morning at 0600 hours an old maid came out to the shed to feed some rabbits so I spoke to her, explained that I was American and asked for help. Going back to the house she brought me some broth and bread and helped me conceal the shed by use branches and leaves, after which she returned to her home.

About 1200 hours two Frenchmen came to the shed and after convincing themselves that I was an American (the old maid had doubts—these people have been so terrorized by German troops that they seem unduly suspicious) one produced a civilian overcoat and we walked into the house. There I washed my face and hands, had lunch and went to bed. All of these arrangements were made easily as one of the Frenchmen spoke English.
About 1830 hours I was awakened and nau... was taken to a farmhouse about a quarter mile away. I stayed there from the 8th of August to the 2nd of September. While there I learned that the people with whom I was staying were the parents of the two Frenchmen who had been helping me—the one who spoke English. He had been a school teacher and having had a good education, was not at all in sympathy with the Nazis.

On the 9th of August contact was established with the underground but they advised me to stay at the farmhouse until our lines moved up, which was what I did.

On September 2nd the Allies arrived and I went north with 3rd Armored Spearhead to Mons. While with them I saw some action and a lot of dead Germans but I decided there weren't half enough of them.

On our arrival in Mons, I was returned to England.

* * *

The following is an account of the experiences of Lt. Bertram D. Knapp and Leo C. Arlin, who were lucky enough to meet in the same underground channels. Lt. Knapp tells his story first:

I jumped after Arlin from about 2500 feet and landed in the underbrush of a wooded area, wrenching my knee and spraining my ankle.

After hiding my parachute, I headed south but at the end of an hour I hid in a wheat field near the woods and spent the remainder of the night there. My ankle and knee were hurting me.

Early in the morning I was approached by a farmer with a scythe who gave me my position as 2 or 3 miles north of the French-Belgian border. Though he was skeptical at first, he was very friendly after
walking up to the house, I looked up a woman there alone. Knocking on the window pane, I showed her my dog tags and asked for a place to hide. She told me to come in, after which she gave me some coffee and food and sent her husband for help.

Her husband brought back another man who, giving me a civilian coat, took my flying jacket and took me to his home. When we got there he got a doctor. About a half hour later, arlin came in.

It. Arlin's story follows:

I landed in a high tree and as I was having trouble with my harness, I spent the rest of the night there in the harness.

When I got on the ground, I destroyed all of the information regarding our target and started walking to the southwest. It was a miserable day—the wind was blowing and it was raining so I walked for only about an hour. At the end of that time I hid in a wheat stack. An hour later an old woman came by, gleaning, and saw me. Up to this time I had been seen by no one but now it was not a question of my approaching someone. Showing her my dog tags, I asked for help and received no answer, neither yes or no. She left.

She returned with another woman and a child an hour or so later, at which time I asked for food and help. For some reason I took out my wallet and some Dutch money fell out of it, whereupon they all walked away.

It was then around 1500 so I slept for a while and upon awakening saw two men approaching me. It seems that the women had sent four Maquis to kill the Boche with Dutch money.

Luckily Knapp had told them of the plane crash, so after
pretty poor disguise. At any rate, I was taken to the home where I
met Lt. Knapp. We were very happy to see each other.

That same night we were given civilian clothes and moved to
another house. The French were not very secretive of our presence,
so it was only a matter of a few days that we were able to stay
there. On the fourth night we moved to another hiding place and
shared quarters with a Maquis chief who had been wounded in one of
his operations. We stayed there for 25 days, leaving only one when
a German patrol was out—we hid in the hayloft.

During the time we were in this town, the German troops took 50
hostages and made them sweep roads; this was in retribution for a
Maquis operation. However, we, and everyone else, thought the
hostages extremely fortunate, since no further harm came to them.

One night we heard firing and later heard German demolitions.
The FFI and White Army had liberated the village, in the town just
to see how the people took the liberation. They were overjoyed
almost to the point of hysteria.

The next morning we caught a ride with a British captain who
took us to the American lines. Enroute we had to detour due to
shirmish between the FFI and some troops. From the American line
we went to Paris and were returned to England.

* * *

The adventures of T/Sgt John X. Beare are given below:

After the alarm signal, I went forward and bailed out of the
front bomb bay.

Landing near the French-Belgian border, I walked in the direction
of Belgium for a while but then used the compass from my escape kit.
At dawn I found a small canal which was heavily weeded, so concealing myself in it, I slept all that day.

That night I walked a little more and the next day, the 8th of August, I approached a sheep herder who took me to a small town and helped me get a passport. I was then taken to a farm where I was given directions on how to reach the French border. After crossing the border, I contacted the underground whose agents provided me with a French passport and gave me a bed for the night.

The next day I went to Mauberge where I stayed for two days after which I went to LeCheauteu; staying there for three days I was sent to Guisc, where I was put up in a hotel. All of the time I was at the hotel, I was constantly on guard as there was a detachment of SS troops quartered there. I was stopped only once during my stay there but my papers said I was a deaf-mute so I wasn't trouble with any questions.

A few days later I returned to LeCheauteu and stayed at a farm for four days. Then I was transported by auto in the custody of FFI to a camp near Vallee Multrie. Upon my arrival I was told there was a P-51 pilot nearby and that night I was taken to see him.

He was staying in a farm house so I joined him and we stayed there until the American lines caught up with us on September 5th. Then we were convoyed to Paris by a jeep from Hqts., 4th Armored Division. Arriving there, we were sent back to England.
occupied territory back to England is told below:

When the alarm was given I was in the bomb bay fighting flames which were a result of gasoline lines breaking and spraying. When I heard the alarm, I put on my chute, which was just forward of the bomb bay and jumped.

A minute or so after my jump I saw the plane crash and blow up. I later learned that the plane crashed near White Horse, France, about 20 miles from the Belgian border.

I landed about five miles from the plane and in doing so, was knocked out when my head hit a fence; I also hurt my ankle.

When I came to I could hear the baying of hounds which I supposed were on my trail. I quickly hid my parachute and started running. My ankle would not stand the strain so I hid in a deep ditch and after the hounds had lost my scent, I proceeded slowly on.

Next day the hounds picked up my scent again and after I evaded them, I started to an isolated farm house that I had seen before.

When I knocked on the door it was opened by a farmer who was a patriot. He asked me in, fed me, and gave me a place to sleep. The next morning I was awakened and hurried out to the barn where I hid in the hayloft. Some German troops came to the house searching for me.

That night I went back into the house where I stayed
for twenty-six days. While I was there, there were occasional search parties who would come in, drink wine and leave; their search was very superficial. The children of the house were not aware of my presence until I joined the American forces near Douaumont on the 1st of September.

After joining the ground forces, I travelled to Paris as a guard on a prisoner of war train from which I was returned to England.

* * *

S/Sgt Fred H. Heath had the following unexpected but interesting experiences in France:

Landing in a wheat field, I ditched my parachute and taking the cans of water from my individual dinghy, started walking toward the low country. At daybreak I hid myself in a wooded area and resumed walking after darkness had fallen. Following that procedure for three days, I finally approached a main road and found a sign: 9km. to Le Vaudeville, 3 km. to Vervins.

I hid nearby and rested, then continued until I came across a farmer cutting wood. When I approached him I asked for help but either he couldn't or wouldn't help me so I continued.

My next appeal for help was to a small boy who, by the aid of my language card, showed me where I was on my escape map. He hid me and told me he would send me civilian clothes soon. True to his word, he sent a man who gave me food and clothes. Then I started walking in
As I had no idea—someone approached and finally got up enough nerve to speak to a farmer passing. After convincing him that I wasn't Dutch, he hid me and continued on his way, after telling me that he would return at 2300 hours that night.

When he returned, he guided me to his home where I stayed for three days. I was informed that there were three Gestapo officers in the same village and my presence was extremely dangerous to all concerned. I learned this from the man's son who, fortunately, could speak English. After these three days they asked if I would consider going to the Maquis. With my consent they brought a Maquis chief who took me to Chateau Porcia.

I stayed at Chateau Porcia for four days but the Maquis decided to transfer me to another camp, the journey to be made by bicycle. I was sent to another village where I was directed to a woman near a railroad track who introduced me to several friendly "Milice". It was through this source that I learned the Maquis party had been intercepted by the Gestapo, so I was moved to another house in the village where I stayed for three days. During this time, the woman who had helped me was taken prisoner by the Gestapo who immediately set out to search the village.

I was warned of the impending search by a fourteen year old boy and his friend. The three of us headed for the woods where we stayed for fourteen days; our beds were made from wheat; our food was supplied by women from
a nearby farm house and by night ——

At the end of these fourteen days, we learned that the Americans had advanced to within eleven miles of the village and the German troops had evacuated it so we returned to the village.

A celebration was under way as two members of the "Milice" had captured three Gestapo agents. Everyone was in a good mood and we had numerous toasts to the French, Americans and English.

That evening I set out with my two friends to another village six miles away and almost walked into a pitched battle between the Maquis and the Gestapo who had returned looking for their agents. We skirted the battle and hid in the woods near an old encampment of German troops but shortly afterward proceeded and met the American troops on August 30th.

* * *

T/Sgt. Donald C. Adamson escaped from occupied France in the following manner:

The alarm having sounded, I bailed out at the front of the bun bay, whistled down and landed in a tree. Leaving my parachute there, I dropped to the ground and started walking in a southeaster direction.

At daylight I stopped and hid in a grove of trees until about noon. From this vantage point I watched farmers working in a field. I did not speak to them then. Later I crossed the field to a bay stack where I tried to dry my clothes and get warm. About 1730 a lone farmer
tered and nervous but through the aid of my language card I asked for directions to the French-Belgian border. After getting the necessary map reference, I asked for some civilian clothes and the farmer went home to get them for me.

When he came back, accompanied by two of his friends, we went to the grove of trees while I got rid of my uniform. They told me to wait until dark and that I would be guided to the frontier. The hour on which we agreed was 2400.

This time at 2400, four men came, the additional one being the chief of police who took me to his home and gave me water for a hot bath. He told me that I was to stay there and that arrangements would be made for my passport. Then I would be taken to France and returned to England. Once while I was there, the house was searched by the Gestapo but we had been warned and I escaped by hiding in a secret cellar.

Several days later my passport arrived but the local Maquis chief advised me to remain where I was. From this time I was in contact with my navigator and bombardier who were only four kms. away. We exchanged notes via a nurse who was caring for Lt. Arlin. Through them I heard that our co-pilot, 1st Lt. Daniel G. Olenych and our passenger, 2nd Lt. William F. Reagan of the 857th Squadron had been captured. They had been transported to France, stayed in a farm house one night and the next
day were arrested by the Gestapo.

I joined the American forces on September 4th.

*   *   *

LTS. ARLIN & KNAPP WEARING THE CIVILIAN CLOTHES IN WHICH THEY "EVACUATED" IN BELGIUM
On Friday, 8 September 1944, aircraft No. 767; and crew consisting of 2nd Lt's Lawrence Berkoff, (Pilot); John H. Vcri (Co-pilot); Vincent D. Marus, (Navigator); George H. Snyder, (Bomber); Sgt's Alphonse J. Rinz, (Engineer); George F. Villani, (Radio Operator); Laurel L. Transtrum, (Dispatcher), and John D. Duer, (Tail Gunner), of the 66th Squadron, took off on a mission to France. Immediately after take-off, Sgt Rinz noticed that number 2 engine was trailing a great length of flame from its exhaust. Not wanting to abort unless absolutely necessary, Lt. Berkoff circled the drone several times while the engine was under observation to determine the extent of malfunction. As the length of the flight increased the seriousness of the flame decreased, and finally, just a small tongue of flame could be seen emerging from the flame arrester.

Lt. Berkoff conferred with the engineer and decided to pick up course and land for their target. At 2325 hours, as the plane near the southern coast of England, Sgt Rinz, who had been watching the exhaust of No. 2 engine throughout the flight, was not satisfied with its performance, and although the flame arrester was eliminating all flame from emerging outside the trail exhaust, flames were still igniting within the exhaust itself and thus giving off a red glow which would make a perfect target for night-fighters over enemy territory. Rinz expressed these facts to the pilot and it was agreed to turn back. Lt Berkoff, flying at 5,000 feet,
put the aircraft into an 180° roll and as the ship righted itself on its return course, Rinz received a call from the pilot over the interphone. He was told to look at the instruments of No. 1 engine. Oil pressure and mercury pressure gauges indicated far below normal performance and as the engineer and pilot were looking at the instruments, the engine stopped cold.

Lt Berkoff immediately started adjusting controls and feathering the prop of this dead engine and while he was thus engaged, number 2 engine started to eject flame again and to run very roughly. With No. 1 engine dead and No. 2 inoperative, the plane started to lose altitude very fast and it became impossible to hold the ship on straight and level flight. The drag of the two engines caused the ship to turn over on its side and whenever Lt Berkoff would bring the wing up to level position, which was done several times after tremendous struggling with the controls by both pilots, the ship would nose down and then again the left wing would drop. After repeating this struggle to keep the ship on an even keel, it became evident that the flight of the aircraft was uncontrollable and Lt Berkoff sounded the alarm and gave the order to bail-out.

The ship was at an altitude of 3300 feet as the first chute opened and drifted below. The other crew members followed, one after another until only Rinz and Berkoff were left. Rinz stayed with the ship until the last minute to help Berkoff, who was still fighting the controls while the crew bailed out, in the event that the ship became flyable.
again.

When the ship was at about 1,000 feet, Rinz made his way to the catwalk in the bomb-bay and yelled for Berkoff to "come on, let's get the hell out." Berkoff did not appear to hear him, so he yelled again and when he looked back into the cockpit, he could still see Berkoff righting to fly his ship. By this time, Rinz could see the ground and the ship suddenly rolled over on its side. Rinz reached overhead and grasping the side of the bomb-bay, swung himself out into space and at the same time, pulled his rip-cord.

The airplane continued over into a spin and dove straight down, crushing just below Rinz. The blast from the crashing aircraft and the resultant explosion, caught into Rinz's chute and blow him upward. Then the force of the blast had subsided. Rinz floated down into very near the burning ship, and as he descended, he narrowly missed being sucked into the flames by the vacuum caused by the blazing wreckage.

The other crew members had made successful jumps and were well scattered around the country-side. Then they when all accounted for, the extent of personal injury was surveyed. Sgt Rinz was suffering from an injured ankle, Sgt Buer from severe shock, and Lt. Berkoff was instantly killed, still at the controls of his aircraft, in order that others might live.

* * *
On 14 August 1944, an aircraft of the 356th Bomb Squadron was reported MIA on a mission to France. The crew members were: 2nd Lt's Richard R. Norton, (Pilot); Connie O. Walker, (Co-pilot); Benjamin Rosen, (Bombardier); Lloyd L. Anderson, (Navigator); S/Sgt's James H. Husbands, (Engineer); William H. Moncy, (Radio Opr); Wayman B. Skadden, (Tail Gunner) and Sgt John W. Gillikin, (Dispatcher).

Nothing was heard of what happened to the aircraft until a letter (see copy attached) was received at this station on 11 September summarizing the brief story of the lone surviving crew member, Sgt Gillikin.

* * *

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On the night of 3/4 March 1944, Lt. Carpenter's aircraft failed to return from a mission over France. For about a month nothing more was heard, to indicate what the fate of the crew had been. Then, a monitoring station of the Federal Communications Commission, operating in the United States, overheard a German broadcast listing the names of recent Prisoners of War. The same broadcast was heard in London, but unfortunately, the complete list of P/W's was not heard. The F.C.C. forwarded word to Lt. Eshleman's family, since his was one of the names heard, and his family thereupon notified his organization, the 36th Bombardment Squadron. The remaining names overheard by the monitors were: Lt. Nesbitt, Lt. Carpenter, Sgts. Burris and Jordan. In the meantime, a friend of Lt. Nesbitt's, residing in London, received a postcard, a photographic reproduction of which is attached, appears to be authentic, and, in fact, the handwriting on it has definitely been established as Lt. Nesbitt's. However, only the partially heard German broadcast remains as the basis for any hope for the other crew members mentioned. Furthermore, the possibility exists that additional crew members' names were broadcast, but were not overheard. This is the condition as it appears in regard to Lt. Carpenter's crew, as of this writing - 27 April 1944.
Kriegsgefangenenlager

March 14, 1945

Dear Miss Sandra Rawlins,

I am in good health and doing much better now. Don't worry as it will turn out good when the end comes. At least I am alive.

We are treated well and have food to eat. Be good and I mean it for I will return to make sure.

Love and regards,

[Signature]

Please write me soon.

Gepflegt, 22. -

Kriegsgefangenenpost

Mit Luftpost

Dear Miss Sandra Rawlins,

Lettre an eine andere Person.

Londres, Acton W3

Church Rd.

Versandort: London, Acton W3

Straße: Church Rd.

Land: England

Gebührfrei

Vor- und Zuname: J. B. Rawlins

Gefangenennummer:

Lager-Bescheinigung: Dari-Lucht

Deutschland (Germany)
On the 6th of May an aircraft piloted by 1st Lt. George Pipkin of the 496th Bombardment Squadron failed to return from a mission over Denmark. The other crew members were:


No further word was heard until------, when a message from the field arrived continue a successful drop, then, in the last week of May, approximately three weeks after the date of the mission, it was learned from London that two of the crew members had arrived safely in the United Kingdom. The two men were Lt. Holmes, bombardier, and T/Sgt. Mengert, radio operator. Colonel Helmin and Major Boone went to London immediately and brought back word that the two men were in the best of health and would soon be back to tell us of their experiences.

At the usual briefing of crews on 1 June, a man dressed in gaudy civilian clothes rose to say a few words. He wore a blue and white checked sports jacket, striped tie, tan trousers, blue shirt, and a blue hat with a cocky feather on the side. It was Lt. Holmes. He was greeted by enthusiastic applause, and when the clapping had stopped he described how happy he was to be back. He emphasized the importance of taking precautions daily before each mission.
On 3 June, Lt. Holmes gave the group an account of his experiences. A resume of these experiences follows.

The aircraft had left the target area, after successfully dropping its load, and was proceeding on course back in the direction of the Danish coast. Its altitude was 5000 feet. Suddenly, about 45 minutes after the aircraft had left the target a single anti-aircraft gun, undoubtedly equipped with radar, opened fire on the aircraft. Lt. Holmes, from his vantage point in the nose, saw clearly that only one gun was firing and that a total of five bursts were fired.

Everyone of the bursts struck home, but without injury, apparently, to any crew member. Number 3 engine caught fire and the flames spread rapidly to the gas tank. The pilot told the crew over the inter-phone that he would attempt to put the fire out and he began violent maneuvering. But whenever the aircraft leveled off, the fire flared up again. Then #4 engine caught fire. It was obvious that the fire was now out of control and the bailout alarm was sounded. This occurred about four minutes after the first attack.

When Lt. Holmes reached the bomber to jump, he found that the hydraulic system had been burned out. It was necessary then to kick open the doors. This was done largely by Sgt. Wengert. Lt. Holmes believes that all the crew members made the jump all right. If there was any question at all it would be about Lt. Pipkin who remained to the last minute studying so that the others could bail out. Lt. Van der Schraff had trouble with his "chute harness, but finally got the

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over the deck.

Lt. Holmes bailed out when the aircraft was at 2000 feet. He delayed to 2000 feet and then pulled the ripcord. He was bumped about when he hit the ground, until he managed to release himself from the 'chute harness. He found that he had landed in a sandy area, very near a small forest. The first thing he did was to hide his 'chute and arms. This was accomplished quickly, under sand and pine needles. Shortly after he hit the ground, he heard a great explosion and saw the fiery evidence that the aircraft had crashed.

Holmes knew that south of that night's target there were swamps and he decided that if there should be a search with bloodhounds, he would do well to make for these swamps, accordingly he set out in a southerly direction. About half an hour after he began walking he was hailed by someone behind a clump of bushes. Thinking he had been discovered by a German patrol, Lt. Holmes stopped short. Then he heard his name called. It was Sgt. Xangert, who had landed safely, buried his parachute and was engaged in figuring out his next move when he spotted Holmes.

The two men started off together in a southerly direction, they come to the swamps and waded along them. After a while, they could hear bloodhounds baying in the distance. They saw some animals, and their scent was never picked up. Approaching the outskirts of a town, they found a place to lie up in a hedge. They spread their clothes out to dry and stayed there all day. A farmer with his dog passed, but did not bother them. When darkness came, they
their plan was to get to the northeast to Sweden. They guided themselves by their compass and the north star.

In this manner, they walked for several days. They had decided to approach no more than two farmhouses a day, one in the morning and one at night. Following out this plan, they found that most people were friendly, gave them something to eat, but could offer no real help. The difference in language created a great obstacle.

The two men supplemented their diet by eating raw potatoes by drinking milk which they stole and by making the fullest use of the emergency rations in their escape kits.

One night, having skirted a town and crossed a trench about 20 feet wide and 12 feet deep, partly concealed by wood and trees, they came to a haystack close by a lonely little farmhouse. There they decided to spend the night.

The next morning, a woman appeared near their hiding place. One of the men called her over and they showed her their American Air Force Insignia. But they were unable to get her to understand anything except who they were. They gathered, however, that her husband spoke English. She brought them food and told them wait there for her husband. But when he arrived, he seemed frightened and did nothing but send the two men on their way.

The set off again. In five days they figured they had progressed exactly thirty miles. Although they had made no important contact, they had at least managed to avoid trouble. They considered this remarkable, in view of they were still...
wearing their green flying clothes, and their caps turned in and all insignia hidden. In this way they had been passed without question by a German motor convoy and by German motorcyclists.

They came to the house of a gate tender at a railway crossing. Here they were given a cup of coffee and a cup and a pair of trousers for one of them, and they were told something about where the Germans were.

That evening they arrived at a farmhouse where they were given supper with the farmhands. It was here that they made the very first contact with the underground. Someone told them of a man, whose name they interpreted as "Preston," who spoke English. The direction was pointed out to them. Anxious to follow up the lead, the two men walked all that night, on the open roads, tired and cold. They stopped, towards morning, and went to sleep in a haystack, near a farmhouse.

When the smoke, they approached the farmhouse. Here also they were told of the man who spoke English. While the two Americans were being fed by the wife, the farmer cycled off to get "Preston". The men attempted conversation with the wife, but it was impossible to understand. She went out of doors and one of the men followed her, still trying to get her to understand his questions. Following her turned out to be a serious mistake, because he was seen by one of the farmhands.

When the farmer returned with "Preston", the men found out that "Preston" was apparently the Danish word for minister. When the English-speaking minister had heard the whole story, he told the men that he was sorry, he might have been able to help them but the minister was not the right person.
nothing but turn them in to the police himself.

The man persuaded him at least to give them five minutes' start. The minister agreed to this and added that if they would hide out for two nights they could come to his house and perhaps he might find help for them. He gave them detailed instructions on how to reach his home, and asked for their identity papers.

The two men left the farmhouse in daylight, ran five miles to a haystack, where they hid for 36 hours. They knew that a search for them had been instituted, because they could hear the baying of bloodhounds.

When the proper length of time had elapsed, they left their hiding place and made their way to the minister's house. There they were fed and told that arrangements for their journey had been made. They were given civilian clothes and identity papers. They were told that the Germans had searched the minister's house and the farmhouse where they had first left him. It was clear that the talkative farmhand and indeed talked.

Holmes and Weingart were driven by car for two days in a northerly direction. They arrived at an isolated farmhouse where they were hidden away by a farmer who also spoke English. The driver of the car left to complete arrangements and the two men remained hidden in the farmhouse for four days.

During this time the English-speaking farmer told them about the work of the Danish underground. For the first
They were told that German patrol activity had increased and that the Dunes were losing three out of four committees.

At last, the two Americans were taken from the farmhouse and brought to the coast where they were smuggled into a boat bound for Sweden.

In Sweden, the two men stuck to their story that they were escaped prisoners of war and before long they were returned to England.
The following is an account given by Lt Simon on the manner in which he evaded capture by the Germans in France, and finally made his way to England.

During the night operation, 5 May 1944, our aircraft was set on fire by a night fighter. The rudder control, interphone and electrical systems were shot out. We suffered other damage and when I smelled gas fumes in the cockpit, I ordered the crew to bail out. The co-pilot remained in the ship until all others were out, then he jumped and I followed immediately.

Knowing our height at be around 5500 feet I counted 1000-2000-3000 as soon as the slipstream picked me up and then pulled the rip-cord. I was floating over a wooded area. In the full moonlight I could see the co-pilot. He yelled to ask me if everything was all right. I told him it was, but not to make so much noise. My chute lodged in a tree on the edge of the wood. Suspended a few feet from the ground, I unbuckled the harness and fell out of it. After a few tugs at the chute I left it, dropped my leg west and struck out on the run through the woods without choosing a direction. After 20 minutes I stopped to hide my flying pants and check my direction by my escape compass.

Since I knew my approximate location in the center of France, I turned due south, getting out of the wooded area as soon as possible. I then sought obvious places to hide.
and skirted a farmhouse to avoid the danger of barking dogs. An hour's time brought me to a country road lined with trees and brush which I followed in the shadow. I had covered about two miles when I thought I saw someone walking toward me. I fell to one knee and, thinking that I heard footsteps, rolled into the ditch. The ditch was a good place to spend the night. I slept intermittently until daybreak and was awakened when a farmer passed in a cart. I remained motionless but he glanced down at me and was startled. I called out, "Je suis américain", and received a nod of understanding, but he shook his head to tell me that he could not help. I put my finger to my lips to ask him not to give me away and he nodded agreement.

I crawled further along the ditch looking for a better hiding place. Workers in pairs were already in the fields and I thought it wise to catch one alone. Some time after the farmer had seen me a woman cycled by. She must have known I was there. Her glance signalled recognition, and again when I put my fingers to my mouth she seemed to understand.

Soon after she had gone, a man on a bicycle passed, looking in the ditch at me, pretending he did not see me and rode on. I was trying to find a way out of the ditch, unobserved by the field workers, when the man returned with civilian clothes and the rest of my journey arranged.

* * *

While he was being taken care of by the underground, Lit Simon spent two days hiding in the home of a Belgian noble.
confiscated all his property that area. It was the Italian chief who told Simon what had happened to the rest of his crew (see stories on Lt's. Red and Russell). He also gave Simon many examples of Nazi cruelty, how they had captured men of the Maquis and tortured them mercilessly, in an effort to gain information of the underground organization.

In the course of his evasion, Lt. Simon had to travel by train a great deal. This presented many problems, because invariably the trains were crowded with people, including German soldiers and Gestapo agents. As with most evaders, Simon employed the expedient of feigning sleep, in order to prevent being spoken to. But there were several narrow squeaks, when people would address him suddenly.

At one time, Simon and his guide were at a railway station, passing through a gate where tickets were being collected. People jostled so that Simon became separated from his guide who held both tickets. The guide went through the gate and continued on for a short distance. Then Simon came up to the guard at the gate. He had no ticket to show. The guard addressed him in excited French. Not understanding the drift of the guard's remarks and not being in a position to offer any rebuttal anyway, Simon did the obvious thing, and that was to bolt through the gate. He caught up with his guide and both of them continued on their way, without being questioned any further.

Another time, a Maquis group were caring for Lt. Simon and in the course of transporting him used a big, black automobile which they had taken from the Gestapo. This particular
group had performed many hair-raising exploits, such as liquidating eighteen German locomotives, capturing eight cars, seizing a truck-load of cigarettes, and wiping out uncounted German personnel.

* * *

4
Photograph taken by the Maquis of Lt. Simon's crashed airplane.
Lt. SI CIU'S CREW - BOMM SQUADRON

On 19 September 1943, Lt. Reitmeier, navigator on Lt. Siou's crew, returned safely to England. The following day, Sgt's Letta and Collier returned, making a total of five men who have returned safely from this crew. That happened to Lt. Hest is told in a separate story. And Sgt's Dunnill and Hasty, are known to be German prisoners of war. Hasty, who had been hit by flak, was being operated on in a hospital at Roanne, and while still under ether he was captured by the Nazis.

Many action on the night of 5 May has been described previously. However, Lt. Reitmeier brought back some additional information. The aircraft had been hit by 40 mm and 20mm flak from a flak train parked on a railway line ten miles north west of Nuremberg. The main gas tank was hit, the communication system was knocked out and flak came up between the navigator and bombardier, knocking out all the bomb fuses. Shells exploded in the left and right wing auxiliary tanks and fire began to rage throughout the airplane. All crew members succeeded in bailing out.

Reitmeier cleared the burning, crippled airplane, but could not get his parachute to open by pulling the ripcord. He struggled with the parachute and by pulling on the strings managed to get it to open. He was then 150 feet from the ground. The force of landing from that short distance rendered him unconscious. When he regained consciousness, he found that he was uninjured, save for the bruises he had suffered an landing.

[Image]
He immediately began walking.

He continued in an easterly direction until daybreak. Entering a wood, he discovered a vacant shed and he decided that would be a good place in which to hide for the day. Utterly exhausted, he slept the entire day. When evening came he found that his back was giving him a great deal of pain. Because of that and because it had begun to rain heavily, he determined to spend the night again in the shed. He built a fire and used branches of trees to blackout the shed. In all this time, Reitmeier had had nothing to eat except the melted milk tablets from his emergency kit. He was able to obtain fresh water from a stream near the shed.

Reitmeier remained in the shed until 1500 hours, 7 May. Then he decided to begin walking again. He set out and before long reached a town called Chenev-le-Châtel. He made a detour of the town and found himself on the road to Roanne. He had gone only a short distance on this road when he met three French boys. They appeared trustworthy and Reitmeier, feeling it was necessary for him to begin making contacts, took the chance of speaking to them and introducing himself. The three boys immediately led Reitmeier to a nearby house, where he was fed and given a place in which to sleep.

He slept for three hours and when he awoke was moved to Marsigny. He spent the night in the home of a patriotic family and the next day was hidden in a field. Throughout the day members of the family brought him food and drink. Finally at 0200 hours the following morning, a man came for Reitmeier. The two of them travelled overnight to Loddes, northeast of
Le Palais. Here they made their way to arrangements had been made for Reitmeier to stay. He lived in the farmhouse, in relative comfort and without incident, for a total of thirty-five days. During this time, attempts were made to obtain a forged passport for Reitmeier, but they failed. At last he decided to make his way without a passport.

He was given directions, and saying goodbye to the people who had proven so hospitable, he took his leave. He walked to the railway station at La Picardor and in accordance with the instructions he had received took a train to Roanne. The train stopped at the first station and a young girl got aboard. She walked through the train and when Reitmeier saw she was carrying the magazine which was the pre-arranged signal, he motioned to her. She sat down beside him and slipped him a note, written in English. The note stated that the girl was unable to speak English and that Reitmeier was to follow her. At Roanne the girl got up and left the train, Reitmeier trailing her at a short distance.

They left the railway station and were on a street. A man rode up on a bicycle and stopped abreast of Reitmeier. In English, the man said, "How ya doin', Buddy"? Reitmeier almost fell over. The stranger went on to explain that he was a British Secret Service agent and that he was to be known as "Googo".

Googo led Reitmeier to a house in Roanne owned by a man known as "Babe", who was a French Intelligence agent in charge of that district. It was at this house that Reitmeier...
had bailed out of the airplane without mishap, had been picked up by patriots and brought to Roanno.

Reitmeier and Head lived in Babe's house for a week. Then Head left and made his way to the Haquis. His subsequent exploits as a member of the Haquis will form a separate story in this history. Reitmeier remained in Roanno.

Three weeks went by. Then, three Gestapo men appeared suddenly, and seized Babe. As they were leading him out of the back door, Reitmeier escaped unnoticed through the front door. He walked hurriedly down the street and by chance met Goegoo, who was bicycling in the direction of Babe's house. Reitmeier told him what had happened. Goegoo took Reitmeier to a house in another part of the town. Reitmeier stayed for dinner, and at 1600 hours a man came for him and escorted him to the home of a patriotic dentist, where Reitmeier remained for the next two days.

At the end of that time the guide returned with bicycles. The two men rode to a rendezvous outside of the town. A truck was waiting for them, and they were driven up into the mountains to join the Haquis. There, Reitmeier found Head again.

Reitmeier remained with the Haquis. He could not take part with them, as Head was doing, in their activities, because his back was beginning to give him a great deal of trouble. His contribution, a valuable one, was to instruct classes in the use of the Winchester carbine.

One day, word came to the camp that Babe, one hour be-
been dealt with.

After Reitmeier had been with the Maquis for two weeks, one night an alert was sounded in the camp. Three heavily armed Milice had been seen approaching, feeling out the Maquis positions. Not wishing to reveal their positions by firing, the Maquis silently dispersed and hid out in a deep woods for the night. The next day, when they returned to camp, they decided that it would be best for Reitmeier whose back gave him a great deal of trouble in the mountainous terrain, to be sent to a place of safety. They believed that the reconnaissance of the previous night would lead to an attack in greater force.

Johnny Head knew of a farmhouse where Reitmeier could stay and so Reitmeier departed the Maquis camp, bicycling seven or eight miles to the farmhouse. It was situated near the village of Lac. Reitmeier was well received by the farmfolk and lived with them for a week and a half. But it was by no means a safe place. One day some German soldiers billeted in Lac began shooting at random throughout the village. Reitmeier was sitting in the living room of the farmhouse at the time, conversing with the daughter of the house, and a couple of bullets entered through a window. Fortunately, no one was injured and nothing came of the incident.

But it was decided that Reitmeier had best be moved again. He was therefore directed to the village of St. Polgne, and he made his way there in safety. He had been there a short time, when he heard news of the family with
he saw more eloquent testimony to the barbarism and brutality of those fascist collaborators with the Nazi occupationists.

Reitmeier met his benefactor Babo, again, and heard from him many accounts of torture witnessed by him.

When Lyon was liberated, shortly thereafter, Reitmeier went there and proceeded to an advanced Headquarters of the 12th Air Force, twenty miles east of Lyon. He was well treated, and at the first opportunity he was flown by B-25 to Salo and from there, by C-47 to Caserta, Italy. From there he was flown to Algiers, then to Casablanca. From Casablanca, Reitmeier flew to England.
Lt. Simon's Crew (Cont'd)

This is the story of what happened to Sgts Latte and Collier, two of the enlisted men on Lt. Simon's crew.

Sgt. Latte landed unhurt and after hiding his equipment immediately began walking. He walked for an hour and then found a hiding place in a wood. He remained hidden there that night and all of the following day. When night came, Latte left his hiding place and approached an isolated house. The people of the house readily agreed to help him. They fed him, gave him a place to sleep and the next morning had a suit of civilian clothes ready for him. Clothed in these, Latte set out again. He walked continually, with very few interruptions, for six days, trying to make contact with the resistance organization. Once he was stopped by gendarmes. They searched him, found his dog tags and knew immediately who he was. Fortunately, the gendarmes were patriotic Frenchmen, and they sent Latte on his way, giving him good advice on which roads to follow and which towns to avoid.

On the seventh day of his travels, Latte finally made a Maquis contact. From then on, he travelled with a Maquis group, moving from one hiding place to another. At last, on the 20th day of May, Latte reached a large Maquis encampment, situated in the comparative safety of the mountains. Here he found Sgt. Collier and seventeen other Allied airmen.

Collier had experienced several long, worried movements when he bailed out. His parachute had refused to open. He kept pulling hard at the rip-cord and finally, at an altitude
...a few hundred feet, his parachute opened. Collier landed all right, hid his parachute and began walking towards the southwest. He went on until daylight, when he saw people on the road and accordingly hid himself in a wood. He had been in his hiding place for only thirty minutes, when he saw a farmer who was engaged in rounding up his cows. The farmer spotted Collier and approached the hiding place. Collier, using his language card, explained who he was and waited for the Frenchman's reaction. The farmer said, "restez là," and went on to say that he would get in touch with the maquis. Then he left. In a short time he returned, bringing food, wine, blankets and whisky for Collier. Collier remained in his hiding place all day. At night the farmer returned with his wife, remained for a while chatting with Collier, and they told him that they had contacted the maquis. Then they left him, and Collier spent the night in his hiding place.

The next morning, the farmer returned with food and he moved Collier about 100 yards to a better hiding place. Toward evening of that day, a group of maquis appeared, carrying parts of Collier's wrecked airplane, which they asked him to identify. Then Collier was taken to a nearby farmhouse, where he was outfitted with civilian clothes and given a feather bed to sleep in.

Collier remained in this farmhouse for three days, after which time he was picked up in an automobile and driven for some distance to a town. After a stay of five days in...
train, truck and on foot to the Maquis camp where he met Latta. The roundabout journey to this camp took over two weeks.

For about a week Latta and Collier lived unmolested in the Maquis camp. Then, on 10 June, two divisions of Germans began an attack on the Maquis position. The group of Americans decided to leave, since they were anxious above all to return to their units. Accordingly, at midnight they slipped out of camp and walked all night, undetected by German patrols.

The next morning the group split itself into units of three and four men, in order to make escape easier. Latta, Collier and an 8th Air Force Major formed one such unit. The Major knew of a Frenchman who might be able to help them. The three men made their way to the home of this Frenchman. The latter showed his willingness to help the Americans, and he directed them to the secret hide-out of a Maquis group, consisting of from twenty five to thirty men. The major and two sergeants joined the group and remained with it for some time.

After the first two days, the Germans launched an attack and the Maquis, fantastically outnumbered, moved from their position. They walked for three nights, sleeping in woods during the day. At last they were out of the German's reach, but still the group kept moving. Latta and Collier with them. For the most part, the two sergeants did R.P. while the Maquis went about blowing up bridges and picking off
until 10 July, at which time they were transferred to another Maquis group. They were part of this latter group until 12 August. On this date, Letta and Collier, dressed in uniforms, took part in the liberation of a French town. They had been in the town only three hours, when they were told a guide was coming who would see that they got to England. They got out of their Maquis uniforms and into civilian clothes and waited, but the guide did not appear. At the direction of the Maquis chief, the two men were thereupon placed in the home of a patriotic farmer to await developments. On 19 August, word came that a guide would arrive for them from Paris, but he, too, never showed up.

Letta and Collier thereupon returned to the Maquis group. They remained until 31 August, when they decided to look up the 8th Air Force major with whom they had once travelled. As it turned out, this was an inspired idea. When they reached the major, they found that he had information of an assumed channel of escape. He invited the two sergeants to accompany him. They stayed with him for five days, waiting for a propitious time to begin their escape. Finally, on 6 September, the three men set out. They travelled by train to another town, where the Maquis awaited them. Then, in a captured German staff car, they were driven in style to the American lines.

In a matter of a few days, Letta and Collier were telling their story to S-2 at Harrington.
I landed in a wooded area, pulled my parachute down from the trees, and hid it and my west under some scanty brush. My first impulse was to look for Lt. Simon, to whom I had yelled on the way down, but I did not want to attract attention by yelling for him. I headed Northwest to get away from the plane, sticking to fields close to woods, as I had been told in S-2 lectures. It would have been faster on roads and I think just as safe since I landed at night. I walked cross-country until about 0430. I was wearing worn out oxfords, so that I had to keep on my flying boots. I could hardly have walked in anything worse. At daybreak I lay down in a field close to a dry lake bed, well surrounded by trees, and tried to go to sleep but could not.

I rested until 0600. I examined my escape kit and hid some of my flying equipment and my boots under brush. I put on my green shirt inside out, scuffed up my shoes as I had heard in S-2 lectures (I had to polish them again later in the day) and stuffed my escape equipment into the pocket of my flying jacket. At 0715 I walked to the first farmhouse, where a Frenchman was milking, and whistled for the road. I had in the meantime studied the phrase list enough so that I was able to explain that I was an American flier. The man took me to his wife and I had my first encounter with the impossible problem of trying to get a drink of water in
cited to eat. I sat there noticing that these people would not invite me to an underground group, but I could see that I was not making much headway. When I showed my map my host pointed out where I was and told me to go West, because there were a lot of Germans toward the East.

I was so tired that I did not think that I could last more than another hour. I went to a village cafe where I saw a couple of men drinking wine. The proprietress asked me what I wanted, and knowing nothing else to do, I pointed to a wine bottle, which I paid for with the smallest French bill I had. I knew that I could not walk far in the shoes that I had on that I should look for help early. But for the shoes I would have struck out on my own long since. When the proprietress was alone I showed her my crash bracelet and told her that I was an American flier. She fried some eggs for me and called in everybody who came along the street, just to show me off. I ate my eggs while half a dozen or so people watched. A little girl who was supposed to know English came with a dictionary. I showed her my phrase card and explained that I wanted civilian clothes. She declared that the soldiers knew that I was there and were coming for me, but I was hidden in a upstairs room and a woman brought me civilian clothes.

Later I was given a jug of wine, a loaf of bread, and some cheese, put on a bicycle, and told to follow a woman at some distance. We started out in the direction that the old peasant had warned us against going. We came to a main
and followed them. Soon they motioned for me to join them.

One of them seemed to know who I was. They took me to a couple of cafes for wine, at one of which a young fellow who spoke a little English took us out in the alley and asked what I wanted to do. I was a bit startled by the question but I explained that I wanted to go to England through Spain or by the saquís. I was not sure which to say. There had been a rumor at our group that if we got in with the saquís we could get out a quicker than by running for Spain. So I indicated interest in the saquís.

At another cafe a German officer and civilian were sitting at a table talking. The Frenchman told me that the civilian was a German from the United States. Some disturbance occurred outside and the Germans went out to see what was happening. My friend went over to steal a cigarette for me from the pack they had left on the table. The German officer returned just then and saw what he was doing. But the German had had enough drinks to be rather happy, so the Frenchman talked himself out of the difficulty, and the German gave him the cigarette. I saw the German officers at smoking the cigarette and my friend with a self-rolled one and came over to see what was going on. My friend gave another long explanation to cover this situation with the result that the Germans wanted us to come over and play cards with them. I nearly dropped through the floor at that suggestion and to my dismay my friend seemed rather willing to go over. I told him that it was absolutely out. The German insisted that we play, but the Frenchman finally talked him out of it. I think
time that we left. I was in a cold sweat. I was thankful if these people talked so much with the emphasis, for my French was almost nonexistent.

I was then taken to a place from which my journey was begun. I was moved to a number of places without making much progress toward Spain. Finally I was told that all the people who were keeping me were going to the Maquis, and no one was left who could give me shelter. I decided then to go to the Maquis myself. When we arrived at a town in Maquis territory and the people heard that Americans were there, the whole town turned out for us, singing Tipperary and other songs and piling us with souveniers. There I met Lt. Cater.

There was great excitement when we heard of the Normandy landing. A few days later we heard rumors of imminent German attacks against the Maquis in our section. Late in the evening of 12 June we heard that a German division was on the road some three kilometers away. We had been told that we would be warned in case of attack, but we knew that German attacks had taken place before without warning. We had also discovered that the dispersal plans seemed to cover the disappearance of everyone but us. When we got reliable but unofficial news that the Germans were close, we thought that we had better be moving. We held council of war to decide what we would do. The Allied officer who was more or less the senior of our group of airmen knew of a cave and thought that we should hide there a couple of days and see how the attack progressed, confident that the Germans could not find
not think this a good plan. We thought that if the situation
was bad enough to require leaving from our hiding place,
which was an excellent one, we had better leave the area
entirely. If I left the area, I had no intention of coming
back. After considerable discussion a couple of men went over
to take a look at the cave, and decided that it was unsuit-
able. The whole group of us packed up our stuff and left this
Maquis section early in the morning of 11 June 1944.

We saw some villages turning in the section which we
had left. After we had walked some distance we were well
out of the Maquis territory, we had another conference. Most
of the men did not know what to do and were inclined to stick
with the senior Allied officer, whose plan was to wait in
the woods for a couple of days, living on the country, and
then to move back into the Maquis section when things quiet-
ed down. I wanted to leave on my own, and a couple of Raf
men wanted to do the same thing. Lt. Carter had already de-
cided to go also, so the four of us left together.

We found supper, bed, breakfast, and a map at a farm-
house. A friendly peasant told us that no Germans were in
the town which we were near. On another occasion a woman
with the help of a little boy who spoke English showed us
where to go. Once we hid from a truck, only to run into the
drivers in the cafe in the next village. They turned out to
be friendly and wanted us to join Maquis group toward
which they were heading. By that time we had had enough of
the Maquis group, but we thought that we might go along and.
journey on our own. We were taken to a very friendly hotel, but after a couple of days we learned by chance that they had no real connections, things also did not seem to be going well for the Maquis, and we decided that we had better leave. By this time we decided that four men traveling together were much too conspicuous, so we left the two RAF men.

We walked a considerable distance, taking great pains to keep well separated while going through towns. We went by train to one town looking for people with whom I had stayed before. We were unable to find the people and were sheltered by some farmers. We took a train to another place and approached a house at which I had stayed, taking care not to give the people away or to get into wrong hands if the people were gone. My friends were still there and were once again most helpful. They got identification papers for Lt. Cater, laid out a route for us, and gave us suggestions for travel. They also gave us a paper saying that we were deaf and dumb and wanted a ride, and told us to stop cars and show this note. We knew that cars with gasoline equipment were very unlikely to be turned. Training as deaf and dumb, however, seemed to us likely to attract attention. We were taken to a hotel for the night and the next morning were put on an early train which we were told had no control. Some Militia men, however, came through checking papers, and we passed this test all right.

After a long ride on a slow train which stopped at nearly every station, we descended foot along many roads...
erable distance we took another train, when we got off we
noticed everybody rushing up to get some sort of pass from
a controller, apparently because the maquis were active in
the section and strangers needed paper to certify their
genuineness. It seemed just a routine operation, so we que-
ued up, but about the time we reached the controller he start-
ed asking questions. That seemed too difficult, so we left
and took the shortest way out of town. After a considera-
dle distance we found shelter at a farmhouse where we were told
that we were again in a maquis controlled section. This
group did seem to have some connections, so we decided to
stick around. For a number of days we lived comfortably in
maquis controlled towns, well entertained as Americans.
Ex-collaborators wanted to show that they were good for some-
thing and opened up their stores of wine, which we spent a
good deal of time drinking. From there we were taken to a
place from which the rest of our journey was arranged.

* * *

Lt. Russell was one of the two American pilots brought
back to England in the Dakota operation of 6 July 1944.
Russell therefore became the first Air Forces man to be re-
turned from the interior of France since D-day. He brought
cumbersome information back with him which was considered of
vital importance by SHAEF Intelligence.

Russell also had information about the two members of
his crew who are prisoners of war. Lt's Dumesnil and Hasty.
Hasty landed in a tree, after taking his parachute jump and
injured his foot, so that he was easily captured. Dumesnil,
who spoke French proficiently, probably made the mistake of asking for civilian clothes in that language when he approached a farmhouse, after landing from his jump. This was a mistake, because the Germans sometimes sent out cross-dressing as Allied fliers, in order to snare sympathetic French people. These Nazi agents speak French, and the French people are therefore suspicious of anyone claiming to be an Allied airman and speaking French. When Luwesnil called at the farmhouse, the woman he spoke to became suspicious and thinking he might be a Nazi agent, called the gendarmes. Even then there might have been a chance for Luwesnil to escape, because, of the four gendarmes who had arrived, two were sympathetic and in favor of letting Luwesnil go. But the two pro-Nazi gendarmes over-rulled them, and Luwesnil was arrested.

Lt Russell was in France for a total of nine weeks. During this time, he traveled between 300 and 400 miles, or which he walked 200 miles. Approximately 400 French people, Russell estimates are involved in his evasion of the Germans — involved even if it was only to the extent of giving his food or a night's shelter, so that their lives would be in jeopardy if the Germans knew about that involvement.

At one time, Russell had been walking steadily for about a week with Lt. Cater (the "Jim" of the Luxembourg story). They landed by chance into a town, which they soon discovered was swarming with Luftwaffe personnel, since a German airfield was located just outside of the town. Cater and Russell were both dressed to look like German.
a spot and spent the night sheltered in a farmhouse on the outskirts. They were told at the farmhouse that getting out of town had been a very wise step, in such as just the day before, two men had been shot as they stepped out of a train in the town. The Germans hadn't asked any questions, they just shot the two men, simply because the men "looked as if they were going to join the Maquis." With increasing nervousness Lt. Russell heard his host add that the two men had answered closely to a description of himself and Lt. Cater.

When Russel1 and Cater were finally in the hands of the Maquis, they made a couple of Maquis forays. It was a highly dangerous business, because as Russell put it, the Maquis "go looking for trouble", and they never consider stopping at the barricades placed across roads by the Nazi. The job of the two Americans was to sit in the back-seat of the automobile used in the foray, armed with sub-machine guns and acting as a sort of tail-gunner team. No trouble was encountered, which was rather a relief for Russell and Cater, under the circumstances.

* * *

25
Lt. John B. Lunn, known familiarly as "Johnny," everyone in the Group who knew him, was a bombardier in the 95th Squadron (then the 406th Squadron). He had been in the Carpetbagger Project from its inception, and was considered one of the most skillful practitioners of Carpetbagger bombardiering. One of his closest friends was Captain Robert S. Sullivan, the Group Intelligence Officer, whom he and his wife, Dorothy, had known back in the States.

For four months, Johnny Lunn flew on Carpetbagger missions, contributing his particular bit to the growing success of the Group. And then, on 5 May 1944, it happened. The aircraft, piloted by Lt. Simon, in which Lunn was bombardier, failed to return from a mission to France.

The whole group was saddened by the news. Everyone knew he would miss good-looking Johnny Lunn, his friendly smile, his enthusiasm, his drawling speech. Captain Sullivan wrote to Dorothy, offering what consolation he could, telling her not to give up hope. But three weeks went by, and no further word was heard. As each day went by it became more difficult to hope.

Then, on 29 May, something happened. An 85th aircraft piloted by Lt. Lunn, was engaged on a mission to a point deep within central France, in the vicinity of the town of Roanne. As the aircraft circled the target area, the Radio Operator, T/Sgt. Clarence H. Brown, succeeded in establishing an S-phone contact. He was somewhat surprised that the voice came back in perfectly unbroken English.
Perhaps because the voice from the ground had a noticeably southern drawl, Brown replied, "Neither, we're Yankees."

"Who's your pilot?" the voice then asked.

"Lt. Lunn," Brown replied.

"Well, I'll be damned!" the voice said. "Tell him hello. Tell everybody hello. This is Johnny Lunn."

Startled almost to the point of speechlessness, Sgt. Brown managed to ask Lt. Mead how he and the rest of the crew were. The answer came that everyone was perfectly all right. Mead would not give any details over the S-phone regarding the evasion or discovery by the underground.

By this time, Lt. Lunn's aircraft was in a position to make its dropping run. Lt. Mead gave detailed instructions from the ground, and a perfect completion was accomplished. When the drop was completed, and Lt. Mead had acknowledged that it was a good one, he instructed that the Radio Operator tell Colonel Hefflin that "The Colonel's doing a good job too."

Nothing more was heard from Mead until 4 July, when a wireless telegraph message came over one of the circuits from the French underground, saying that John Mead was in charge of a group of French and an able assistant to the senior commander.

The next day, 5 July, Captain Sullivan was telling this story in the Intelligence Office at Hurlington. As he talked, an orderly brought in an unsigned letter from America.
Dorothy, asking for some crumb of information about Johnny.

But Dorothy will have to wait and suffer until Johnny returns from working with the Secret Army, or until the war is over, because to tell her anything now would break a stern security rule which protects Johnny and thousands of others - British and American soldiers and French Guerrillas.

In the meantime, Johnny lead is running true to join and is a good guerrilla - a soldier in the Secret Army of France.

* * *

28
JOURNEY TO JOHNNY MEAD

In the middle of October, after Carpetbagger operations had ceased and while 492nd personnel (including Johnny Mead) were engaged in a special mission in France, the Group Histori-ian flew to the Haute-Savoie to interview Mead. The bombardier turned Maquis was altogether too reticent about his exploits. He was first of all reluctant to describe incidents in which his role could be construed as "heroic." He shuddered at the thought of appearing dramatic or heroic. Moreover, he did not wish to submit for permanent record any facts which his chiefs, the British agents "Geeges", "Victor" and "D'Arrien" had included in their official reports, since he considered this a breach of discipline. This account, therefore, is the historian's own recollection of Mead's informal, off-the-record conversation. It must not be interpreted as a definitive report of the activities carried on by the Maquis group of which Mead was a member.

* * *

First of all, Mead was able to supply the last word to the story of how his airplane, piloted by Lt. Simon, was brought down. It was on 5 May 1944, at 0032 hours, twenty kilometres North of Cheney le Chatel, altitude 1200 feet, that the airplane was shot down by twelve 20-millimetre flak guns mounted on a troop train. The train, at the time, was blacked out and not in motion. Immediately after the airplane was hit, a German telegraph, tapped by the French Resistance, sent out a message as follows: "Enemy aircraft fired on and damaged to such an extent should fall in near vicinity."
Mead bailed out at 700 feet. It was a good jump and he landed on his feet in a cow pasture. Unhooking his parachute, Mead hid it, his Mae West and his harness. Then he lit a cigarette and attempted to get his bearings. At that moment he heard an explosion and looked up to see his airplane blow up and go down in flames. Immediately, Mead took out his escape kit, removed the compass and began walking in a southerly direction.

Daylight found him in a populated area near Vivans. He began to think of getting help and to that end he approached an isolated house. Meeting a farmer near the house, he introduced himself with the aid of his language card. The farmer showed a willingness to help. Mead asked if there were any Germans nearby, and the farmer replied in the negative. Then they entered the house, and while Mead was given food and drink, the farmer sent his daughter in search of assistance. In this way, contact was made with the Resistance.

Mead remained in this house until 9 May. Then he was called for by the British agent known in the field as "Victor", and the two men journeyed on bicycles to a secret Maquis headquarters in Rennes. In the course of their conversation, Victor told Mead that he was short handed and would like Mead to remain in France and work with him. Mead expressed a willingness to do so. And so, when they reached Rennes, Victor despatched a coded wire to London requesting that Mead be permitted to remain and help the Resistance in that area.

Mead remained hidden in Rennes until late May, when an answer arrived from London, requesting your XX55078 (Mead's
Army serial number) keep him?" And from that time on, until
the final liberation of France, Mead stayed and worked in the
Resistance as an assistant to the British agents who were chief
of Resistance forces in that area.

At this time the organization was primarily concerned with
sabotage, but it was decided that Mead could work as instructor
of American equipment, thereby laying the foundation for be-
ginning an active Resistance unit. To this end, quantities of
material were requested from London and delivered by air, large-
ly by Carpetbagger crews. By a remarkable turn of events, Mead
found himself on the ground as leader of a reception committee,
instead of in the air pinpointing the dropping ground.

Receptions were set up in the following manner. Six men,
armed with tommy guns and grenades, stood on guard one kilometre
from the ground, three more men were stationed a half kilometre
away and at the ground itself were five men. Then, when the
airplane was in the target area, the men from the outer ring
were called in to assist in the reception. The drops, Mead
said, were generally good. Only someone who has been at a
reception can appreciate the anticipation with which the French
people awaited the loads. Though the danger was extreme, even
mothers of families would come, just to see the drop. It was at
one of these receptions that Mead spoke over the S-phone to Lt.
Munn's crew.

After a drop was completed, and the packages and containers
had been collected, Mead and his men would transport the load
into Ronne, usually by ox-cart. Once, when a drop had been made
at night as Mead was beginning to get little, Mead described how
into Roanne, which was then garrisoned by 2,000 Germs. His lap was resting a machine-gun. Looking back at this incident, Mead could hardly believe that no evil consequence had befallen this overt indication of resistance, but none had.

The resistance used the abandoned warehouse of a textile factory in Roanne as a warehouse and assembly shop. Here they clandestinely stored the material they had received by air, unpacked, cleaned and assembled it. Mead, at the time, was living in the home of a prominent engineer. Every day, dressed in civilian clothes, he would walk to work at the warehouse. The route he chose to walk was past a German barracks, because it had been found that that was one place where no one was ever stopped for questioning. All of Mead's papers were in order, even to a bicycle-tax receipt. He had French pin-up girls in his billfold, and he carried a lunch-basket complete with a bottle of wine (of course, a Sten gun was credited at the bottom of the basket). If he had been stopped, his papers would have identified him as Jean Noel Dumbret, a deaf-mute.

On 26 June, Mead was commissioned to take active charge of a small unit, and he moved out of Roanne into a mountain headquarters, sixteen kilometres Southeast of Roanne. There he formed a unit known as "Maquis Violette." The FFI name for the unit was "Groupe de Fregny." From this time on, Mead operated in his capacity of instructing the men in American field equipment and in basic military tactics. Moreover, sabotage activities were carried out from this headquarters. Johnny Mead was getting to be a dyed-in-the-wool guerrilla.
On 13 July Mead received the following telegram:

"Congratulations on your good work and regards from your Colonel and your friends. Signed Heflin."

"Maquis Violette" was attacked in force by German troops and Vichy French Milice on 21 July. The group was forced to withdraw and to disband. But in accordance with pre-arranged plans, the men of the group rendezvoused a week later at another position near Pic de Rochefort, thirty kilometres Southwest of Roanne. At this time the Germans, faced with disaster in the North, were intensifying their attacks against the Maquis throughout the rest of France. The Maquis were re-organized into small, compact groups of men who were by now well trained; and Mead was moved with his group to work the area Northwest of Roanne. Here, Mead and his group began intensively to interfere with German communications, and to engage in road, telegraph and railway sabotage.

At Fragny, the group of twenty-eight men led by Mead found themselves on a hill surrounded by German forces. The first information Mead received was that a patrol of thirty Germans was moving up the hill towards him. Instead of retreating in the face of such a small force, Mead decided to defend his position. He gave the order to fire. Unfortunately, the information he had received proved, as usual, to be incorrect, because after four minutes of continuous firing he observed that his position was surrounded by close to six hundred Germans. Mead decided to lead his men in a break-through to safety. Cautiously, the Maquis slipped down the hill as the Germans
moved up. At the bottom of the hill was a field and at the edge of the field a road, Highway 82, ran. The Germans had fast cars, armed with machine-guns patrolling the road. Led by Mead, the Maquis group crawled across the field. Mead waited until the cars were at the greatest distance from his position, and then gave the signal. The men leaped across the road. One armored car swung sharply around and opened up with its machine-gun. Mead could hear the bullets whistling about his ears. But his Maquis aide, an Alsacian, stood up and fired his tommy-gun. The German machine-gun was silenced.

Mead's group had suffered casualties, but he had led most of his men to safety. Mead himself, however, was not yet out of danger. He and his staff of four were being hotly pursued by six Milice. Mead and his men headed for the Loire. At his order, the four men split up, two going North and two South. Mead and his Alsacian aide were together. Reaching the Loire, and still pursued, they dove in and swam, under fire from the Milice, the two hundred feet to the opposite shore. They reached safety and later rendezvoused with the rest of the group.

At Tarare, Mead led a unit of sixty men, part of a force of three hundred and sixty, in an attack against twelve hundred Germans. Displaying a brilliant command of field tactics, Mead disposed his small force so skillfully that they succeeded in demoralizing and routing a large group of Germans, preventing them from retreating, and driving them into the hands of Canadian paratroopers. When
Mead entered Tarare he found the bodies of nine French-women and three Frenchmen. Mead discovered the cause of their death. It seems that they had been driving down a road and had been shot in cold blood by a retreating German officer.

This is only one example of German atrocities to which Mead can personally attest. At St. Yan he saw the bodies of thirty unarmed men who had been slaughtered at the entrance to the town's hotel. And at St. Gingolph there were the 800 people, of all ages, massacred in a church. This is quite beside the instances of individual torture, the mutilated, burned and broken bodies of Mead's own comrades who had fallen into German hands.

Finally, on 20 August, as the Allies advanced in France, the efforts and sacrifices of the Resistance bore its final fruit. Rennes was evacuated by the Germans and all German control in the area ceased. On 23 August, Mead received the following wire: "Advise me present work not in line of duty. Suggest you return immediately if possible. Don't take any chances. Signed, Heflin." This wire may seem to cast a dubious light on Mead's stay in France. Actually, USSTAF had issued secret orders that he remain and work with the Resistance. That is why Colonel Heflin's wire was not in the form of a direct order, but was rather a "suggestion" that Mead return "if possible."

At any rate, the Germans were cleared out and the work of the Resistance in that area was at an end. On 24 August, therefore, Mead joined Lt. Reitmeier, who had been the navigator on Lt. Simon's crew (see story of Lt. Reitmeier's evasion).
in Reims. They remained there until the roads were cleared, and on 5 September left for Lyon together. From Lyon they went to Ambérieu and from there they caught a ride in a B-25 to Salon. From Salon they flew in a C-47 to Caserta, Italy, arriving on 8 September. Mead was interviewed by General Cabel, Headquarters MAF, who requested that Mead return to France to aid in the work of the Air Force Recovery Unit. On 10 September, Mead received orders from General Spaatz, placing him on detached service with ACRU #2 for an indefinite period. So Reitmeier went on to England, and Mead, after cabling the news of his survival to Dorothy, his wife, returned to France.

Mead's activities with ACRU #2 will form the basis for another story in a later installment of this History. Johnny Mead returned to England, at last, on 4 November, to find that it was now Captain John E. Mead. Moreover, he had been recommended for a Silver Star "for gallantry in action against an armed and determined enemy, while engaged in a special assignment with the French Forces of the Interior."

There is no better way to conclude the story of "Johnny Mead - Guerrilla" than to quote the closing lines of that recommendation.

"During his stay in France under the occupation, Captain Mead upheld the best traditions of the U.S. Army. His initiative, daring and courage, while engaged in combat with the enemy, reflect the highest credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of the United States."
We were shot down by flak. The plane crashed, and a couple of us were thrown out. We walked south several miles, and slept the rest of the night in a gully, where we also stayed all the next day. That night, some Frenchmen who had seen us, brought us bread. We continued walking, lay up in a shed on the edge of a town, and spent the next day there. In the evening, a girl who had come upon us, gave us food. At nightfall we continued our journey southwards, and rested part of the night in a barn.

The third morning, we approached an old man. He said that the women of the village would take care of us. We were led down the main street of the village, still dressed in flying clothes, and taken in, out of sight. We were then given civilian clothes and taken to a house from which our journey was arranged.

However, when I got down in the South of France, something went wrong with my helper's connections. I was given a railway ticket to another town and continued towards Spain on my own. After the train ride, I walked out of the town and spent the night in bushes by a river. The next morning I made the mistake of walking to the Northeast. I spent the night outside a village and was told to take a bus to a town where I could find directions for getting to Spain. The bus, however, went only as far as the town at which I left the railway. So I continued walking South, and was taken in by
I walked to the town to which I had been directed. I was fed by a peasant, and went on to a town farther to the South. On the way, a French Gendarme checked my identity papers and asked me where I was going. When I told him, he asked me why I was going there. "To work," I explained, and my identity card said I was a blacksmith. The Gendarme laughed and let me go. I spent an uncomfortably cold night in a shed.

I walked all the next day and spent that night in a sheepfold. About ten O'clock next morning, a woman took me in and fed me. She explained that it was dangerous to be found in the "Zona Interdita" along the Spanish border, which I already knew from P/T lectures. This woman kindly arranged for a guide to take me over the mountains.

Lt Kelly's experiences also included some rather humorous situations which he found himself involved in. Or at least, they seem humorous in retrospect. Every moment spent in occupied France can be only tense and ominous.

At one point in his journey, Kelly was being led through Paris. His guide entered a subway, and Kelly followed. When it came time to enter the train, Kelly was lagging a bit behind, so that the doors closed upon the seat of his trousers. Reacting instinctively, Kelly said, "Whoa, there!" in a loud voice, and in English. He found himself facing a trainful of raised eyebrows, but fortunately, all the people on the train must have been sympathetic, because no one spilled the
Another time, while Kelly and a group of other Americans were being hidden by the women who eventually arranged for the guide, the question of having a fling with the local "Girls" arose. All the Americans were heartily in favor of the idea. The Frenchwoman was amused and remarked that the fresh eggs she had been feeding the Americans would make them "too strong". But, in a more serious vein, she explained it would be dangerous, because any girl she might get would probably boast to their German customers that they had been with Americans.

Lt. Kelly's guide over the Pyrenees into Spain was a capable enough fellow, but somewhat eccentric. This was especially evident when he had consumed an excess of wine, for which he had an inordinate propensity. At one time, after they had finally crossed the frontier, the slightly tipsy guide led Kelly three miles out of the way, merely to show him a stone marker indicating the boundary between France and Spain. Under the circumstances, and having walked innumerable miles, Lt. Kelly admits that he was by no means appreciative of his guide's sight-seeing tendencies.
Evasion in France

On the night of July 4-5, 1944 the Liberator piloted by Lt. John J. Meade and crew as follows:

1st Lt. John J. Meade, Pilot
2nd Lt. James L. Lovelace, Co-Pilot
2nd Lt. Gerald E. Mitchell, Navigator
2nd Lt. John D. Bonnin, Bombardier
S/Sgt. William R. Dubois, Jr., Tail Gunner
T/Sgt. Edward J. Jones, Radio Operator
T/Sgt. Frank F. Hines, Engineer
S/Sgt. Ellis H. Syra, Waist Gunner

failed to return from an operational mission over France. During the last week of August five members reported individually into the Intelligence Headquarters at London, England. All five had successfully evaded capture by the Germans in France. Through their resourcefulness and the assistance of the French Underground these men returned to fly and fight again. Their stories follow.

1ST LT. JOHN J. MEADE, PILOT

On the night of July 4-5, 1944 we were flying at approximately 7000' approximately 30 to 40 miles South of Paris. At 0030 o'clock we were attacked from 7 o'clock low by one ME 110. Our tail gunner S/Sgt. Ellis H. Syra was shot in this attack and went down with the ship.

It seemed the entire bomb bay was enveloped in flames and #2 engine was out. I gave the alarm to bail out and all the men jumped with the exception of Syra who had been shot. The ship was in a dive and I pulled her up before bailing. All the men landed safely with the exception of Co-pilot 2nd Lt. James L. Lovelace who apparently collapsed his chute when he

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by Frenchmen who later showed me his grave, the wreckage of
the plane, and described to me how the plane had headed di-
rectly towards their village, burning and diving and how by
some miracle (they believed it was me in the ship) it had
pulled up and cleared the town before crashing.

I landed in a clump of cherry trees scrambled out of my
chute and Mae West and ran like Hell. I ran directly into a
marsh and fell down, got up, turned around and ran the other
way for approximately 4 hours. I knew the Germans would
search the area and I wasn't going to be there. I came upon
a small woods so decided to hide. I stayed until 11 o'clock
the next morning, then went down a lonely road and stopped a
Frenchman in a horse drawn cart.

I used my phrase card from my escape kit and he advised
me to stay hid! His sons later came back with food and civil-
ian clothes for me and took me to a cave near their home while
they contacted an organization in the town. I spent approxi-
mately three hours in the cave when the sons returned and I
followed them for about an hour. We came to a road where I
was picked up in a car and taken to town, here I was hidden
for one week in a house.

After one week I was taken out to a farm where a party
had been planned and there I met Lt. Bonnin, Sgt Dubois, Sgt.
Jones, and a Lt. Lafferty, lst Pilot on a B-17. We stayed
at the farm that night and had one big party, plenty to eat
and plenty to drink.

Next day Lt. Bonnin and myself returned to the home where
I had been staying and spent some 6 or 9 days there. By this
It was a bright moonlight night and although we tried to lose the ME 110 in the clouds we didn't have a chance. We had a run away gun in the tail and were only able to fire a few bursts.

Lt. Mitchell and I went out at the same time and I saw him land about a mile from me. I know he got down okay but I haven't heard anything since.

I hit hard and hurt my leg a little but hid my chute and Mae West and walked for about 5 miles. I saw a man working in the field so I contacted him and he took me over to his house. I was fed well and given civilian clothes and given a place to sleep and get some rest. In the meantime he contacted another party and I later walked to the next town with this party. Here I stayed two days in one room and I think the worst thing of all was the total of 5 days I spent alone looking at 4 walls in a room.

While I was in this town the Gestapo came and searched the place. I was given a bicycle and with a Frenchman we rode to the other town where I hid out in a hayloft for 3 days. After 3 days I was brought back on bicycle to the original home where I met Sgt. Jones and Lefferty, the B-17 pilot. We were all taken by car to the farm house for the party mentioned by Lt. Meads. From there on our stories are the same.

The Frenchman asked for identification and examined my dog tag and escape kit.
The next morning I walked all the way until noon and hid out for the day. When night approached it began to rain and I walked for 10 or 12 miles until I became tired. I crawled under a bush for the remainder of the night and tried to keep dry without much success.

Next morning I went over to a farmers barn and hid out until about noon. I approached him in the lot and asked for some food and in return received two raw eggs. He directed me to the south west and again I walked almost all night finally stopping in a clump of trees to remain for the next day.

A farmer was plowing in a nearby field and as I was pretty tired and very hungry I approached him, telling him I was an American and needed food. That afternoon he brought me bread, meat, cheese, wine and cherries. When night approached I took off again on a South East compass heading. I crossed a canal and was going to cross a main road when some farmers stopped me and told me that Germans were in that direction and that there were Americans about 5 miles the other way.

I walked back to some woods as the weather was getting bad, and asked some farmers for help. They gave me a good meal and fixed me a place to sleep in the barn. They also advised me not to go to the town to which I had been directed as it was occupied by Germans. As it was so far to go around the town I decided to head back the other way walking approximately 55 kilometers, all thru the forest.
In Paris four of us shared one room and the food situation was not good. We had 2 meals a day consisting principally of macaroni and the only toilet facilities consisted of a bucket in the corner which the madam emptied. We did have a radio and listened to the news broadcasts. We heard how the Americans were at St. Lo and the British at Caen.

We took walks in the evening and I saw quite a bit of Paris. The Jews all wore yellow stars on their clothing. I saw the Arch de Triumph, Grand Palace, Eiffel Tower, and other famous spots.

One evening I was taken to a French Restaurant for dinner. I was taken by two girls with a younger sister and brother. We had steak and potatoes from the black market. I was told the Germans hadn't been paid for a month and many were pawning personal items for money. There were reports of skirmishes about Paris between the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht. Curfew was at 0100 in the morning at first then changed to 2000 hours.

When we heard the Americans were advancing towards Chartres we decided to head that way. We were put on the right road and followed a French youth. We were stopped once, by a Boche Captain and we told him we were headed for Chartres to see the youth's father who was a doctor. The German said he didn't bu-
before we got there.

We contacted a Spaniard in Chartres who hid us out for 2 days then we hid in a French home for 3 days. Later we were placed in a camp in the woods with approximately 150 other airmen hiding and waiting for the American army.

One day I went into Chartres to buy vegetables and saw a jeep with an American Colonel and caught a ride back to Corps Headquarters. He sent two trucks to pick up the men in the woods. We were interrogated at the Corps Headquarters, then sent to a PW camp, later we were flown out from a beach landing strip in a C-47 on the 19th of August.

I will never forget the day of liberation in Chartres. Frenchmen roamed the streets with a hand grenade in one fist and cognac in the other. I saw them shaving the heads of the Collaborationist. The people went wild and their joy at the sight of the Americans was unlimited. I saw some old people sitting in chairs in front of a demolished house waving at the Americans, and one time a sniper opened up from a church. An American half track going down the street with lightning precision turned its turret around and in a matter of seconds there was no sniper and very little of the church left.

* * *
and very hungry. Two Freonhman were picking cherries, so I asked them for food and they took me to their home a short distance away, fed me and we conversed a little in German. I told these people I was an American Maquis and the youth to whom I had been conversing in German went to the nearby village to contact the local Maquis. Later, an English speaking Maquis accompanied him on the return. This man took me home with him where I stayed for three days.

After three days I was shifted to another home for three days, then to another for four days. During this time, the local Maquis chief had contacted higher authority and I was moved to a forest where a Maquis camp was set up. I stayed with this organization approximately three weeks. As camp life was dull I decided to return to the village and join the local resistance movement there.

The local resistance group armed and clothed me and I worked for them stealing automobiles. On one occasion, an Australian and I were working together on a job. We were driving one car and towing another when a thunderbolt decided to give us a strafing. He did a thorough job, raining the car we had by direct hits into the engine.

I was provided with civilian clothes by this resistance group and while I was in town, the Germans attacked the other camp in the woods.

The Americans were getting much closer now and one day a patrol came into the village and shot up the place. The local resistance movement immediately grew very strong and took complete charge of the village forcing all Germans out.
One of the Americans who came into the town was a Lieutenant. I spoke to him in English. I stayed on a couple days after this contact, then hooked a ride on a jeep back to headquarters.

Later, I was given a ride on a truck into Le Mans where I received an American uniform from the airdrome Squadron. I was then taken by jeep to headquarters of the 9th Air Force and returned to England by C-47 plane, arriving August 25th.

While I was in the hands of the resistance group I was told that Lt. Lovelace and Sgt. Syra had been killed and they also told me where they were buried. I couldn't find out anything about Lt. Mitchell.

* * *
I had landed in a small field which I thought was water on the way down, and landed pretty hard. I immediately hid my chute and Mae West in a line of trees which ran along the field and started running toward the North.

After running and walking for about 2 hours I hit a farm yard hedge row and dogs started to bark. A woman came out of the house and took me inside. She then called in a neighboring farmer who asked for my dog tags and examined my escape aids. They were all very poor people and plenty scared. After about an hour they showed me a farm about a mile away and told me to go there, taking me part of the way.

I went to this large farm and sat in the farm yard a long time too scared to attract attention. It was about 0530 hours when I finally knocked on the door. The folks let me in and were very nice to me. They gave me civilian clothes and fed me and I also met here another flier who had been shot down 5 months previous. As the Jerries were now searching the area the farmer took us to a woods to hide where we stayed until about 1400 hours.

I stayed approximately three weeks in this general area and was passed around from house to house all the time. While I was here I was taken to the party at the farm house where I met Lt. Meade, Lt. Bonnin, Lt. Laffery and Sgt. Jones.

After the party Laffery, Jones and myself were taken in a German truck with a tank engine fixed up by the French to a neighboring village. From this village we were later taken by two resistance men by truck to Paris. While in
Paris we were taken on a tour of the city and got to see a bit of the town. We were split up here and I was taken to the suburbs where I lived for about 2 weeks.

One day, another fellow who was there with me and myself got pretty restless so we took off for the city. We had an address of an organization which we looked up and we were put up in a private home. We stayed here until the troops came into the city.

There were about 10 Americans living in this flat and we exercised by walking in the garden at night. They never fired a pass for me because they were afraid I would take off. We were well fed and cared for though.

At night I could look out and see the flash of guns. The people were very nervous as the Gestapo were searching many houses. There were skirmishes and shooting in the streets and when the troops did come in the people I was staying with were afraid to let me go. I finally hopped out of a window and contacted a Lt. Col. Stephens of the Signal Corps who was taking pictures. He steered me to other contacts and I was sent South of Paris to a PW camp where I was interrogated. I was then sent to Normandy and flown out by C-47.

I arrived in the United Kingdom August 30th and saw Lt. Meade and Lt. Bonnin's names on the board at Intelligence Headquarters in Brook Street. I later ran into Sgt. Jones and Sgt. Hines at the Columbus club. It was great to be back.
I was hidden in a garage behind a stack of hay for two days and nights before I was taken to the girls home. Here I met DuBois and Lafferty and we stayed together until we were all taken out to the farm to the party attended by Lt. Meade and Lt. Bonnin.

After the party we all went different ways again but I returned to the same village to a different house. I stayed here until about the 20th and got my exercise at night walking in the garden with the French girl.

I finally left on a bicycle accompanied by the girl and a boy. We picked DuBois up along the way. We rode along that day stopping once for drinks and spending the night in a private home in a neighboring town.

Next morning we left by truck and drove to a rendezvous with another car which took us down a road to the farm where...
and went to town in the Frenchman's car. She was really eager and wanted some one to drop him a tank to fight with. He even took Lt. Meade out on his farm to pick out a landing field. In town we changed cars and rode in the job fixed up with a tank motor to the Railroad station, where we caught the train to Paris.

The train to Paris was crowded and there was a sprinkling of Germans about but we had a seat. There were the three of us and two French boys. Once a man turned around and spoke to me and the French boy took care of the situation by handing him some money.

In Paris we took the subway across town and went to a cafe while the Frenchman straightened out the details and decided what to do with us. I left the other two boys here and departed with an old Frenchman who had lost a son in this war in a German concentration camp.

I lived on the 5th floor in a flat for 5 weeks and the only sun I got was what came thru the window. The old couple were very careful and the only people who knew I was there were the neighbors across the hall whose son was with the Maquis in southern France. I was fed very well and got my exercise by taking calisthenics in the kitchen. The old French lady thought I was crazy the first time I guess and told me I would be sick.

I had a sink and spilet in my room, and had access to a commode across the hall. My food consisted of carrots, beans, mashed potatoes, a little spaghetti, and an occasional steak.
The first day. After breakfast each morning they gave me a big bowl of black ersatz coffee. I lost no weight.

The couple were very good to me but couldn't speak English. We listened to the war news on the radio regularly and they had a war map on the wall with pins stuck in it. They arranged a passport for me and when it came time for me to leave they both cried like babies. It sure made me feel funny.

I saw a lot of the battle of Paris from my window and when the Americans came I immediately contacted them. I was sent from hand to hand until I finally ended up with Capt. Arnold. He said I could leave by truck the next day.

A whole truck load of us went the next day to a PW Intelligence camp where we were interrogated and stayed for two nights. We then took a plane for England.

* * * * *
LT FITZPATRICK AND CREW

On 29 May 1944, an aircraft of the 858th Squadron went missing from a mission to Belgium. Crew members were: Lt. Ernest B. Fitzpatrick, (Pilot); Lt. Richard V. Thiriot, (co-pilot); Lt. James S. Sherwood, (Navigator); Lt. Joseph J. Lasicki, (B Oberdier); S/Sgt James E. Williams, (Dispatch); T/Sgt Paul F. Kasa, (Radio Opr); T/Sgt Walter W. Swartz, (Engineer); T/Sgt William S. Schock (T/Gunner) and Lt Cornell Dogroth (359th Squadron, Navigator, flying check-out mission).

For over three months nothing was heard of the crew. Meanwhile, Eisenhower's armies invaded France and moved eastward into Belgium. In the middle of September, as a result of the progress achieved by the liberating armies, many Allied airmen who had been hidden by Belgian patriots began returning to England. Among these were Lt. Fitzpatrick and four members of his crew, Lt's Thiriot and Sherwood, Sgts. Kasa and Swartz. This is the story of what happened to them in Belgium.

On the night of 28 May an aircraft had successfully completed a dropping mission at a ground near Osric 14 which was the target for Fitzpatrick's crew on the following night. As the result of activity on the night of the 28th, the Germans had occupied the ground and all adjacent areas, and moved in mobile field units and had placed night-fighters in readiness. Unfortunately, the Belgian patriots were not able to transmit this information to London immediately. In effect, therefore, Fitzpatrick was flying straight into a German ambush.

The airplane took off from the Hastings Point area.
schedule at 2300 hours. Flight took off normally and succes-
ful and the airplane proceeded to Belgium. At 0100 hours the
Target was reached and identified. There were no fighters to
indicate the presence of a reception committee. Then, as the
aircraft circled the area, all hell broke loose from a flak
battery on the ground. The aircraft was hit, and as it went
away from the area it was attacked by a waiting JU-88, which
raked it with 20mm cannon fire. The stricken airplane became
enveloped in flames.

Further flight was impossible, and Fitzpatrick sounded the
bail-out alarm. Struggling with the controls, he steadied the
aircraft until he was certain that all members of his crew had
jumped. Then, putting the airplane on Auto, he made his own
jump. The aircraft crashed forty kilometres from Landen.
It was a total wreck.

Fitzpatrick made a successful jump, landing unhurt in
a field. He immediately ran his parachute and made west, and
began walking rapidly towards the South, in the direction of
the French frontier. He walked without stopping until 0630
hours, covering a distance of about fourteen miles. Then it
became light and not being inclined to expose himself until
he had taken stock of his situation, he took refuge in a field
and remained hid en in a clump of bushes. At 1800 hours, an
old farmer crossed the field, intent on gathering his cows
together. The farmer appeared trustworthy, and Fitzpatrick
hailed him, language cord in hand. The old man spoke only
Flemish, but Fitzpatrick managed to convey the idea that he
would like a bed to sleep in for the night.
Ten minutes later the old man was back, accompanied by three other men, younger than he. They brought food and beer for Fitzpatrick, and they sat with him as the hungry American ate and drank. The old man went away, leaving Fitzpatrick and the other three men. They remained in the field, talking, until it grew dark.

At 2200 hours, the men led Fitzpatrick to a house in a nearby town. There he met Lt Lasicki. Several days later the two lieutenants were moved to a farmhouse where they met Sgt's Scheck and Swartz.

Sgt Swartz recounted his experiences. He had bailed out of the airplane at 7,000 feet, when he saw the rest of the crew jumping. His parachute opened at 6,000 feet, and he continued falling. He hit the ground very hard, was badly jolted, but recovered quickly. It was then 0130 hours. He quickly buried his parachute, checked his compass and headed North, thinking he might meet some of his crew. He walked until daybreak and when it was light he hid in a small woods. Around noon, he looked out of his hiding place and observed a farmer working in a field next to the woods. At last Swartz left his hiding place and approached the farmer.

Although the farmer spoke only Flemish, Swartz, using his language card and pantomime, communicated the fact that he was an American flier. The farmer was friendly, offered Swartz some cold coffee from a jug and told him that ton
Swartz set out again, this time heading north to the French frontier. He walked for some distance, and at last found a young man working in a field. Swartz approached him. The young man could speak French, which made it easier to converse with him. Hearing that Swartz was an American flier, he led him to a far edge of the field, showed him a hiding place in a swamp and instructed Swartz to remain there. Then he left, returning shortly with food and drink. As Swartz refreshed himself, the Belgian told him that "one of his comrades" was nearby. It was too dangerous, however, for Swartz to move just yet, so he remained hiding in the swamp and his benefactor left.

At 1300 hours the Belgian returned, bringing a jacket and a straw hat for Swartz. Together they made their way to a farmhouse, and there Swartz met Sgt Schack. Schack's knee had been wrenched in the course of bailing out, but otherwise he was all right.

While the two American sergeants were enjoying their reunion, the farmer was engaged in contacting the underground Intelligence. During the aternoon of the following day a representative of the underground arrived at the farmhouse. He questioned Schack and Swartz closely, gave him papers to fill out and sign. He seemed satisfied that they were bona-fide Americans and before they left the farmhouse three days later had delivered passports and identification cards to them.
In the evening of the fourth day a horse-drawn cart arrived, bearing Fitzpatrick and Lasicki. The man had little time to celebrate their reunion, however, because they were taken almost at once to the home of a member of the underground some distance away. The guide walked ahead of the cart, two of the Americans ride in the cart, and the other two walked about fifty feet behind. In this manner they arrived at their destination.

At the house, they were given food and drink. It was decided that Lasicki and Scheck would remain at the house and that Fitzpatrick and Swartz would be taken to another place. Accordingly, the latter two men travelled a distance of twenty kilometres to a village. They found the house to which they had been directed and made themselves known. They were taken in, and remained there for a week. The day after they left, a week later, the Germans came to the house, looking for rooms in which to billet troops.

Fitzpatrick and Swartz left on foot. As they walked along they noticed two Gestapo men walking ahead of them. The two Americans slowed down. But looking back over their shoulders they slowed down. But looking back over their shoulders they saw two more Gestapo men behind them, heading in their direction. Their first reaction was that the Gestapo was closing in on them, that they were trapped. It would never do, however, to make a run for it. So they continued their slow walking pace. After a few endless
Fitzpatrick and Swartz turned off into a side road but quickly covered the rest of the way to the house which was their destination. They arrived safely and were taken in an hidden.

The next day Swartz was moved to another house, while Fitzpatrick remained. But after one night, Swartz was re-turned to Fitzpatrick's house. They heard later on that the Gestapo had been searching for Americans in the house where Swartz had spent the night. Fitzpatrick and Swartz stayed where they were for nine days. Finally, their former guide came for them and they travelled, by bicycle and on foot, for sixty kilometres to their next destination. Here they met Lasicki and Schack again. They spent the night, and on the following morning, all four of them took a train into a nearby city of Liege.

In Liege they went directly to White Army Headquarters, where they filled out new forms and received new papers and identification cards, as well as work cards. They remained here for four days. Then, Lasicki and Schack were taken together to one house, and Fitzpatrick and Swartz to another. A week later the Gestapo cracked down on White Army Headquarters. The only person they found was a woman member of the White Army. The Gestapo beat her brutally, but could not force her to give any information.

Fitzpatrick and Swartz were taken to a house on the outskirts of town. They were then there only a short time.
at the house they were living in told the Fritziros that Fitzpatrick and Swartz were staying.

Warmed in this, Fitzpatrick and Swartz hid out in the fields until the danger was past. Some Army men came to protect them, bring guns, ammunition and food. Then they were taken to another house, where they remained in safety for seven weeks.

From here they were moved to a castle on the outskirts of Liége. They lived in comparative luxury for four days, enjoying good food and comfortable beds, hot water and pre-war whisky. Then they moved on, travelling by train into Liége.

The American advance continued to roll on, and at last was at the gates of Liége. The city was bombarded and shelled. Street fighting began and snipers bullets whined through the streets. Fitzpatrick and Swartz remained in the house to which they had been brought. One day, the young Belgian who had been their guide was in the street and saw a man struck by a bullet. He was attempting to help the man, when a German patrol passed, saw him, hit him in the chin with the butt of their rifles, called him a terrorist and shot him through the head. Fitzpatrick and Swartz will never forget that boy (for he was no more than a boy) and they will never forget the Germans for their crime of assassinating him in cold blood.
Thiriot was told it would be best for him to stay in the house until arrangements could be made with the escape organization of the Belgian underground. To this end, Thiriot shortly received a note which indicated that the writer was "a comrade of the underground," and that a fellow crew member was nearby. It turned out that Sgt. Kasza was in fact in the house next door, being cared for as Thiriot was. Kasza and Thiriot began to maintain regular communication with each other.

Kasza had made a good jump from the doomed airplane, but he had been somewhat cut up when he caught on some barbed wire upon landing. He had hidden his chute and crossed a field, heading South. Reaching a small town, he jumped a fence and skirted around the town. He heard dogs barking and fearing bloodhounds he changed his direction to North, walked for a while and turned to the Southwest. After a few hours, he saw three houses, watched them for unfriendly indications and when he saw none, approac hed one of them. With some difficulty he convinced the people that he was American and obtained their promise to help him. They took him in. It was the house next door to which Thiriot had made his way.

After a couple of days Thiriot and Kasza were taken to another village. Here they lived in a barn and slept in a haystack. They were told that before long a car would come for them, they would be driven to a secret airfield from where they would be flown to Spain. But that never happened.

June 8th, and with the invasion German patrol activity
492nd Bomb. Gp.

A.A.F.

Downgraded to Restricted
per authority JWD Cir 259
dated 23 June 44
Robert W. Fish
Col USAF

SUMMARY

April 1945

Secret
INTELLIGENCE

S-2 carried out its normal functions, including the briefing and interrogating of crews and the maintenance of pertinent flak information. As always, close liaison was maintained with OSS and Special Forces headquarters in regard to pinpoint data and field conditions. Force headquarters in regard to the forward base at Dijon were highlighted by excellent operations from the forward base at Dijon. In this respect, it was very gratifying to receive a letter of commendation from Colonel Bowman of the Office of Strategic Services. The text of the letter, dated 26 April 1945, follows:

"1. Since 19 March 1945, the 492nd Bombardment Group has completed for this organization fifty-four successful operations from the Dijon base. This is an extraordinary record of achievement which has been accomplished in the face of innumerable difficulties. Among these, perhaps the greatest was the fact that we operated with the rapid advance of the armies. It has been necessary in many cases to change the dropping point at the last minute, sometimes to terrain which was very hazardous for night operations. Instead of complaining about these constantly shifting arrangements, the officers of the 492nd Bombardment Group took a sympathetic view of the situation and did everything in their power to be cooperative and helpful. We cannot commend too highly the work done by all the officers and men involved, especially the Commanding Officer (Capt. Hartley) and the Intelligence Officer (Capt. Shapiro).

"2. Although it is impossible at this time to evaluate fully the results of these operations from an intelligence point of view, the information already obtained from the agents who were dropped has been of very great value to the Allied Armies. Taking into account the fact that not more than five planes have been operating out of the Dijon base at any one time, it is safe to say that no Group of this size has made a greater contribution to the war effort."

When Norway was liberated, an officer of this Group who had gone MIA on 20/21 April, was flown back to England and gave the following story:


The North Sea had been crossed at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Shortly before reaching the Norwegian coast, the pilot had begun to climb. The coast was crossed at Aberg and the aircraft proceeded northward to the target area. About 12 to 15 miles inside the coast in the vicinity of Vargersen, Lt. Divine felt the plane shudder. He thought it had been hit by 1142, but then, looking down, he saw an AA-100 below the B-24. The B-24 turned in an attempt to escape, but it was losing gasoline rapidly. A large hole..."
During the month of April, there were no changes in the Navigational technique required for Carpetbagger Operations. Navigators continued to get to the target with the use of GR-2, Dead-reckoning, TX, Rebecca and Pilotage. In Mosquito Operations, navigators made use of Loran, with very good results.

Seven (7) new crews were trained for Carpetbagger Operations, their training consisting of large part of Navigation practice.
A new problem was presented to Carpetbagger Bombariers, when, in the last part of April, the group was informed that it would be necessary to fly missions to Norway during the non-moon period. Test drops were made to determine the best method of releasing containers. A bomb-sight was used, in order to give the Bombarier a reference point for release. Both test and operational drops were very satisfactory.

It was decided to drop containers from an altitude of 6,000 feet, since flying at this altitude would prevent aircraft from crashing into high ground. Crews were given instructions in the proper method of releases, as the drops would be made with a fixed angle technique, all crews made numerous daylight runs, in order to improve crew coordination. Bombing tables were compiled and issued to the Bombariers.
### Ground Training Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
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<th>No. Hours</th>
<th>No. Man Hours</th>
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<td>532</td>
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<td>Equipment Lecture</td>
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<td>1:00</td>
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<td>1:13</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>Radio Operator's Training</td>
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<td>1:25</td>
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<td>Night Vision</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1:36</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1:42</td>
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### Flying Training Statistics

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<td>Navigational Flights</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>153:35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bombing Flights (Dry Runs)</td>
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<td>27:15</td>
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<td>Bombing Flights (Practice Drops)</td>
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<td>9:40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night Flights</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20:20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night Navigational Flights</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35:10</td>
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<tr>
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### Accident Statistics

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<tr>
<td>3 April 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Landing Accident</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 April 1945</td>
<td>Local Transition</td>
<td>Take-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Fire in air</td>
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</table>

### A/C & Personnel

- **A-26 A/C**: Declared salvage. No injury to personnel.
- **Mosquito A/C**: Declared salvage. No injury to personnel.
- **Mosquito A/C**: Destroyed. One (1) of crew fatal. No injury to other personnel.
OPERATIONS

With the war in Europe reaching its last climax, Carpetbagger operations were given top priority throughout April and a maximum effort was put out every night that weather permitted. Missions, both from this base and from the forward base in France, had good results. The enemy, in the desperation of his last hours, offered stiff resistance, especially in Norway, with the result that several B-24 aircraft suffered battle damage and three (3) B-24 aircraft went down.

Our A-26 crews completed their training and the three (3) A-26 aircraft which were still to be modified were completed and placed in readiness for operations. However, because front-line advances were rapidly absorbing our anticipated A-26 targets, few A-26 sorties were flown from the home base. A number of sorties were flown from advanced bases on the Continent, with excellent results.

High-altitude mosquito missions (called "Red Stooling" missions) made good progress during the month, as the crews became more experienced with the work and the aircraft. An average of one (1) "Red Stooling" mission a night was flown with a normal accuracy of success.

The group received seven (7) new crews during April, and a concentrated effort was made to train them, at a maximum of time, for B-24 Carpetbagger operations. Each squadron held one (1) aircraft on operations for training purposes, and these aircraft were flown around the clock on training flights. Ground-school training was completed by scheduling such training for the hours between flights. The seven (7) crews were trained and declared operational after two weeks of training.
He and Greenwood were in the Oslo hospital for three weeks. Then, on 7 May, the Germans acknowledged their capitulation by moving alligraphs into rooms without barred windows or guards.

The rest of the crew had been taken in by the underground and successfully moved to Sweden. The Germans told Divine that they had found Marquardt's body and had identified it by his dog-tags.

On the night that Divine's B-24 was shot down, the RAF had lost six aircraft over Norway.
had been knocked in the main gasoline tank. No. 1 engine was hit and the flaps and aileron on the left side were shot out. The ME 110 stuck with the B-24 for ten minutes but it could not line up for another attack. The pilot decided to try to reach Sweden. Besides the damage to No. 1 engine and to the left wing, a large hole had been ripped between the right wing and the fuselage; and the interphone system was shot out.

Out over the sea again, the pilot ordered the load salvoed, then he headed for Sweden. It was impossible to hold the crippled aircraft to a steady course and soon it had crossed back over the Norwegian coast. South of Larvik, the B-24 was subjected to intense flak and rendered unflyable. The pilot thenupon sounded the bail-out alarm.

Everyone reached ground safely except the Mickey operator, Lt. Divine. As he was jumping from the catwalk in the bomb-bay, he heard Marangas say that he was unable to land his parachute. Later, Divine learned that Marangas had bailed out forward, hanging on with 5/Sgt Brubec, the radio operator, and had either slipped or jumped at some distance from the ground and had been killed.

Divine landed about 100 yards from a farmhouse, because he had bailed out at 700 feet and had been unable to control the oscillation of his full, he had landed hard and sustained a broken ankle. He dragged himself to the farmhouse and pounded on the door. An old man came to the door, and when Divine explained who he was the old man took him in and called the civilian hospital in Larvik.

A Norwegian doctor arrived to look after Divine, but a few minutes afterwards a group of Germans came and captured the American Lieutenant. They took him to a German Army recuperation center, where they gave him a shot of morphine and set the bad ankle in a splint.

After a day and a half there, the Germans took him to Oslo. Divine was entered in a hospital which specialized in bone cases. He had met Sgt Greenwood, his tail gunner, at the recuperation center in Larvik, and Greenwood, too, was taken to the hospital in Oslo. He was suffering from a broken leg.

From a medical point of view, they were treated fairly well. But Divine reports that the food was very bad, and only after three starving days could he bring himself to eat the sour, black bread which was the main item of their diet.

While they were at the hospital, a Luitwaffe major came to interrogate them. He introduced himself as a member of "The Grounded German Air Force." His first question was, "Are you from Harrington or Alconbury?" When Divine was silent, the major continued by saying, "I know you're from the 492nd Group at Harrington. Are you in the 85th, 85th or 85th Squadron?" Although understandably startled, Divine was still silent and the major caused by saying, "I know you were doing night bombing; now I know you were also supplying the underground."

Lt. Divine does not believe the Germans were able to get any information from his aircraft. He saw it crash and saw the sky-blow from its burning.
All maintenance activities on our aircraft for the month of April remained virtually the same as during March. The modifications on Mosquitoes and A-26's were completed but the ending of the war in Europe nearly concluded so that very little operational time was flown on the last modifications.

The design or turbo-supercharger system for replacing flame arrestors on our B-24 aircraft was tried out during the month. Although several factors of heat distribution and air-currents arose during the trials it seems quite likely we were on the right track but two years too late.

Another very interesting subject which seems years late was a Thx from ASC pertaining to turbo by-pass valves for B-24 aircraft. This group has never had a B-24 equipped with the subject valves but an approach to the matter along exactly the same lines was made on one of our aircraft about a year ago. The turbo air-ducts were removed from a B-24 and C-47 type air-scoops installed direct to the carburetor. On test flights it was shown that with an installation of this type the B-24 engine would develop as high as 55 inches Hg on take-off with a shorter run because the fuel built up more rapidly than the turbo. All other operations were the same as any non-turbo supercharged engine and altitudes of 1400 feet were obtainable. The engines ran consistently lower temperatures than when boosted by a turbo, making it interesting to contemplate the number of additional hours which might have been realized from B-24 engines had a by-pass been originally installed so that turbos would not have been necessary below the critical altitude of the internal blower.

### COMPARISON OF DAILY STATUS OF AIRCRAFT BY SQUADRONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>456th</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Average assigned aircraft:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. B-24's &amp; B-17's</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. A-26's &amp; C-47's</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Percentage of aircraft in:</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>a. B-24's &amp; B-17's</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>05</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. A-26's &amp; C-47's</td>
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<td>3. <strong>Average aircraft in/day:</strong></td>
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<td>a. B-24's &amp; B-17's</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
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<td>b. A-26's &amp; C-47's</td>
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<td>4. <strong>Average aircraft out/day:</strong></td>
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<td>b. A-26's &amp; C-47's</td>
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<td>5. <strong>Average aircraft depot/day:</strong></td>
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<td>b. A-26's &amp; C-47's</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>56th</td>
<td>56th</td>
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<td>6. Average aircraft awaiting parts/day</td>
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<td>7. Engine changes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>average day/change</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>8. Fuel cell changes</td>
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<td>9. Aircraft lost or damaged</td>
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<td>12. Average time on aircraft</td>
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<td>1255:14</td>
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<td>241</td>
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<td>13. Fuel used in combat, B-24's &amp; 17's</td>
<td>36,531</td>
<td>62,352</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hours flown</td>
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<td>257:05</td>
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<td>Average/hour</td>
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<td>243</td>
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<td>14. Fuel used in training B-24's &amp; 17's</td>
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<td>Hours flown</td>
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<td>18. Fuel used in combat A-26's</td>
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COMMUNICATIONS

RADIO MAINTENANCE RECORD

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<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>NO. OF FAILURES REPORTED &amp; REPAIRED</th>
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<td></td>
<td>IMAGINED</td>
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<td>LIAISON</td>
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<td>COMMAND</td>
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<td>RADIO COMPASS</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>INTERPHONE</td>
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<td>MICROPHONES</td>
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<td>HEADSETS</td>
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<td>INST. APPROACH</td>
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<td>VHF</td>
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<td>TRAILING WIRE</td>
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<td>FREQUENCY METER</td>
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INSTALLATIONS FOR THE PERIOD

- LOCALISER RECEIVER: 12
- GLID PATH RECEIVER: 16
- INTERPHONE, NEW TYPE: 4
- VHF: 2
- RADIO COMPASS: 1

STRENGTH OF RADIO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

- 55th: 9
- 56th: 9
- INST. APP. (SCS-51): MAINTENANCE MAN: 5
- TOTAL: 25

SECRET

71
RADAR OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

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<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
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<th>NO. FAILURES</th>
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<td>GEE</td>
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<td>LORAN</td>
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<tr>
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(*-Includes both APN-1 and SCR-716)

INSTALLATIONS MADE DURING APRIL

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<tr>
<th>EQUIPMENT</th>
<th>TYPE OF A/C</th>
<th>NO. INSTALLED</th>
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<tr>
<td>LORAN</td>
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<td>APS-13</td>
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</table>

This past month has seen Mickey used almost exclusively as a low-altitude navigational aid. This has proven only partially effective, since at low altitude, interpretation cannot be made from standard Mickey maps. However, it has been invaluable for approaching and leaving enemy coastlines.

Concurrent with the stepped-up installation of Rebecca Equipment (to complete installation in all aircraft of the 350th Squadron), a training program for navigators has been re-instated, with the cooperation of the Group and Squadron navigators.

The outstanding achievement of the installation section has been the success of the APS-13 tail warning in the mosquito. Previously considered impractical, the standard installation with necessary modifications worked effectively on the first test flight.

There have been no changes in Radar personnel during April.
FLYING CONTROL

The month of April, from a flying control point of view, was one of the most perfect experienced at this base during over a year of operation. This is due mainly because the weather was good both day and night, allowing some type of operation from here every night except two during the whole month. On two occasions planes had to be diverted but only three each time, just before dawn in both cases.

Due to the distance of the targets and type of operation of the Mosquito and A-26 aircraft from this base, it was often necessary to arrange a landing at an advanced base for rearming. The Continental Liaison Officer and the rear element of RAF 2 Group have been most helpful in this.

Several of our airplanes made emergency landings at fields located within territory occupied by the Allies. Had these forced landings occurred two or three months earlier both the planes and their crews would have been lost to us.

Not since the early days of operation here has the entire airfield been clear of obstructions as it has for the last month. It is most pleasant to work under these conditions when it is necessary to brief to only give the runway in use.

Our VHF installation is working very well, having contacted aircraft as far east as Cromer and as far south as the north coast of France. On one occasion a plane was diverted to us from Alconbury, but we could not land it having closed in ourselves when it arrived. The plane was rediverted by us to Bradwell Bay. It was running short of gas and when it arrived at Bradwell Bay, tried to contact them on VHF. It is fortunate we have the same VHF frequency as Alconbury and strong transmission, since we told the pilot he would have to contact Bradwell Bay on 6440 and while he was already over Bradwell Bay.

SIGHT

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WEATHER

During the first three (3) weeks of April, carpet bombing in Denmark and Norway were carried out with considerable success from the point of view of weather. Seventeen (17) missions were accomplished with one hundred and sixty (160) successful sorties and twenty seven (27) failures attributed to weather. This record should be considered a reasonable success because operations in Norway and Denmark, particularly at this time of the year, has always been limited by meteorological factors. In Denmark, the advection of warm air over the relatively cold water causes very low stratus and drizzle to form during the night, seriously impairing any visual operations. The difficulty of forecasting this stratus is limited by the scarcity of reports and the extreme sensitivity of the air-flow to change over the peninsula. In Norway, orographic lift over the rugged terrain, causes a pile-up of clouds, on the windward side, of the hills. This factor and severe icing encountered in these clouds, further limited our operations.

In the last week of the month, a flow of cold unstable Arctic air over the British Isles, around a low trough over Norway and Denmark brought about an untimely outbreak of instability troughs with its heavy rains and snow showers. Severe icing and turbulence, and heavy cumulus activity over thunderstorm proportions, would not permit any operations. Instead, practice cross-countries were carried out in a limited scale, whenever the weather permitted.
The following is a summary of the activities of Public Relations during the month of April 1945:

In preparation for the announcement of V-E Day, hometown newspaper releases which were to have covered all personnel on the station were prepared. The releases carried a statement by General Doolittle and gave an outline of the Eighth Air Force's achievements in strategic bombing. It was to be sent out as soon as the V-E Day announcement was made public. Since the news came much sooner than was expected, it was impossible to carry through the plans as contemplated. Despite the lack of time, however, about 300 releases were rushed through and sent out on the morning of 9 May 1945.

The section also arranged coverage of sports on the base in The Stars and Stripes and submitted other material to the service newspaper. In addition, it continued to send out stories and pictures to hometown newspapers on promotions, awards and decorations, and arranged photographic coverage of the memorial program for President Roosevelt and of the presentation of awards and decorations.
492nd BOMB. GP.

A.A.F.

SUMMARY

APRIL 1945

SECRET

Downgraded & Restricted as per WD Cir 259 dated 23 June 44

Robert W. Fine
Col US A.F.
With the war in Europe reaching its last climax, Carpetbagger operations were given top priority throughout APRIL and a maximum effort was put out every night that weather permitted. Missions, both from this base and from the forward base in France, had good results. The enemy, in the desperation of its last hours, offered still resistance, especially in JURI, with the result that several B-24 aircraft suffered battle damage and three (3) B-24 aircraft went down.

Our A-26 crews completed their training and the three (3) A-26 aircraft which were still to be modified were completed and placed in readiness for operations. However, because front-line advances were rapidly absorbing our anticipated A-26 targets, few A-26 sorties were flown from the home base. A number of sorties were flown from advanced bases on the Continent, with excellent results.

High-altitude mosquito missions (called "Red Sea"
missions) made good progress during the month, as the crews became more experienced with the work and the aircraft. An average of one (1) "Red Sea" mission a night was flown with a normal crew of success.

The group received seven (7) new crews during APRIL, and a concentrated effort was made to train them, in a minimum of time, for Carpetbagger operations. Each squadron had one (1) aircraft on operations for training purposes, and these aircraft were flown around the clock on training flights. Ground-school training was completed by scheduling such training for the hours between flights. The seven (7) crews were trained and declared operational after two (2) weeks of training.
# Statistics

## Ground Training Statistics

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<td>First Aid</td>
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<td>Link Trainer</td>
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## Flying Training Statistics

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<td>Bombing Flights (Dry Runs)</td>
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## Accident Statistics

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<td>Operational</td>
<td>Landing accident</td>
<td>A-26 a/c declared salvage. No injury to personnel</td>
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<td>3 April 1945</td>
<td>Local Transition</td>
<td>Take-off</td>
<td>Mosquito a/c declared salvage. No injury to personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April 1945</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Fire in air</td>
<td>Mosquito a/c destroyed. One (1) of crew fatal. No injury to other personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A new problem was presented to Carpetbagger Bombardiers, when, in the last part of April, the group was informed that it would be necessary to fly missions to Norway during the non-moon period. Test drops were made to determine the best method of releasing containers. A bomb-sight was used, in order to give the Bombarider a reference point for release. Both test and operational drops were very satisfactory.

It was decided to drop containers from an altitude of 6,000 feet, since flying at this altitude would prevent aircraft from crashing into high ground. Crews were given instructions in the proper method of releases. As the drops would be made with a fixed angle technique, all crews made numerous daylight runs, in order to improve crew coordination. Bombing tables were compiled and issued to the Bombardiers.
During the month of April, there were no changes in the navigational technique required for Carpetbagger Operations. Navigators continued to get to the target with the use of GEE, Dead-reckoning, TX, Rebecca and Pilotage. In Mosquito Operations, Navigators made use of Loran, with very good results.

Seven (7) new crews were trained for Carpetbagger Operations, their training consisting of large part of navigation practice.
INTELLIGENCE

S-2 carried out its normal functions, including the briefing and interrogating of crews and the maintenance of pertinent flak information. As always, close liaison was maintained with OSS and Special Force Headquarters in regard to pinpoint dates and field conditions. Operations from the forward base at Dijon were highlighted by excellent intelligence work. In this respect, it was very gratifying to receive a letter of commendation from Colonel Bowman of the Office of Strategic Services. The text of the letter, dated 20 April 1945, follows:

"1. Since 19 March 1945, the 492nd Bombardment Group has completed for this organization fifty-four successful operations from the Dijon base. This is an extraordinary record of achievement which has been accomplished in the face of innumerable difficulties. Among these, perhaps the greatest was the fact that due to the rapid advance of the Armies, it has been necessary in many cases to change the dropping point at the last minute, sometimes to terrain which was very hazardous for night operations. Instead of complaining about these constantly shifting arrangements, the officers of the 492nd Bombardment Group took a sympathetic view of the situation and did everything in their power to be cooperative and helpful. We cannot commend too highly the work done by all the officers and men involved, especially the Commanding Officer (Capt. Hartley) and the Intelligence Officer (Capt. Shapiro).

"2. Although it is impossible at this time to evaluate fully the results of these operations from an intelligence point of view, the information already obtained from the agents who were dropped has been of very great value to the Allied Armies. Taking into account the fact that not more than five planes have been operating out of the Dijon base at any one time, it is safe to say that no group of this size has made a greater contribution to the war effort."

When Norway was liberated, an officer of this Group who had gone MIA on 20/21 April, was flown back to England and gave the following story:


The North Sea had been crossed at an altitude of 1,000 feet. Shortly before reaching the Norwegian coast, the pilot had begun to climb. The coast was crossed at Lyvarg and the aircraft proceeded northward to the target area. About 12 to 15 miles inside the coast in the vicinity of Vargarshei, Lt. Divine felt the plane shudder. He thought it had been hit by flak, but then, looking down, he saw an ME-110 below the B-24. The B-24 turned in an attempt to escape, but it was losing gasoline rapidly. A large hole..."
had been knocked in the main gasoline tank. No. 1 engine was hit and the flaps and ailerons on the left side were shot out. The Me 110 stuck with the B-24 for ten minutes but it could not line up for another attack. The pilot decided to try to reach Sweden. Besides the damage to No. 1 engine and to the left wing, a large hole had been ripped between the right wing and the fuselage; and the interphone system was shot out.

Out over the sea again, the pilot ordered the load salvaged, then he headed for Sweden. It was impossible to hold the crippled aircraft to a steady course and soon it had crossed back over the Norwegian coast. South of Larvik, the B-24 was subjected to intense flak and rendered unflyable. The pilot thereupon sounded the bail-out alarm. Everyone reached the﹀﹀﹀

Out over the sea again, the pilot ordered the load salvaged, then he headed for Sweden. It was impossible to hold the crippled aircraft to a steady course and soon it had crossed back over the Norwegian coast. South of Larvik, the B-24 was subjected to intense flak and rendered unflyable. The pilot thereupon sounded the bail-out alarm. Everyone reached the ground safely except the mickey operator, Lt. Marangas. As Lt. Divine was jumping from the cat-walk in the bomb-bay, he neara Marangas say that he was unable to link his parachute. Later, Divine learned that Marangas has bailed out plastic back lashing with S/Sgt Brabc, the radio operator, and had either slipped or jumped at some distance from the ground and had been killed.

Divine landed about 100 yards from a larmhouse, because he had bail-ed out at 700 feet and had been unable to control the oscillation of his fall, he had landed hard and sustained a broken ankle. He cragged himself to the larmhouse and pounded on the door. An old man came to the door, and when Divine explained who he was the old man took him in and called the civilian hospital in Larvik.

A Norwegian doctor arrived to look after Divine, but a few minutes afterwards a group of Germans came and captured the American Lieutenant. They took him to a German army recuperation center, where they gave him a shot of morphine and set the bad ankle in a splint.

After a day and a half there, the Germans took him to Oslo. Divine was entered in a hospital which specialized in bone cases. He had met Sgt Greenwood, his tail gunner, at the recuperation center in Larvik, and Greenwood, too, was taken to the hospital in Oslo. He was suffering from a broken leg.

From a medical point of view, they were treated fairly well. But Divine reports that the food was very bad, and only after three starving ways could he bring himself to eat the sour, black bread which was the main item of their diet.

While they were at the hospital, a Luftwaffe major came to interro-gate them. He introduced himself as a member of "The grounded Ger-man air force". His first question was, "Are you from Harrington or Alconbury?" When Divine was silent, the major continued by saying, "I know you're from the 492nd group at Harrington. Are you in the 656th, 657th or 658th squadron?", although understandably startled, Divine was still silent and the major ended by saying, "I know you were doing night bombing; now I know you were also supplying the underground."

Lt. Divine does not believe the Germans were able to get any infor-mation from his aircraft. He saw it crash and saw the sky-glow from its burning.
He and Greenwood were in the Oslo hospital for three weeks. Then, on 7 May, the Germans acknowledged their capitulation by moving Allied POWs into rooms without barred windows or guards.

The rest of the crew had been taken in by the underground and successfully moved to Sweden. The Germans told Divine that they had found Maragis' body and had identified it by his dog-tags.

On the night that Divine's B-24 was shot down, the RAf had lost six aircraft over Norway.
ENGINEERING

All maintenance activities on our aircraft for the month of
April remained virtually the same as during March. The modifications
on Mosquitos and A-26's were completed but the ending of the war in
Europe nearly concluded so that very little operational time was
flown on the last modifications.

The design or turbo-supercharger surround for replacing flame
arrestors on our B-24 aircraft was tried out during the month. Al-
though several factors of heat distribution and air-currents arose
during the trials it seems quite likely we were on the right track
but two years too late.

Another very interesting subject which seems years late was
a TWX from MAC pertaining to turbo by-pass valves for B-24 aircraft.
This group has never had a B-24 equipped with the subject valves but
an approach to the subject along exactly the same lines was made on
one of our aircraft about a year ago. The turbo air-ducts were remov-
ed from a B-24 and C-47 type air-scoops installed direct to the car-
buretor. On test flights it was shown that with an installation of
this type the B-24 engine would develop as many as 53 inches H.B. on
take-off with a shorter run because the ram built up more rapidly than
the turbo. All other operations were the same as any non-turbo super-
charged engine and altitudes of 1400 feet were obtainable. The en-
gines ran consistently lower temperatures than when boosted by a turbo,
making it interesting to contemplate the number of additional hours
which might have been received from B-24 engines had a by-pass been
originally installed so that turbos would have not been necessary
below the critical altitude of the internal blower.

COMPARISON OF DAILY STATUS OF AIRCRAFT BY SQUADRONS

1. Average assigned aircraft:
   a. B-24's & B-17's  
      12.1  
      10  
   b. 456th, A-26's & C-47's  
      19.0  
      0

2. Percentage of aircraft in:
   a. B-24's & B-17's  
      66  
      70  
   b. 456th, A-26's & C-47's  
      0  
      0

3. Average aircraft in/day:
   a. B-24's & B-17's  
      10  
      16.9  
   b. 456th, A-26's & C-47's  
      7.1  
      0

4. Average aircraft out/day:
   a. B-24's & B-17's  
      1.3  
      1.3  
   b. 456th, A-26's & C-47's  
      .8  
      0

5. Average aircraft depot/day:
   a. B-24's & B-17's  
      .0  
      1.6  
   b. 456th, A-26's & C-47's  
      1.9  
      0
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>56th</th>
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<tr>
<td>6. Average aircraft awaiting parts/day</td>
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<td>7. Engine changes</td>
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<td>Average day/change</td>
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<td>8. Fuel cell changes</td>
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<td>9. Aircraft lost or damaged</td>
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<td>10. Aircraft received</td>
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<td>513</td>
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<td>12. Average time on aircraft</td>
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<td>Hours flown</td>
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COMMUNICATIONS

RADIO MAINTENANCE RECORD

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<th>NO. OF FAILURES REPORTED &amp; REPAIRED</th>
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INSTALLATIONS FOR THE PERIOD

LOCALISER RECEIVER ............................................ 6
GLID PATH RECEIVER ........................................... 12
INTERPHONE, NEW TYPE ......................................... 16
VHF ............................................................ 4
RADIO COMPASS ................................................ 2

STRENGTH OF RADIO MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

c53th ......................................................... 9
c56th ......................................................... 9
INST. APP. (SCS-51) MAINTENANCE MEN 2
TOTAL ....................................................... 23
Radar Operational Summary

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<th>No. Failures</th>
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<td>Gee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boozer</td>
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(*Includes both APN-1 and SCB-710)

Installations Made During April

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<th>No. Installed</th>
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This past month has seen Mickey used almost exclusively as a low-altitude navigational aid. This has proven only partially effective, since at low altitude, interpretation cannot be made from standard Mickey maps. However, it has been invaluable for approaching and leaving enemy coastlines.

Concurrent with the stepped-up installation of Rebecca Equipment (to complete installation in all aircraft of the 350th Squadron), a training program for navigators has been re-instated, with the cooperation of the Group and Squadron navigators.

The outstanding achievement of the installation section has been the success of the APS-13 tail warning in the mosquito. Previously considered impractical, the standard installation with necessary modifications worked effectively on the first test flight.

There have been no changes in Radar personnel during April.
FLYING CONTROL

The month of April, from a flying control point of view was one of the most perfect experiences at this base during over a year of operation. This is due mainly because the weather was good both day and night, allowing some type of operation from here every night except two during the whole month. On two occasions planes had to be diverted but only three each time, just before dawn in both cases.

Due to the distance of the targets and type of operation of the Mosquito and A-26 aircraft from this base, it was often necessary to arrange a landing at an advanced base for refueling. The Continental Liaison Officer and the rear element of RAF 2 Group have been most helpful in this.

Several of our airplanes made emergency landings at fields located within territory occupied by the Allies. Had these forced landings occurred two or three months earlier both the planes and their crews would have been lost to us.

Not since the early days of operation here has the entire airfield been clear of obstructions as it has for the last month. It is most pleasant to work under these conditions when it is necessary to briefing to only give the runway an use.

Our VHF installation is working very well, having contacted aircraft as far east as Cromer and as far south as the north coast of France. On one occasion a plane was diverted to us from Alconbury, but we could not land it having closed in ourselves when it arrived. The plane was recirculated by us to Bradwell Bay. It was running short of gas and when it arrived at Bradwell Bay, tried to contact them on HF. It is fortunate we have the same VHF frequency as Alconbury and a strong transmission, since we told the pilot he would have to contact Bradwell Bay on 6440 Coanda while he was already over Bradwell Bay.
WEATHER

During the first three (3) weeks of April, carpet bombing in Denmark and Norway were carried out with considerable success from the point of view of weather. Seventeen (17) missions were accomplished with one hundred and sixty (160) successful sorties and twenty-seven (27) failures attributed to weather. This record should be considered a reasonable success because operations in Norway and Denmark, particularly at this time of the year, have always been limited by meteorological factors. In Denmark, the advection of warm air over the relatively cold water causes very low stratus and drizzle to form during the night, seriously impairing any visual operations. The difficulty of forecasting this stratus is limited by the scarcity of reports and the extreme sensitivity of the air-flow to change over the peninsula. In Norway, orographic lift over the rugged terrain, causes a pile-up of clouds, on the windward side, of the hills. This factor and severe icing encountered in these clouds, further limited our operations.

In the last week of the month, a flow of cold unstable Arctic air over the British Isles, around a low trough over Norway and Denmark brought about an unusually outbreak of instability troughs with its heavy rains and snow showers. Severe icing and turbulence, and heavy cumulus activity or thin or thunderstorm proportions, would not permit any operations. Instead, practice cross-counties were carried out in a limited scale, whenever the weather permitted.
The following is a summary of the activities of Public Relations during the month of April 1945:

In preparation for the announcement of V-E Day, hometown newspaper releases which were to have covered all personnel on the Station were prepared. The releases carried a statement by General Doolittle and gave an outline of the Eighth Air Force's achievements in strategic bombing. It was to be sent out as soon as the V-E Day announcement was made public. Since the news came much sooner than was expected, it was impossible to carry through the plans as contemplated. Despite the lack of time, however, about 300 releases were rushed through and sent out on the morning of 5 May 1945.

The section also arranged coverage of sports on the base in The Stars and Stripes and submitted other material to the service newspaper. In addition, it continued to send out stories and pictures to hometown newspapers on promotions, awards and decorations, and arranged photographic coverage of the memorial program for President Roosevelt and of the presentation of awards and decorations.
A MAQUIS CHIEF VISITS THE CARPETBAGGERS

On 17 May 1944 our combat crews were treated to a very special event. An informal meeting was held, at which the chief speaker was a French patriot, organizer of the Maquis resistance group in the Haute-Savoie department of South-Central France. This is the section that contains our "John" jobs. The organizer had been our source of information on the incident involving Lt. Ambrose's aircraft, the report of which is found elsewhere in this History. Accompanying the organizer were an American captain, from the London office of OSS, and a French officer. The American captain acted as interpreter when the going got tough for the organizer, who to some extent managed to express himself in English.

Colonel Veflin introduced the speaker, who was a short, slightly built man, apparently in his middle thirties. He wore horn-rimmed spectacles and resembled a bookish sort of school-teacher. He was not physically impressive, but in the light of his work, of his direct contribution to the anti-Nazi struggle, he seemed a truly heroic figure.

The Colonel suggested that the meeting be conducted in the form of questions-and-answers. By their questions our combat crews showed a lively interest in the work of the French underground and in German counter-activities. A resume of the questions and answers follows:

Was trouble from the Germans increased or decreased of recent weeks? - The number of patrols has substantially increased. All trucks travelling along main or subsidiary roads are stopped and searched. Hence, it is highly important for the drops to be made precisely on the reception; otherwise, complex arrangements for well-protected transport have to be made, involving incalculable dangers.
How much of the material gets into German hands? - About 40%.
However, the assurance is implied that the remaining 60% is put to
eexcellent use.

How far from the reception does the stuff usually drop? - This
depends on the altitude from which the drop is made and on the force of
whatever wind there may be. If there should be no wind, it is best to
make the drop from a height of 400 feet. This usually produces very
accurate results. A drop made from a higher altitude may cause the
packages to go astray.

The Colonel then observed that a crew has sometimes reported that
the reception lights were not lined up into the wind, as they should be.
The organizer replied that the answer may lie in the fact that wind in
the air often differs from wind on the ground. He said, moreover, that
sometimes drops have been made across the lights, instead of directly
on the lights.

How close to the particular ground can Jerry be depended on to be
located? - Jerry is sometimes on the spot before the parachutes descend
to the ground. (In all his speech, the organizer displayed an admirable
talent for making short, pithy answers, answers which were in-
variably spiced with an ironic humor.)

At this point the organizer related a story dealing with a large-
scale pitched battle fought by a body of patriots and a force of German
soldiers, abetted by French militiamen. The patriots used weapons, ammun-
tion and grenades which had been delivered to them, in large part, by
the Carpetbaggers. The organizer told how 800 patriots were seized and
 summarily shot. For their services, some of the French militiamen re-
ceived Croix de Guerre awards from Vichy. But, added the organizer
with a meaningful smile, that was only their first cross - other
crosses are due then.

Emphasizing the need for accuracy in making drops, the organizer told the story of one aircraft which circled the reception, found the lights in the proper place, was guided to the pinpoint by Eureka, and then went off and dropped its load so that it landed in the main street of a nearby village, where obviously it did no one good except the Germans.

The question was asked, why are pinpoints sometimes moved without notice? - Proximity to unexpected German activity necessitates the move.

At this point, the Colonel mentioned the fact that a plan is expected to be put into effect, whereby the aircraft would make some sort of signal to the reception, indicating that the drop has been completed. This will obviate the possibility that the reception lights might be turned off prematurely, as has happened in some instances.

The next question was, what is the usual German course of action, when containers or packages are discovered in or near a village? - The Germans do not usually carry out reprisals in such cases. However, if material is discovered in a person's possession, that person is shot out hand.

How many persons are required as a reception committee for one one aircraft? - Usually, reception committees are assigned on the basis of twenty-five men to fifty containers. Additional men are assigned in proportion.

Is the volume of delivery large enough to necessitate maintaining stores? - Only ammunition and explosives are stored in any degree. Articles such as firearms are immediately distributed as widely as the quantity received allows. At no time are stores of these articles on
hand sufficient for a period longer than eight days. Even in the case of ammunition and explosives, the material is largely dispersed, since large stores are obviously most subject to detection and seizure.

Do many containers and packages drop without the parachutes' opening? - A very small proportion, but sometimes this does happen. It is impossible to salvage such material, since the fall breaks it to bits.

Do chutes ever split? - This has never happened in the organizer's experience.

The question was asked, what if the lighting system is not exactly as briefed; must it be assumed, even if the pinpoint is definitely established, that something has gone wrong and the enemy is on the ground? No; it is best to make the drop anyway. Often, young boys are handling the Morse lights, who have a limited knowledge of the code. If three lights can be understood, it may be assumed that the proper reception is on the ground. The organizer stated that he himself had heard of only one instance in which the Germans set up a bogus reception.

From how far away does the reception recognize our aircraft? - The sound of the aircraft is heard and recognized two or three minutes before it actually appears overhead.

When are the reception lights turned on? - When the aircraft is first heard. The organizer added that on ordinary moonlit nights, our aircraft are clearly recognized. But when the moon is at its fullest, it is too bright to see the aircraft. He said that German activity goes on in equal degree during both the moon and the dark periods.

Does the underground know our outfit? - No, they do not.

On S-phone jobs, does at least one member of the committee speak and understand English? - Not necessarily.
Most of them speak only French. But generally they can understand simple phrases in English.

Is it fairly easy to find the containers and packages, assuming the drop has been made accurately? - The containers are easily found; but the packages are more dispersed.

A series of questions was asked, the nature of which indicated that our combat crewmen were intensely aware of the dangers and difficulties under which the patriots work:

What steps does a committee take to safeguard a ground on the night of operations? - Guards are posted, and boards with nails sticking out of them are placed about the area. If a reception committee is detected, the German patrol calls up reinforcements, and, if the committee is surprised at its work, the two groups fight it out. Of course, if a member of the committee is caught, he is immediately shot. However, said the organizer, the Germans are rather stupid about the thing, inasmuch as they ordinarily send out their patrols at the same time each day. A patrol consists of four or five men, either German or French militia, one as bad as the other. When a road is blocked off, the patrol is strengthened to fifteen or twenty men. The organizer related the following incident: a landing operation was in progress, when a German patrol detected it. However, a large armed guard was in evidence and so the patrol withdrew while reinforcements were sent for and brought up. But by the time the reinforced patrol returned, the operation had been successfully completed, and not a soul was to be found in the vicinity.

In the event of detection, the particular ground becomes unusable for a time. But patriots maintain a constant watch, observing enemy activity and reporting whether or not a ground is ready for use again.

The question was then asked, if a single allied airplane is heard,
is a city alerted? – In reply, the organizer simply smiled in his ironic
way and said that with even one aircraft overhead, the Germans beat the
French into the shelters.

That is the degree of German aerial activity at night? – Very slight
It is a rare event to see German aircraft after dark.

Is there a curfew in effect? – Yes; at 2200 hours.

Are trucks seen on the road by our men after that hour to be assumed
German? – The Colonel observed that at any rate, don’t go down to shoot
at them. The organizer added that the trucks would almost invariably be
German; however (displaying his smile again), in the event of a convoy,
one or two of the trucks could be assumed patriot.

A series of questions were asked, bearing on "Escape and Evasion"
matters. The organizer’s answers invariably corroborated the information
which the P/V Officer, Lt. Brinc, has been passing on to our crews:

Are some districts in France entirely collaborationist? – Yes.
But if you need help, approach working people and peasants, rather than
well-to-do people. Priests, too, have proven helpful. But approach a
person who is alone, not in a group. People of the type indicated are
very apt to help you. Some, however, will hide you for a night and ask
you to leave in the morning, having become frightened at the thought of
detection by the Gestapo.

Is it best to remain hidden for a couple of days or to move im-
mediately and rapidly away? – It is definitely best to get away from the
scene at once. The Germans always make an immediate search of an area
in which there has been an incident.

Is it possible to walk from the Haute-Savoie district to the Swiss
border? – It is possible, but extremely difficult without expert knowled-

(At this point the Colonel drew a knowing laugh with the
observation that travelling in the direction of Switzerland could lead only to internment, while travelling in the opposite direction led to Spain and more or less prompt return to England.)

Would it be possible to put up a fight against German captors? — Not likely. Arrests are usually made by two members of a patrol, while the others remain hidden behind bushes, in case of emergency.

Do German patrols wander off beaten paths very much? — No. They stick primarily to well-defined paths. In fact (here the organizer smiled again), people seen on the road at night can safely be assumed to be either German patrols or French underground workers.

Several questions were asked, relating to the morale of German troops. The organizer answered one such question in his careful, heavily accented English, "Not so good. But they still fight." He explained, further, that German SS troops are of high caliber, both as to intelligence and to morale; but the ordinary German soldier is quite unimaginative, and capable of doing only what his officer directs him to do.

In the course of the meeting, the organizer related the stories of two of his face-to-face encounters with the Germans. The first story dealt simply with the time he was stopped by a Nazi soldier who ordered him, in German, to produce his identification papers. The organizer brought out his papers with an agreeable, Germanic "Ja, Ja", which undoubtedly disarmed his questioner completely.

He was stopped in this manner many times while journeying about in his car. Once, he was driving along with eighteen million francs in the car. It was dead winter and the road was in an extremely icy condition. The car went into a skid and turned completely about, so that, as the organizer put it, he found himself headed in the direction he had come from, instead of the direction he was going. The car continued skidding
and when it finally came to rest, it was at the side of the road, with its back-end in the ditch. The organizer got out and flagged down the next car that passed. He was a bit startled to find that he had of his own accord stopped a car carrying a German captain and two sergeants. However, having stopped them, he proceeded to enlist their aid in getting his car out of the ditch. The captain immediately ordered his two sergeants to attach a rope to the rear of the Frenchman's car and haul it out with their own car. They attached the rope; but the organizer's car balked. It was a forward-drive car. Thereupon, the captain commanded his men to put their shoulders to the job and get the car out of the ditch, anyways. Laboriously, the two sergeants followed out the order; and after they had finished tugging and pushing and straining, the organizer's car was once again solidly on the road. Remembering the necessity for political education of the backward French, the German captain asked, "Well, now - are you glad the Germans are in France?" The organizer, probably with a sly glance at his rescued car, replied, "Oh, Yes! Then he got back into his car and drove off - with the eighteen million francs intact, and in the proper direction.

Towards the end of this most interesting meeting, Colonel Heflin told that the organizer had brought word with him that one of our men, whom the Colonel did not name, is a P/V in a German hospital. The organizer added that the man is watched, of course, by the Germans, but is also watched closely by French patriots. And when an opportunity presents itself, the patriots will get him out.

In conclusion, the organizer said that the reception committees wait every night with impatience for our aircraft. They arrive at the ground at least one hour before the specified reception time and remain until the last possible minute. They will wait at a ground any number of nights.
that is necessary, and, the organizer pointed out, every one of them has a day-time job as well.

Then the meeting was over and all the men rose and stood at attention as the Maquis chief left, flanked by the Colonel and the OSS captain, and followed by the French officer. It was obvious that every combat crewman present had been deeply impressed by the vivid evidence that had been offered them of the worth and importance of their work.

* * *
"MARKSMAN" VISITS THE CARPETBEAGERS.

24 July 1944.

The British Major who was one of Colonel Heflin's passengers on the return leg of the Dakota operation (6-8 July 1944) visited Harrington today, in order to give our combat crews some idea of Maquis work.

As an agent in the field and of the chief Maquis organizers, the Major (now a Lieutenant-Colonel) operates under the code name of "Marksman" in the Department of Ain, an area northwest of the city of Lyons. There, the Maquis hold a section 60 miles long and 40 miles wide. It was in this section held by the Maquis of Ain that Colonel Heflin landed his C-47. The Major's remarks began with a word of congratulations to the crews for the manner in which they had been getting the material to the French patriots. He said that the Resistance Groups welcome all the material they can get, and are hungry for more. If they are to continue their operations even on the same scale as heretofore they will require a lot of stuff immediately. One indication of the scale of Maquis operations in Ain is the fact that in the past ten months they have killed one thousand Germans.

The question was asked, what type of arms can the Maquis make the most use of? The Major answered, mostly light weapons, although recently they had made good use of a few heavies. They would like to have more mortars and heavy machine guns. They are not quite ready for anything heavier. The consideration is that if Jerry appears suddenly in force, while Maquis troops are carrying out an operation, they have to disappear very quickly. In circumstances such as these, too heavy weapons would act as encumbrances.
How many members comprise the Maquis of Ain? — Between four and five thousand. Since D-day, the ranks of the Maquis have swelled considerably. Now, the only limitation on the numbers of personnel is imposed by the quantity of arms available. The Major went on to say that attacks are continually being pressed by German forces against the Maquis. At the present time a major attack is in progress by a force of 40,000 Nazis. The battle is going on rather well for the Maquis, but they need ammunition urgently. An established practice of the Germans is to make reprisals against the civilian population. The attacks being made most of the time by the Germans are abetted by Vichy-led French Forces, such as the Garde Mobile and the Milice. The Milice are as dangerous as Jerry himself, since they form a French Gestapo. Most of them wear distinctive military uniforms, but there is also a force of plain-clothes Milice, who are the most ruthless.

The Major gave an example of how a German reprisal takes shape. During the large-scale attacks of February and April, the Germans occupied some villages which had previously been liberated by Maquis forces. The Germans moved in, they exacted seventy reprisals against non-Maquis civilians and wantonly burned down three hundred farm-houses. Recently, the Major added, the degree of German barbarity has been intensified.

The method employed by the Maquis in operations against the Germans emphasizes the guerrilla type of fighting. They make lightning raids or launch quick lethal forays from ambush. This is the only way in which they can compensate for their inferior numbers. But once, the Major said in the Belgrade sector, a twelve-day pitched battle raged, and before the Maquis withdrew under the pressure of tanks and heavy guns they had accounted for numerous German dead.

The Maquis of Ain have been going strong now for twelve months.
They started operations with a force of one hundred shock troops, men who had been in the Maquis and had been training for their exacting and specialized tasks for eight months. Since D-Day the numbers of these shock troops has reached eight hundred, and is still growing.

Officers of the Maquis are chosen by the men themselves. All the troops are volunteers and submit themselves to a rigorous training program and a strict military discipline. At the present moment, 2,500 men are enrolled in the Maquis Volunteer Training Program in the Department of Ain.

The question was asked, is there any authenticated instance of torture by the Germans? The Major answered that there were many instances. One outstanding example occurred in the large-scale April battle. There was a man who had been captured and imprisoned by the Germans but had managed to escape; making his way to Ain, he joined the Maquis forces in order to continue the fight against the Germans. During the April battle, he left one morning on a mission, ran into a German road patrol and was captured. The Maquis found him four days later — his genitals burned, his tongue cut out and his eyes pierced. This, the Major said, is just one instance. Torture by the Nazis is going on all the time. The Maquis wounded, for example, are invariably beaten to death when Jerry finds them.

Formerly, the Maquis made it a practice not to keep German prisoners for very long, although they never beat prisoners. But recently, they have adopted a new policy. They keep prisoners alive, and have formally notified the Germans that a ratio of three to one was in effect — for every Maquis soldier killed or tortured by the Germans, three prisoners would be killed. In line with that policy, the Maquis have in recent weeks killed off fifty-seven German prisoners in one
batch and thirty-four in another.

As a footnote to his remarks on the German's use of torture, the Major described the favorite device at Gestapo Headquarters in Lyons. The device, known as the "Scotch Shower", involved baths in ice-cold water and frequent beatings.

A question was asked about the Maquis' food problem. The Major replied that in general the food situation is satisfactory, although in times of major battles serious shortages do develop. He added that the Maquis are very appreciative of the American "K" rations dropped to them by the Carpetbaggers. A Maquis group, for example, bound for a distant railway-cutting mission, finds the "K" rations indispensable.

How do the Maquis officials establish the trustworthiness of a recruit? — The Major replied that a new man is placed for three weeks in a camp where he is under constant observation. In the meantime, his papers and stories are investigated and their authenticity confirmed. The Major said that very few cases of attempted trickery have taken place. He told of one such case, however. A man had been in the Maquis for four months, and had appeared to be a very good man. One day he asked for a short leave, and when it had been granted to him he made his way to the Germans and set them on the trail of Maquis Groups. In due time that man was properly disposed of by the Maquis.

Of what composition are the Maquis of Ain? — Predominantly French, of course, but with many Czechs, Spaniards, and Yugoslavs.

The Major was asked to elaborate on the reference he had made to the strict military discipline in force among the Maquis. He said that for the least infraction of regulations the penalty was death, and he gave the example of a man who had stolen a pair of socks from a comrade and was put to death for that offense.
Are the Maquis able to capture any German heavy weapons? — Not very many. They have taken a few mortars, but very little else.

Have operations against the Germans gone any better since D-day? — A little better, though the Maquis are most seriously handicapped by a scarcity of heavy weapons. The town of Nantua (visited by Colonel Heflin on his Dakota flight) is at present in German hands, but the Maquis are hopeful of retaking it.

Have the Maquis sustained large percentages of losses during their operations? — Losses have been very small, in proportion to the forces employed and those opposed. In a four-and-a-half day action against eight hundred Germans which took place at Belgrade, a shock force of only two hundred Maquis was used, with a secondary reserve of four hundred men. Because the Maquis, lacking heavy weapons, were forced to fight a rearguard action, and because they try to avoid fighting inside a town in order to prevent casualties among the civilian population, they were unable to hold Belgrade. But a great many Germans were killed in the action while Maquis losses were moderate.

Do the Maquis of Ain have a policy of cooperation with other resistance groups? — Yes. Arrangements are in effect whereby, in the event of a German attack, a diversion will be created by a neighboring Maquis Group. The purpose is to give Jerry the idea that his rear is always vulnerable to attack, and the plan has worked out very well.

If a target is laid on for a number of aircraft, do the Maquis know how many? — Yes. There was a case where two grounds, one fairly close to the other, were prepared to receive three planes each. But at the last minute, one of the grounds was rendered unusable by the Germans. By S-phone contact, all six planes were directed to drop at the safe ground. The six drops were successfully accomplished.
What constitutes a good drop? — Material which lands within four hundred yards of the reception lights represents a successful drop. The danger of dropping material outside that four-hundred-yard radius is that the ground might be given away. The Major recalled that during one dropping operation, some of the material was found four miles away from the reception lights.

Does Jerry know how supplies are delivered to the Maquis? — Yes. The ground for the six-plane operation previously referred to was located a scant fifteen miles from a Nazi observation post. The Major observed that very often towards the end of a drop, the airplane had gained altitude and increased its speed, with the result that some of the packages went astray. He stated that in cases where this condition could arise it would be desirable for the pilot of the aircraft to make two runs over the target.

Have lorries carting the stuff away from a ground ever run into German road patrols? — This rarely happens, because out-of-the-way back-roads are used by the lorries, and patrol schedules are checked beforehand. The Major paid a warm tribute to the Maquis drivers. Since January they have worked tirelessly, transporting supplies day and night. To date, six drivers have been killed by Jerry.

Why is Eureka used on some jobs and not on others? — The fact is that there simply are not enough Eureka sets. The Maquis of Ain at the present have only three sets, and these are used at grounds where the most difficulties will confront a dropping operation or where a multiple operation will take place. But many more sets are needed.

What is the military organisation of the Maquis? — Similar to the British and French Army. That is, companies of 120 men, platoons of 30 and sections of 10 or 8 men. The organizers try to apportion whatever
arms are available so that each section will have a Sten gun and each company will have four bazookas and mortars, besides the weapons carried by each individual soldier.

Is the Maquis objective to occupy towns? — Not primarily. The main function of the Maquis, in view of their numbers and equipment, is to kill as many individual German soldiers as possible and to harry and delay bodies of troops.

Is Jerry getting noticeably stronger or weaker? — He is becoming definitely weaker all the time.

Do the Maquis have their own doctors to attend to medical needs? — In the past six months, they have managed to acquire four doctors. However, many doctors and hospitals in various German-held towns cooperate with the Maquis. They take in wounded Maquis soldiers, camouflage their battle wounds as one illness or another, and give them the best treatment possible. If a wounded man is captured and brought to a hospital by the Germans, the nurses and doctors help the Maquis to get the man out. Five or six Maquis enter the hospital room suddenly, and "just take him out". The Major added that if an allied flier is in a hospital, he has a very good chance of being taken out by the Maquis. In fact, they have taken airmen out of German prisons; but that sort of thing is becoming increasingly difficult.

The final question asked of the Major had to do with evasion. Our crew-members wanted to know if evasion had become more difficult since D-day. In reply, the Major assured the men that this was not necessarily the case. Evasion of the Germans is still entirely possible, and most French people are more than ever willing to help out.

Then the meeting was over, and the muscular, soft-spoken Major left the Briefing hut. His is one of the most hazardous jobs of the war, b
he had left the vivid impression that he was eminently capable of handling that job.

* * * * *
VISITOR FROM DENMARK

2 August 1944.

The briefing hut was filled. Every available seat on the hard wooden benches was accounted for. A cloud of cigarette smoke hung over the hum of conversation. Outside, the normal traffic of the Hurlingdon drove went on, though the unaccustomed sunshine seemed to have slowed somewhat the hectic tempo of ordinary, raw days. Suddenly, "Attention!" was shouted out. Officers and men sprang up; the easy-going atmosphere became tense, filled with expectancy. Three men walked down the center aisle toward the platform and the huge map at the front of the room. Colonel Helvi was one of the men, an RAF officer; another, and the third was a civilian—a towering, pleasant-looking man with graying hair and a weather-beaten face.

The Colonel put his men at their ease and then introduced the civilian as an organizer of the resistance movement in Denmark. The tall Dane began speaking and immediately won the interested attention of his carpetbagger audience. He spoke in a clear, modulated voice, displaying a noteworthy command of English.

He began by making a differentiation between resistance in Denmark and resistance in other occupied countries. In France, for example, the maquis have large bodies of organized troops centered in mountain strongholds, and they have successfully liberated substantial portions of their country. In Denmark, however, there are not many mountains or large forests from which guerrilla fighters could operate.
Therefore resistance is not open or on a large scale, but rather it is clandestine, consisting of individual acts of sabotage and terrorism. Nevertheless, the accumulation of such acts represents an impressive total -- so much so, that by the Nazis' own admission more troops per capita are in occupation of Denmark than of any other country in Europe. And the total increases continually, as more and more Danish patriots feel impelled to take violent counter-measures to the German occupation. The Nazis have adopted the expedient of employing many informers, and as a result of bribes and Gestapo threats these informers have been responsible for the apprehension of many patriots. Nevertheless, the ranks of the resisters are swelling; the life of the German occupationist is one of harassment and uncertainty.

The work of the Danish resistance groups is concerned mainly with the sabotage of factories engaged in turning out material for the German war machine. Since 1943, a great deal has been accomplished along these lines. A blown-up factory has two results: the act of violence inspires a factory-owner to discourage German orders on the basis that if he accepts the order his factory will certainly become the target for saboteurs. In this way, some Danish manufactures have been successful in turning down orders for German war material. Moreover, over a period of time, as acts of sabotage were multiplied, many neutral Danes who might have been tempted to collaborate with the Germans had their eyes opened to the fact that an irreconcilable difference existed, in spite of disarming German propaganda, between the Danish people and the
German invaders, as a result of the vigorous anti-Nazi activities carried on by the underground has been that very few Danes have proven guilty of collaboration. The organizer estimated that fully ninety-eight per cent of the Danish people are definitely anti-Nazi.

In the past couple of months, opportunities for sabotage have increased. Since the invasion of Western Europe, the Germans have attempted to rush reinforcements to France from Norway and Denmark. Movement of such troops had to be via boat and train, a situation fraught with possibilities for the saboteur. In Denmark there are only two main railway lines, making it relatively easy to plan and perform acts of sabotage and the Danes have exploited every possibility. By effective sabotage of dock and railway installations they have caused troop movements to be delayed ten, twelve or twenty-four hours. The Germans have been forced to change plans at the last moment. Even the slightest delay of a troop-train becomes an advantage to allied forces in France.

To accomplish their brand of resistance, the Danish underground requires quantities of high explosives and pistols. They do not need machine-guns or Sten guns at the present time, since they do not fight the sort of pitched battle with Nazi forces such as Maquis groups frequently do. Especially in high explosives a desperate need exists. Substantial quantities were delivered to underground groups during 1943, but all of it has been used up. Danish patriots make the urgent request that more high explosives be delivered at the earliest date possible.

21
The organizer elaborated on the difficulties of dropping missions in Denmark from the point of view of both the Carpetbagger crew and the reception committee. Since Denmark is a small, flat, and densely populated country, a committee is hard put to it to meet secretly at an isolated ground. A square mile is rare which does not have numerous houses in it. Moreover, it is difficult for a Carpetbagger plane to fly over Denmark at the low altitude required for its particular kind of mission. There are no mountains to screen the flight of an aircraft, and the land is studded with German fighter airfields. The only solution is to reduce to a minimum the time spent over the country by an aircraft. For this reason, the Northern extremity is best for Carpetbagger operations. Moreover, whatever good grounds there are in Denmark are located in the North, and the distinctive Northern Coastline is most suitable for navigation purposes.

The organizer emphasized the necessity for accuracy in making drops. The least deviation would undoubtedly lead to the loss of the material. At best, a committee has one half hour after the drop in which to gather the containers and packages and leave the ground. The Germans have many DF stations and detector devices, and they can be expected on the spot in an hour after the aircraft reaches its target. As a matter of fact, German soldiers once arrived in twenty minutes. Therefore, there cannot be very much circling around over the target; the target must be hit accurately and without delay.

The most desirable condition is one created by multiple operations in one night. It is better to have six aircraft in
one night than one aircraft on six consecutive nights, because multiple operations help to confuse German observers and make it difficult for them to plot the course of any individual aircraft. To reduce the effectiveness of radar detection, it is best to maintain a low altitude over Denmark, a minimum of three hundred feet is required for a successful drop; therefore, that altitude is suggested for flight over Denmark.

Sometimes, the organizer went on, an aircraft has circled over the target after completing a drop, in order to check results and make sure that the material is being picked up. The Danes appreciate such solicitude, but would prefer that the aircraft cut loose for home immediately after dropping, since its presence over the ground becomes a beacon for German observers. It is a better idea for the aircraft to circle somewhere else on the way home, as a sort of decoy. But the Danes do not expect that an aircraft be submitted to such additional risk; they leave it up to the individual crew to decide. And, the organizer added, it is only fair to warn the crews that there are many German night-fighters in Denmark.

German soldiers patrol in groups, and they show every indication of being afraid to walk about at night. All in all, therefore, few reception committees have been surprised at their work although the Germans often show up at a ground after the Danish patriots have already left. Whenever a committee has been discovered, they have managed to escape to the woods or woods, unless they have sustained wounds. The greatest danger for the underground lies in the talkativeness
of new members or irresponsible friends. The Gestapo has arrested many patriots as a result of this loose talking, and by its use of torture has been able to learn the names of other patriots. The underground has lost a few whole committees that way. In the past year alone, six committees have been executed "because someone talked." For these reasons great care must be exercised in the selection of committee members, in order to reduce the risk of talkativeness.

Of all the matériel which has been delivered by aircraft to the Danes, about two-thirds has been put to use. The other third has been taken by the Germans while it was being transported or stored. However, the organizer said, the effects of the two-thirds have been "good enough."

The organizer felt it was necessary to explain why it was, at the time Germany invaded Denmark, that Danish resistance was so meager. He placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of "the politicians", who did not or would not realize that the Danish people were willing to fight the invaders. Especially young people were eager to offer resistance. The army generals demanded total mobilisation, but the politicians minimised the danger and delayed taking any action. Then the enemy was already battering down the doors; but it was too late -- the Danes were not prepared for invasion. "But", said the organizer, "the people are finding the means to fight now." The Danes do not want to sit idly by at the present climax of history, and do nothing. They want to join in the common fight of the United Nations, and
they have expanded, through their resistance against the
German occupation, tremendous and effective efforts. though
the results of those efforts may appear small in comparison
to large-scale military events.

Returning to the subject of drops, the organizer told
the story of the aircraft which was approaching a target where
three lights were laid out in a triangle as the reception
signal. The committee heard the engines of the aircraft when
it was three miles north of the target. But at that point the
aircraft's crew observed a similar layout of lights created
through sheer chance by signal lights at a railway station.
The aircraft went down to make a drop, discovered the error
in time and, while it fortunately did not drop on the railway
station lights, was then unable to find the real reception
and headed for home without dropping.

To prevent this sort of mischance, it would be very desirous for the Danish patriots to have more special equip-
ment than they now have. They have a few Eureka sets, with
which they have helped successful drops to be made, but they
could do with more sets. As for S-phones, the organizer
seemed to have little faith in them, and he recounted the
story of the drop which was bungled because the S-phone
operator in the RAF aircraft spoke only Polish and so was
unable to communicate intelligibly with the Danish operator
on the ground.

The organizer also belittled the importance of code
letters flashed by the reception lights. An incorrect letter
he said, should not deter a pilot from making a drop.
He told of a reception committee leader who was, to say the least, unfamiliar with the ins and outs of code. He never did manage to flash the correct letter, but nevertheless took part in six or eight consecutive successful dropping operations.

The organizer said that he had been considering the possibilities of blind drops, precluding the necessity for lights. In this connection, a small island in a northern river is being considered. By using this island for a ground, and by the aircraft's use of Rebecca, it is thought that successful drops could be accomplished. Moreover, it is known that there are no Germans stationed on the island. The organizer added a word of warning, however, about the necessity of maintaining a low altitude. He recalled the time an aircraft made a drop from 800 feet, making it possible for a German observation post on the mainland to observe the activity. Troops were immediately dispatched to the island by motorboat and all the material was lost to the Germans. That happened sometime ago, however, and the incident has not rendered the ground unusable.

The organizer stated that people in the underground movement in Denmark are always impressed by the excellence of weather-forecasting from England. Often it happens that the weather appears perfectly clear, but the B.B.S. signals cancel the night's operations. The underground cannot understand the cancellation, until, sure enough, fog moves in during the night.

In conclusion, the organizer gave the Carpetbagger crews
some valuable tips on how to get along in Denmark, in the event any of them should ever be forced down or bailed out over that country. He said that fully ninety-eight per cent of the population is anti-Nazi, but many people are afraid of performing an overt anti-Nazi act, such as helping an Allied airmen. However, more than half of the ninety-eight percent can be expected to take risks and help out. The others may, at the worst, call upon the Danish police to report the airmen. If this happens, the airmen is still reasonably certain of receiving help, because among the Danish police force, not one half of one percent are pro-Nazi. There used to be more pro-Nazi policemen in Denmark, but the police chiefs got rid of them. Therefore, unless he is compromised by unreliable witnesses, the policeman who comes to arrest the airmen will invariably help him to escape instead.

An airmen attempting evasion must be sure to contact as few people as possible. He will have no trouble about food, which, in spite of German depredations, is still fairly plentiful. There is enough meat, butter and cream; and the airmen should be able to get along with what he can pick up even without contact people. Peasants, who cannot speak English, are to be avoided for the most part. The people most prepared to offer direct assistance are doctors and persons, fully ninety-nine percent of whom speak English, are strongly anti-Nazi and stand ready to help. Doctors and persons, furthermore, are conveniently distributed over the whole country, and their residences are easily recognized by distinctive signs. A great many Allied fliers have been:
rescued as a result of the efforts of doctors and persons, but heretofore there has been no system or coordination of their efforts. However, a new organization, quite separate for the most part from the sabotage activities of the underground, is developing for the express purpose of rescuing Allied airmen. The underground directs this organization and attempts to give the doctors and persons information on how to go about helping the airmen and making the necessary contacts with the underground, so that the airmen may be moved out from Denmark to Sweden. The rescue-organization also maintains a staff, composed mainly of lawyers, who are prepared to cross-examine a man, in order to establish his authenticity as an Allied flier. Therefore, the organizer warned, an airman should be prepared for very strong interrogation. But he should understand that such interrogation is a necessary safeguard against the Nazi trick of dressing their own agents up to pose as Allied airmen and thus attempt to gain information about the organization.

Another good source from which to get help is a cooperative shop or dairy, of which there are many throughout Denmark. People in these cooperatives are almost entirely anti-Nazi. The peasants, during the early days of the occupation, were fooled by the high prices paid for produce by the Nazis, and therefore they still have a kind of admiration for their uninvited guests. But the cooperative people understood that high prices paid in Nazi-backed currency were not a very valuable asset, and from the very beginning they were opposed to the Nazi regime and all its doings.
Whichever the airmen approaches, a doctor, person or cooperative, he must remember to take elementary precautions to avoid detection and to avoid compromising the person whose assistance he seeks. The airmen must make sure that no one can see him entering the doctor's or person's home or the cooperative shop. And he must not make such visits during the daylight hours.

If circumstances make it impossible for the airmen to establish a contact with the underground or rescue-organization, they can still manage to get along on his own, take his way north to the Jutland coast, steal a boat and travel across to Sweden by himself. Good weather and a westerly wind will ensure his arrival in Sweden. The Danish coast at that point is still patrolled only by Danish police, and if they should observe the boating activities of an Allied airmen, the best they will do is to wish him "Good luck." The organizer insisted that stealing a poor Dane's boat should not cause a stricken conscience, because, if the owner of the boat spots the airmen, he too will invariably wish him a successful voyage. The same lack of compunction should exist as regards bicycles, the organizer added, in the event that the airmen should find it necessary to journey for any distance in Denmark. In the organizer's own words, "Just take a cycle where you find it." He added that, inasmuch as tires are usually pretty bad, it might be necessary to "requisition" three of four bicycles before the airmen's journey was completed.

In one way or another, hundreds of Allied airmen have
reached Sweden from the Jutland coast of Denmark since the war began. And not one accident has occurred.

The organizer's informal speech was finished and he left the briefing Hut with Colonel Heflin and the RAF officer who had escorted him to Harrington. In the minds of the carpet-bagger crews, the tall organizer had become a symbol of Danish resistance -- strong, assured, unconquerable.
LT. BURTON — OIC OF HARASSING UNIT IN FRANCE
(Article prepared by T/Sgt S. A. Garland)

On the night of 12 June 1944, Colonel Fish took off at 2300 for a trip; the code designation of this particular target being "Hugh I". In addition to the load of twelve containers and eight packages, he had aboard three "Joes."

The Joes were a Jedburgh team of two Commissioned Officers and one Non-Commissioned Officer, all of them paratroopers, who were to be dropped near Chateau Rouge for the purpose of organizing harassing units.

The ship came in a bit low over the target. The containers, packages and Joes were dropped in that order. The Joes unfortunately had mishaps on landing: The E2I was killed, due to the failure of his chute to open; one of the Officers broke both his legs; Lt. Burton, the Officer in Charge landed safely, but about three hundred yards away from the target area in the middle of a field.

On the afternoon of 3 November, Lt. Burton, who had returned to England visited this station to lecture the combat crews of the 856th Squadron. His opening remark was, "The last time I was on this base, I was scared to death — thankfully, the circumstances are a bit different this time."

Lt. Burton looked none the worse for wear after his few months in France and he had quite a few remarks to make concerning "Carpetbagger" operation. As he himself explained, "I only wish that we could have met before we started — it would have simplified things for both of us." Lt. Burton had few complaints to make about the procedure used by this group; however, He did point out that the material and personnel dropped had a tendency to go far beyond the lights. He also cited an unknown crew, who came over the triangular pattern of bonfires downwind at normal cruising speed, opened the bombay doors and dropped from at least one thousand feet. "To say the
least, they certainly made me very unhappy. Several containers carrying ammunition broke in the air and we spent many hours picking up every round that we could find. You can realize the magnitude of the job if you stop to think that each container contained at least 5,000 rounds of ammunition."

Lt Burton continued by saying that one of the worst handicaps he encountered was the careless handling of firearms by the Frenchmen. "From the time we were on the receiving ground to our time of departure we were subject to shots from every quarter and we had at least one accident each night with many near misses. The night that a French infantry Lieutenant shot himself in the leg with a .45 pistol was the night I gave up — completely."

In regard to the activities of his unit he was brief. "Our main objective was to blow up bridges, rails and in general, disrupt transportation and communication lines in our particular area. During the time I was there we averaged twenty-eight breaks (in railroad tracks) each night and I feel that our system was effective, for during the whole time there I didn't see a single train."

"Our system of cutting telephone and telegraph lines was handed to us, rather than being arranged through any efforts of our own. Two men asked to help with our work, and after further questioning it came out that they were line repairmen for that district. They suggested the system whereby one man cut lines one day and repair them the next day. On development it proved better than average, for they often forgot to repair some of their own cuts. I think it's safe to say that the communications were "breached" in that area."

Lt Burton told of several operations in which his unit took part: The stealing of ten thousand pounds of butter from a convoy; laying tacks
along five miles of highway over which an enemy convoy was scheduled to pass. (The convoy was held up ten days); The surrender of 12,000 troops to the 83rd Division was, in part, due to the "attention" they received from Lt. Burton's band. The other occasions are much too numerous to mention.

Most of us left with a very envious glance at Lt. Burton, not for his having returned safely, rather for his having been in on the more interesting phases of "Carpetbagger" operations.

* * *
CONTRIBUTIONS

One of the most remarkable aspects of the Group's work was the confirmations received from agents in the field. These confirmations were received in the shortest possible time, often in ten days or less, and they testified to the growing efficiency of the work. Confirmations served two purposes: not only did they indicate whether or not the particular mission had succeeded in "delivering the goods" to the right people, but they served as an authoritative key to local conditions and the activities of the enemy in a given area.

There was always intense drama intrinsic in the briefly-worded, almost brusque messages. On 15 January 1944, in reference to Lt Stapel's mission of 6/7 January, the following message came through: "We have received an explanation from the field for the non-reception of these operations. The Gestapo occupied the grounds following a denunciation by a member of the secret army." In these few words, the whole story was told: that all the painstaking work of the American crew, and all the courage and sacrifice of the French patriots, had been frustrated by the defection of one treacherous man.

But in spite of this disappointment, and in spite of all the other things that went wrong - "Receiving set broke down just as the B.B.C. messages were due, and these messages were consequently not received and the committee were not advised of this operation" (Capt., then Lt Hygstad, 4/5 Jan 44); "The field reports that the lack of reception was due..."
to German patrols on both these grounds" (Capts., then Lts., Rudolph and Schreiner, 4/5 Jan 44); "Reception was not out that night owing to Gestapo activity" (Lt McKee, 8/9 Feb 44); "Most of the material was taken by the Germans" (Lt Pipkin, Lt Harrison and Capt. Rudolph, 4/5 Jan 44); "No parachutes opened and consignment was practically totally destroyed. Nobody was hurt, and they hope to be able to obliterate all traces and save the remains" (Lt McKenny, 14/15 March 44) -- in spite of all these set-backs, and ever-increasing number of missions were confirmed as full successes - the material delivered was well on its way to doing the most harm to the Nazi and the most good for the United Nations.

Received 15 February 1944, Lt. Grice's mission of 8/9 February and Lt. Fitzpatrick's mission of 10/11 February.

a. The field reports the reception of 12 containers and 5 packages; b. The field reports the arrival of 12 containers and 4 packages.

Captain Land's mission of 4/5 February and Lt. Harrison's mission of 8/9 February, in a message dated 25 February, was declared unsuccessful, but a later message, dated 6 March, corrected the previous message and announced the success of the operation. A message of 10 March confirmed that Lt. McKee's load was received by the ground reception on 2/3 March. On Lt. Welcott's mission of 2/3 March, the pilot reported bad weather which made identification difficult, but the field announced, on 10 March, that the operation was nevertheless successful.
On the 6/7 March, for the first time in the Group's history, personnel was carried as part of the load. Col. Heflin was captain of the aircraft. On 9 March, confirmation was received that the two agents had arrived safely, as well as all the material.

Received 11 March, re Lt. McDonald's mission of 29/1 March: "The field reports that 12 containers and six packages have been received on this operation."

A message received on the 24th of March confirmed the success of three missions - Lt. Kelly's and Lt. Cassidy's of 5/6 March and Lt. Hock's of 6/7 March. The 18th of March had already brought confirmation of the success of two operations carried out on the 6/7 March by Lt. Fitzpatrick and Lt. Hock, respectively. This confirmation also congratulated the pilots for taking "wonderful drops from a very low altitude. All the material was successfully recovered in spite of a violent wind."

Received 20 March, re Lt. Van Zyl's and Lt. Lucey's missions of 6/7 March: "The field have acknowledged the receipt of 24 containers and 7 packages on this ground. This is five packages short of the number dropped."

On 2/5 March, Lt. McDonald and his crew and ship failed to return from a mission. The missing men's friends in the Group, in the midst of their grief at the loss of their comrades, derived the utmost satisfaction from the field message received on 9 March, which reported the receipt of 9 containers and three packages on this operation. Whatever had befallen Lt. McDonald, he had gloriously advanced the
cause of the French people against the Nazi aggressor, and thus the cause of the free people of the world.

A similar equal can be added to Captain Magstad's mission of 3/4 March, from which he and his crew failed to return. A message, dated 16 March, read: "The aircraft on this operation went missing, but a signal has been received from the field confirming the success of the operation."

The human element was inescapable in these confirmations since they involved people, ordinary people, engaged in what was probably the most hazardous jobs of the war - the work of the underground in territory occupied by the enemy. Sometimes a humorous note would creep in, because freedom-loving people keep their sense of humor, even in the gravest circumstances. On their return flights, the crews dropped leaflets which kept the French people informed of the progress of the war and acted as camouflage for the real purpose of the mission. On 17 February 1944, a rather amusing message was received from one of the field agents: "Please brief the crews where to drop leaflets. On Saturday they were dropped in the fields far from houses, with the result that I was among those requisitioned by the Gendarmes to pick up the tracks on Sunday afternoon. I am now suffering from backache. This is not my idea of a picnic."

Then again, a note of inspiration could be found in this message from another agent (30 March): "I visited the Léquis last week and was much impressed to be made to inspect first-class disciplined men with a wonderful morale."
by their Chief, a commander, and his Second. During the
march past, it was heartbreaking to see such a splendid
body of men dressed in shabby clothes and worn-out boots,
same with their toes out. I then made a speech which was
covered with Hurrahs for our two countries. L'entente
cordiale does exist there."

* * *

(complete file of Confirmations will be found as
an appendix to this history.)
HEADQUARTERS
Army Air Force Station 179

STATISTICAL REPORT OF TOTAL OPERATIONS IN CARPETBAGGER PROJECT JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER

TOTALS
2514 SORTIES ATTEMPTED.
1774 SORTIES SUCCESSFUL (70%)
415 MEN DROPPED.
20,562 CONTAINERS DROPPED. (3,408.6 TONS)
10,750 PACKAGES DROPPED
18 A/C LOST.

TOTALS BY COUNTRIES

FRANCE
2297 SORTIES ATTEMPTED.
1857 SORTIES SUCCESSFUL.
377 MEN DROPPED.
19,194 CONTAINERS DROPPED.
10,249 PACKAGES DROPPED.
13 A/C LOST.

BELGIUM
185 SORTIES ATTEMPTED.
102 SORTIES SUCCESSFUL.
36 MEN DROPPED.
1192 CONTAINERS DROPPED.
460 PACKAGES DROPPED.
4 A/C LOST.

NORWAY
8 SORTIES ATTEMPTED.
6 SORTIES SUCCESSFUL.
72 CONTAINERS DROPPED.
15 PACKAGES DROPPED.

DENMARK
24 SORTIES ATTEMPTED.
9 SORTIES SUCCESSFUL.
104 CONTAINERS DROPPED.
1 A/C LOST.

THE ABOVE FIGURES WERE COMPILED BY THE STATISTICAL SECTION OF O.S.S. IN LONDON.
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Following is a breakdown of awards made to Officers and Enlisted Men of the Squadrons engaged in Carpetbagger Operations, from January to 12 September 1944.

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<th>Air Medal</th>
<th>Oak Leaf Cluster to Air Medal</th>
<th>Distinguished Purple Heart</th>
<th>Silver Star</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>474</td>
<td>121</td>
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<td>307</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>547</td>
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<td>449</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>804</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2837</strong></td>
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</table>

The Group also received two campaign awards: Air Offensive-Europe and Air Offensive-Normandy; and the Presidential citation — Battle Honors.
The gymnasium was gradually taking on an American atmosphere with baskets and boxing guards having been constructed. Boxing equipment and general working-out facilities, consisting of weights, medicine balls, punching bags and wrestling mats, were made available.

Musical instruments had been obtained, and a base dance band was formed. Since that time this unit has played for numerous dances and entertainments on and off the station, including several British Charities.

The station library was organized and originally established in the Chaplains' Office in the gymnasium building. In spite of its smallness the library proved popular and as soon as the Aero Club was established, the library was moved into the Club building where a more appropriate atmosphere could be enjoyed. Books have been added whenever they could be secured.

From an educational standpoint numerous facilities were gradually made available, including British University and Armed Forces Institute courses. French and German classes were held three nights per week on the base, and the construction of an orientation center was begun which was intended to be an outlet for war information and fronts, and any other orientation material available from time to time. This department has seen a considerable expansion until at present there are large scale maps of all theaters and fronts giving the latest available status of the warring nations, plus ever-changing displays of poster material, and photographs of all descriptions.
About 1 July 1944 an entertainment feature known as Cabaret Night was inaugurated in the snack bar of the Aero Club. This item is presented every Thursday night and endeavors to create an atmosphere found in a typical night club, with dancing and floor show.

In respect to organized athletics, considerable activity has originated through this department. The Station baseball team broke even in the Composite Command baseball tournament, winning three games and losing three, but went into the Northampton Red Cross tournament and walked off with first place, bringing home our first silver cup, and individual medals and certificates for each member of the team. For the season, the Station team won twelve games and lost eight.

Softball provided more mass participation. A station league consisting of eight teams competed for the privilege of representing the base in the Composite Command Tournament. The "Liberators" led the league and went on to win the sectional elimination. The finals were played on this station but first place went to Station 102 after a hotly contested battle. At present the "Liberators" are in the finals of the Northampton Red Cross Tournament and the game is scheduled to be played soon.

A track team represented the station in a meet at Desborough. It took first place in high jump and broad jump, and second place in the 220 yard and 440 yard dashes. The tug-of-war team also defeated all its competition. This tug-of-war team later participated in the Rothwell Field Day and again were undefeated.
This station had one representative on the Composite Command swimming team which competed in the 8th Air Force swimming carnival. Sgt Scherberle won the 50 yard backstroke and as a member of the medley team helped place second and third in two contests. In all, Sgt. Scherberle came away with three medals for the day.

There has already been an completed basketball league of eight teams, and the regular season is just starting. The prospects of an outstanding base team are excellent.

A very interesting tennis match between world famous Frank Shields and Charles Hare was held for the Station personnel during the month of August.

Billy Conn will give a boxing exhibition on this station on the 27th of September 1944. As an added feature, several local boxers will meet some of the troupe in short bouts.
NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS

Throughout the life of the Carpetbagger Project, items appeared in various newspapers and periodicals which testified to the growing success of the work. Samples of such items are reproduced on the following pages.

* * *
WITH the new day brought a sense of drudgery to most of the population. The enemy's advance, which had been halted by the resistance fighters, was now in full swing. The occupation forces were now in control of the country, and the resistance fighters were forced to retreat.

**Norway Front**

In the northern part of Norway, the resistance fighters continued their fight against the invaders. The Norwegian people had shown remarkable resilience and determination in their fight for freedom. The German occupation forces were met with fierce resistance, and the Norwegians refused to give up their hard-fought struggle.

**Simón Harcourt-Smith**

Usefully near the coast, the task of escaping out rear is very simple. Only in the hills and forests of the Ardennes can we count upon serious resistance; in the Flanders and Belgium resistance which would carry us to the Rhine and then to the east of Germany. The situation in Belgium is critical, and it is possible that the Germans may attempt to break through there.

**Our Hope**

The crusade of resistance and the seat of our main hopes is the French Command. Hitler's dispositions of his forces in November 1944, the transportation of Frenchmen, the destruction of our forces, etc., have brought the people into the war again.

**Monstrous**

Some elements among the Allies, totally wedded to a pre-war political system, determine their strategy by the degree of suffering they require for the economic consequences which they advocate, a convenient country after the war. To secure the victory, to establish a new order, is a warning to us.

By the use of mass media, the enemy's propaganda is spread to all corners of the world. It is a battle for the minds of people.
ARM THE PATRIOTS:
LONDON'S RADIO
PLEA TO FRENCH

AN appeal for help issued by the chief of the French Maquis (patriot forces) in Haute Savoie was broadcast to France by the B.B.C. all day yesterday. The first call went out at 6.30 a.m.

These were the four main points of the appeal:
1. Men who have arms hidden in their homes are asked immediately to join their comrades in the Maquis.
2. Workers are urged to strike.
3. Without taking undue risks, but also without hesitation to take useful ones, all patriots should sabotage railways, roads and factories useful to the enemy.
4. Everyone should carefully note the names and descriptions of the Germans who are leading the Vichy police.

"These men should know that they are the hostages of France," the broadcast said.

MORE FRENCH SABOTAGE

Railway line in a curve near Amiens, in Nord Department of France, has been blown up by saboteurs, according to Vichy radio.

7 FEB 14
PATRIOTS IN FRANCE HAVE NEW STATUS

By a Special Correspondent

WHEN M. d'Autier, the French National Committee's "Home Secretary," announced, last week, that the FFI, the French National Committee, has now a status and title that of the FFI, "Forces Francaises de la Liberation," De Gaulle's Fighting French, is the first step towards securing full belligerent status for the "Maquisards" on the side of the Allied invasion.

When De Gaulle's first airmen and sailors engaged the enemy in the autumn of 1940, the Germans used to blackball him by announcing that they would treat as rebels or fascists and shot out of hand.

Allied counter-threats had an immediate military effect and, since then, a number of Gaullists captured on various fronts have been treated as prisoners of war on the same footing as other regular Allied forces.

MAJOR POINT

In the same way the FFI, Forces Francaises de la Liberation, is now a status with full-time soldiers entitled to full belligerent status. The Germans made first threats against France's Home Guard in 1940 and started the war. But, in the case of the Maquis, most of the French partisans are already full-time soldiers in every sense of the word since they take to the mountains to avoid working for Germany.

One of the main dangers to the Maquisards is that they will be captured by the Germans and other Vichy chiefs who lead to emulate Franco's example by treating their opponents as rebels to avoid trial.

"R.A.F. DROPS ARMS"

PARACHUTE containers with tommy-guns, revolvers and ammunition are being dropped by the British to the French patriots—according to Philip Henriot, Vichy Minister of Information. Henriot, quoted by Vichy radio last night, said:

Fourteen parachutes with metal boxes containing arms and explosives were dropped in the Bordeaux Department on February 4.

On February 23, 16 boxes were parachuted at Larelle containing 85 tommy-guns, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, 25 revolvers, and explosives.

Another 124 arm containers with ammunition, 578 grenades, 3,000 packets of dynamite, 25 Colt revolvers and 32 Mausers were dropped in the Var Department yesterday. 41 metal containers were dropped in the Aisne Department.

At another place today 18 boxes of tommy-guns, ammunition and explosives were dropped.

SECRET AIRMEN

EXPLORATIONS OF men in Britain's Special Air Service, whose work is a close secret, will make amazing reading after the war.

It was stated yesterday that the day-by-day history of the Service will be published after the war.

Sgt. Fred White, D.C.M., of Carrisdale-avenue, Erith, said members of the Service, are all "specialists.

"I have been dropped by parachute several times, but we are not a section of the para troops," he added.

The author is the medical officer of the Service, stated to be a well-known Liverpool doctor.

France Arms in Secret Says German

GEORGE SCHROEDER, a correspondent of the German Overseas News Agency, came to the microphone in Berlin last night to make astonishing disclosures of how the "hidden arms" of France are being armed.

"Somewhere in France," said Schroeder, "there is a secret dumping ground covered with this armament."

"From England comes automatic pistols, very simple in design and easy to handle—product made specially for terrorists."
The war in the maquis goes on. It is one of the most extraordinary episodes in the story of the rising of Europe's patriots against the German oppressors. Already the maquisards are pinning down many German divisions urgently required elsewhere, and they are actively preparing to play a still more vigorous part when the Allied armies land in France.

The movement took organized form when Laval, at Saucelot's bidding, called up young Frenchmen for forced labour in German war factories. The call-up was designed to serve a double purpose. It was hoped to reinforce German manpower at a time when it was strained to the utmost. There was also the need to get as many as possible of the young men out of France so that they should not be available when the invasion came. Neither purpose has been achieved. When the men of the younger age groups received their calling-up papers the great majority of them packed a few simple things in a suitcase, bade goodbye to their families and homes, and set off not for the German assembly points but for the maquis.

The choice of the expressive name of maquis was happy in its popular and romantic appeal. Maquis belongs originally to the south, a bare 100 miles from the shore of the mainland where the term has now been transformed and, indeed, transfigured. Prendre le maquis was the phrase used to describe the outlaw who took to the scrub of Napoleon's island. In the French maquis today, there are, it is true, a few criminal gangs whose interest is in loot and not in resistance. They add one more to the many difficulties of the organized maquisards, who have to round them up because of the discredit they might bring on the patriotic movement and because of the help they might give to the enemy as informers and agents provocateurs. The maquis country is usually thought of as confined to Haute-Savoie. It is in fact much more extensive. One area embraces all the French Alps and all of the Jura; another stretches from Châlons-sur-Saône down to Toulouse, from Lyons to Limoges; there is a third in the Pyrenees. In Brittany, where the resistance movement claims the support of 97 percent of the people, the maquis is of a different type. From theounces little-guerrillas; there the German and ward are of the closest.

GERMAN SAVAGERY

Wherever there are far-reaching forests and mountains there is the maquis: for that is the terrain which lends itself best to the kind of warfare—ambushes, sorties, forays—which is being carried on. Many parts of the maquis are remote; communications few. The facilities for evasion and concealment are correspondingly many. Bands of maquisards disappear into the blue when the approach of the enemy is signalled. The Germans have found to their cost that their "little war," as the campaign has been called, is full of hidden dangers and sudden reverses.

These geographical advantages have their drawbacks for the patriots. The conditions are hard and hazardous. Living in the winter in barns and roughly constructed shacks has been the stiffest test of both spirit and stamina. Supplies of food, fuel, clothes, and arms have to be maintained. It is probably not too much to say that the fight would have gone hardly with the maquisards if they had not had the constant and courageous cooperation of the local inhabitants. Farmers provide them with bread, butter, and other foods. Wives mend their clothes and do their washing. Shepherds watch roads and paths for signs of the enemy. Many a farmstead has been razed to the ground because the household was suspected of helping the patriots; in the Ain Department, for example, the Germans destroyed 400 farms as a reprisal. Many a peasant has paid with his life for the food he has provided. A painful aspect of the story is the increasing savagery to which the Germans are resorting in their attempts to check the uprising. The taking of hostages is common. In one place at least public hangings were staged as a deterrent, but the only effect was to deepen the hatred. It is related as showing the spirit of the civilians that in Limousin a peasant took a civi. 50th of butter, and boards for making huts to a band of patriots, and went where he was asked to take payment for his gift.

The maquisards include representatives of all classes, the rich and the poor, the Communist and the bourgeois. The discipline is self-imposed and therefore the best kind. Some bands are commanded by officers of the so-called Army of the Armistice who went into hiding—many taking their arms with them—when the Germans marched into the old Free zone at the end of 1942 and ordered the demobilization of the armed forces. Hazeards and hardships shared in common have bred a spirit of solidarity among the men of the maquis which may well outlast the war and in which some observers see a good augury for France. This is only one branch of the National resistance movement. It may be said that almost every town and every village in France has its group of resisters, who organize the wrecking of bridges, railways, and power stations, the derailing of German troop and munitions trains, and the shooting or bombing of German soldiers in the streets and cafes or in more isolated posts. Vichy and Berlin lump the resisters, whether in the towns or in the maquis, as "terrorists" or "Communists." Neither description is true. This was shown last year when the German occupation authorities, alarmed by the nation-wide growth of the movement directed at their overthrow and apprehensive about the second front, demanded that the so-called Vichy Government should undertake the most ruthless steps to suppress the spreading terrorism. It was hoped that the necessary agreement would be found in Joseph Darnand, who was invested last year with the widest powers to maintain law and order.

MEN OF THE MAQUIS
DARNAND'S METHODS

Darnand, who has been aptly called the Himmler of France, set to work with a will. Apart from the increased J'shooting of his opponents, he organized large-scale operations against the maquis of Haute-Savoie. They were carefully represented as an action by Frenchmen against outlaws. Laval's Milici—modelled on Himmler's own S.S.—and security police were in the forefront of the offensive. Always, however, the forces of the Wehrmacht were in the background. The results to date have been disappointing to the enemy. Some of the French forces proved 'untrustworthy': they had no heart for the job of mopping up their own countrymen. Many bloody clashes have taken place. The Germans have been at pains to proclaim that their own troops have not been involved; every neutral and independent report contradicts them. Thousands of German wounded are in hospitals in and near the scenes of the fighting—Evian, Thonon, and elsewhere. Hundreds lie dead in the maquis. Paincre ou Mourir is the motto of the eager and valiant young men who are waging the French war within the war. Their casualty lists attest supreme fidelity to the cause of France.

Darnand has just made his first report on the operations in Haute-Savoie, in which he claims to have "cleaned up" the department. The curfew has been "humanely" put back an hour. But the concession is "subject to repeal." Now, Darnand boasts, he is going to "clean up" the departments of Dordogne, Corrèze, Haute-Vienne, and Creuse. Dordogne has already been declared a forbidden zone.

Often enough the maquisards have had to fight against heavy odds. Photographs of them taken on the spot and smuggled to this country showed that many were ill-clothed, ill-shod, and ill-equipped. Weapons were not enough to go round, so that they shared the use of firearms for training and in action. By contrast their ardently faces were a moving testimony of invincible valour. Today, according to the latest reports reaching London, the situation is better. Arms are reaching the maquis in growing volume—how is for the Germans to find out, although Vichy assures that they are dropped by parachute from British aircraft. They are being used already for the weakening of the enemy; soon they may help in his final overthrow.
The Maquis: Allies in Hiding

Another fellow claimed in, "The Vichy people have tried to paint us as a bunch of robbers. The peasants know better.

"What about the Boches? Have they ever tried to catch you up here?" asked Paul, the youngest of the messengers. He tried to sound tough and unconcerned.

"German?" The man who answered was much older than the rest of the group, forty or fifty perhaps. His furrowed face, his thin mustache, the quiet gray glow of his eyes, the stiff way he carried his head, betrayed his identity. He was a lieutenant of the demobilized Army of the Armistice—the army the Germans had allowed to number 100,000 in June, 1940, "to protect France's colonies," and which had been dissolved by them on Nov. 13, 1942, after the Allied landings in North Africa.

"The Germans," he repeated, and his voice was stern. "They would not dare come up here. First they would have to get past us. This is difficult going, as you may have discovered for yourselves. And even if they did attempt the climb we would be here to greet them." He pointed to the gun rack at the very entrance of the dug-out. The guns were shaky, loaded, and, unlike the men, had seen too much. They were all over the world—from Germany, via disposed-of Germans, from Great Britain via parachutists, from France herself.

"Just let them come," continued the lieutenant. "We know every stone and tree in this mountain. Let them just come!"

He laughed and suddenly looked much younger. "We're really big boys. We've learned so much!"

"The times come to do so." They were all thinking of the minute when through their primitive radio equipment they would hear the news of the invasion. Every one of them had learned what to do and what not to do. One of them had his own job outlined and clear in his mind: a bridge across the valley, the route Nationale XX, the telephoned orders from Thomas, the power station in the mountains, a large gared railroad track... They knew what to do about every one of these. They were not frightened, they were impatient.

On the wall the heavy letters of a small notice stood out black and urgent: "The day of the landings, prepare for the ultimate combat. The French will try to stop the Germans from fighting for the liberation of their country. German soldiers are ready: men between 18 and 40 years of age will be ordered to concentration camps. Machines guns will be taken over. Frenchmen who have come to fill national duties, do not obey the orders of the enemy. You are on your own, citizens. Your life is at stake. Arm yourself."

The food,解释道, was cooked, peacing bowls of steaming gray, "is given to all, by that peasant. Not really giving, he buy it from them, but they could rather sell it to us at cost than to get a lot of money from the cowards."
All Factions Fused in France's Resistance Army

I Meet Some of the Quiet Heroes Who Know It from the Inside

From VIRGINIA COWLES,
Daily Telegraph Special Correspondent

ALOIZIUS, Tuesday,

The men of France are not men without medals. Although their clothes are shabby and their shoes unpolished, their deeds are as daring and romantic as those for the Scarlet Pimpernel of another age, and will one day become a proud legend.

For years on end they have lived a hidden-underground life. Without a name, without a face, these men in the French Assembly, these men in Paris, these men in the provinces, were only the symbols of a far greater power than they themselves represented. They were the messengers of a movement whose purpose was to bring France's liberty back to her treasure-house of the past.

A minute ago, you had a hint of the underground. Perhaps you were there yourself, among those who are now to be called the sons of the land and the fathers of the future. You had a glimpse of the smile that is on the face of France, of the joy that is in her heart.

But you did not see the man who was the heart and soul of the underground. You did not see the man who was the backbone of the resistance. You did not see the man who was the leader of the movement. You did not see the man who was the hero of the hour.

The man who was the hero of the hour was a small man, a shy man, a man who did not speak much. But when he spoke, his words were music to the ears of those who heard him. His voice was a voice of inspiration, a voice of hope, a voice of courage.

He was a man who knew no fear. He was a man who would not be defeated. He was a man who would not be crushed. He was a man who would not be silenced.

And so he spoke, and people listened. They listened to him because they knew that he was a man of wisdom, a man of courage, a man of love.

And then, as the man spoke, the sun shone down upon his face, and the world was at peace.

Dying "Without Dignity"

I asked the man if he was afraid. He smiled. He was not afraid. He was prepared to die, and he was prepared to die with dignity.

The man was a hero, a Saint, a man who was greater than life itself.

Underground Ministries

The organization of the underground was not easy. It was a task of enormous magnitude, and it was a task that had to be done with care and precision.

The organization was divided into three sections: the political, the military, and the administrative. Each section had its own leaders, its own goals, and its own methods.

The political section was the most important. It was the section that was responsible for the spread of the underground movement throughout the country. It was the section that was responsible for the training of new leaders, for the distribution of literature, for the establishment of centers.

The military section was the section that was responsible for the protection of the underground workers. It was the section that was responsible for the provision of arms, for the organization of defense, for the preparation of plans.

The administrative section was the section that was responsible for the organization of the underground as a whole. It was the section that was responsible for the coordination of the work of the other sections, for the provision of support, for the distribution of propaganda.

The underground was a movement of the people, it was a movement of the masses. It was a movement that was strong, it was a movement that was inevitable.

It was a movement that was going to be victorious.
The Magus: Allies in Hiding

There are certain young freedom, 20,000 strong,

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The power of the Field, the Field of Power,
FILM OF SAVOY GUERILLA ARMY SMUGGLED OUT OF FRANCE

By VICTOR SCHIFF

HIGH-UP in the snow-covered French Alps, cameramen recently made one of the most remarkable records of the war—a film of the "Men of the Maquis," the French guerillas.

The film has been smuggled out of France to London. Soon it will be released for the general public.

It shows the routine life of the partisans before Darnand, the French S.S. leader, launched his main attack against them.

German-controlled Paris radio said last night that the guerillas are cut off and surrounded.

"Soon the Haute Savoie will be the first French Department to be freed from terrorism and this campaign will be waged in other provinces," a broadcast declared.

To Create Chaos

"It is clear," he added, "that the Allied High Command was aiming at creating chaos in France before the invasion.

As shown in the film record, the day of the "Army of the Maquis" begins with the traditional French military ceremony of saluting the flag.

The scene is a glade in a forest, where the partisans have established their camp.

The majority of the guerillas are in shabby civilian clothes and shiver in the cold, but some wear their former French uniforms.

They include an officer who, when unoccupied France was invaded, joined the patriot army with a military car.

Pride Of Camp

This is now the pride of the camp. Somehow the partisans get the petrol to keep their engines.

From the camp a number of guerillas are seen walking down to the next village with a wooden Lorraine Cross, the de Gaulleist emblem, which is laid at the foot of the local war memorial.

Now that mountain village may have been reconquered by the Vichy милитаризован, and some of the Partisan soldiers pictured in the film may have been killed.
American Pilot Helping French Fight Nazis Is Wounded, Seized

An American aviator brought down over France, who was being passed from one band of Maquis resisters to another on his way to freedom and who managed to elude pursuit of the Germans by a narrow margin, was captured by the French resistance forces. The report of his exploits was received in London from the French underground, which withheld the pilot's name.

The pilot was shot down in an ambush that left his Maquis comrades wounded. His plane was hit by a German machine gun, and he had to make a forced landing in the French countryside. The Maquis fighters, who were familiar with the terrain, were able to locate him and rescue him.

The report of his survival was a morale booster for the French resistance forces, who were fighting against the German occupation. The pilot's story was a testament to the bravery and resilience of the French resistance movement.

Aiding Patton

It is due in large measure to the contributions of American pilots and aircrews that General Patton has been able to leave part of the "infamous" 7th Army in Tunisia. The advance has been able to move with surprising speed.

They are a strange force, these American pilots and aircrews. While the British and French consider them part of the 2nd Trenching of the Germans, they have made the Americans aware that they are against the enemy.

Their equipment, is made up of aircraft ranging from Spitfires to P-51 Mustangs. They also have various types of bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes.

These aircraft come in various forms, some in small numbers, others in large formations. They are flown by American pilots and aircrews who have volunteered for service in the French resistance movement.

They have been instrumental in providing close air support to the French resistance forces, which have been fighting against the German occupation. Their presence has been vital in ensuring the success of many operations.

They BUDGE

A normal rule in the Maquis is that if a man is not doing anything useful, he is pushed out of the way. To shoot down these planes and to protect our lives, we have to protect our planes.

The Maquis are not alone in their struggle. They are joined by the French resistance movement, which includes fighters, free French units, and other resistance groups.

FRENCH PATRIOTARY ARMY STRIKES INCREASED SABOTAGE

A general reconnaissance No. 1 is not only on Supreme Headquarters and Allied Expeditionary Force, but on the 2nd Trenching of the Germans, as well as on the 1st Trenching of the Germans. The 2nd Trenching of the Germans, as well as on the 1st Trenching of the Germans, is the French resistance movement.

The FFI in France is the most organized of the French resistance groups, with thousands of fighters. They are fighting against the German occupation, and they have been instrumental in providing support to the Maquis.

A Promise of a New Era

A fresh wave of resistance has arrived in Maquis. The Maquis and the FFI are determined to fight against the Germans, and they are not alone in their struggle.

The FFI is in full control of the southern part of France. They have been instrumental in providing support to the Maquis, and they are fighting against the German occupation.

There is no Government in France, but there are French resistance groups that have been formed to fight against the German occupation.

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The FFI is in full control of the southern part of France. They have been instrumental in providing support to the Maquis, and they are fighting against the German occupation.
**Woman Beat Gestapo**

By VICTOR SCHIFF

**These** three played with death in Paris to outwit the Nazi... three typical of many who never give in.

1. **Madame Simon** is a woman doctor. When her husband was arrested by the French police, she had him handed over to the enemy. She was a Gestapo case, succeeded as a Gestapo agent, and persuaded the French to hand over her husband to her. He was captured again, and three rescue attempts failed. The fourth worked.

2. In the centre of a city the van in which he was being driven away for execution was attacked.

3. Four German soldiers were killed in the shootout—two in the street. Then, **Madame Simon**'s husband was freed from prison.

4. **Madame Fosset** is an old woman. She organized an offer for looting parties paper.

3 June 1944

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**Patriots Blow Up Electric Works**

**French** patriots blew up two electricity works at Baulic and Truyère, south of Septmes, early in February. Algers radio revealed that last night.

The works were so heavily damaged that work has stopped completely at Baulic and repairs will take a very long time. The Truyère works will not begin work again for at least a year, it is stated.

The patriots got past the guards at the Baulic works, penetrated into the main building, and blew up three transformers and other machinery.

Some time later patriots encircled the central electricity works at Truyère.

After all the workers had been shepherded to shelters, two lorries full of high explosives drew up in the factory yard.

When the patriots left one hour later large explosions shook the works.

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**CZECH PARTISANS**

**TRANSFORMING CARPATHIANS INTO GUERRILLA CAMP**

Czech mountain fighters have transformed the Western Carpathian slopes into a vast guerrilla camp, according to reports reaching Czech quarters in London. These mountains of Ruthenia, in the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia, are now the German armies at every possible opportunity.

They know that at the inner side of the snow-covered Carpathians, Czechoslovakia's First Czech Brigade are in the van of Marshal Zhukov's army at the entrance to the Tatra Pass.

Moreover, the capital of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and Mukacevo on the other side, have been converted into German fortresses. Only German troops are allowed to enter them.

The Czechoslovak partisans are now using a secret apparatus from London on how to sabotage the German communications. Several different types of electricians and blowing up trains, and methods for the manufacture of special apparatus, have been discovered.

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**French Police Arrest 500**

The French police have arrested 500 people for "anti-national activities" in the last four days, including a Paris radio last night.

Seven foreign "Communist" leaders were among those arrested, added.
MORE ARMS SENT BY AIR TO MAQUIS

Allied planes recently succeeded in dropping large quantities of arms for Maquis fighters, in the Haute Savoie district of France, where violent fighting has again broken out, according to two Swiss papers, the "Journal de Genève" and "La Suisse" (quoted by Reuters).

British planes dropping arms to French patriots, says Vichy

PARACHUTE containers with tommy-guns, revolvers and ammunition are being dropped by the British to arm French patriots, according to Philippe Henriot, Vichy Minister of Information and Propaganda. Broadcasting last night on Vichy radio, he said: "Fourteen parachutes with metal boxes containing arms and explosives were dropped in the Dordogne Department on the night of February 4.

A wireless set arrived by parachute on February 8, with instructions in English. On February 11, 18 boxes were parachuted at Lavelle, containing 85 tommy-guns, 2,400 rounds of ammunition, 25 revolvers and explosives.

578 GRENADES

"On the same day, another 124 tommy-guns with ammunition, 570 grenades, 2,000 packets of dynamite, 20 Colt revolvers and 32 Mausers were dropped in the Var Department.

"Yesterday 41 metal containers, whose contents have not yet been examined, were dropped in the Allier Department today, only a few hours ago, over 100 tommy-guns and a quantity of ammunition was dropped in the same place.

"Another place today, 18 steel boxes containing tommy-guns, ammunition and explosives were dropped." (Reuters)

15 Feb/44

500 PARTISANS MASSACRED

FRENCH "BATTLE" ZURICH, Tuesday.

The "biggest battle yet" between French patriots and Germans occurred recently when about 1,500 partisans were attacked in the Ain Department, Southern France, according to frontier reports.

The partisans raided a German field camp, killing and wound a large number with small arms to themselves. The Germans lost more than half their strength. Reinforced by the Vichy armed forces, mobile and strong artillery, the Germans surrounded about 500 partisans. Although the partisans sent several requests to the Germans, continued firing until all the 500 were massed,—Reuters.

SABOTAGE BEATS RAIDS, FRENCH ARE REMINDED

Algiers radio, appealing yesterday to the people of France to develop sabotage "to the utmost ruthlessness," cited these advantages over air bombing:

1. Sabotage is more precise and accurate.
2. It causes less harm to civilian populations and property.
3. It is less expensive than the smallest air raid which costs atomic sums in money and life.

NAZIS USE TANKS AGAINST MAQUIS

First-hand reports reaching Switzerland from Haute Savoie yesterday say the Germans are using tanks and flamethrowers in continued ruthless attacks against the Maquis and the local population.

They are concentrating all their efforts on isolating Haute Savoie from the Italian Maquis as several hundred French partisans out of a group of 500 escaped there. The "Journal de Genève" reports: "Under the pretext that young refractori had sheltered there, the village of Cahinho was burned to the ground, only four houses being left standing.

Before the population had evacuated," the report continues, "Germans opened fire from the station on the village of Ardon."

In addition, the Germans consumed food and captured.

BATTLE AT FRENCH-FARM

Parist radio reports gay-cold battle between French-occupied police and "terrorists" armed with machine guns and grenades had in a French farm. Claimed six partisans captured.

9 Feb/44

54
MAQUIS WERE SUPPLIED BY ALLIED PLANES

PARACHUTES DROP GUNS

Thousands of tons of arms, ammunition and other supplies have been dropped by parachutes and planes of the United States Exhibit Air Force to the French Forces of the Interior who are now playing a vital and conspicuous part in the liberation of France.

Supplies have been pouring into the Maquis, and it is estimated that at least 50,000 resistance fighters are receiving supplies from Allied planes.

Plane Convoys Supply Them

THOUSANDS of tons of arms, ammunition and other supplies have been dropped by parachute to the Maquis by the United States Exhibit Air Force.

In the past week alone, supplies dropped over 10,000 Maquis fighters have been equipped with fresh arms and ammunition.

MAQUIS OVERRUN A THIRD OF FRANCE

ALGERS, Sunday. — The French Forces of the Interior now cover nearly a third of France, says a communiqué from French HQ.

It says that since the Armistice, the Maquis forces have cleared out many places where the Germans were still strong. The Maquis forces have captured many prisoners and have destroyed much German equipment.

30,000 in Paris

Two American officers have been sent to Paris to help the Allies, which aims to join up with the Allied armies.

A Maquis officer brought news that at least 30,000 resistance fighters are inside Paris and are already in the fight.

Hundreds in Paris have been arrested and deported to new concentration camps in Alsace Lorraine.
MAQUIS GET ORDERS BY RADIO

Code Messages Tell When to Strike

BY GUY RAMSEY

In a secret headquarters in London yesterday the High Command of the Maquis sent orders and received reports from the French Forces in the Interior all over France.

Yes—even when General Koenig, the captain of the "ghost army," is in France, the F.F.I. are commanded from London.

Orders to and reports from these groups are transmitted along well-prepared, well-timed, sure channels.

SHAEF'S FIRST MAQUIS COMMUNIQUE

The first communiqué from General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters telling of the activities of the French Underground Movement within Nazi-occupied territory was issued last night. At the same time an A.P. message stated that two French Armies of the Vichy Army had gone over to the French Resistance complete with arms and equipment.

According to the communiqué, the underground armistice in the German lines had undertaken a large plan of sabotage, which included in part the paralysis of rail and road traffic and the interruption of telegraph and telephone communications.

It said: "In the majority of cases these plans have been achieved. The destruction of railways has been accomplished, and a large number of bridges have been blown up at strategic points. On the roads, German trucks and lorries have been blocked and stopped at strategic points."

CHUTING OF SUPPLIES TO MAQUIS BY 8TH AF HEAVIES IS DISCLOSED

Eighth Air Force planes have dropped thousands of tons of supplies to the French Free Forces and other groups in the French Underground, who now are engaged in widespread operations against the Nazis.

Although the work of supplying the underground forces has been carried on by air for months, it was only recently that the dangers of the Germans discovered if the operations were not carried out with caution.

On several occasions, hundreds of Eighth Air Force planes have dropped supplies to Maquis forces deep in France. Most recently, last July, 142 planes dropped 200 tons of supplies.

The planes, which are continuing, have become extraordinary skill and courage. Flying under the constant threat of enemy flak and fighters, the pilots must have the skill to avoid the near points at which the F.F.I. are operating.

The supplies must be delivered so early that the German columns can be overflown at night.

The German Army has been engaged in continuous battle against the Maquis forces, using all available resources.

Ground control is made by radio and weather reports furnished by American Luftsperre aircraft which patrol the skies over Europe.

For the second straight day, a large German column, including armor and infantry, advanced through the Maquis lines, causing many of the Maquis to retreat. The planes have been dropping supplies and ammunition to the remaining forces, who are now fighting for their lives in the mountains of France."
Maquis Get ‘Manna From Heaven

Tons of Ammunition
And Guns ‘Chuted
Into France

By Major E. J. (Bud) Huber

All most of the sunny day 2:00
Clark H. Bonansegna, 30-year-old pilot
from Pinedale, Ohio, had pushed his
four-engine Fortress across nearly all of
France. It was a long flight, but neither
he nor his crew objected. Clark E. Smith
was the navigator, L. T. Mack L. Reed
was the bombardier, and Capt. Lowell J.
Jeffers was the radio officer, all of whom
were well aware of the mission.

The main mission of the Eighth Air
Force was the dropping of supplies to
freedom fighters in France.

Almost Shrove Tuesday

The overcast sky was the background for
the approach to the target, a field
behind a village. As the bombers
approached, the ground was covered in
snow and ice, making it difficult for
the crew to prepare the parachutes.

The bombs were released, and the
chutes opened, carrying the tons of
ammunition and weapons to the
Maquis fighters.

Children All Lined Up

On the ground, the children were
lined up to receive the supplies. They
stood in the cold, waiting for the
parachutes to open and for the
ammunition to be handed out.

The Maquis fighters were
overjoyed to receive the supplies,
which included weapons and
ammunition.

Then the Maquis get brave. "If we
want France to live, we must fight the
Germans."
NIGHT SEARCH IN BRUSSELS

BELGIUM tidily, setting on
marching steps to the
airing but strong at Brussels
for fear of disorder.

The Germans are Singh

MAQUIS USE GERMAN TRANSPORT

SOLDIERS IN THE MAQUIS

French troops of the Resistance
use arms dropped in
French territory by
British paratroopers. They
are now active in
the Maquis, who
were imported from
the German
squadron.
LONDON.
7th January, 1944.

LTMF/845

Dear Heflin

I was delighted to hear of the success of your Liberators during the last few nights. I consider it a splendid achievement to have got your Organisation going and produced these early successes in so short a time.

My best wishes for the success of your Squadrons which I sincerely hope will keep up their excellent start.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Lieut-Colonel Clifford J. Heflin,
O/o Major J.W. Brooks.
HEADQUARTERS
AAF STATION 179

APO 639
11 May 1944

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: All Ground Personnel this Station

1. All ground personnel of the 801st Bombardment Group (H) (Prov) are cited for exceptionally meritorious achievement from the time of the Group's arrival at this station to the present. Faced with the task of setting up for operations in the shortest possible time, officers and enlisted men of all sections gave their best efforts, in a spirit of unselfish cooperation, to expedite a smoothly functioning organization. The Group's operational successes during this period are the result of the collective efforts of all the ground sections. Each man has borne his share of the work - whether it was maintaining the aircraft and equipment, or supplying the innumerable needs of the men engaged in the Group's activities. Without the constant, wholehearted support of all ground sections, the Group's record of achievement would not have been possible.

2. I wish personally to commend all of you for your contributions. With your continued cooperation, we will achieve still greater success in the future.

CLIFFORD J. HEYLIN
Lt. Colonel, A.G.
Commanding

RESTRICTED
Appealing to the services of several large corporations, a small number of personnel in the entertainment industry, and even the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was taken. Service members were taken everywhere the could be scored.

The next development was the establishment of an enlisted men's lounge in the barracks reserved for the future Aerie Club. Initially, the lounge facility was only intended as a stop in which WACs could establish its presence and begin to take off.

During this period, the Village was basically the core of construction for the Aerie Club. The entertainment portion of the Village was.

The Village was a vital part of the club, providing a centralized gathering place. In spite of difficulties initially, tours were conducted, apparently successfully. The Village included the surrounding area, the dining area, and various girls from the local community. Luncheon and dinner were served from that point onward, and the Village expanded.
FROM SAGGC
TO GO HAJ
RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS REPEATED FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL CONCERNED COLON
QUOTE THE OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES OF THE 801st PROV GROUP ARE TO BE HIGH-
LY COMMENDED PD IT IS MY DESIRE THAT THE GROUP STAFF, CMA, COMBAT CREW-
MEN, CMA AND MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL BE CONGRATULATED FOR THE OUTSTANDING
ACHIEVEMENTS BEING MADE BY THIS UNIT PD SGD SPAATZ PD UNQUOTE QUOTE IT
IS GRATIFYING TO FORWARD SUCH A MESSAGE PD PLEASE CONVEY IT TO THE
GROUP COMDR TOGETHER WITH MY OWN CONGRATULATIONS PD THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
OF THE 801st MERIT THE HIGHEST PRAISE PD SGD DOOLITTLE UNQUOTE QUOTE IT IS
WITH PLEASURE THAT I NOTE THIS COMMENDATION AND THE ADDITIONAL GRATIFY-
ING REMARK OF GENERAL DOOLITTLE PD PLEASE ADD MY HEARTIEST CONGRAT-
ULATIONS TO ALL CONCERNED PD END.

HILL
SPECIAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
Block II, Montagu Mansions,
Montagu Street,
LONDON, W.1.

24 Sep 44.

My Dear Fish,

In Colonel Heflin's absence I would like to thank you and all the Officers and men in your Group who have so excellently been carrying out Missions for us. I would like you to feel how much we appreciate the work you have done, and the many ways in which you have all gone out of your way to help us.

From the reports of those people who are now returning from their Missions in France in great numbers I hear nothing but praise for the way in which your operations were carried out.

May I offer you my best wishes in your new venture.

Sincerely,

Lt. Col. Robert W. Fisk,
Commanding Area 7,
Station 179.
1. A message just received from Marquis contains the following:

"Priere transmettre mes remerciements au Colonel Heflin et a son equipage." **

2. Would you kindly convey the above to Colonel Heflin.

* - Marquis - Code name of an agent.

** - "Please transmit my thanks to Colonel Heflin and to his outfit."
6 July 1944.

TO: Major John Thayer.

Our Training Officer, Major Cohen, tells me that the training exercise carried out Friday night, 30 June, was completely successful and of great value to our Agents. Will you kindly extend to Col. Heflin, Col. Fish and the others who were involved in this Operation our sincere thanks.

H. Harrison Proctor
Lieut. (jg) USNR.
Air Dispatch Officer, SI.

1st Ind.
Special Forces Headquarters, London. To: C.O., Area T, 7th July, 1944.
For your information.

John C. Thayer
Major, A.G.
Air Operations Section

United States
CONFIDENTIAL
Equals English CONFIDENTIAL
Milton Hall,
Mr. Peterborough.
2 March, '44.

Dear Mr. Peterborough,

This is to tell you how much we appreciate the hard work and the co-operation which you and your squadron put into the show last night.

What you were able to do for us was of very great value to our people and there is no doubt that, from our point of view, the job, with its unavoidable limitations, was very well worth doing.

Several of your guests of last night have told me that they would go anywhere with your fellows and I can assure you that they are not "shooting a line".

Yours sincerely,

Ronald S. Gilchrist

[Signature]
SPECIAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS

London, W.I.

EXTRACT

6 June 1944

TO: Commanding Officer, 801st Bomb Gp (Prov) Station 179
APO 639, U.S. Army.

THROUGH: Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
Commanding General, USSTAF
Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, Bomber Command.

1. This Headquarters, at the direction of SHAEF, placed a high priority on operations into the heavily defended areas of ****** and ****** during the last operational period. Without hesitancy you immediately diverted your efforts to the accomplishment of these particularly hazardous operations with unprecedented success.

2. It is my desire to express my appreciation and compliments to you and your flight and ground personnel for your courageous work, and the distinguished record you have built throughout the flying of ****** missions.

3. This Headquarters realizes the complexities of the daily coordination and cooperation you are required to maintain with both British and U.S. ground installations, the Royal Air Force and this Joint Headquarters. The great part you are playing in making the efficient operation of our total effort in support of ****** is of the highest value.

S/ Joseph F. Haskell
T/ JOSEPH F. HASKELL
Colonel, GSO

AG 330. 13-1 OCT – AGM

1st Ind.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, APO 757, 9 June 44

TO: Commanding Officer, 801st Bomb Group (Prov) Station 179
APO 639, U.S. Army.

THROUGH: Commanding General USSTAF
Commanding General Eighth Air Force, Bomber Command.

For the Supreme Commander:

S/ E. C. Boehnke
T/ E. C. BOEHNKE
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General
373.2 -  2nd Ind.  June 14, 1944
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633.

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, APO 634.

S/ J.B.G.
T/ J.B.G.

373.2 -  3rd Ind.
HQ., EIGHTH AIR FORCE, AAF STATION 101, APO 634, 19 June 1944.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Air Force Composite Command, APO 639.

The Commanding General desires to add his expression of appreciation for the splendid manner in which recent vitally important missions, involving great hazards, have been accomplished.

By command of Lieut. General DOOLITTLE:

S/ Edward E. Toro
T/ EDWARD E. TORO
Colonel, ACB
Adjutant General

373.2 -  4th Ind.  C-D-10
HEADQUARTERS, VIII AIR FORCE COMPOSITE COMMAND, AAF STATION 113, APO 639, 26 June 1944.

TO: Commanding Officer, Army Air Force Station 179, APO 639.

I take great pleasure in forwarding this letter of commendation, and desire that the contents thereof be made known to both air and ground personnel under your command by methods consistent with security regulations.

S/ Edmund W. Hill,
T/ EDMUND W. HILL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commanding

373.2 -  5th Ind.  A-1
HEADQUARTERS, AAF STATION 179, APO 639, U. S. ARMY 29 June 1944.

TO: All units, this Command.

In concurrence with the preceding endorsement it gives me the greatest pleasure to forward this commendation to you. I wish to take this opportunity to extend my heartiest congratulations to each officer and enlisted man under my command for their cooperation and devotion to duty in our past operations. With this close and harmonious unity our operations in the future will be even more successful.

S/ Clifford J. Hefflin,
T/ CLIFFORD J. HEFFLIN,
Colonel, Air Corps Commanding
Dear Colonel,

May I be permitted to express to you and all under your command at Harrington the warmest appreciation of the French Section for the magnificent work accomplished by crews from your Station during recent weeks. The record of successes of Harrington is really remarkable, and we have the highest possible admiration for the tenacity and perseverance of pilots in finding dropping points in difficult conditions.

I am glad to say that our men in the field have been doing excellent work in the last few days, and are all clamouring for more materials to go on doing it.

All your friends in the French Section (and that means all the officers in the Section) join me in congratulating you and all associated with you on the fine successes achieved.

Yours,

Maurice Luke

Colonel C. Heflin,
U.S.A.F.,
Harrington.